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ART. I.—IS IT POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN HELP FOR
DENOMINATIONAL SCHOOLS OUT OF THE
RATES?

1. *Report of the National Society.* (London: 1893.)
2. *Report of the Committee of Council on Education.* (London: 1892-3.)

THERE are such unmistakable signs of dissatisfaction with the working of the Education Act of 1870, as to render it more than probable that efforts will be made at no distant day to procure material alterations in it by Parliament. What these alterations may be it is not easy to forecast. There are those who would desire to remould it in such a way as to make it impossible for denominational schools to exist, whilst there are others, amongst whom we number ourselves, who earnestly desire to see such an alteration in its provisions as would secure the possibility of all Christian parents being able to obtain for their children a Christian education, which now they are not.

The secularist party desire a system of universal school boards; they feel, naturally enough, that the present denominational system is one eminently adapted to secure their purpose, and consequently their wish is to extend it, and so to sap effectually the religious portion of the educational system to which they are opposed. They are conscious that there are weak places in the board school system as it at present exists, which they would like to amend, and they would wish to utilize their efforts to improve it for the purpose of its indefinite extension. In this light we may read words spoken by the Vice-President of the Committee of Council on

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Education in recently moving the estimates. He is reported to have said :

‘If it were possible for one moment to set aside questions of religious instruction and of rates, I would say that what almost all persons who are interested in education feel is this—that we want, whether in town or country, better organization of our various schools. In the country districts the area of many a school board is much too contracted, and it would be better if we could merge many of these smaller boards into one board covering a larger area.’

This looks very much like a cautious feeler, and may be only a covert way of extending school boards ; and whilst we may agree with the Vice-President that the present organization of board schools is always very costly, and sometimes faulty, we should look with considerable suspicion on attempts at grouping, as they would probably be only a mask under which to hide some new plan for forcing school boards on reluctant parishes, of which we have seen more than enough lately. For in the event of one parish in the group over which the school board had authority having a board school, and a rate for its support, or even for the other expenses of the board, being levied over the whole group, it is obvious that the parishes not having a board school, and not being in any way advantaged by the school board, would feel themselves aggrieved ; and there would be a danger that some of the ratepayers in such parishes, not realizing the infinite importance of definite religious instruction, might be tempted to advocate a board school in their own parish, in order that a fair share of what they were compelled to pay might be spent in the place in which they were interested.

But our object is not to set forth what our opponents desire ; we have merely said what has been just written to show that they are not quite satisfied with things as they are, and that they would be glad to alter them in their own way. With the complaints and proposals of our friends we are more immediately concerned. These may be ranged under two heads—religious and financial.

To deal first with the more important. The limits placed by the Education Act of 1870 on the power of the electoral bodies to determine the character of the religious teaching to be given in the schools for which they have to find the funds, are such as seem designed to deceive both parties. It should have been evident from the beginning to those responsible for the defence of Church interests that the more honest of the two parties was certain to find itself taken in ; and that the result of the working of a scheme of religious teaching, which

by a plausible interpretation could be made palatable to those who believed such teaching to be all-important, and to others who were anxious to have the least possible amount of such teaching, could only prove delusive and a snare. And yet such a scheme was adopted with the consent of those in authority. The Cowper-Temple clause, to which we refer, was represented to the friends of religious teaching as only limiting such instruction in one particular manner, and they were sufficiently desirous to make things pleasant to believe the representation. It was represented to them that the teachers would be left perfectly free to teach all there is in the Catechism or any other religious formulary, only they must not teach the words themselves; the object was to get rid of formularies which might be regarded as party flags, but in no way to deprive the children of the spiritual teaching contained in them. It was asserted that all the Catechism taught could be supplied quite as effectually by the use of other and less controversial words, and that it might be so supplied by the teachers. If it had been said with respect to teaching arithmetic, 'We desire that all the children should learn it, but we strictly forbid you to allow them to learn the multiplication table,' the effect would have been practically the same with respect to the teaching of arithmetic, that the prohibition of a Catechism was to the teaching of religion. To the other side it was said, 'By excluding catechisms and formularies we lay down a principle that no distinctive religious teaching is to be given, and that it will be the duty of school boards to prohibit such teaching in the schools they provide.' It is unnecessary to say how completely this last interpretation of the clause has held possession of the field. It is held to cover not only the teaching given in the school, but also the religious profession of the teacher. By most school boards, notably by the London School Board, the members are forbidden to ask any questions concerning the religious belief of the applicants for employment in their schools, so that believers and unbelievers, Churchmen, Agnostics, Roman Catholics, and Baptists, or even Mahometans and Parsees, may be regarded as equally eligible to become the instructors of the children.

It is obvious that all persons who have any real belief in the Christian religion must regard such a state of things as most unfair to the children who attend the schools, and to their parents, who desire that they should be taught the rudimentary principles of Christianity. Some years since the Nonconformists were desirous to compel all Church schools

to accept a conscience clause. Their contention was a perfectly true one, that the responsibility rested upon the parents to determine the faith in which their children should be educated; the weak point of their case lay in this, that the Church schools had been provided at the cost of Church people for the instruction of the poor children of their own communion, and they were not bound to provide schools for persons of a different religion, more especially if they thought that by the admission of children who objected to the religious teaching of the school, the religious influence of the school would be lessened to those for whose benefit it had been erected. This is a bygone controversy, and we only mention it to show the inconsistency of the party, and in some cases of the persons, who did their uttermost to uphold the rights of the parents when the object was to assail Church schools, but who are now resolved to do what they can to ignore such rights and to place the responsibility of determining the faith or no faith in which a child shall be educated in the hands of the State.

For this is what is virtually being now done in all places where there are only board schools. The essential difference between them and most of the voluntary schools at the period just referred to is conveniently forgotten. Board schools have not been erected by persons approving any particular religious system, but by rates levied upon all. Under the present altered state of things the State compels the children to attend the schools; it punishes with fine or imprisonment the parents who neglect to send them; and then it lays down rules concerning the religious teaching to be given in the schools, which practically determine what that teaching shall be; and if the parents have any definite religious convictions that teaching must be most unsatisfactory to them. Under the old system all was voluntary; no one was compelled to provide schools; no parents were obliged to send their children to school. Politicians generally seem to entertain the idea that the only hardship with respect to religious teaching consists in having it taught at all, or in compelling children to learn what their parents disapprove; and that there is no hardship in forbidding them to be taught what their parents regard as essential for their well-being in this world and the next. So that, whilst they would look upon it as a kind of persecution and tyranny for the child of a Secularist or Nonconformist to learn the Church Catechism, they would see nothing wrong in the child of a Churchman having no religious teaching whatever, and being allowed to grow up in complete ignorance of the truths of

Christianity. It is obvious that the parents are for the most part unable to teach their children; whilst the short and scanty opportunities afforded by Sunday schools, as they are now arranged, can never be an effective substitute for religious teaching in day schools. It is not too much to say with respect to a very large percentage of children that they will receive no religious teaching at all if it is not given in the day school. Those who require it the most, from their parents being indifferent to religion or apathetic, would not attend Sunday school; whilst in more favoured cases the instruction would be very insufficient and incomplete. What, then, Churchmen have to contend for is, not only that children should not be obliged to receive religious instruction to which their parents object, but that they should have the opportunity of obtaining such teaching in religion as their parents desire. At present we have not religious liberty in rate-supported schools, because the second of these conditions is denied. The importance of insisting upon the parents' responsibility with respect to the religious training of their children is not only right and true in itself, but it is also far-reaching in what relates to their after life. If the State is to determine that which will do much to mould their characters, to make them honest and industrious, or to leave them without the motive to become such which religious people believe to be the only effectual instrument for the purpose, it is only fair that the State should also make itself responsible for feeding and clothing them, and for making all other provisions which may be necessary to secure their happiness and prosperity.

There is, then, an unquestionable grievance on the religious side with the present popular rendering we have of the words 'religious liberty.' These words are now construed to mean liberty to believe nothing, whilst they deny the liberty to teach the faith which Church-people and most persons holding a definite religious creed regard as requisite to secure obedience to the moral law as set forth in the Bible, and the happiness promised to those who believe and observe what is there commanded. But the present grievances do not stop here. Ever since the Education Act of 1870 became law, those who hold a definite faith to be essential for the well-being of all for whom the Lord of all things took our nature and died upon the cross, have felt it as an intolerable hardship that they should be compelled to pay rates for inculcating an undenominational religion, which they look upon as dishonouring to Jesus Christ and a mere sham and pretence to lead ignorant people to imagine that their children are taught

Christianity when they are not. They rightly feel that if the consciences of Quakers and others were respected, and the Church was deprived of Church rates by which the fabrics of her sacred buildings had been sustained from time immemorial, in order to vindicate the principle of religious liberty, the consciences of Church people ought to be equally respected when they object to paying for a system of education that is precluded from teaching religion in the only way which they believe to be true or effective. To an earnest Christian nothing can be more offensive than a system of State-invented religion, which is supposed to be made acceptable to all by not teaching what any really believe. It seems to them a political travesty of what is highest and holiest by making it subservient to political purposes and adapting it to meet the political necessities of the hour, without any thought of whether it does, or does not, accord with what was taught by Him who is the Divine Author of our religion.

This grievance has existed in school board districts ever since the passing of the Act of 1870, but the realization of its injustice and impiety has been recently intensified by the manner in which the Education Department has sought by all means to suppress the voluntary denominational schools, and to compel unwilling parishes to have school boards. It has always been known that the powers possessed by that Department are such that, by the arbitrary exercise of them, it would be comparatively easy to crush many voluntary schools out of existence. When money has to be raised by voluntary contributions there are few places where the required amount can be hastily collected, and where demands for a large expenditure can be met without considerable effort and personal self-sacrifice. All, therefore, that the Department has to do is to issue large requirements for additional accommodation, for extensive improvements, for new-fangled arrangements of cloak rooms and class rooms, and for costly additions to the teaching staff of the school, or for the educational appliances used within its walls, under threat that if these are not supplied within a very limited time, a school board will be ordered. When this has been done, the Vice-President may declare that he has acted with the strictest impartiality, that he has only required from voluntary schools what he demands from board schools, but he knows very well that in some places the result evidently desired by him will certainly be secured. Some of the things ordered may be necessary, others may be desirable, whilst it is certain that some are neither one nor the other. Thus, in

one school that we know certain additions and improvements were ordered, some of which were desirable; but then the architect of the Department for a long time, and until there was a prospect of the matter being brought before Parliament, insisted upon a covered staircase to an upper room, which greatly added to the expense, whilst a staircase similar to what had been allowed for two board schools in the same parish was declared to be inadmissible. In another parish—Willesden—extensive schools were built for a new neighbourhood, and as most of the inhabitants were above the poorest class, a small fee was charged in addition to the sum allowed by the Government for fee grant. The local school board approved the plan; free places were provided for those who required them, and the number of unoccupied places on the free side was considerably greater than of those on the pay side; but the Department objected that the supply of free places was insufficient, and refused to pay the annual grant, though the school was excellent. Then, at Hounslow, additional school accommodation was ordered, and in a few weeks the offer to supply it by Church people was made and the funds provided; but in the meantime a small public meeting of persons eager for a school board had been held, at which rather more than one per cent. of the inhabitants of the parish were present, and the Department held that it was bound to attend to the request of such a meeting and refuse the offer of Church people to provide the accommodation needed; and a school board was promptly ordered. These are but samples of what is now being carried on throughout the country; and, though the Department may be able to show that it is technically right, there are few fair-minded people who would not say that it was morally wrong, and that it was degrading a Department of State into a partisan organization for the promotion of what many people believe has a tendency to lower the moral wellbeing of the people, and to rob them of their Christian faith.

To make the position of the friends of voluntary schools still more difficult, two events have unhappily coincided, each of which makes a heavy demand upon their purses. The Act of 1891, which provided for the free education of all children whose parents demanded it, has had a very different effect in different places. In country and other parishes where the school fee charged was a penny, or not more than twopence, a week, and where the burden of maintaining it was exceptionally heavy to bear, it was hoped that there would be a considerable gain, as the Government allowance in lieu of the

school fee is ten shillings a year, or nearly threepence a week. To counteract the advantage which such parishes would gain by the burden resting upon the managers being lightened, the Department has enormously increased its demands for cloak and class rooms, alterations of structure, new offices, enlarged staffs, and other expensive provisions. In towns where a higher fee was charged there has been greater or less loss where the schools have been entirely freed. In the northern parts of England, where wages are high, it had been customary to charge a much larger school fee than in the south, where wages are for the most part lower. The change to free schools in such cases must in any case have involved a considerable loss to the school managers; but this would have been partially made good to them by the small fee which they are still permitted to charge in addition to the ten shillings attendance grant from Government, and the parents would have cheerfully paid such diminished fee, if persons whose special object it is to injure schools where definite religious teaching is given had not sent agitators to incite the people to demand free education for their children. This agitation has been in some places successful, and it is said that the Department has been so willing to co-operate with them, that in one place a school board has been ordered because there was one child who could not obtain free education in the school of the place. This process, then, has caused a great strain upon the resources of the managers of some schools; but a heavier trial has come in the greatly increased demands of the Department for improvements in the school buildings and organization in consequence of the increased sums paid by the State. Some of these demands are fair and just, but sufficient time for carrying them out is not always given; and it is obvious that when they are hurriedly pressed upon managers, who feel in considerable difficulty owing to the loss of the larger school fees that had been paid by their scholars, they are not very easily complied with.

There was, however, another event coincident with this change of system that has intensified the strain upon the friends of religious education in growing parishes. The census of 1891 showed that the population in them had materially increased during the decade then closing, and that more schools were needed for the additional population. Consequently a demand was made that new schools must be provided within a very limited time, or a school board would be ordered. Sums of 6,000*l.* and more had to be raised at once, or the religious education of a considerable number of the youthful members

of the parish was doomed. Noble efforts have been made in several places that could be named, and what the State required is in course of being supplied; in some others, notably in Hounslow, the deficiency would have been made good if a more equitable mode of procedure had been adopted by the Department; whilst in some others that had made vigorous efforts in the past, it was found impossible to meet the new requirements, and school boards have been ordered. During the past year we are told by the 'Report of the Education Department' that nineteen school boards have been compulsorily ordered, and that of the 2,163 school boards 1,057 have been called into existence in the same manner by that authority; so that one half of the school boards have been formed without, and in many instances contrary to, the desire of the unhappy people who have to provide the funds for their support, and to further the crusade against religion which seems now to have inspired the action of a certain class of politicians and enemies of the Church.

The resources of the friends of voluntary schools have, therefore, been heavily drawn upon, and their liberality severely taxed, in order to maintain what they believe is essential if this country is to preserve to any great extent its Christian character. Such a strain is seriously added to by the falling off of lukewarm friends. The number is not small of good sort of people who are ready to accept any excuse to save their own pockets. They give to a certain extent when everything is smooth and no objections are raised, but so soon as opposition arises they take advantage of it, and shield themselves from doing more by the plea that the result is so uncertain that it is unwise to throw away good money after bad.

The evil just mentioned has been unhappily intensified by certain theological writings that have recently appeared. The writings of those who advocate what is termed the 'Higher Criticism' have had a practical influence far beyond the persons who have actually read them. Reviews and newspapers have created a feeling that able and learned men call in serious question what has hitherto been the popular belief with respect to the Old Testament Scriptures; that they attribute their authorship to a much later date than had been assigned to them, and to persons very different from those whose names they bear. Such doubts carry disbelief in the minds of partially educated persons much further than the writers referred to would wish or defend. Many of them would regret as sincerely as we do that their writings

should have such an influence, but we fear that the fact cannot be questioned; and it is obvious that wherever such doubts have been raised, one effect of them must be to make the persons who entertain them less ready to make sacrifices of time or money to preserve the traditional faith of the Church in our elementary schools.

From the causes that have been named, and possibly from others locally known, of a less general character, there can be no doubt that there is at the present time a most severe trial placed upon the faith and patience and perseverance of those who believe in the definite religious training of the young being essential for the well-being of the nation. And the question has not unnaturally been raised, What steps can be taken to preserve our schools? It seems well-nigh impossible to obtain the larger sums needed from voluntary sources; can we not, and ought we not, to endeavour to obtain a share of the school rate to which we are compelled to contribute, by making some arrangement with the State? This question has been seriously raised, and is being much discussed in some places, more especially in the north of England; it is therefore desirable that we should look the subject fairly in the face, and see what can be said for and against it; whether under any circumstances such a claim would be advisable, and, if so, what are the conditions which must be insisted upon?

Our readers will remember that when Mr. Forster introduced his Education Bill in 1870, he proposed a clause enabling school boards to make grants to the voluntary schools within the sphere of their authority, the only condition being that, if a grant was made to one such school in a rating district, an equal grant should be made to all the others. In deference to the strongly expressed objections of some of his more Radical followers, Mr. Gladstone withdrew this clause, and promised that in lieu of the assistance that might thus have been obtained by the voluntary schools, the Government grant should be increased to the extent of fifty per cent. This was promised on the ground that, with a rate-supported system, the voluntary schools must naturally expect to suffer, as the funds they obtained from subscriptions would be certain to diminish; some of their supporters would be unable to pay subscriptions in addition to a school rate; others would make the existence of a school rate an excuse for not contributing; whilst public bodies, such as Railway and other Joint Stock Companies, would not be allowed by their shareholders to continue to subscribe, when they were compelled to pay rates. It may be well, therefore, to examine how far the promise then made has been

fulfilled, and whether, as a matter of justice, the voluntary schools have not a righteous claim upon the State for help beyond what has yet been given them.

In 1870 the cost of each child's education in an elementary school was *1l. 5s. 5d.*, and the grant received from Government was *9s. 9½d.*, the remainder of the sum required being made up by the children's pence, averaging *8s. 4½d.* for each child in average attendance, and voluntary subscriptions *6s. 11¾d.*, and the balance by some small endowments. So soon as the board schools had come into active operation, the cost of education rapidly rose. School boards, and notably the London school board, were anxious to draw the best teachers from the voluntary schools, and to effect this they offered much higher salaries than the teachers were then receiving. Consequently, the average cost of each child's education in a voluntary school had risen in 1874 to *1l. 10s. 10½d.*, the Government grant to *12s. 5d.*, the children's pence to an average of *10s. 5¾d.*, and the voluntary contributions to *7s. 9d.* Mr. Gladstone's promise had therefore then been so far made good that the voluntary schools were receiving *2s. 7¾d.*, or 27 per cent., more from the Government for each child under instruction than they had done in 1870; but the burden upon the subscribers, so far from being diminished, had actually increased, and instead of having to supply *6s. 11¾d.* for each child they had to furnish *7s. 9d.* Since then the Government grant has steadily increased, until last year it amounted to *18s. 0¾d.*, or more by 80 per cent. than the amount at which it stood in 1870; but then, during the interval, the cost of maintaining the school had proportionately increased. So that, whilst the promise has been more than fulfilled in the letter, it has been broken in the spirit, as not one particle of the alleviation of the burden promised to the supporters of the voluntary schools has been afforded. The condition of things in 1874 has remained practically unchanged ever since: the cost of each child's education in a voluntary school has risen since 1870 to *1l. 17s. 9½d.* in 1892, that is, by *12s. 4½d.* Whilst the Government grant has been enlarged by *8s. 3½d.* during the same time, the amount that has to be supplied by voluntary sources is only one penny less than it was in 1870, and far more than this sum has been provided by endowments given since that year. In the intervening years the heaviest payment by voluntary subscribers was *8s. 8¾d.* per child in 1877; the lightest, *6s. 7½d.* in 1889. It says much for the zeal and self-sacrifice of Churchmen that during these years they have added 1,319,911 places to the number provided by their

schools, or doubled the accommodation supplied by them, at a cost of some millions, and this notwithstanding a certain amount of drain upon them by some managers surrendering their schools to school boards, and the annually increasing sums needed for management in consequence of the additions made to their school accommodation. For as it is almost unnecessary to say, when the same sum for the education of each child has to be provided, it makes a great difference whether that sum has to be furnished for 844,334 children, as it was in 1870, or for 1,716,877, as it was in 1892.

It is material to our present inquiry to examine what amount of money is now being expended on board schools, as it is evident that the sums which supporters of the voluntary schools have to assist in paying to the rival system must exert considerable influence over their ability to maintain their own schools. The Report of the Education Department tells us (p. 29) that 'the deficiencies in the school fund' required to be met by the rating authorities out of the local rate, and paid by them to the treasurers of school boards during the years ending Michaelmas 1891-2, were: in England, 1890-91, 3,165,684*l.*, in 1891-2, 3,289,885*l.*; in Wales, 1890-91, 158,642*l.*, in 1891-2, 172,471*l.* We also find that the school board rate is rapidly growing. The average rate in the former of the two years just named was 8*2d.*, in the latter 8*5d.*; an increase of more than a farthing in the pound; whilst in Wales the additional burden amounted to more than twopence in the pound; in 1890-1 it was 7*7d.*, whilst in 1891-2 it was 9*9d.* Or, if we look at the matter more in detail, we find that in 1891 there were 202 parishes or boroughs where the rate was 1*s.* in the pound or more; in 1892 the number had grown to 237; in 1891 there were 321 places where the rate was 9*d.* or more, but less than 1*s.*; in 1892 the number was 367. In 1891 there were 648 places where the rate was 6*d.* or more, but less than 9*d.*; in 1892 it had risen to 691. As there were only twenty-five more school boards in the returns for 1892 than there were in those for 1891, the number of places paying a lower sum for school board rates was proportionately diminished. The sums advanced to school boards as loans amounted to rather more than twenty-three millions. It is also worth noting that the cost of administration amounted to 379,596*l.*, or more than 5 per cent. of the sum levied on the unfortunate ratepayers; and it ought also to be remembered that when the Education Act passed in 1870 Mr. Forster, the author of it, assured us that the rate would never exceed threepence in the pound.

With these facts before us, we have to consider what ought to be done. We are far from yielding to the despairing cries which some weak-kneed or partially-informed friends are inclined to raise, and we should no more think of giving up the fight than we should think of abandoning our churches in order to stop the agitation of our Liberationist enemies. The Roman Catholics in France, under much more trying conditions than those against which we have to struggle, nobly maintain their schools, and we hear no cries of despair from the Roman Catholics in this country, though they let us know that they most seriously feel the strain that is placed upon them for the support of their schools. Whilst therefore we feel that in the interests of religion, and in the discharge of our duties as Christians, we must maintain our schools at any cost, and that the Church can no more abandon her duty to train her children in the true faith in her schools than she can refuse to proclaim the Gospel in her churches; we only act as prudent men when we carefully examine whether there is any possibility of easing the present strain, and making such arrangements with the State as would enable us not only to maintain but to increase our power of imparting definite religious instruction to the rising generation. Of course, if the nation really accepted the principle of religious liberty, and was prepared to act upon it, there could be no difficulty about the matter, for then some arrangement would be made by which the parents should determine the faith in which their children should be educated, and this could be accomplished far more easily than those who desire to maintain the present system assert, for Nonconformists are satisfied with undenominational teaching, whilst Church-people and Roman Catholics demand that their distinctive tenets shall be taught. But it seems that the party which professes to be the advocate of religious liberty understands by those words the support of all sectarian and unbelieving institutions, and the oppression and robbery of the Church whenever it is possible. And, to their shame be it spoken, many professing Churchmen, for political reasons, seem ready to join in the persecution or injury of the Church of which they call themselves members.

The question, then, practically is, Can any scheme that we could conscientiously accept be devised for obtaining that assistance from the rates which was proposed by Mr. Forster in the Bill of 1870 when it was first presented to Parliament? can any concordat be proposed to afford us the substantial help promised by the Government responsible for the Bill,

which has never been given for the purpose for which it was promised? There can obviously be no objection in principle to all schools receiving such assistance; for denominational schools, equally with board schools, fulfil the requirements of the law and constitute a portion of the National system of education. Moreover, every ratepayer is compelled to contribute his quota; and there can be no more objection to the friends of denominational education receiving a share out of the common fund, to which they contribute, than to the friends of undenominational religious education. If these last object to denominational teaching as contrary to what they believe, and as a violation of their consciences if any portion of the rates they pay go to denominational schools, it is quite certain that the friends of such teaching entertain at least as strong objections to a system of professedly religious teaching which they look upon as a sham, and as not at all calculated to attract those who receive it to lead a moral or religious life, and that their consciences are equally violated if their rates go to the support of such schools. And it is tolerably certain that the friends of definite religious teaching pay quite as large a share of the rates as do the friends of the existing system. This is shown by some friends of the existing system saying that the board schools would be starved if the ratepayers were allowed to allocate their rates to the schools they prefer.

The real point, then, to be carefully examined is, what are the indispensable conditions on which the friends of definite religious education must insist if any concordat is to be arrived at, and which it is well to state in their irreducible form. These are two: the one is, that they shall retain perfect freedom to teach religion in the manner they think best; and the other is, that they shall have a prevailing voice in the selection of the teachers. There are all kinds of subsidiary questions that must naturally arise, and which would admit of modifications of treatment. Such would be the amount that the rating authority might contribute, and the amount that must be raised by voluntary contributions; the constitution of the committee of management which would admit of arrangement so far as this, that the number of members who might be nominated by the rating authority or by the parents of the children being educated in the school might remain indeterminate, but in no case must they equal the number of members selected by the subscribers to the school, who represent the religious principles on which the school was founded. A further consideration would be

whether the rating authority might have a negative power over the nomination of teachers, and also whether it should have an independent examination of the school, on which the amount of its grant might be made in some measure to depend, as proposed by the Royal Commission on Education in 1861. A further consideration would be the conditions on which new schools might be erected by members of any of the religious bodies interested in education, and the amount of liberty which should be left with the rating authority to determine the number of schools which should be in the hands of those who favoured one or other of the forms of denominational education, or of the undenominational system. And it ought to be directed that the rating authority should be guided in what it orders by the requirements of the locality. The sovereign principle of the parents' responsibility to determine the religious principles in which his child is to be educated ought to be scrupulously adhered to, and the rating authority ought to take care that in some satisfactory manner the requisite facilities to secure a knowledge of this should be furnished, so that the necessary amount of school accommodation to meet their wishes might be provided.

It may be well to state why it is impossible for the friends of denominational education to yield on the point of the selection of teachers. They believe that no one can teach religion effectively unless he believes what he teaches. Not only in the religious lessons, but in others which he has to impart, the teacher's belief, or want of belief, is certain to be made apparent, in a greater or less degree. For a teacher incidentally on some other lesson to controvert or to contradict what the child has been taught in the religious lesson would throw an air of untruth over all that it had been told by its religious teacher, just as an air of unreality would be thrown over the teaching if the Church, or any other denominational, Catechism was taught by one whom the child knew belonged to a different religion. How could a Churchman consistently entrust his child's religious education to a Roman Catholic, or an Agnostic, or the member of some Nonconformist sect, or *vice versa*? If it should be said that such a system would be unfair to the general ratepayer, it would be well to remind the objector that the ratepayer is not an abstract being, but is either a Churchman, a Roman Catholic, a Nonconformist, a Jew, a believer, or an unbeliever, and that under the system just proposed all but an infinitesimally small minority would be cared for in a satisfactory manner; whereas, as matters now stand, there are large and influential bodies of people who are

profoundly dissatisfied. And we have yet to learn that the Nonconformist or Secularist has a greater right to have his scruples or prejudices respected than a Churchman or Roman Catholic. Moreover, it must be remembered that the State, in return for what it contributes towards the support of schools, has a lion's share in their management. The buildings must be approved by its officers before they are commenced, although the State does not contribute a farthing towards the cost of their erection; no alterations can be made in them until the plans have been declared satisfactory by their architect. No teachers can be employed that have not received the *imprimatur* of the Department. The lessons taught, the hours at which they are taught, and the books used in teaching them, must be approved by its officers. The number of teachers to be employed must satisfy the regulations it has laid down. The hours during which religious teaching may be given are controlled by rules that it has imposed. The financial accounts, including all sums received and expended, must be submitted to its officers; and, to crown all, every child in the school must be presented to its inspectors for examination, and the amount of its assistance is made to depend upon their report, and upon their assurance that all the above-named conditions have been complied with.

We are far from supposing that the plan of which we have suggested an outline is free from risk or objection. It would be impossible to frame such a plan. If it were possible permanently to maintain a system supported by voluntary subscriptions side by side with one dependent upon rates, and to develop it as rapidly, in order to secure the religious education of children in newly-formed districts where new schools were needed, there would be no occasion to think of any alteration in the existing system. It is because we are compelled to take note of the rapid growth of board schools, and of the slow growth of denominational schools, and the increasing difficulties experienced in some places in providing the funds required for the efficient support of existing schools, that we are driven to consider whether any, and, if any, what steps can be taken to ease the strain. We are quite conscious that any proposals for a concordat on the subject of education will find strenuous opponents on many sides. Some will think that too much is demanded by the friends of voluntary schools, and others that too little is asked for. Some will complain that the concessions proposed are too great, others that they are insufficient. We cannot, for example, expect all our Manchester friends to approve what we have suggested, as the Bill

they have propounded rests upon a somewhat different basis. It would make no pecuniary demands on the friends of denominational schools, beyond those which they have already made, or those required for maintaining the fabric of the schools, and would place the management of all such schools in the hands of a committee consisting to the extent of one-third of members elected by the trustees in whom the school is vested, one-third of members appointed by the school board, and one-third of persons elected by the parents of the children who are being taught in the school. Then they would throw the whole cost of management upon the rates, so that, as a matter of fact, the religious character of the school would be in danger of being sacrificed whenever the clergyman of the parish or the managers of the school were for any reason unpopular with the parents of the children attending the school.

A second party would probably object because it adds to the burden already pressing so heavily upon the ratepayers. If these objectors would remember that the possible alternative to such a plan is throwing the school into the hands of a school board, or closing it altogether, and so compelling the board to provide new buildings, as well as the cost of maintenance, they might be willing to reconsider their objection, more especially if they would take to heart that the latest returns of the Education Department show that the average cost of the education of each child in schools under voluntary management is *1*l.* 17*s.* 9½*d.**, whilst in board schools it is *2*l.* 8*s.* 4¾*d.**, and that in voluntary schools a subscription of *6*s.* 10¾*d.** suffices for the education of each child, whilst the corresponding demand upon the rates for board schools is *1*l.* 1*s.* 3½*d.**, and beside this large amount a considerable sum has to be added for the cost of management.

Those who desire universal school boards under the existing conditions for their management, would not, of course, be satisfied, as the plan sketched out would effectually hinder such a melancholy consummation, and would secure for every child whose parents desired it, definite religious education: and, moreover, would provide that the children's parents should determine the faith in which their children should be educated, instead of the State resolving that a great number of them should be taught a new-fangled religion, which is not Christianity, that itself favours.

Last of all, we fear that a good many excellent Church-people would object to it, because they would fear that it might lead to a worse system than they dread. They imagine

that it is possible to preserve the present system. They will not realize existing difficulties, which are much greater than meet the public eye; neither will they lay to heart the miserable condition of new neighbourhoods, where there are no denominational schools. They assert that to take any help from the rates would destroy subscriptions, which it certainly would not if the rate contribution was made to depend upon a certain sum being raised from voluntary sources. The objectors on these grounds would largely consist of persons who either have none of the worry and wear and tear of being responsible for schools, or else of persons happily placed in parishes where the necessary sums required for the support of the school or schools are easily raised, or possibly of those who lack the requisite information to enable them to know where and how the difficulty arises. With the feelings of such persons we have the greatest sympathy. But it would be well to remind them that they do not realize this important fact, that the greatest demand for elementary schools is necessarily in parishes where the largest number of poor people live, and that for the most part in these parishes there are the fewest wealthy people. Moreover, it is in such parishes that there is the greatest need for definite religious teaching, as there are fewer civilizing and christianizing influences than are to be found in parishes more favourably circumstanced. We should greatly prefer keeping things as they are, if it was possible to do so, but we cannot be insensible to the leakage that is going on, to the loud complaints that are being raised of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of maintaining schools, that are coming from many, and some of them unexpected quarters, and moreover, of the failure in some rapidly increasing places, such as London, of providing new schools for their growing populations. We are reluctantly driven to the consideration of what is possible, and not of what we should prefer. And believing, as we do, that the well-being of the country, not less than that of each individual member of it, depends to an untold extent upon the character of the education given at school, we are prepared to surrender our own likes and preferences as to the manner in which the work should be done, in order to secure the largest amount of attention that is possible to the inculcation of those Divine truths without which we feel that all which makes a people great and noble must perish.

There is one important question the consideration of which we have left to the last, and that is, What shall be the rating authority to which shall be entrusted any scheme that may be adopted? The Education Department is anxious to draw

within the sphere of its influence all that relates to the education of the country, whether it be elementary or superior although it is already overwhelmed with the mass of detail with which it has to deal. Besides which, happily for our instruction, the present holder of the chief position in that Department has, by his action, warned us not to leave more under its control than can be helped. In the recently issued Report he tells us that he is taking steps to bring the care of Secondary Education under his influence. The Report says :

‘The question of a properly organised system of secondary education for England and Wales will soon become a very urgent one. In order to consider this question among others, and particularly the relation to one another of the Government Departments which are at present concerned in various degrees with secondary schools, the Vice-President has appointed a Departmental Committee, consisting of representatives of the Charity Commissioners, the Science and Art Department, and the Education Department.’

At the present time the County Councils have a good deal to do in the work of furthering education, and we must confess that we should prefer entrusting the task of arranging what help should be afforded to voluntary schools from local rates to their hands, rather than to those of the Education Department, whilst we should deprecate the interference of that Department with secondary education, which has not yet been entrusted to it by the nation. When the Bill for completing the system of Local Government comes before Parliament, we should be glad to see placed in the hands of the District Councils, that will no doubt be called into existence, the power of locally assisting the schools in their respective districts in such a manner as would at once further the cause of education, and at the same time really respect the religious liberty of the people and not ruthlessly trample upon it, as is now done under the Education Act of 1870. To them the school boards should have to apply for the sums required from the rates, whilst in their hands should be left a power of limiting the expenditure of boards, some of which is most extravagant, and in not a few cases perfectly reckless. From such an authority that ought to be neutral, and in many cases would be so, the voluntary schools should be able to obtain the assistance intended by the authors of the Act of 1870; whilst the conditions under which it should be given must be imposed by Parliament. If politicians would be content to be really equitable, so as to propose a scheme that would keep inviolate the authority of the parents and respect the convictions of those having a definite

religious faith equally with those who lack such a belief, it ought to be possible under such local auspices to obtain a system of elementary education which should be truly National. And from the outset it may be well for them clearly to understand that the agitation of this question will not cease until they have consented to deal equitably with the religious convictions of the people. Such an equitable dealing demands that the parents shall determine the religious faith in which their children shall be educated, that the principles of the founders and managers of voluntary schools shall be respected, and that no unfair use shall be made of schools erected and supported by public funds for the suppression of beliefs, held by a portion of the community to be of the greatest importance. At the same time we should hope that such an authority would put an end to the wasteful expenditure that is encouraged by a system of rival schools, and whilst they should be enabled to assist all elementary schools that fulfil the requirements of the State with respect to education, they should not be empowered to interfere with schools that prefer to continue in their present position.

ART. II.—APOLOGETICS.

Apologetics, or Christianity defensively stated. By ALEXANDER BALMAIN BRUCE, D.D. (Edinburgh, 1892.)

IT is evident that the great changes which theology in recent years has undergone could not be without their effect on the particular department of Apologetics. Hence we can sympathize with Dr. Bruce in the evident perplexity in which he found himself, as to how he ought to shape the treatise just published. In recent years both science and Biblical criticism have come in conflict with Christian faith. They have not only assailed the outworks, but have tried to force an entrance into the citadel itself. How are we to meet this new state of things? Are we to meet it as of old by direct negative, or are we to yield somewhat to the advancing foes? Are we to cling to the old position, or are we to take up a new one? If we determine, as most people have done, to do the latter, then a very formidable question arises: What is that new position that we are to take up? In other words, the apologist has to ask himself, What is it that I am to defend? What is it that I am to apologize for? It is a

question which will brook no delay. It must be answered at once and offhand, without any reason given. But is apology qualified to give an answer? Is apology in a position in which it is possible to do so with any effect?

The matter is of considerable importance, because in the course of the argument admissions have to be made, and, in point of fact, are made, often merely for the sake of argument, the apologist not in any way committing himself to them, or vouching for their truth. And yet such admissions, on whatever grounds they may be made, from the simple fact that they are the basis on which we reason, will in the course of the argument vitally affect our idea and estimate of the Christian religion. We may thus be led to take a view of our religion for which the apologist, who is our guide, declines to vouch—a view, too, which we ourselves might decline to accept were we to argue out the whole question in cold blood.

The truth is that ever since the old and time-honoured formula, 'the evidences of natural and revealed religion,' has been abandoned, the very idea of apology, what it is, and what it has to accomplish, has been in a state of flux; and different authors have taken different views of it. Dr. Bruce has a special chapter in which he discusses these views as to the nature of Apologetics under the two heads of its *idea* and its *method*; and as the question is not without importance we shall follow him. Beginning, then, with the *idea* of apologetic, the first thing we have to do is to distinguish between apology and apologetic. Dr. Ebrard states the distinction as being, that, whereas apology is a reply to a definite and particular attack, apologetic deduces the method of defence and the defence itself out of the essence of Christianity. 'Apologetic,' he adds, 'is that science which from the essence of Christianity itself determines what kinds of attacks are possible, what sides of Christian truth are open to attack, and what false principles lie at the foundation of all attacks, actual or possible.' The distinction thus drawn is something like that between a particular duel and the science or art of fence. We may admit it to be true as far as it goes, but it does not really help us much. Our author next goes on to quote other writers of recent times as to the proper definition of apologetic. He refers to Sack, who regarded apologetic as the proof of the real or historical side of Christianity, it being left to theology to prove the ideal or doctrinal side. It is important, however, to notice that Sack was led to take this view by the pressure of Strauss's *Leben Jesu*, which dis-

solved the fundamental facts of Christianity into myth and fable. Very much to the same effect was the view of Drey, who lived at the same period, and was subject to the same influence. He defined apologetic as the philosophy of the Christian religion, and of its history. In Lechler the point of view changes. He relegates apologetic to the ideal side of Christianity. In his hands it becomes the scientific demonstration of the Christian religion as the absolute religion, alone satisfying the need of man as a religious being, and setting forth the pure unmixed truth regarding God. Ebrard and Delitzsch, perceiving that these opposing views are both one-sided, combine the two aspects. They assign to apologetic a double function: on the one hand, that of defending the eternal truth contained in Christianity as tested by the facts of nature and of human consciousness, and on the other, that of defending Christianity as an historical fact, viewed in its organic connexion with the general history of religion.

It is characteristic of all these conceptions or definitions that they do not differentiate apologetic from theology generally. To establish the ideal or doctrinal side of Christianity is the proper business of theology; so also the vindication of its fundamental facts is the business of Biblical and historical criticism. If we are to take apologetic as these authors have pictured it, it almost comes to this, that apologetic is to do in an abbreviated and imperfect manner what theology and criticism have already done fully and perfectly. Hence there has been a class of writers, who, as our author points out, have disputed the claim of apologetics to any place in the theological curriculum. They argue that the function of defence is one which has to be performed by every positive science for itself, and by theology in particular. They further urge that what unbelievers attack is always some dogmatic truth; and if the truth assailed be properly stated and handled by the systematic theologian, nothing remains to be said by the apologist. It would be difficult to answer this argument, if we take the view of the nature of apologetic, which is set forth by the authors above quoted. Nevertheless the general conclusion has been in favour of apologetic. Most are agreed with Schleiermacher that it ought to have a place in the theological curriculum. Schleiermacher would regard it as a branch of philosophic theology; and from this point of view it has been taken as the mediator between philosophy and theology, taking up the discussion where philosophy terminates, and so connecting with theology. This view would have much in its favour, if philosophy

always, as of old, remained the humble handmaid of theology. But, as our author well remarks, philosophy in our day is not always so modest.

‘Not unfrequently it leaves the mind of the student prepossessed with opinions concerning God, man, and the world, opposed to those which underlie the Christian faith, so that at least one, if not the principal, function of apologetic must be to deal with anti-Christian prejudices, that Christianity may get a fair hearing’ (p. 37).

These last words indicate the point of view from which the author constructs his own idea of Christian apologetic, which we now proceed to give in his own words :

‘Apologetic, then, as I conceive it, is a preparer of the way of faith, an aid to faith against doubts whencesoever arising, especially such as are engendered by philosophy and science. Its specific aim is to help men of ingenuous spirit who, while assailed by such doubts, are morally in sympathy with believers. It addresses itself to such as are drawn in two directions, towards and away from Christ, as distinct from such as are confirmed either in unbelief or in faith. Defence presupposes a foe, but the foe is not the dogmatic infidel who has finally made up his mind that Christianity is a delusion, but anti-Christian thought in the believing man’s own heart. “A man’s foes shall be they of his own household.” The wise apologist instinctively shuns conflict with dogmatic unbelief as futile. He desiderates and assumes in those for whom he writes a certain fairness and openness of mind, a generous spirit under hostile bias which he seeks to remove, a bias to no ignoble cause, animated even in its hostility by worthy motives. But, on the other hand, with equal decision he avoids partisanship with dogmatic belief. He regards himself as a defender of the Catholic faith, not as a hired advocate or special pleader for a particular theological system. He distinguishes between religion and theology, between faith and opinion, between essential doctrines and the debateable dogmas of the schools. There are many special views held by believers, of which, whether true or false, he takes no cognisance ; many controversies internal to faith, such as that between Calvinists and Armenians, with which he does not intermeddle’ (p. 37).

Regarding the latter part of this statement we may have considerable doubts. We may suspect that it means more than it states. We may suspect that in it the author gives us fair warning that what he is to defend is not the Catholic faith ‘whole and undefiled,’ but a Christianity or a religion of a somewhat more attenuated kind, which he may think is more suited to the present age. But putting this aside for the moment, and looking at the former part in a fair and candid spirit, we think there is no doubt that a treatise carried out in the spirit and on the lines indicated would be extremely useful.

There are at the present moment many persons who at heart are drawn to Christ, but whose spiritual life is quite paralysed if not destroyed by anti-Christian prejudice. Anything done to remove that prejudice would be of the greatest moment. We may, no doubt, as Christians have the firmest faith that the present anti-Christian phase of secular culture will by and by pass away. In the progress of the human mind culture is ever changing, that is, ever assuming new aspects, and the next aspect it takes on may be, and probably will be, more in harmony with the faith. But that will take time; and in the meantime we have to consider those in whom the higher life is paralysed. Anything done for their help every right-thinking man must welcome.

It is a different question, however, whether such a treatise, so conceived and so carried out, would be what we mean by Christian apologetic. In our opinion it would not be so; for the field is too wide and the aim too undefined. Like the writers whom he has quoted, our author does not differentiate apologetic from theology and criticism generally. His idea of apologetic is that of the title page, 'Christianity defensively stated;' but such a statement of Christianity is just what theology and criticism are bound to give, and which presumably they have given already. Apologetic, if it is to have a place in the theological curriculum, ought to have a special department assigned to it, and a special end which it is its business to attain. Perhaps the author means to indicate the aim by laying stress upon the word *defensively* in the above statement. His view may be that apologetic is not to deal with Christianity systematically, but is to exhibit it in its best aspect, its spirituality, its beauty, and its adaptation to the wants of man. Still, however, it is a statement of Christianity, and as a statement does not carry us beyond the sphere of theology and criticism. It is also, in our opinion, as an apologetic inadequate. Apologetic in its old form aimed at something more, and we think at the present day believers, and those who want to be believers, look to it for something more.

We may bring this out, if for a moment we pause and ask ourselves the question: What is it, exactly, that as Apologists we want to prove or establish? Is it the spirituality, the truth, the beauty of the Christian system? Surely not. That in the writings of the prophets we have a wonderful system of spiritual and moral truth—wonderful, we mean, considering the age of the world in which it was propounded; or that the words and acts and aims of Jesus are spiritually

and morally beautiful ; these are things which are of vital import to Christian faith. But do they need proof, defence, or apology ? Hardly, we think. For every competent scholar and right-minded man will readily allow that the fact is so. And yet, notwithstanding this, Christian believers never tire of pointing to them and setting them forth in all their fulness. Why do they do so ? Why do they engage in a task apparently so unnecessary ? We imagine it is not solely for the sake of the facts, and the satisfaction they bring to the soul, but because of the fascination which attaches to an inference which is drawn from them. We mean the inference that in the prophets and in Jesus we have a voice speaking to us from the other world. Apology in its old form claimed that inference as its special subject and vindicated it in its own way. Why should not apology at the present time do the same in another way ? Of one thing we are certain, that this is the great practical want of the present day. And, we see that, if we assign to apology the task of vindicating this inference we differentiate it from theology and criticism, and assign to it a department of its own—a department, too, of vast importance.

Our author has studied German authors, and it is possible a treatise of Dr. Harvey Goodwin, late Bishop of Carlisle, on the 'foundations of the Creed,' may have escaped him. It is a treatise, however, which is worthy of very deep consideration by all who are interested in our present subject. It is not a finished treatise, but for that reason it is perhaps more valuable, because it contains in embryo many fruitful thoughts and suggestions. The idea of the foundations of the Creed, which he specifies as history, reason, faith, is such a fruitful thought, and, in our opinion, would constitute an excellent basis for an apologetic adapted to the wants of the present day. If we were to interpret the thought of the Bishop it would be something like this. He seems to say : Let the critics do their work upon the Scriptures, and do not imagine that you are thereby resigning heavenly treasures to the enemy. For there are critics and critics. If there are negative and unbelieving critics, there are also positive and believing ones. We may well believe that the conflict between the two will issue in the establishment of a certain amount of hard undoubted historic fact. With this fact, it is the province of human reason to deal. Reason has to consider what it means and what it leads to. Now, what if both historic fact and human reason are thrown into confusion, unless a third factor, faith, comes to their aid ? By faith is meant the step by which we reach forth

to the other world—that is, rise to the supernatural. Faith by itself—that is, without anything else but a subjective basis—may be a weak thing; but Faith leaning on History and Reason is strong. If it is demonstrated that History and Reason cannot stand by themselves, if it is shown that the facts of History and the verdicts of Reason all point upwards towards that world whither Faith alone can carry us, the argument for the Divine origin of Christianity becomes very strong. It is some such shape, that, in our opinion, an apologetic treatise adapted to the present time, ought to take.

The next point to be considered is the *method* of apology, and the author gives an interesting summary of recent opinion on this head. There is first of all the time-honoured formula which long sufficed for the wants of our fathers, we mean, 'the evidences of natural and revealed religion.' It is time-honoured and not altogether antiquated even at the present day. We admit, however, with the author, that it is not altogether the best for present use. It had this great advantage, that it grappled boldly and manfully with the supernatural, rising to God first on the sphere of the natural, and secondly on the sphere of revelation. Leaving it on one side we come to the attempts that have recently been made to find another method. The author first mentions Baumstark, who tries to build up apologetic on an anthropological foundation:

'Taking man, his nature and his needs, for his starting-point, he seeks to show that Christianity corresponds perfectly to the religious wants of humanity, confirming the positive argument by a negative one directed to prove that no other religion satisfies these wants' (p. 41).

Next in order comes Delitzsch, who works, not on an anthropological foundation, but on the idea or essence of Christianity itself. He determines what Christianity is, analyses it into its elements, and then shows that these elements one and all are in harmony with the moral and religious consciousness of man, and contain at once the refutation and the truth of all opposing philosophies and religions. Somewhat similar is the method of Ebrard, who starts from the idea of redemption, pointing out first its presuppositions, viz. the existence of a living God, an everlasting moral law, the freedom and responsibility of the human will, the existence in man of a state of opposition to the law and the impossibility of self-redemption. He then shows that these are in harmony with the facts of nature and human consciousness.

It is clear that the idea underlying all these methods is, that the ultimate aim of apologetic is to establish the harmony

of the Christian religion with man's nature and wants. We admit that this is an important point to make out, because if it could be shown that Christianity does not possess this character it would so far fail to establish itself. But a doubting mind might admit this harmony and yet not be satisfied. It is a fundamental point in the philosophy of nature in vogue at the present day that that which is fittest survives. Arguing from this point of view, it might be urged, that the human mind seeking to adjust itself to the facts of nature and human nature creates in succession a variety of religious systems. Some of these are more, some are less fitted to the wants of man. Of these systems Christianity, being best adapted to that end, survives. But, it would be urged, Christianity is not thereby proved to be more than a fond creation of the human mind. The argument of adaptation to the wants of man is, we allow, an important one, but we think believing souls look to apologetics for something more.

The author next goes on to define his own method which arises out of the aim he has in view. What he aims at is to secure for Christianity a fair hearing. He writes for implicit believers whose faith is stifled or weakened by anti-Christian prejudices. His aim is thus not so much theological as practical. For ourselves we admit, and have already admitted, the importance of this aim, but we must again point out that that aim is not the aim of Christian apologetics. We think the author would have done more wisely had he dropped the title *Apologetics* altogether, and addressed himself free and unfettered to the carrying out of his purpose. For the taking of the title *Apologetics* serves no other purpose but to hamper and restrain him at every point. It leads him, in fact, into an impossible position, as will be clearly seen if we go on with his statement. He says:

'For the accomplishment of this end, the first step obviously is to make sure that men know what Christianity really is. Much of the weak, half-hearted attachment to the Christian faith which prevails, arises from lack of such knowledge. And if we wish to dispel this baleful ignorance, we must not begin with any ready-made idea of the Christian religion extracted from the creeds, or current in the Churches, but, remembering that much prejudice against both creeds and Churches exists in many minds which we should desire to influence, we must remount to the fountain head, and learn the nature of our faith from the records of Christ's life and teaching contained in the Gospels. Nay, to avoid outrunning the sympathies of honest doubt by seeming to forestall the solution of any grave apologetic problems, we must impose on ourselves a still further restriction, and gather our information regarding nascent Christianity, in the first

place, from the first three Gospels, leaving the fourth on one side to be dealt with at a subsequent stage. An honest endeavour to extract from these Gospels a simple account of what Jesus was and taught might, without further trouble, win to hearty faith many whose alienation has its root in social grievances rather than in science or philosophy or Biblical criticism' (p. 43).

It may be an excellent thing to construct a new rendering of Christianity out of the life of Jesus which would be more acceptable to the present age. But is it the business of Christian apology to do so? Is it not rather the business of the theologian and the critic? The author tells us he sets about his task because he declines to receive any ready-made idea of the Christian religion. But as an apologist has he any option? Is not apology so far dependent on theology and criticism that it must at their hands receive its idea of the Christian religion? If it declines to do so, what is the consequence? It must construct for itself a new idea, and in that case it is no longer apology but theology and criticism. The position the author takes up is, in fact, an impossible one. He wishes to construct a new idea of the Christian religion, but his character as apologist hampers and prevents him from doing so with any effect. It, in fact, comes to this. The author finds himself face to face with destructive criticism both of the Old and New Testaments, and he has to determine how far he will accept the results. He does come to a decision in favour of these results, but the decision is to a great extent unreasoned, the grounds of it being only partially stated. The reader is thus left in a state of doubt and confusion, and, what is aggravating in the extreme, the author himself declines to vouch for that which he accepts. Why is the decision arrived at in this unsatisfactory manner? Simply because his character as apologist prevents him from entering fully on the question. The whole work is, in fact, a medley. It is partly theology and criticism, and partly apology. In our opinion it would have been more satisfactory if it had been the one thing or the other.

We have made these remarks because we think it very desirable that apologetics, viewed as a theological discipline, should receive its right position and its own special department. We may now state briefly the author's division of his work. He divides it into three books. The first book deals with the presuppositions hostile to Christianity. It is by far the best part of the author's work, possibly because both its subject-matter and procedure are purely apologetic. Christianity, the author tells us, is not a philosophy, but, like every

other religion, it has its own peculiar way of looking at God, man, and the world, and their relations. In other words, it has a theory of the universe. The first book, therefore, has for its object to elicit from the Christian facts what view of things Christianity takes, and to defend that view as against the hostile speculative theories of the present day. But Christianity has also its historic presuppositions. Jesus belonged to a peculiar people, and His religion grew out of and was a development of the religion of Israel. Hence the second book treats of the history, the sacred books, and the religion of Israel. The third book is devoted to Christianity itself, and has for its subject-matter such topics as these: 'Jesus in Himself and as the Christ; His work; His resurrection; the faith of the early Church concerning Him; Paul as a factor in the nascent religion; primitive Christianity; the historic value of the evangelic documents.' Altogether the ground covered by the author's treatise is extensive—perhaps too extensive for adequate treatment.

The author's first book is, in our opinion, very well done. It begins with a chapter in which we have a statement of the Christian facts made with the view of eliciting from them the Christian philosophy. Then we have in a second chapter a statement of the Christian philosophy, or, as the author terms it, the Christian theory of the universe. This is followed by five more chapters, which have for their titles: the Pantheistic theory; the Materialistic theory; the Deistic theory; Modern Speculative Theism; and lastly, Agnosticism. The author's philosophic knowledge is extensive and accurate, and he has great literary skill, which enables him to present his statements in a plain and popular way. In dealing with these subjects nothing would be easier than to lose oneself in metaphysical abstractions, which, instead of edifying, would only bewilder the reader. This the author never does, but manages to fix attention on the main points, which are presented in a way intelligible to the general reader.

Looking at his account of the Christian facts, we find that they are generally understated. This, however, may be pardoned in view of the class of persons whom he wishes to instruct, and who might be repelled by a stronger presentation. The points he insists upon are the following. We have first the revelation of love in Jesus, which, however, is not put in its highest aspect, as the love of God for fallen man; then we have Christ's miracles, which are softened down as 'works of healing.' After that comes Christ's idea of God and of man. Of God He taught that He is Father, and of man

that he is child of God: the whole resulting in the purifying of the Divine idea, and the marvellous elevation of man to a high position in the universe. The facts stated up to this point give rise to the question: Who was Jesus? The author does not state His Godhead, but veils it under the expression of 'a remarkable and exceptional Person, whom the Church believes to be God.' Of course, if He is God, his appearance as man was an Incarnation. It was God entering the world in human form, and under the limitations of humanity, as a redemptive force, to battle with the moral evil that afflicts mankind. Of the Incarnation the author says:

'If we form the highest idea possible of Divine love and grace, the amazing thing will not appear utterly incredible. On the physical and metaphysical side the doctrine may seem to present a difficulty bordering on impossibility, but on the moral side it is worthy of all acceptance. The world has a religious interest in the faith that Jesus is Divine; for what can be more welcome than the idea that God is like Him, loves men as He loved them—nay, is Himself personally present and active in that Good Friend of publicans and sinners?' (p. 52).

The next in order of the Christian facts is Christ's proclamation of the Kingdom of God and the Messianic hope. In dealing with this the author addresses himself to the question: Did Jesus think and call Himself the Christ? He mentions Dr. Martineau and those who think in his way, who decline to admit that Jesus identified Himself with the Messiah or allowed His disciples so to identify him. Dr. Martineau thinks that the title was given to Him by the Primitive Church, and was the earliest attempt of the Church at a theory of His Person. Among other reasons for adopting this view, Dr. Martineau thinks that the adoption of the Messianic title would have been inconsistent with the modesty of Jesus and the unity and harmony of his spiritual nature.¹ In reply to Dr. Martineau the author softens down the significance of the Messianic title a little too much; and then he concludes his enumeration of the Christian facts by an account of Christ's conflict with Pharisaism and His doctrine of sin.

Out of the Christian facts so stated the author gets the Christian theory of the universe, which serves as a norm for comparison with other philosophies. It consists of the following points: *First*, in regard to God, He is a Personal

¹ No doubt in this Dr. Martineau is right, *if Jesus were only man*. But this is just one of those points, of which there are so many, which would destroy the character of Jesus unless we pitch our idea of His Person very high.

Being, the term personal being used in the same sense as when we apply it to man. The ground assigned for this is that the relations asserted by Jesus to exist between God and man imply an essential likeness between the Divine and the human nature. Hence, since man is a being who reasons and wills, and distinguishes between right and wrong, God also possesses a reason and will and a moral nature. He is a rational, ethical personality, self-conscious and self-determining.

The *second* point in the Christian philosophy is the exaltation of man. Man is a child of God, taught by Jesus to address God as our Father. The place assigned to man in the universe is an important point in every philosophy. Pantheism and Materialism degrade man, while Christian philosophy exalts him. In this connexion the author would have the support of St. Augustine, whose favourite exclamation, *O homo, agnosce dignitatem tuam*, passed as a principle into mediæval theology. It is easy to see how this elevation of man is inwoven in the very substance of the moral code of Jesus, and how it was the moving principle of His self-sacrifice, as it is also of the self-sacrifice of His followers. The author also claims it as the great practical foundation of the hope of a future life. If God is our Father, He cannot be the Father of the dead, but of the living. We admit the great importance of this argument, though we do not, with the author, dismiss as worthless Bishop Butler's reasoning.

The *third* point in the Christian philosophy is the doctrine of sin, and what the author says on this head is exceedingly good and balanced. The points he insists upon are put under several heads. There is (a) its reality. Sin is not a triviality, an infirmity, a necessity, or the negative side of good. All such minimising views are characterized as insulting to human nature.

'They virtually,' says the author, 'represent man as a being so weak that it is idle to expect virtue from him; as a victim of necessity who only deludes himself when he imagines that he is free; as a thing, not a person, as a human animal, not a rational and responsible creature. Christianity commits no such offence against man's dignity' (p. 61).

The next point (b) is that sin does not originate with God. This is proved by the attitude of Christ, who came into the world to wage war with it. This attitude Christ could not have taken up if sin had not been eternally contrary to the Divine will. The same thing also comes out in His beautiful saying, 'There is joy in the presence of the

angels of God over one sinner that repenteth.' Again (*c*), sin is not to be conceived as a necessity, a fatal, incurable vice of nature inevitable for all men. Rather, from the fact that Jesus represented Himself as a moral physician, we are to regard it as a disease foreign to the normal condition of human nature, capable both of prevention and cure. The attitude of Christian philosophy is that sin might not have been, and that, existing as it does, it does not do so necessarily. The last point in regard to sin (*d*) is its relation to physical evil, disease, pain, sorrow, calamity, death. The remarks of the author on this head are very good. He inclines to the view of Schleiermacher, that collective evil in the world is to be regarded as the penalty of sin: social evil directly, physical evil indirectly.

From the consideration of sin the author passes to the *fourth* point in the Christian philosophy, which is the creation of the world by God. In stating the doctrine of creation he refers to a division of opinion on the subject which has come out in recent times amongst Christian advocates. Some of these, as, for instance, Dr. Matheson, have held it possible that the universe might be the creature and the abode of God even though it never came into being, but was like God, eternal, while others adhere to the old doctrine that it had a beginning. Our author suggests that it might guard all Christian interests if we say that the world *might have had* a beginning, and that if eternal it was so by God's will. At the same time, he points out the danger that might arise to the supremacy of God, and the dependence of the world on Him, from the idea of a world eternally existing. This idea, in truth, leads to one of two anti-Christian conceptions. The one is the Greek idea of $\epsilon\lambda\lambda\eta$, which is supposed to have existed first as chaos, and which, at a subsequent time, was shaped by God into cosmos: it is a view which lands us in incurable dualism. The other is the Pantheistic idea of the world as eternally flowing out from God. Under this latter view creation becomes a necessary emanation, excluding from God freedom, if not consciousness, and God becomes identified with the universe, differing from it only in name.

In regard to the supposed eternity of the world, it has not been observed that eternity cannot possibly be predicated of the world. Eternity is an attribute of mind and cannot be predicated of anything but mind. It is easy to say the world is eternal, but if we think out what we mean by the expression we shall see that we are giving utterance to a contradiction and an absurdity. No doubt very formidable meta-

physical objections may be brought against the affirmation that the world had a beginning. But they arise from an abuse or misapplication of the predicate of time. Time, *as we know it*, is applicable only to sublunary things. It is not applicable or suited to express the relation in which the world stands to the eternity of God. Our wisest course is to dismiss that relation as a thing too high for our comprehension. It is enough for Christian faith to believe that the world derived its being from God, and that the creation of the world was the bringing into being of time as we know time.

The *fifth* point in the Christian philosophy is the doctrine of Providence. The world was not only brought into being by God, but it is guided and ruled by Him in its onward progress. In stating this doctrine the author refers to an intensified Biblical view which almost seems to blot out second causes and to make God the immediate cause of events—a kind of Biblical Pantheism. We think, however, he has not quite caught the Biblical idea, which is rather the absolute dominion of God over all the causes of nature. This conception of God is eminently theistic, not pantheistic. Its conception of God is not that of a living soul *within* nature, but the conception of One who is *above* nature, to whom nature in all its details is subject. The Biblical idea was beautifully expressed by our Blessed Lord when He said: 'Not a sparrow falleth to the ground without your Heavenly Father;' and by the people when they said of Jesus, 'What manner of man is this, that even the winds and the sea obey Him?' The dominion of God over nature, although thus held to be absolute, is not to be conceived as arbitrary or capricious. The existence of second causes, which the Biblical view throughout contemplates is inconsistent with such a notion. The dominion of God is rather to be conceived as orderly. It is a guidance of nature in its onward course towards the attainment of His high ends and purposes.

The sixth and last point of the Christian philosophy is the hope for the future, which the author next goes on to deal with. It is the hope of 'new heavens and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness.' The hope is grounded on the redemptive work of Christ, and on the idea of the kingdom of God which He came to establish. That work and that kingdom must be perfected, and the essence of Christian hope lies in looking forward to and believing in this perfection. But we shall not pursue the subject farther. We would only remark that in thus drawing out and emphasizing the various points of the Christian system the author constructs a standard

by which he is enabled to measure anti-Christian systems. And this gives him a great tactical advantage. In dealing in the following chapters with Pantheism, Materialism, Agnosticism, and the other opposing philosophies, he is enabled, by contrast, to show more strikingly their defects, and the points at which they conflict with man's nature and most crying needs. Nor is he contented with a merely defensive treatment. He carries the war into the enemy's camp and points out the thinly veiled impotences and contradictions which are engrained in many of these systems. Altogether the first book is an exceedingly good one.

The second book, which deals with the history of Israel, is of a different character. We cannot regard it as in any way satisfactory. The ground covered by it is far too wide. To deal with it satisfactorily would require a separate treatise of no mean extent. Then, too, the way in which the subject is handled is confusing in the extreme. The mode of procedure is mainly historical and critical, but it is history and criticism paralysed by apology. In his character of apologist the author is debarred—or feels himself debarred—from exercising his own judgment as to the great facts. He feels compelled to receive the facts from others, and he does so receive them. He accepts what is practically the Graf-Wellhausen theory of the history of Israel, not without misgiving, for he declines to vouch for it as true. Apparently he does not perceive the gravity and far-reaching consequences of this acceptance, but they are plainly enough brought out in the course of the work. For having accepted the theory and made it the basis of his work, the theory reacts upon himself, and moulds and determines every conclusion at which he arrives. We will not ask how far such a mode of procedure is legitimate, but we would point out the confusion and perplexity which it must occasion to the unsophisticated reader.

But what we especially regret is that with the Graf-Wellhausen theory he accepts what is its most questionable and, we think, its weakest point, the unhistorical character of the early books of the Bible. From this point of view it is significant that, not only the primitive history, but the history of the patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and to a great extent also the history of Moses are all excluded from consideration in the work. We think this acceptance of the non-historical character of the early Bible is a conclusion of the greatest gravity which ought not to be adopted except under compulsion of the clearest grounds for it. We do not inquire

how far it would affect our faith in Christianity, but apart from that there is a practical consequence of the utmost importance. The Church has to deal not only with educated people whose faith has been shaken, but with the great body of the population to whom the Bible is all in all. Learned professors in the seclusion of their academic retreats do not think perhaps so much as they might of the toiling millions whose souls have to be fed, but to the working clergy it is a matter of life and death. These will ask: How is reverence for the Bible and Bible reading to be continued at all, if it goes out that a great part of it is fable; and above all how are we to continue to read it in Church? Looking at the matter from a practical point of view we do think that the non-historic view of the early Bible, if generally adopted, would shake the religion of the masses to its foundation, if it did not destroy it altogether. But then is it necessary to adopt this view? Is a Christian apologist at all justified in making it the basis of his treatise in present circumstances? Let us look for a moment at the question as it at present stands.

There are two aspects in which the Graf-Wellhausen theory may be viewed. From one point of view it is a criticism of the sacred documents: from another, a reconstruction of the sacred history. In its character of criticism it is comparatively harmless. It claims to have shown the composite character of the Pentateuch. On this head a great deal might be said. We think there is no doubt the Pentateuch is composite, though whether it is in the exact sense the theory supposes is a different matter. There are some, especially the Americans, who vehemently deny the practicality of the Wellhausen analysis, and affirm that even now it is on the point of collapse. But on the other hand there are so many able scholars who have accepted it that we do not feel inclined to call it in question. The point we would insist upon is that the composite nature of the Pentateuch is not inconsistent with its character as true history. Nay, we would go farther, and say that this composition, which has been the triumph of the negative critic and the despair of the orthodox, may at a future stage of the controversy quite change its character, and become one of the firmest supports of the credibility of the history. We thus see that there is nothing in the Graf-Wellhausen theory, viewed as criticism, that need alarm us. It is as a reconstruction of the history that it is dangerous, and therefore we must look at it from this point of view.

We may ask what are the grounds on which the history is

reconstructed? The answer is, they are mostly *a priori*. The students approach the history with certain prepossessions as to how the history must have run. All religious histories, they argue, do run somewhat in this way. There is first the savage state, the religious equivalent of which is animism; then comes the barbaric state, the religious equivalent of which is tribal and at a later period national gods; then, thirdly, there is the civilized state, the religious equivalent of which is ethic monotheism, or, if not quite this, at least worthier notions of God. The religious history of Israel, therefore, must have run in this way. It is true, the Bible says it did not run in this way at all, but in quite a different way. But the Bible, so they tell us, is not to be believed as against the theory. The Bible must be manipulated and reconstructed so as to make it agree with the theory. And so they proceed to reconstruct the history. The first dawn of history, they tell us, opens with the appearance of a number of barbarous tribes on the borders of Canaan. These tribes, which constituted Israel in its first historic stage, conquered the country, settled down, and assimilated themselves to the Canaanites, adopting their sacred places and generally their religion, though retaining their own God. Throughout the period of the Judges and the early kings they made some progress, but they never advanced beyond the idea of their God as a national God, who was to them very much what Chemosh was to the Moabites, or Milcom to the children of Ammon. It was at the Assyrian period that they made the greatest step in advance, the step which constituted them the Israel of God as we know them. Under the pressure and agony of that period they were, through the ministry of the prophets, lifted out of polytheism into ethic monotheism. Truly a wonderful step in advance, if only we could believe that it took place. But the fact is simply asserted, and no adequate reason or ground is given why it should take place. The only thing that is spoken of is the Assyrian oppression, though what that had to do with it is not easy to understand.¹

If we fix our mind on the appearance of the Israelites

¹ This 'immortal leap' of Wellhausen's and Kuenen's is deservedly turned into ridicule by Dr. Robertson (*Early Religion of Israel*, p. 316). Dr. Robertson complains that those who make so much of the orderly evolution of religious ideas always fail us at the very point where such orderly evolution is most required. Their evolution degenerates into a leap. The reader ought also to bear in mind the importance of the point where this failure occurs. It is the crucial point of the theory, which professes to give the orderly evolution of religious ideas in Israel from the lowest form of animism up to ethic monotheism.

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on the borders of Canaan as the first dawn of real history we shall get the point of view from which the theory regards all that went before. It is not history but myth, legend, invention. The primitive history is myth, and the stories of the Patriarchs are inventions. They were invented mainly with the view of glorifying the sacred places. In like manner the religious ideas and practices attributed to the Patriarchs are unreal. These ideas and practices could not have existed at a period so remote. They are nothing else but the ideas and practices of a later age, which have been projected into hoar antiquity so as to constitute a kind of glorified mirage.

This reconstructed history has been roughly handled. It is in truth assailable at many points, but we shall not enter upon that aspect of the question. It will be enough if we emphasize two exterior reasons which, in our opinion, render the theory quite impossible. Some time ago, when speaking of the time when the Tübingen controversy regarding New Testament history was at its height, we had occasion to remark that Providence itself had mingled in the fray. And so in truth it was. For at the very time that the strife was at its height there followed, one after the other, a series of discoveries of ancient documents, by means of which it became possible to trace the Gospel of St. John up to the very edge of the Apostle's lifetime, thus establishing a fact altogether at variance with the Tübingen theory. So it has also happened in the present case. Recent discoveries in archæology have quite destroyed the foundations of this reconstructed history. Has there really in this been a working of Providence? To many of the present day it may seem only a fancy to think that there should be One who is jealous of the honour of His Word, and who by His Providence brings to nought the counsels of opponents. It may be no doubt only a fancy—it is perfectly possible to think so ; but nevertheless the facts, both as regards the New and the Old Testaments, are exactly as we have stated them. But leaving this on one side, let us return to the theory. If we look at the elements of which it is composed we shall see that there are two presuppositions which are essential to it. One has reference to culture, the other to the art and practice of writing. Let us take culture first. According to the theory there was a progress among the progenitors of the Israelites from the savage to the barbaric state. At the period of the conquest they were in the barbaric state ; but if we go back to the date assigned to Abraham, or say to two thousand years before Christ, we should find them in the savage state, or just

issuing from the savage into the barbaric state. And this low state of culture, so the theory presupposes, was not peculiar to the Israelites, but at the dates mentioned was general over the whole east. It is clear that this is an essential presupposition of the theory; for if we allow to Abraham and to Moses, and to the ages in which they lived, a high degree of culture, the elements which form the very substance of the theory are destroyed. So also in regard to the art and practice of writing. The theory presupposes that it was not known, or at least not practised to any appreciable extent, till about the eighth or ninth century before Christ, when all at once literary activity in a variety of departments burst into full bloom. We wish in this case also to point out how essential to the theory is this view in regard to writing. For clearly if writing was both known and practised from the times of Abraham onwards, the ground for rejecting documents supposed to have come from these times is gone from us.

Such are the two presuppositions of the theory, and nothing could be more complete than the refutation which has been given to them by recent archæology. We now know that at and before the time of Abraham a high degree of culture existed, not only in Chaldæa and Egypt, but generally throughout the East. The written memorials of these ages recently discovered already fill volumes, and they are of the most varied character. There are not only historical records, but other departments of literature are represented. There was in Chaldæa the famous epic poem, the eleventh canto of which contains an account of the flood, and in Egypt the poem of Pentaur, which is placed before the exodus. Nor is this all. The Tell Amarna tablets show that, previous to the conquest, correspondence in writing was carried on in Canaan.

We are not concerned with the Wellhausen theory except in so far as it affirms the non-historical character of the Pentateuch. The point we maintain is that, in view of archæological results, it is impossible to affirm that written memorials of the times from Abraham onwards may not have come down to a later period, and formed the basis of the Pentateuch narrative whensoever and by whomsoever it was thrown into its present shape. At all events, the ground for denying the existence of such written memorials is taken away. Let us look at the circumstances and probabilities of the case. The family of Abraham was of princely rank, and that being so he probably received a Chaldæan education, and was

acquainted with such memorials of primitive times as then existed. If so, he might have brought with him from Ur of the Chaldees written accounts of these memorials. The elder Delitzsch affirmed that Abraham's family did so, and others have said the same. It is not, however, necessary for our argument to say more than that they *might* have done it. Similarly, the family of Jacob might have taken with them into Egypt written memorials of the Patriarchs. There is a foundation for such a supposition in the fact that subsequently Moses addressed the people in the words 'The Lord God of your fathers, the God of Abraham and of Isaac, and of Jacob hath appeared unto me,' thus appealing to a background of history well known to everyone. The only question that might arise in the case is whether God's dealings with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were events of such magnitude and of such importance to their posterity that we might fairly suppose they would be embodied in written memorials by those who we know could write if they chose to do so. In our opinion they were. The real truth is that the magnitude of the religious revolution effected in Abraham is concealed from our view by the way in which it is stated. It is given in the simple words, 'Now the Lord had said unto Abraham, Get thee out of thy country.' We take these words in the partly unreal way in which similar expressions are used by religious people at the present day; but it is plain that they meant in those days something very different. The more we reflect on the religious state of the world at that time, and the contrast exhibited to it in the life of Abraham, the more we see the greatness of the change effected in him. There was through him a real revelation of God to the ancient world. It is perhaps not too much to say that a light then shone which was, to the ancient world, something like that which the Incarnation has shed upon us. If, for instance, we look at the narrative of the flood in its Chaldean form, pervaded by the grossest Polytheistic notions, and destitute of heavenly meaning, and then look at the same narrative in the form in which it was handed down by Abraham to his descendants, we have in this contrast a measure of the magnitude of the religious revolution effected in Abraham.¹ But if the change was so great, there is nothing improbable in the idea that written memorials of God's dealings with Abraham and Isaac

¹ According to the advanced critics J wrote in the eighth or ninth century before Christ. How did J get the narrative of the flood? It is difficult to see how he could have got it unless it came to him through Abraham, for it is the *Chaldean* account purified which he gives.

and Jacob should be carried into Egypt and treasured there. Nor are we surprised that the simple words 'the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob' should, in the days of Moses, thrill through the hearts of the people.

When we come to the period of the Exodus we have to bear in mind the culture and the literature of Egypt as it then existed; we have to bear in mind the position of Moses in Egypt, and the fact, sufficiently probable in itself, that he was 'learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians;' we have to bear in mind, too, the effect of Egyptian culture and literature on the leaders of the people and on the people generally. If we do so, it seems impossible to doubt the existence of written memorials of the deliverance from Egypt and of the revelations, the deeds, and the legislation of the whole period from Egypt to Canaan. There can be no doubt that Moses and the leaders of the people could write if they chose to do so. And surely they had every motive to write in the stirring events through which they passed. We are told, in fact, that Moses was commanded to write certain things, and that he also wrote other things; and if we admit so much it is not irrational to suppose that others within the circle of the leaders wrote other things. Indeed, if we bear in mind what Egypt was, from which they came out, and even what Canaan was, which they conquered, it seems hardly credible that there should be no written record of the events through which they passed.

It seems thus probable that from Abraham's time onwards there were written memorials of Israel's history; and, if such existed, we may be sure they were treasured by the best and wisest of the nation. Hence the problem of the Bible, as we conceive it, is simply this: when, how, and by whom were these memorials woven into the Pentateuchal narrative as we possess it? Did the process commence with Moses, or with the generation of the conquest? or did the memorials remain unelaborated till, in the days of Samuel, they fell into the hands of the 'companies of the prophets'? Mysterious as is to us the religious life and the constitution of these companies, we at least know so far that certain members of the class devoted themselves to literary pursuits, especially to a study of the archives of Israel. We know, too, that in the opinion of that and subsequent ages they were 'prophets,' the 'earlier prophets'—that is to say, they were inspired men, receiving revelations from the God of Israel. Was it by them that the Pentateuch was moulded into its present shape? It is possible that the questions here raised may not be susceptible

of an answer; but it is seen that the light thrown upon the problem by archæology leads to an assured inference that in the Pentateuch we have a true history, and this inference is borne out in a remarkable way by the fact that every test of archæology or geography by which we can try the Pentateuch has resulted in its confirmation.

But our author, as we have seen, though he does not commit himself to the truth of the Wellhausen theory, yet bases his whole procedure on its conclusions. We think this a very serious step to take, and one which is altogether premature, even if we have regard to nothing else but the fact that the negative side have had their innings, while their opponents have not yet had theirs, but are only just beginning to score. Nor can it be doubted that the whole controversy will assume a very different complexion before it closes. However, the author makes his election, and on it bases the plan under which he goes to work. After the chapter on the sources, to which we have already adverted, he begins with the prophets. Why does he do this? Evidently under the pressure of the Wellhausen view, that the early history of Israel is not reliable history, but mostly legend. His object is to get from the prophets what they held and taught regarding God, and what view they took of the preceding history. He would thus establish a sure basis of fact amid the supposed surrounding legend. Then he subdivides his treatment of the Old Testament history under certain heads. There is a chapter on Mosaism; and this is followed by two chapters on Prophetism. Then we have a chapter on Judaism, by which is meant the Exilic period. This, again, is followed by a chapter on the night of Legalism; and then he concludes with two chapters, one on the Old Testament Literature, and the other on the defects of the Old Testament Religion and its Literature.

It is not necessary, nor have we space, to follow the author over this very extensive field; but we should like, in connexion with what we have already written, to make a few remarks on the chapter on Mosaism. In this chapter the author departs from Wellhausen's view in so far as that he attributes to Moses the giving of the Decalogue. It is pretty clear why he does so; for, having taken from Moses everything else, there would be nothing to write about on the subject of Mosaism unless he allowed to him the Decalogue. But what the author does not see is that by doing so he has really taken up an inconsistent and impossible position; for if we admit the Decalogue as a genuine Mosaic relic we take

up a position from which it is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid admitting much more; for clearly, if one thing could come down from Moses why might not a dozen other things just as well? And besides, the Decalogue implies a degree of culture, both civil and religious, on the part of Moses, who gave it, and on the part of the Israelites, to whom it was given, which makes it highly probable that it was not the only written memorial of the time.

Nor is this all. The Decalogue itself implies conclusions of a far-reaching import. If we take the opening words, 'I am the Lord thy God which brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage,' in connexion with the first commandment, we see that God is set forth as the only God, and that Polytheism is absolutely forbidden. Then comes the second commandment, which as positively and absolutely forbids idolatry. Polytheism and idolatry both excluded from Israel. It is truly a momentous fact, a fact which took Israel out of its age, and lifted it up to a towering height above the nations. For the full significance of these prohibitions can only be seen if we bear in mind the religious state of Egypt and of Canaan and of all the surrounding peoples. Nor is the significance less if we look at the two commandments on their positive side. The first commandment does not perhaps fully express Monotheism, but surely it implies it, and it must be taken in connection with the fourth commandment, which designates God as Creator. There is thus a positive command to have and to worship the Lord God Creator of Heaven and Earth, and to worship Him, not by images, but in some way quite different. When we have arrived at this point a multitude of questions crowd upon us. Was or was not Moses on the same level of ethic Monotheism as the later prophets? Was or was not the worship of the high places and of the calves a declension from a higher standard? We here touch the very essence of the Wellhausen theory. The advocates of that theory maintain that the worship of the high places and of the calves was not a declension, but the norm of Israel's worship, which came down from ancient times; and they accuse the prophets of misrepresenting the matter when they reprobate it as a declension. If, however, the Decalogue is the work of Moses, there can be no doubt that the prophets are right and the theorists are wrong. But apparently our author does not see that by ascribing the Decalogue to Moses he destroys the very theory which he accepts and makes the basis of his work.

Nor does the matter end here; for if the first two commandments were given by Moses, we may certainly conclude that a great deal more must also have been given by him. These commandments, as we have seen, prescribe an idea of God and a mode of worship which was wholly different from anything that prevailed at the time. Is it credible that no directions were added prescribing and defining the way in which Jehovah was to be worshipped? Surely not. And hence we see that in admitting the Mosaic authorship of the Decalogue we admit the whole principle of the ritual legislation. We admit that Moses must have prescribed ritual, however the ritual may have been accentuated and modified to meet the wants of future times. Nor are we yet at the end of our questions. We have already got a great and commanding idea of God, the idea of One who says, 'I am He and there is none beside Me,' we have also got a ritual worship differing entirely from anything that elsewhere prevailed. It may therefore further be asked, if Moses did so much for his people, is he not likely to have done more? Is he not likely to have hedged round the life of the people by laws and customs? We have, in fact, the observance of the Sabbath prescribed in the Decalogue, and in other parts admitted to be ancient the three great feasts. Thus admitting the Decalogue to be Mosaic, does it not draw after it, if we are to be logical, all that and more—in a word, a great part of the work and legislation of Moses?

We have given this in the form of an *argumentum ad hominem*, but it is much more than that. The truth is that the whole of the Old Testament is so welded together, its ideas and its facts are so dependent the one on the other, that if we put our finger on any point, and say, 'This is true, this is real history,' we speedily find that that admission involves a great deal more. We have a notable instance of this in the case of the prophets. Their works are admitted to be real history by the advocates of the new theory, but they find to their cost how little the prophets are calculated to serve their turn. We have seen how signally Wellhausen and Kuenen fail to account on natural grounds or by natural process for the ethic monotheism which pervades their writings. The prophets themselves tell us they did not attain to it at all in this way, but received it from ancient times. They throw us back upon a previous history—a history quite different from the new reconstructed history—a history which is substantially that of the Pentateuch and the early books. The Bible in fact is one, and that which makes it one is the

idea of Jehovah who has unveiled himself—Jehovah who says, 'I am He and there is none beside Me.' He spake to Abraham and revealed Himself through Moses. Touch the Bible at any point and this great idea, or rather fact, meets you face to face, and throws you back upon all the rest. It welds the Bible into one, and is the eternal difficulty of the naturalist theologian, who struggles and struggles in vain to get rid of it.

The third and concluding book of the author's work deals with Christianity itself. To those who are acquainted with Dr. Bruce's previous works much of its matter and many of its views will not seem new, only they are now presented to us as apology. Why they should be called or be thought to be apology we do not know. Certainly the author's ideas of Christian apology are not ours. Our idea of Christian apology is that of a work which would meet the wants alike of scholars and of the toiling millions—a work which would grapple with the great question which is crucial to every thinking Christian soul. Have we in Christianity a revelation from on high? In our opinion what Christian men and those who want to be Christian men look for to the apologist is, not to be informed on minor points and nice questions of New Testament criticism, but on this one great question which means the life or death of souls. But our author's work is not of this kind. The ground over which he takes us is mostly of the former character. Are we, then, to condemn the work on this account? We are far from doing so. We certainly think it is not apology, but it has its merits. It deals mostly with those remote, recondite, and difficult questions with which modern New Testament criticism busies itself—questions which may be guessed but which cannot be answered, and which are guessed according to the idiosyncrasies and prepossessions with which they are approached. Many a man would like to know the drift of opinion on these points, but is deterred by considerations of time and leisure, and by the formidable appearance of the volumes in which the information is enshrined. To such the author's third book will be very welcome, for it gives in small and easy compass exactly the information which is wanted. The author is remarkably well-informed and treats all his subjects with a light and easy touch; and it is pleasant in this way to be taken over the ground, and to be told what the great critics are thinking and saying.

The author begins with a chapter on Jesus viewed in Himself. Then comes another chapter which considers Jesus in

His character of Messiah. In this he deals with and answers Dr. Martineau's objection which we have already noticed. Then we have a third chapter which treats of Jesus as the Founder of the Kingdom of God, a subject on which the author has already written a separate treatise. After this comes a chapter in which the resurrection of Jesus is treated. In this chapter we are really upon apologetic ground, and as the subject is important, we may pause for a moment to see how the matter at present stands. The author's method is to consider in succession the various theories that have been brought forward to account for the resurrection, some of which are already well known. We have first of all the *theft* theory of Reimarus, which is deservedly dismissed as unworthy to be entertained. Then we have the *swoon* theory which was in favour with the older rationalists, and which, strangely enough, was patronized by Schleiermacher. There is certainly a case mentioned by Josephus of a person who had been crucified being recovered, but the objections to this view of the resurrection are overwhelming, and are stated with great force by Keim. The third theory is the *vision* theory of Renan and Strauss, which the author himself criticises with great ability and rejects.

All these three theories are well known, and are given in most manuals; but the author adds to the list two others which are perhaps not so well known. The first of these is the view of Keim which is designated the *telegram* theory, and which is given in Keim's own words:

'Without the living Jesus the Messianic faith had been destroyed by the Crucifixion, and in the return of the apostles to the synagogue and to Judaism even the gold of Christ's teaching had been buried in the dust of oblivion. The greatest of men had passed away leaving no trace of Himself. Galilee might for some time have related of Him truth and fiction, but His cause had produced no religious revolution and no Paul. It lands in impossibilities to make the ordained of God so end, or to hand over His resurrection from the dead and for the dead to the uncertain play of visions. A sign of life from Jesus, a telegram from heaven was necessary after the crushing overthrow of the Crucifixion, especially in the childhood of humanity. Even the Christianity of the present day owes to this telegram from heaven, first the Lord, and then itself . . . The hope of immortality, otherwise a mere perhaps, has become through Christ's word, and visibly through His deed, a bright light and clear truth' (p. 392).

The idea of Keim is that the Christophanies recorded in the New Testament were not hallucinations but had an objective cause. Jesus living in the Spirit produced the

manifestations which the disciples took for *bona fide* bodily appearances of their risen Master. The remarkable thing about this theory is that it is a resort to the supernatural by one who otherwise is a thoroughly naturalistic theologian. Keim frankly admits that the explanation is supernatural, but pleads necessity. The subsequent Christian history imperatively demands the fact of the resurrection, or something which is equivalent to the fact. Such an equivalent naturalistic theology cannot supply. The problem is too hard for it; and therefore in this solitary case appeal must be made to the supernatural. Faith is able to rise above the natural order to which science is bound down, and so faith, not science, must come in here. By faith we are assured that Jesus at death took His course to the world of spirits, and from that world it was He Himself and no other who gave to the disciples visions, and so revealed Himself to them.

Our author, however, points out certain difficulties which attach to this telegram view. To carry it out Keim is obliged to tamper with the Gospel narrative, and to call in question the empty grave. Then, too—which is more serious—the theory makes Christ so act as to lead the disciples into error. ‘Christ sends a series of telegrams from heaven to let the disciples know that all is well. But what does the telegram say in every case? Not merely, My spirit lives with God and cares for you, but my body is risen from the grave. That was the meaning they put upon the telegrams, and could not help putting’ (p. 393). But if that meaning was untrue to fact, they, and after them the whole Christian Church, were led into error. After all, the telegram is just as wonderful as a real resurrection, and if recourse must be had to the supernatural, the ordinary Christian would prefer to take the account of the Gospels as it stands, and to believe that the body of Christ was revived and transfigured, and so presented to be seen and felt and handled by the disciples. We must, however, accord to Keim the merit of boldly and candidly facing the problem, and, at a great sacrifice, trying to solve it.

The second of the modern theories is the view advocated by Dr. Martineau, following out, our author tells us, hints from Weizsäcker. It is to the effect that the Christophanies had no existence for the first disciples, that they originated in later traditions, and that it is these later traditions that are reported in the Gospels. Such being the case, the problem before us is simply this, to explain how the legend of the resurrection arose. The basis of the legend, according to

Dr. Martineau, is nothing more than this. The first disciples believed that the Crucified One 'still lives, and only waits the Father's time to fulfil the promises;' and he lives, not like ordinary mortals in 'the store-house of the underworld,' but with exceptional spirits like Enoch, Moses, and Elijah, in the home of angels. This faith came to them as a kind of reaction after the shock and grief of the crucifixion, just as, in ordinary cases, the sufferers from bereavement are wont to console themselves with the thought that the lost one still lives in a better world. Such is the sole basis of fact out of which the legend of the resurrection grew. But in what way did it grow out of this? It was in this way. The first disciples had a strong conviction and faith in Christ's celestial life, and this conviction they wished to convey to the minds of others. In order to do this more effectually they were in the habit in their preaching of saying that they had *seen* Jesus. If we wonder how they were justified in doing this, the edge of the objection is turned by an adroit reference to St. Paul. It is urged that when they affirmed they had *seen* Jesus they meant no more than St. Paul did when he said the same thing; but St. Paul's sight of Jesus, so we are assured, was purely spiritual. Another point, however, requires explanation. It may be asked, How are we to account for the legend of Christophanies of a more substantial character, such as that which convinced St. Thomas? The answer is, through the craving of the Jew and Pagan for something better than subjective visions in proof that Christ still lived. Under the influence of this craving hearers of apostolic preaching would be apt to convert spiritual visions into optical ones, and the Apostles themselves would be tempted not to be very careful to correct misapprehensions.

This theory is well criticized by our author under two heads—(a) Does it give a true account of the experience of the first disciples? and (b) Does it give a probable explanation of the rise of the more materialistic legend of the resurrection? We shall give the substance of what the author says in an abbreviated form.

To take (a) first. It is seen that it imputes to the disciples who were Jews the Pagan view of the immortality of the soul, whereas the Jewish notion of the future life was a reincorporated life, a life in which man was to possess a body, which, though lacking the grossness of the mortal body, was still perceptible by the senses. This objection has very considerable weight. But, in the second place, St. Paul's sight of the risen Lord is under-estimated and understated. When

St. Paul said he had seen the Lord, did he mean a subjective or an objective vision? At all events he meant something definite. He meant something that took place in space and time, something, too, that brought to him a firm conviction that then and there he had seen the Lord. This we may conclude from the emphasis he laid upon it, and the importance he attached to it. It is true the theory takes St. Paul's vision to have been subjective, and it tries to level down the Christophanies to the same subjective level. But St. Paul's argument requires exactly the contrary procedure. It is essential to him that he should level up, so to speak, his sight of the Lord to the objectivity and reality of the Christophanies. For the objection against him was that he was not a true Apostle, that he was not like those who had been with the Lord, and to this he replies: 'Have I not seen Jesus Christ our Lord?' In regard to the second head (*b*), the account which the theory gives of the rise of the legend is, that faith in the continued spiritual existence of Jesus produced the later tradition of optical visions, not the optical visions the faith. It is something like Strauss's theory that faith in Jesus as the Messiah produced the legend of His miracles. But in both cases the effect is put before the cause. To Strauss it might be replied that unless wonderful works had been done by Jesus the people would never have believed Him to be Messiah. And so in the present case it is enough to say, without such appearances as the Gospels record, faith in a risen Christ could never have come into existence.

But a much more serious objection to the theory remains. It is maintained that the first disciples, in order to convey to others their strong conviction of the continued existence of Jesus, were in the habit of saying in their preaching that they had *seen* Jesus. It may be asked were they justified in doing so? They would have been justified no doubt if they had something definite to go upon—something not less so than the visions St. Paul had. But if we suppose so we practically come back to the Christophanies of the Gospel. The theory, however, supposes that they had nothing definite to refer to—nothing beyond a strong inner conviction. How, then, were they justified in using such language, and more especially when they saw, as they could not help seeing, that it was literally taken? Our author asks: 'Is not this very like the reinstatement of pious fraud as a factor in the case, by reversion in part, or in a refined form, to the long-abandoned theory of Reimarus?'

The author sums up the whole case regarding the resur-

rection in these words : 'The result of the foregoing inquiry is that all naturalistic attempts to explain away the resurrection up to this date have turned out failures. The physical resurrection remains. It remains, it need not be added, a great mystery.' A mystery no doubt it remains, and will continue to remain ; but it is also at the same time a fact. And though we cannot fully understand it, yet a part of the veil has been removed. According to the Gospels, both synoptic and Johannine, Jesus intimated many times previous to His death that He would lay down His life and take it again. That was the great purpose for which He came into the world and lived His earthly life. And on one occasion He pointed out the end to be gained by His surrender. He would give His life a ransom for many. So also His Apostle, inheriting His teaching and filled with His Spirit, said : 'He died for our sins, and rose again for our justification.' It is only when elevated into this high sphere that both the cross and the resurrection attain their full significance ; and that both cross and resurrection were so elevated, in the very earliest times, there can be no doubt. Our object in mentioning this is simply to point out that the fact of this elevation in the earliest times reacts upon the evidence as no mean element in the proof. If St. Paul could say, 'if Christ be not risen, your faith is vain,' is it likely that he and those who thought with him, who had the means of testing the truth, would not make quite sure before they staked their lives on it ?

After dealing with the resurrection, the author goes on in his next chapter to treat of Jesus as Lord. After that comes a chapter on St. Paul, and another on Primitive Christianity. In the two following chapters he takes up the Gospels, dealing first with the synoptics, and after that with St. John. The concluding chapter is on Christ the Light of the world. There are many interesting points raised in these chapters which we should have been glad to discuss if our space had permitted.

ART. III.—THE PLACE OF CHRIST IN MODERN THEOLOGY.

The Place of Christ in Modern Theology. By A. M. FAIRBAIRN, M.A., D.D., Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford; Gifford Lecturer in the University of Aberdeen; late Muir Lecturer in the University of Edinburgh. (London, 1893.)

THE main position of Dr. Fairbairn's new book may be briefly described. It is that the historical and critical studies of the present century, following on philosophical inquiries by which they have been not a little influenced, have led to a clearer conception of the actual life and teaching of our Lord, and that this recovery of the historical Christ necessitates a theology in which He is the central figure, which tests all doctrines by their relation to the Fatherhood of God, and which declares the Church to be neither an infallible teacher nor a body limited by any external conditions, but simply the invisible communion of holy souls.

We do not propose to follow Dr. Fairbairn through all the details of his learned work. We have read with the greatest interest much which it will be impossible for us to notice here. The perusal of his accounts of some of the systems of the great German philosophers, and of the influence which they exercised on the theology of Germany, has been to us a task of real pleasure. But we shall perhaps be wise if we refuse to turn aside to subjects so fascinating as, for instance, the indebtedness of Baur to Hegel, or Schleiermacher, or Strauss, and confine our attention to some crucial points in the theology of the volume.

I. We desire to comment, in the first place, on the undue importance which Dr. Fairbairn assigns to the influence of the environments of the Faith in the early centuries of the Church. He frequently writes as if Christianity was affected not only in method of expression but also in its doctrines themselves by the forces by which it was surrounded. When he speaks of philosophy and various polities and heathen religion as determining the 'forms' which 'the life' of the Christian 'society' 'assumed' (p. 62), or when he says that the 'formation' of the 'doctrines of the Godhead and the Incarnation' was due 'to the speculative genius of the Greek theologians' (p. 81), he evidently regards the truths themselves which the Creeds contain as having been gradually

worked out by the Church under influences of the most different kinds. It is in harmony with this view that he should look upon the sub-apostolic writers as the poorest of 'religious authorities' (p. 55), and should think it an open question 'whether the Nicene theology did more eminent service or disservice to the Christian conception of God' (p. 91). And at a later point he writes:

'The doctrine which conceives God as Lawgiver and Ruler had as the main or active agent in its formation the Latin Church. But the doctrine which conceives the Godhead as a Trinity, or a threefold distinction of Persons subsisting in a unity of essence, had as the active agent in its formation the Greek Church. Each Church, as we have seen, exercised its formative activity under different conditions, the plastic agency being Roman law and polity in the one case, and Greek philosophy in the other' (p. 388).

In opposition to such teaching, it is to be remembered that there was from the first a deposit of the Faith. Careful study of the Gospels shows the pains which our Lord took in the training of the Apostles. It was not a training in character only, important as that was. It was a training also in knowledge and in belief. They were to be fitted to be teachers. The training did not end with His death. It was part of the work of the interval between His Resurrection and the Ascension that He should continue to teach.¹ It was part of the promised work of the Divine Spirit that He should 'guide' them 'into all the truth.'² Thus it is we find mention of a 'way' which could be expounded,³ and of definite truth which St. Paul had 'received,'⁴ of a 'pattern of sound words' and a 'deposit'⁵ committed by St. Paul to St. Timothy, of 'the faith' which St. Paul had kept.⁶

Early Christian writers confirm what the New Testament implies. To St. Clement of Rome it is one of the reasons why the clergy are to be obeyed that they are the successors of the Apostles, who received revealed truth.⁷ St. Ignatius refers repeatedly to the true doctrine which is in the possession of the Bishops of the Church.⁸ It is the 'word which was delivered unto us from the beginning' which St. Polycarp regards as the safeguard from error.⁹ Irenæus knows of and appeals to a 'rule of the truth' which was found throughout the whole Church, which had been received from the Apostles and

¹ Acts i. 3.² St. John xvi. 13.³ Acts xviii. 26.⁴ 1 Cor. xv. 3.⁵ 2 Tim. i. 13, 14.⁶ 2 Tim. iv. 7.⁷ St. Clem. Ro. i. 42.⁸ St. Ignat. *Eph.* 3, 4; *Magn.* 13; *Trall.* 6, 7; *Philad.* 1-3.⁹ St. Polyc. 7.

must be accepted by those who wished to be in the Christian society.¹ To suppose, as some seem to do, that the idea of a Christian tradition of central truth, first revealed and then handed down, is a growth of a later age, is to be false to all the evidence which the earliest writers afford.

Dr. Fairbairn describes with force, if without perfect accuracy, the differences in temper and habit and environment between Christians of the East and those of the West. Each such difference makes doctrinal agreement more significant. Widely separated Christians under greatly different influences believed alike because they inherited a tradition, and were taught to understand it by the Holy Ghost.

It is not, of course, to be denied that the terminology of the Church was enriched and modified as time went on. The words which express a truth accurately in one age will be inadequate to express the same truth under more subtle conditions of thought. To say what is both true and useful either a Church or an individual must speak in the language of the time. Nor again is it to be denied that inferences from central truths were more clearly seen and more fully expressed. It would have been a dead Church and not a Church living with the life of God and guided by the Holy Ghost which would have refused to assert the unity of the Person of our Lord because no such formula had been drawn up in an earlier age. But to express old truth in new terms, or to express what old truth really means and necessarily implies, is not to form a doctrine but to explain it.²

¹ Irenæus, *C. Her.* I. i. 20, ii.

² The admirable statement of St. Vincent of Lerins, *Commonitorium*, xxii., xxiii., is well known. See especially § 55: 'Sed forsitan dicit aliquis: Nullusne ergo in Ecclesia Christi profectus habebitur religionis? Habeatur plane, et maximus. Nam quis ille est tam invidus hominibus, tam exosus Deo, qui istud prohibere conetur? Sed ita tamen ut vere profectus sit ille fidei, non permutatio. Siquidem ad profectum pertinet, ut in semetipsam unaquæque res amplificetur; ad permutationem vero, ut aliquid ex alio in aliud transvertatur. Crescat igitur oportet et multum vehementerque proficiat tam singulorum quam omnium, tam unius hominis quam totius Ecclesiæ, ætatum ac seculorum gradibus, intelligentia, scientia, sapientia, sed in suo dumtaxat genere, in eodem scilicet dogmate, eodem sensu eademque sententia;' and § 58: 'Fas est etenim ut prisca illa cœlestis philosophiæ dogmata processu temporis excurentur, limentur, poliantur; sed nefas est ut commutentur, nefas ut detruncantur, ut mutilentur. Accipiant licet evidentiam, lucem, distinctionem; sed retineant necesse est plenitudinem, integritatem, proprietatem.' Cf. St. Aug., *Conf.* vii. 25, where, after stating the doctrine of the Incarnation and referring to some errors, he adds: 'Improbatio quippe hæreticorum facit eminere quid Ecclesia tua sentiat, et quid habeat sana doctrina.'

To allow for such a deposit of the Faith as we believe can be shown to have existed, the greater part of the first division of book i. of *Christ in Modern Theology* would have to be rewritten, and the rewriting of it might lead, we are disposed to think, to the necessity for no small alterations in other sections of the work.

We must protest, moreover, against Dr. Fairbairn's treatment of authorities in the same part of his book. When he writes of the teaching of Tertullian, 'The Son once was not, is derivative, a portion of the Divine essence, "secundus a Deo constitutus"' (p. 83); 'To be this' (*i.e.* "consortes substantiæ Patris," with whom He speaks "quasi cum ministris et arbitris ex unitate Trinitatis")' 'the Son and the Spirit' 'were created, for Son and Spirit alike owe their being to the Father' (p. 99), he is doing a great injustice to a writer who, if impatience and self-will made him differ on some points from the Church, was with regard to many truths a prominent defender of the Faith. It can hardly be necessary to point out to Dr. Fairbairn that it does not follow that because the Son and the Spirit 'owe their being to the Father' therefore they 'were created,' or because the Son 'is derivative' therefore He 'once was not.' If he should think that the passages he refers to in the treatises against Hermogenes and Praxeas¹ prove his point, it would have been only fair to quote with some degree of fulness other emphatic words of Tertullian, as, for instance, where he says :

'The mystery of the *oikonomia* is still guarded, which distributes the Unity into the Trinity, placing in order the Three, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, three indeed, not in condition, but in degree ; not in substance, but in form ; not in power, but in aspect ; yet of one substance and one condition and one power, because one God.'²

'The Word is always in the Father, as He says, "I am in the Father," and is always with God, as it is written, "And the Word was with God," and is never separated from the Father or other from the Father, because "I and the Father are one." This will be the *προβολή* of the truth, the guardian of the unity whereby we say that the Son is derived from the Father but not separated from Him.'³

¹ Tert. *Adv. Hermog.* 3 ; *Adv. Prax.* 2, 3, 7, 9.

² Tert. *Adv. Prax.* 2 : 'Et nihilominus custodiatur *oikonomia* sacramentum, quæ unitatem in trinitatem disponit, tres dirigens, patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum, tres autem, non statu, sed gradu ; nec substantia, sed forma ; nec potestate, sed specie ; unius autem substantiæ et unius status et unius potestatis, quia unus Deus.'

³ Tert. *Adv. Prax.* 8 : 'Sermo ergo et in patre semper, sicut dicit, Ego in patre, et apud Deum semper, sicut scriptum est, Et Sermo erat

No one who appreciates Tertullian's personal history will regard him as on all points a dependable writer, or will expect him at any time to use in every respect the exact language of the Nicene period. We do not think any who will really weigh his teaching will consider it fairly represented in Dr. Fairbairn's account.

Nor, after carefully thinking over the language of Justin Martyr about the *Λόγος*, can we regard the following passage as justly estimating his use of the word :

'Justin Martyr differs as much from John as from Athanasius ; his idea is inchoate, partly philosophical, partly theological ; his *Λόγος* is a *Θεὸς ἔτερος*, created yet divine, appointed Creator by the will of God, existing wholly in Christ, partially or seminally in man ; He is innate in all, and in Him all participate' (p. 85).

There were many questions present to the mind of Athanasius of which Justin can hardly have thought, and this would necessarily affect his language, but it is difficult, when his strong and variously expressed teaching of the full Divinity of the Son is borne in mind, to suppose he would have given any other answer to later questions than that the *Λόγος* was not a creature and that His essence was that of the Father and different from that of man. Justin had received the rule of the Faith, and he struggled to express in the old Platonic language the truth which was new to him.¹ If his phraseology differed at all from that of an earlier or later orthodoxy, it was not because the doctrine of the perfect Deity of the Word was being developed, but because different persons at different times were differently expressing the same truth.

Dr. Fairbairn's view on the subject we are discussing comes out clearly in a statement about the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. 'The Fathers,' he says, 'were slow in dis-

apud Deum, et nunquam separatus a patre, aut alius a patre, quia, Ego et pater unum sumus. Hæc erit *προβολή* veritatis, custos unitatis, qua prolatum dicimus filium a patre, sed non separatum.' To ascertain what Tertullian's opinion really was, this passage should be carefully compared with chapter ix. of the same treatise, especially with the statements, 'Ecce enim dico, alium esse patrem, et alium filium, et alium spiritum,' 'non tamen diversitate alium filium a patre, sed distributione, nec divisione alium, sed distinctione, quia non sit idem pater et filius, vel modulo alius ab alio.' It is a reasonable inference that, however awkwardly he may have written in some places, Tertullian's belief was that there are Three Persons in the Godhead of one substance and power and eternity. We are aware that Petavius (*De Trinitate*, I. v.) wrote severely of some treatises of Tertullian, but it was characteristic of that great theologian to make the most of any questionable language in the Fathers.

¹ Cf. Canon H. S. Holland in Smith and Wace's *Dictionary of Christian Biography*, iii. 574.

covering what the Apostles had so clearly seen ; ' touching ' the ' person and work ' of the Holy Spirit ' confusion reigned till late in the fourth century, and did not by any means even then cease ; ' ' in this point, as in so many others, though perhaps in this point most of all, the gap between the New Testament and the first three centuries of patristic literature is such as no theory of development can bridge ' (p. 490).

It would be absurd to say that there was nothing left for the end of the fourth century or for the fifth or later centuries to think and write freshly about the Holy Spirit. But we do say there was a definite tradition with regard to His Person and work which was received from the Apostles, and which can now be traced. When St. Clement of Rome joins the Holy Spirit with the Father and with Christ, and speaks of them as ' the faith and the hope of the elect,'¹ he testifies to His Godhead. When he says that the Scriptures were given by the Holy Spirit,² he is conscious of His work. St. Ignatius could associate the Spirit with the Father and the Son as though equally God, while speaking of them in such a way as to imply that they are distinct in Personality,³ and could say that the Spirit was from God.⁴ He knew it was the Holy Ghost who caused the conception of our Lord by the Blessed Virgin,⁵ and that it is the Holy Ghost who sanctifies Christians.⁶ The theology of Justin may need to be greatly supplemented with regard to the Spirit, but at least he links Him with the Father and the Son.⁷ When it is considered that there is clear and definite teaching about the Person and work of the Holy Spirit in Irenæus⁸ and the Epistle of the Churches of Lyons and Vienne,⁹ in Tertullian¹⁰ and Cyprian,¹¹ in Clement of Alexandria,¹² Origen,¹³ and Cyril of Jerusalem,¹⁴

¹ St. Clem. Ro. i. 46, 58.

² *Ibid.* 8, 13, 16, 22, 45.

³ St. Ignat. *Magn.* 13.

⁴ *Ibid.* *Philad.* 7.

⁵ *Ibid.* *Eph.* 18.

⁶ *Ibid.* *Eph.* 9; *Philad.* *ad init.*

⁷ Just. M. *Apol.* i. 13.

⁸ Irenæus speaks of Him as the eternal Breath of God (*C. Hær.* V. xii. 2), as the giver of prophecy (*ibid.* III. xx. 2), as present in the Church (*ibid.* III. xxxviii. 1), as working in Baptism (*ibid.* III. xviii. 1), and in the Eucharist (fragment xxxvi. in Harvey's arrangement; cf. *C. Hær.* IV. xxxi. 4).

⁹ He is referred to as the Spirit of the Father and the helper of the faithful: see Eus. *H.E.* V. i. 29.

¹⁰ He is the Third Person in the Trinity (*e.g.* *Adv. Prax.* 2), the guide of the Church (*e.g.* *De Virg. velandis*, 1), the worker in Baptism and Confirmation (*e.g.* *De Bapt.* 4-8).

¹¹ He is the Third Person in the Trinity (*De Orat. Dom.* 23), and is received in Baptism and Confirmation (*e.g.* *Epp.* lxiv. 3; lxxiii. 9).

¹² See *e.g.* *Pæd.* i. 6; iii. 12.

¹³ See *e.g.* *De Princ.* I. præf.; I. ii. 13, iii.; II. ii. 1, vii. 1, 2.

¹⁴ *Catech.* xvi. xvii.

the 'gap' between the New Testament and the end of the fourth century does not appear to be so impassable as Dr. Fairbairn seems to think.

We have dwelt on these instances because they illustrate our main contention. We are convinced that the right conclusion to be drawn from the study of the early Christian writers is that there was a body of central truths handed down as a sacred deposit, sometimes indeed misunderstood, sometimes poorly and inadequately, or even clumsily, expressed, not seldom mingled with philosophical speculations which were a source of weakness as often as a source of strength, needing from time to time fresh and fuller and clearer statement, but still the true and traditional doctrine of the Church of Christ.

II. The repetition of a particular phrase appears to be an indication that Dr. Fairbairn deliberately minimizes the propitiatory side of the Atonement so far as an objective action with regard to God is concerned. For he says:

'In Christ's ideal of religion . . . God . . . appears primarily, not as a God of judgment or justice, but of mercy and grace, the Father of man, who needs not to be appeased, but is gracious, propitiuous, finds the Propitiator, provides the propitiation' (p. 48);

'Its' (*i.e.* of the religion of Christ) 'God did not need to be propitiated, but was propitious, supplying the only priest and sacrifice equal to His honour and the sins and wants of man' (p. 49);

'This Atonement . . . exhibits God as a Being who does not need to be appeased or moved to mercy, but who suffers unto sacrifice that He may save' (p. 487).

There is no doubt that the doctrine of the Atonement has often been taught in such a way as to place an unnecessary stumbling-block before thoughtful minds. Language has been used which, by appearing to associate mercy and love exclusively with the Son, and wrath exclusively with the Father, has practically made a severance in the unity of the will of the Holy Trinity. The ideas of substitution and satisfaction have been emphasized to an extent which has made the act of Atonement arbitrary and altogether unconnected with those who are redeemed, and has led to many false notions about the penal consequences of sin. But at the present time, among educated persons, there is more danger in the reaction from teaching such as we have described than in the teaching itself. While it is necessary to lay the strongest stress on the mercy and love of the Eternal Father, who willed that man should be saved from sin and its consequences, it must not be forgotten that the 'wrath of God' is

a scriptural phrase which sums up a deeply-embedded scriptural idea. The work of the whole Blessed Trinity is a work of love; but while God is what, by the law of His Being, He must of necessity be, perfectly holy, His attitude towards sin can only be that of hostility. And, since this is so, does not His very Nature itself require an act of Atonement for sin? It is not only that for man's sake a terrible penalty is needed in order that he may not think sin something light. If the righteousness of God is real, and if the distortion of sin has laid real hold on the nature of man, there is objective need of an act of Atonement in a Sacrifice offered to God. And this surely is the true teaching of the Bible. The anticipations of Atonement in the Old Testament uniformly point to the holy Being of God requiring sacrifice for sin to be offered to Him. In the New Testament it is not only said that we are reconciled to God, but also that Christ's death is a ransom. It will not do in a reaction from a false emphasis or in the fear of alienating any from the Christian Faith to give up the ideas of propitiation, of substitution, of satisfaction. God willed that man should be redeemed, but still He required the removal of an actual barrier created by sin between Himself and man. Christ is the Head of our race, and joins us to Himself, but still if He had not been the victim we must have borne eternal loss. Many results of sin continue to afflict the race of the redeemed, but still the price has been paid in the Death of the Incarnate God. St. Anselm wrote in the language of his time, and used methods of argument uncongenial to our own days, but the underlying thoughts coincided with the truths of the Christian Faith.

Such a belief is in no way inconsistent with the Fatherhood of God. If He whose nature required an act of atonement Himself willed that it should be made; if He who cannot allow the violation of His law to be unpunished Himself provided means that the race in whom the violation had taken place should be restored; if He with whom none but the holy can dwell gave His own Son to bear the darkness of Calvary rather than inflict on the human race the penalty of eternal banishment from Himself, we may see in God the Father of man. And it is a mistake to say, as Dr. Fairbairn asserts, that the conception of the Fatherhood of God was practically unknown to the Fathers of the Church both in the East and in the West. They would indeed have shrunk from ideas which are suggested by the phrase 'the kindred natures . . . of God and man' (p. 493; cf. p. 115), and would have repudiated such a belief in the participation by man in the

essential Deity of God as would be required to justify the passage (pp. 390-1) in which Dr. Fairbairn argues that a son 'by adoption not by nature' is not a son at all. But of the Fatherhood of God in the true sense, as of the Being in whose image all the human race is created, to whose moral likeness all who will are to be conformed, who has provided means of restoration and sanctification which are designed to lead His children into eternal blessedness in His own immediate presence, the great writers of the Church, both Eastern and Western, are full. It is not a question of a passage here or a passage there. The *Confessions* of St. Augustine, the *De Incarnatione* of St. Athanasius could never have been written by men without this belief. The very mistakes of Origen, even the sternness of St. Jerome, testify to its existence. The Church's grip on truth and power of life mean a knowledge of sonship.

III. As Christ's work is propitiatory, so Christianity is a sacerdotal religion. To Dr. Fairbairn

'It has no temple, save the living man ; no sacrifices, save those of the spirit and the life ; no sensuous sanctities. . . . It stood among the ancient faiths as a strange and extraordinary thing—a priestless religion, without the symbols, sacrifices, ceremonies, officials hitherto, save by prophetic Hebraism, held to be the religious all in all. And it so stood, because its God did not need to be propitiated, but was propitious, supplying the only priest and sacrifice equal to His honour and the sins and wants of man. In that hour God became a new being to man, and man knew himself to be more than a mere creature and subject—a son of the living God' (p. 49).

It 'is a kingdom without any political framework, without any machinery of chartered officials, or spheres of "covenanted mercies," or "recognized channels," or "authorized instruments of grace," but composed of holy men, distinguished by their love and ministry, extended by the preaching of the Word, and the persuasive influence of spiritual character. . . . If we seek its nearest analogy we shall find it in the visible invisible Church of the Reformers ; if we seek its deepest contrast, where is this likelier to be found than in the canonized offices of bodies sacerdotal and ecclesiastical?' (p. 519).¹

The Epistle to the Hebrews explains at length the priest-

¹ We think the account of the growth of 'the sacerdotal tendency' on pp. 102-6 very misleading. For instance, St. Ignatius, for whom it is said the episcopate had 'no sacerdotal' significance, distinctly connects the necessity for Episcopacy with the Eucharist in *Eph.* 5, 20 ; *Philad.* 3, 4 ; *Smyrn.* 8. In the passage quoted from Tertullian on p. 103, note 5, he is stating the Montanist position, and he speaks quite differently when in *De Pras. Har.* 41 he is writing from the standpoint of the Church. The real significance of the differences is entirely ignored by Dr. Fairbairn.

hood and the sacrifice of Christ. As the 'effulgence of the glory' and the 'impress of the substance' ¹ of the Father, He is the true representative of God to man. As possessing human nature, He is the true representative of man to God. ² As eternally begotten, and as declared to be a priest, He is appointed to His office by God. ³ He is thus able to fulfil the ideas of priesthood by bestowing on man the blessing of God, by sympathizing with man, by mediating with God for man. His sacrifice is His own blood ⁴—that is, according to the Scriptural phraseology, ⁵ the dedication of His life even unto death. ⁶ It was offered unto God as the unblemished sacrifice of an unstained manhood empowered by Deity. ⁷ This sacrifice, offered on the Cross, was presented to the Father in the true tabernacle of Heaven, ⁸ and is an abiding offering. ⁹ Henceforward the very presence of Christ in His humanity in Heaven is the pleading of His sacrifice. He is a Priest for ever, ¹⁰ and the sacrifice is a sacrifice for ever also. ¹¹ He, indeed, can no more die in the death which sin made an essential feature of sacrifice, ¹² and which, once borne, bestows sacrificial efficacy on the life beyond it. He, indeed, can no more subject His body to the pains of the way of sorrows and the Cross, because it is glorified with the powers and conditions of His risen and ascended life. But that which is most fundamental of all, the dedication of life, the pleading of the human nature which has passed through death to be a living offering, is His action so long as He is a Priest.

His Priesthood implies a priestly ministry of men. That all Christians are in a true sense priests because they have access to God does not make a priestly order impossible. The Jewish nation, as the chosen people and the vehicle of revela-

¹ Heb. i. 3, ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης, χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως.

² Heb. ii. 14-17.

³ Heb. v. 4-6.

⁴ Heb. ix. 14.

⁵ Cf. Westcott, *Epistles of St. John*, additional note on i. 7.

⁶ Cf. St. Bernard, *De Erroribus Abaelardi*, viii., where, after saying in § 21, 'Non mors, sed voluntas placuit sponte morientis,' he adds in § 22, 'Salus erat in sanguine.'

⁷ Heb. ix. 14. If the words διὰ Πνεύματος αἰώνιου refer to the divine nature of Christ, the meaning is that it was the union with His Godhead which gave the efficacy to the offering of His manhood. If they refer to the Holy Spirit, part of the meaning is that as the sanctity of His manhood resulted from the working of the Holy Spirit, the faultless offering might be said to be made through Him. Whatever the right interpretation of this particular phrase may be, it is clear that it was the Deity of Christ which made possible the efficacy of His death. See an admirable note in Bright, *Select Sermons of St. Leo the Great on the Incarnation*, pp. 82, 90 in edition 1, pp. 134-5 in edition 2.

⁸ Heb. ix. 24.

⁹ Heb. x. 12.

¹⁰ Heb. vii. 15-17.

¹¹ Heb. x. 12.

¹² Heb. ix. 22.

tion and the race in which God was to become man, was a kingdom of priests.¹ But, none the less, the tribe of Levi and the family of Aaron had their special offices, and the high priest had his functions which no one else might perform. So in the Christian religion there are those who bestow on men the gifts of God, and who in special ways plead with God for men, who are the divinely appointed organs through whom the Christian society exercises its powers, as the body sees through the eye and speaks through the mouth. Dr. Fairbairn says that if Christ 'is to remain the ideal' of 'the ministry,' it must be a ministry that neither renders, nor cultivates, nor practises sacerdotal sanctities' (pp. 517, 518). If he means, by a false use of the word 'sacerdotal,' that Christian ministers are not to be arrogant or unreal, we heartily agree. If he means, as certainly he does elsewhere, that they have no sacerdotal powers to exercise, we would remind him that the ministry of Christ which supplies the 'ideal' included when he was on earth acts of blessing with divine power, and the offering on the Cross of His Body and His Blood, and includes now in its glory the prayers for His people which are offered with the pleading of the Humanity that has passed through death into glorious life, a 'Sacrifice for sins for ever.'²

If, then, Christ's death is propitiatory, and if the permanence and exaltation of His Humanity are the means by which the once offered sacrifice is continually pleaded, the whole sacramental system of the Catholic Church becomes intelligible. Baptism, as conveying to the individual the benefits of Christ's death and uniting him unto the power of Christ's life, has a reasonable aspect. Baptism regarded as a definitely appointed rite with objective results implies the whole principle which is involved in the other Sacraments. Moreover, the existence of a visible Church as the place of reconciliation and of receiving God's grace is reasonable also.

Such a conclusion is in accordance with the teaching of Christ Himself. No sufficient answer has ever been given to the arguments which declare that when our Lord said that a man must 'be born of water and of the Spirit'³ He referred

¹ Ex. xix. 6.

² Heb. x. 12.

³ St. John iii. 5. We have, we think, a right to protest against Dr. Fairbairn's curt and positive statement, 'The infant, whether baptized or unbaptized, will not perish. Christ calls all little children unto Him, and says, "of such is the kingdom of heaven." And the way into His kingdom is not guarded by any sacrament which men may give or withhold' (p. 460). The question about unbaptized infants is too difficult to be dismissed in a sentence, and those who have realized how awfully one life may unconsciously be affected by another will be slow to make

to Baptism, and that when He spoke of the necessity of eating His Flesh and drinking His Blood¹ He referred to the Eucharist. It is difficult to reconcile Dr. Fairbairn's confident assertion, 'Nowhere is there a phrase or term that so much as hints at any sacerdotal office, or act, or any official accessories' (p. 518) with the commissions of our Lord to baptize,² to forgive and retain sins,³ to celebrate the Eucharist.⁴ It is no less difficult to make any other theory than that of a visible Church harmonize with our Lord's evident intention to make the Apostles the nucleus of a future society, with His institution of baptism and the Eucharist as signs of His people, with His constant description of His Church as a kingdom.⁵

The same conclusion, moreover, is congenial to and does not contradict the truth of the Fatherhood of God. A Father's love may appoint a ministry and external means by which His children may have closer access to Him. A Father's love may show His children where His truth may be most perfectly known and His grace most fully received. So far from its being true that 'the higher the theory of the Church the meaner the conception of God' (p. 547), a high theory of the Church exalts the wisdom and love of Him whose work she is.

IV. Dr. Fairbairn's view of the Incarnation bears the mark of the evil influence which has been exercised by the Lutheran theologians. Instead of the Scriptural and Catholic doctrine that the Incarnate God possessed whole and unimpaired the true Nature of God and the true nature of man in an indivisible personal union, he accepts a theory which practically means a modification of the Divine Nature in the Incarnate Life :

positive assertions as to what may be the results of men giving or withholding. It is not always sufficiently remembered that theologians of the greatest orthodoxy, including St. Thomas Aquinas (*S. T.*, Appendix, i. 1, 2), have held that unbaptized infants attain to natural bliss. But their thoughtful consideration of the subject differs wholly from Dr. Fairbairn's way of speaking of it, and their conclusion is as far as possible removed from a crude assertion that the fact of Baptism or the want of it makes no difference.

¹ St. John vi. 53.

³ St. John xx. 23.

² St. Matt. xxviii. 19.

⁴ St. Luke xxii. 19.

⁵ We do not understand Dr. Fairbairn's meaning when he says, 'The neo-Catholics . . . seem almost with one consent to have forgotten the kingdom,' *i.e.* of Christ (p. 516), possibly because we are not sure whom he means by 'neo-Catholics.' But we should have thought that from his point of view his complaint against any whom he might so designate would have been rather that they exaggerated the idea of the Church as a kingdom.

'A supreme renunciation was necessary: He had to stoop from the form of God to the form of a servant. This act is described as a *kenosis*, an emptying of Himself. Now, this is precisely the kind of term we should expect to be used if the Incarnation was a reality. It must have involved surrender, humiliation; there could be no real assumption of the nature, the form, and the status of the created Son, if those of the uncreated were in all their integrity retained. These two things, the surrender and the assumption, are equal and coincident; but it is through the former that the latter must be understood. We may express what it means by saying that the Incarnation, while it was not of the whole Godhead, only of the Son, yet concerned the Godhead as a whole. And this carries with it an important consequence: Physical attributes are essential to God, but ethical terms and relations to the Godhead. In other words, the external attributes of God are omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence; but the internal are truth and love. But the external are under the command of the internal; God acts as the Godhead is. The external alone might constitute a Creator, but not a Deity; the internal would make out of a Deity the Creator. Whatever, then, could be surrendered, the ethical attributes and qualities could not; but God may only seem the more Godlike if, in obedience to the ethical, He limit or restrain or veil the physical' (pp. 476, 477).

It is not the same thing to 'limit or restrain or veil' as to 'surrender.' Catholic theology recognizes that our Lord might through His Humanity regulate the exercise of His Divine powers. But it is bound to assert that He did 'retain' the 'nature, the form, and the status' 'of the uncreated' Son of God 'in all their integrity.' Were it otherwise, the Divine nature itself would be capable of change. Dr. Fairbairn does not help his case by his distinction between the 'external attributes of God,' that is, 'omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence,' which he regards as having been abandoned by the Divine Son in His Incarnate Life, and the 'internal' attributes of 'truth and love,' which he regards as having been of necessity retained. The attributes of God cannot be so separated from His essential Nature as to make it possible for any of the Persons of the Godhead to deprive Himself of His Divine attributes without ceasing to be what by the law of His Being He is.¹

It would be expected that Dr. Fairbairn would apply his conception of the Incarnation to the question of the knowledge of our Lord. And accordingly we find him writing:

'If Christ in His historical life be conceived as a conscious God who lives and speaks like a limited man, then the worst of all

¹ Cf. Pearson's *Lectiones de Deo et Attributis*, lectio iv. (*Minor Works*, ed. Churton, i. 33-42).

forms of docetism is affirmed. For it is one which dissolves Him into infinite unreality. If He knows as God while He speaks as man, then His speech is not true to His knowledge, and within Him a bewildering struggle must ever proceed to speak as He seems, and not as He is' (p. 353).

It will be observed that this is no matter merely of the knowledge of our Lord's human mind. It is the even more important subject of the knowledge of His Divine Nature. To say, as Dr. Fairbairn does, that 'as God' He divested Himself of His omniscience when He became Incarnate is to trifle with the fundamental conceptions of the Being of God.

This is illustrated by our author himself. The phrase that 'the natures in their union condition each other' (p. 479), objectionable as it is, might perhaps be capable of an orthodox interpretation if it stood by itself. But elsewhere he writes, referring to the Divine Nature of the Father as well as of the Son :

'Must not the act by which the Son emptied Himself have affected and, as it were, impoverished the Godhead?' (p. 484).

'Theology has no falser idea than that of the impossibility of God' (p. 483).

The Incarnation was the acquiring by the Son of God of a nature which He did not before possess ; it was not in any sense the surrender of that which from eternity He was. If we should suppose that He, instead of exercising Divine powers under certain conditions of human life,¹ ceased to

¹ In speaking of the exercise of Divine attributes under such conditions it is necessary to remember that the question of knowledge differs in important respects from that of power. This has lately been very powerfully stated by the Bishop of Oxford in the following passage : 'That our Blessed Lord in the Incarnation did, by His own determinate counsel, one with that of the Father and the Holy Spirit through whom He offered Himself without blemish, place Himself under conditions by which habitually He regulated the exercise of His Divine power in and through His Humanity, I think is a matter of unquestioned Catholic doctrine—an habitual self-restraint put upon the exercise of those powers of fulness of the Godhead which dwell in Him bodily : a restraint upon the display of the treasures of wisdom and knowledge which are all in Him, hidden whilst He was with us, but never suspended or laid aside, never dissembled or repudiated, a *πλήρωμα* with which *κένωσις* has no common term or element. . . . The limitation of knowledge is a very different thing from the limitation of the exercise of power. Power itself has its essence *in posse*, its manifestation in exercise of will ; knowledge has its essence *in esse*. We cannot, in our thought, define or intelligently explain away the knowledge of the Lord Incarnate. We cannot conceive that He could have knowledge and not use it, as He could have power and not exercise it ; His omniscience is of the essence of the per-

possess those powers, the doctrines of the Incarnation, of the Atonement, of the immutability of God, would all be imperilled.

It is the duty of Christian theologians to keep clearly in view the true and perfect Humanity of our Lord. But it is no less a duty to emphasize the reality and the perfection of His Deity. It is because true God, possessing all the powers of Godhead, dies in human nature on the Cross, that the Sacrifice has the infinite efficacy of the Atonement for all the sins of the whole race. If either nature at that supreme moment was impaired, or if they were not indissolubly united in the one Person of God the Word, we should look in vain for that which is required in the 'High Priest of our confession.'¹

Dr. Fairbairn cannot 'accept the Incarnation as the material and determinative doctrine' (p. 450) which is the test of truth. It is true, of course, in one sense that 'it is a derivative, or secondary and determined doctrine' (p. 451), because it presupposes the doctrines of God and of Creation. But it is at the same time, to borrow his phraseology, 'determinative,' because, as he himself in a later chapter mentions, it is 'the supreme act of revelation' (p. 509). When a modern theologian bids us, though taking as a 'formal source' 'the consciousness of Christ,' yet test our beliefs by an abstract idea of the Fatherhood of God (pp. 450-2), we go back to older words: 'No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him.'²

V. It is not unconnected with questions we have discussed that Dr. Fairbairn should undervalue the teaching of the Old Testament on the subject of sin:

'Nothing,' he says, 'so marks the Levitical system, as a whole, as its inadequate sense of sin and its consequent defective notion of sacrifice.'

'Sin . . . is not simply a religious, but a specifically Christian notion; indeed, we may describe it, whether understood as idea or consciousness or both, as an express and peculiar creation of Christianity' (p. 454).

The teaching and death of Christ, in their fuller revelation of the Nature of God and the enormity of offences against Him, increased and deepened the knowledge of what sin is. But the place and office of the Old Testament in the dispensation in which manhood and Godhead united in Him' (Bishop of Oxford's *Charge at his Second Visitation*, April and May, 1893, pp. 17, 18).

¹ Heb. iii. 1.

² St. John i. 18.

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sations of God is misunderstood if it is not regarded as a great teacher on the subject of sin. It is true that among the Jews wrongdoing was regarded as 'crime,' as being 'an offence against the God who had instituted the state;' it is true some conditions were regarded as 'uncleanness,' as being offences 'against the ritual of the Temple;' it does not follow that 'there was too little of the spirit and the truth in' the 'Deity' of 'Judaism' 'to enable it to comprehend the awful idea of sin' (p. 454). The Jews were not faithful to the purposes of God, but, unless St. Paul wholly misunderstood the Old Testament Scriptures, to form an adequate idea of the awfulness of sin was one great work of the Jewish dispensation. The 'approximations in Old Testament writers to the Christian idea' which Dr. Fairbairn so grudgingly recognizes did not exist so much because 'the standpoint of the priest and the scribe' was 'transcended' as because Samuel¹ and David² and Asaph³ and Isaiah⁴ and Jeremiah⁵ and Hosea⁶ and Amos⁶ were among those who knew what the ritual commands of God meant.

VI. We are thankful that Dr. Fairbairn is careful to deny the false idea that 'whether men will or not they must be saved,' and goes on to say:

'Compulsory restoration is only another form of annihilation. Freedom is of the essence of man, and he must be freely saved to be saved at all' (p. 467).

But we regret his assertion of what he calls 'eternal possibilities of salvation.' It is in harmony with what we know of human nature and of life that there should be a period of probation which affords a true test of character, and that at the end of this period the eternal destiny of the soul is determined. And we think this to be very clearly taught in Holy Scripture. The saying of our Lord that a condition in this life may imply 'eternal sin,'⁷ the solemn warning that the ordinary opportunities of this life are sufficient for every purpose,⁸ the great picture of the decisions of the day of judgment⁹ coincide with much in the Epistles¹⁰ and the declaration of finally determined states of good and of evil in the Revelation¹¹ in showing that the probation of man is not an endless process.

¹ 1 Sam. xv. 22, 23.

² 2 Sam. xii. 1-23; Ps. xl. li.

³ Ps. l.

⁴ E.g. Isaiah i.

⁵ E.g. Jeremiah v. vii.

⁶ Hosea and Amos throughout their prophecies have the most intense sense of the meaning of sin.

⁷ St. Mark iii. 29.

⁸ St. Luke xvi. 31.

⁹ St. Matt. xxv.

¹⁰ E.g. 2 Cor. v. 10; Heb. ix. 27.

¹¹ Rev. xxii. 11.

VII. We have criticised freely a book which is evidently the outcome of study and thought in the conviction that the writer's opinions on several important theological doctrines are not in accordance with true beliefs. We are conscious that an answer might be made that our whole standpoint is different from his, and a claim set up that his standpoint is that which corresponds to the attitude of our Lord towards God. For he writes in the preface :

'What God signified to Jesus Christ He ought to signify to all Christian Churches ; and here all can find a point from which to study themselves and their systems. Theology as well as astronomy may be Ptolemaic ; it is so when the interpreter's Church, with its creeds and traditions, is made the fixed point from which he observes and conceives the truth and kingdom of God. But theology may also be Copernican ; and it is so when the standpoint of the interpreter is, as it were, the consciousness of Jesus Christ, and this consciousness where it is clearest and most defined, in the belief as to God's Fatherhood and His own Sonship. Theology in the former case is geocentric, in the latter heliocentric ; and only where the sun is the centre can our planetary beliefs and Churches fall into a system which is but made the more complete by varying degrees of distance and differences of orbit' (Preface, p. viii).

Dr. Fairbairn would, therefore, probably say that our theology is 'Ptolemaic.' We claim, on the other hand, that the Incarnate God, Who is the Revelation of the Father, and the Saviour and Teacher and Example of man, is the centre of our Faith. We welcome all scholarship and research and historical inquiry which may present to us more accurately and vividly what He did and said. We value the doctrines we believe because we are convinced they are taught by Him or implied in His Nature or teaching. The visible society of the Catholic Church is to us a holy home of truth and grace because when we have weighed His words and His actions we can see no other adequate explanation of many of them than that He intended to found such a Kingdom as we hold the Church to be. If we receive with unquestioning acceptance the Church's universal and permanent decisions, it is because we believe His utterances mean that the whole body cannot commit such apostasy as the clear assertion of untruth would be, and that she is the organ through which the Divine Spirit speaks. If the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament are authorities to us it is because they are certified by His words or accepted by the Church which He declared to be the teacher of truth. Sacraments are of value because He commanded the use of them, and, taught by the Church

He appointed as our guide, we see in them the means of union with Him. In His Death and Resurrection, His perfect Sacrifice to the Father and His triumph over Satan and the grave, we place our hope. To His Life we look as our Example. To His teaching we submit. And if we should refuse to accept anything which we cannot but believe to be implied in His work and words, we should count the sin to be that we were failing to make Him the centre of thought and life.

If, indeed, we are mistaken, if the idea of a visible Church is a delusion, and there is no body known by outward signs to which the promise of never being overcome by the powers of evil has been given, if the Bible as a revelation is less unique than we think, if Sacraments are only tokens which do not convey objective grace, if the meaning of the Sacrifice is not so profound as we hold it to be, our fault is not that we have not tried to take Christ as the centre of our Faith, but that in listening to Him we have misunderstood His words.

And of the interpretation of the Gospels which in its main features may be traced through the centuries of the Church's history till we find it in the earliest writers as something which they have received, and that which individuals have puzzled out for themselves, which is the more likely to be the true teaching of Christ?

ART. IV.—W. G. WARD IN THE CHURCH OF ROME.

William George Ward and the Catholic Revival. By WILFRID WARD, author of *William George Ward and the Oxford Movement*. (London, 1893.)

IT often happens that when a man 'goes over to Rome' he seems to pass altogether into another world. His old friends look askance at him, for a great gulf has been fixed between himself and them. His attitude towards all things changes, and he acquires a new set of interests, in which most Englishmen have no share. He is apt to become denationalized and to look at things from a foreign standpoint—a standpoint which belongs to his newly-adopted foreign allegiance. It is not merely that he professes certain beliefs which a large number of his countrymen reject: the centre of gravity of his existence has shifted, and his highest life draws sustenance

from Rome. A suspicion—often an unreasonable suspicion—of disloyalty attaches to him; and it is regarded with some surprise if he distinguishes himself in his new environment.

It is surely a testimony to the very high level of ability existing among the Tractarians and their immediate followers that of the body of Englishmen who seceded in that connexion two should have become cardinals and another should have attained so significant and powerful a position in the Roman Church as William George Ward. For, whatever may be said of the wisdom of the policy which Mr. Ward defended, there can be no question that his influence was powerful and effective, and that the existing state of things in the Church of Rome owes much to his activity. He did not, of course, wholly escape the sarcasms which are applied to those whose views suffer a serious change. The school of Roman Catholicism to which he was opposed ascribed his fervour to a convert's zeal; but his influence was felt in spite of this. Moreover, Mr. Ward was not only a power in the Church of his adoption, but he was also effective in the open field of philosophical speculation. He succeeded in causing a split in the ranks of those who professed to base their philosophy on mere experience, and this by the unhopeful means of articles in a Review.

The bulk of the present volume is occupied with the history of these two achievements on the part of Mr. Ward. The previous work, describing Mr. Ward's relation to the Oxford Movement, has given us fuller details as to his life and character. The biographical portions of the present volume seem rather to complete the sketch of Mr. Ward's life, and to illustrate the permanence of characteristics already described. There is one important exception to this—the account of Mr. Ward's career as Professor at St. Edmund's. The whole of this section throws an interesting light on the history of Romanism in England. The College of St. Edmund's was 'the St. Sulpice of the Catholic body in this country, in which the clergy of all the southern dioceses went through their theological studies.' The description given of it by Mr. W. Ward, as it was when his father went there, is curiously uninviting. It was 'remarkable for the universal prevalence of the old style of Catholicism, with its unostentatious faith and piety' (p. 7). 'There was not much intellectual culture, and the religion itself was of the silent kind' (*ib.*). 'Men deficient in intellectual attainments and breadth of view, however exemplary in piety, were in many cases in power, and they feared the revolutionary influence of those

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who had so recently passed over from traditions and customs which were strange and suspect' (*ib.*). 'Catholicism in a Protestant country had gradually become . . . dry and undemonstrative, and had lost the warmth and abandon of earlier days and of Catholic Christendom' (p. 52). It was into an atmosphere like this that Mr. Ward found himself introduced when he left Oxford and came to live in the neighbourhood of Old Hall; and it was not only a severe disappointment to him, but it seemed beyond all hope. Mr. Ward, who was in the eyes of the authorities a mere layman, who had entered into the condition of matrimony, was the very last person in the world who could reasonably hope to effect a change. The change, however, did come when Ward, under the influence of Cardinal Wiseman, was made Assistant Lecturer in Dogmatic Theology. This appointment led Ward to study minutely the whole field of Catholic theology, and inspired him with the hope of presenting a wholly new ideal of Roman priesthood. Although Mr. Ward declined to call himself Professor of Dogmatic Theology, and would only accept the title of Assistant Lecturer, he did not scruple to revolutionize, so far as in him lay, the methods and aims of the College. This he did with his customary vehemence. 'If a practice or a rule seemed out of harmony with his view he said so, and did his best to get it changed. . . . If a professor appeared to be opposing the system he was attempting to promote he did his best to get him dismissed' (p. 53). Although, therefore, he always lectured with a priest in the room to act as censor of his doctrine, he did not play by any means a secondary part in the administration of the place.

We cannot but feel in sympathy with Mr. Ward in his work at St. Edmund's College. He had very great and unusual gifts as a teacher; he was a man of extraordinary intellectual power and profound devotion; and even though the character of Old Hall was 'peculiarly English'—though the practices and methods of Ward were startling 'to English reticence on the deeper life of the soul, and on the practices connected therewith' (p. 52)—and though, again, the work carried on by the Vice-President (Vaughan) and Ward was 'a reflection from one point of view of Continental Ultramontaniam' (*ib.*), it cannot be denied that a new strain of vigour and reality was imparted to the Roman priesthood in England. A decisive proof of this may be found in the enthusiasm of so many of Mr. Ward's pupils, of which there are several touching testimonies in this book. Though him-

self never in Roman Orders, Mr. Ward certainly achieved a priestly work.

The work done by Mr. Ward at Old Hall, which was, as already indicated, 'a reflection of Continental Ultramontanism,' brings us into the presence of one of the greatest questions raised during Mr. Ward's life—that of the Infallibility of the Pope. This is a matter as to which the non-Roman mind is, as a rule, in a state of profoundest perplexity. The history of the idea, the precise meaning of the formula of the Vatican Council, the relation of the decree to obviously mistaken decisions on the part of the Papal Chair, are all points calculated to mystify the average British Churchman. Why should the question have been raised at all? he asks. Why should the Pope make a claim which seems to be in the very teeth of facts? And how can there be room for difference of opinion or discussion in a Church like that of Rome, where everything is decisively settled? Mr. Wilfrid Ward's chapter on the growth of the New Ultramontanism is a valuable one, in that it clears up some of these difficulties. Put shortly, its meaning is that the assertion of Infallibility was necessary in order to counteract the spread of revolutionary principles. 'Protestantism,' it was held with Heine, 'is the mother of free thought; and free thought means in the last resort religious negation.' Further, in the field of politics the French Revolution represented the emergence of the principles of free thought into the field of practice, and involved the virtual ruin of the order of the State.

'The Revolution and the Napoleonic wars had impaired the old constructive elements in politics and in religion' (p. 84).

'The old *régime* was sick to death; a new state of society was coming; the Church must enforce the old doctrine of Fénelon as to the papal prerogative; but it must use it as a principle of united action and of social order of quite new importance, because the old principles were failing. A standpoint which had been for Fénelon mainly theological came to bear an international and directly practical character. Ultramontanism was to be the principle of order and authority and the principle of unity among Christians as the Revolution was among the representatives of democratic anarchy' (p. 85).

The Pope was thus to be the actual centre of all the constructive and positive elements in religion and politics: as universal Sovereign and as central fount of Truth.

It must be admitted that this puts a somewhat different colour upon the Papal claims. They are made in view of certain definite circumstances; and they are made in the

interests of Christianity and the due order of life. However strange and fettering they may appear to us, it remains that they have a real basis of reason and are not arbitrary assertions of a capricious desire for power. Everyone admits that there is a danger in the unrestricted freedom of speculation. Everyone admits that a social order once so violently disturbed as by the French Revolution must carry with it the scars of the convulsion for ever. The break-up of old traditions never can be as if it had not been. There is no return or backward movement in things. And even if the essential truths, which belonged to the old system, live again under new circumstances, and in a new atmosphere, they can never have again the old undisputed certainty; there must always hang round them a certain amount of hesitation or doubt.

Mr. Ward's connexion with the recent Papal determinations was almost entirely owing to his speculative instincts. In the long account given of the years of controversy in the book before us we hear little of the Pope as Sovereign, but of the dangers of Liberalism in thought, the tendency of one particular party towards disloyalty to Rome, and the need of doctrinal safeguards. It must be admitted that Mr. Ward's mind was one to which the affirmation of Infallibility was attractive. A man who could say, as he is reported to have said, that he should like a new Papal Bull every morning with his *Times* at breakfast must have had an abnormally developed taste for decisiveness in such matters. We have therefore in Ward exceptionally advantageous conditions for the reception of the new dogma; and his attitude towards various questions which arose before the actual problem shows clearly enough the direction of his thought. He was strongly opposed to Newman's idea of founding a college in Oxford for the education of Roman Catholics. He maintained that secular education could not be separated from religious. 'I have never been able to understand,' he writes to Newman, '(even as a theory, apart from the question of agreement or disagreement) the opinions which I find so generally prevalent as to the essential distinction between ecclesiastical and secular education.' Hence, though he regretted the gradual disappearance of the classics from the education of Catholics, he had no sympathy with Newman's schemes for improving the educational position of members of the Roman Church. When, however, certain writers took upon themselves to criticize the methods of Romanist historians as invalid, to censure some even of the Papal utterances on scientific ques-

tions, and to minimize the range of the teaching office of the Pope, Mr. Ward was excited to the most violent opposition. It does not lie within our scope to describe the circumstances which led up to the Vatican Council; we can only indicate such facts as bear on the intellectual character of Mr. W. G. Ward. It would seem that among Roman Catholics previous to 1870 there were three distinct attitudes towards the definition. There were those who deplored it altogether, there were those who were prepared to accept the dogma, but regarded it as having mainly a negative and restrictive value, and there were those who thought that the Pope's decrees or statements were a source of positive instruction, requiring no interpretation by the Church or the *Schola Theologorum*, but conveying direction and support to any person, lay or cleric, whom they might reach. The decision reached by the Council after long and anxious deliberation was to the effect that the Pope has, in his right as Pope, the infallibility which belongs to the Church. The extent of this infallibility was not defined, and an historical introduction was added

'avowedly designed to prevent extreme interpretations of the decree. It was to show "in what manner the Roman Pontiffs had ever been accustomed to exercise the *magisterium* of faith in the Church," and to prevent the fear lest "the Roman Pontiff could proceed (*procedere possit*) in judging of matters of faith without counsel, deliberation, and the use of scientific means"' (p. 262).

Thus

'while the decree condemned the Gallican view that the consent of the Church is the test of the validity of a definition, the Fathers enforced the share of the Church as represented by bishops, synods, and scientific theologians, in its framing, and, by consequence, the practical necessity of their aid in its interpretation, and in determining what was infallibly and irreformably decreed and what was not' (p. 263).

Mr. Ward's view was more strict than this; at any rate, in the years during which the matter was under discussion. He never identified himself with the absurd and blasphemous extremities to which some French writers seem to have been led. He never had any sympathy with those who addressed Pius IX. in a hymn 'almost identical with that addressed to the Holy Ghost on Whit Sunday.' But, as his son tells us, he 'suffered in popular estimation from association with the general line of the *Univers*,' though he came across it 'too seldom to be aware of its extravagances, and was consequently unfamiliar with one chief cause of irritation against the school to which, in some sense, he belonged' (p. 247).

One of the results of this attitude on Ward's part was a serious difference with Newman. Newman accepted the whole doctrine, as defined by the Council, but he put an interpretation upon it which recent publications have shown to be in accordance with the mind of the Council. Ward pressed Newman with the logic of the situation as he had done before in Oxford; he identified him, in part at any rate, with the Liberal school of Catholics, and thought him dangerous accordingly. It would seem that Newman never thought of denying the truth of the dogma in itself, but he did fear the effect of defining it at that particular time. It was in this sense, and in this sense only, that Newman objected to the dogma. This is an interesting circumstance as described by Mr. Wilfrid Ward. For it surely ought to put an end to the persistent assertions that Newman's Romanism was a reaction from blind scepticism. It was Ward and not Newman who felt the necessity of the definition as a bulwark against all revolutionary ideas. Newman was prepared to bring the Church into something like connexion with the movements of the time. He was prepared to recommend a freer type of education for the Roman Catholic youth; he deprecated the erection of any new dogmatic barriers which might put obstacles in the way of conversion. He allowed, to put it shortly, practical considerations of policy to have their place in deciding the question. With Ward it was quite different. He lived amid abstractions. He thought of the questions at issue, apart from the persons professing and defending them, as intellectual realities at war one with another. He saw what was involved in the formulæ of both sides and was not satisfied without the complete assertion of that which he held to be true. It is easy to understand how profoundly annoying Newman's modified and balanced statements must have been to a mind like Ward's, and, on the other hand, how irritating Newman must have found the hard logical pressure of Mr. Ward's position. It cannot but have seemed inopportune and practically obtuse. One can easily understand, therefore, how misunderstanding should have arisen. But it remains that Mr. Ward's position was the most logical and it may be questioned whether it is not also the most intelligible. If it be indeed true that the whole debate arose out of the reaction and alarm caused by the spread of revolutionary principles, one cannot quite see what could be done on these particular lines, except a definition of Infallibility somewhat in Mr. Ward's sense. There are two ways of meeting views which contravene current opinion. One is to enter the arena of

controversy, face the opponents on their own ground, and lay bare the final grounds of opposition between the party of change and the Church. This is usually a matter of first principles. There is a difference lying hidden somewhere under the superincumbent mass of discussion which is the cause of all the subsequent divergence. To reach this and to display it must lead to some issue—some fuller mutual understanding, or an acquiescence in disagreement. This is the most scientific method, and is, on the whole, far more conducive to the interests of truth. But it has disadvantages. It takes a long time, and, in the meanwhile, leaves the bulk of the faithful in perplexity. They hear their most cherished convictions assailed, criticized, and condemned, and they look vainly for a defender; the subtle disputations, through which the matter really moves on towards settlement, seem to them to be vague and meaningless. There can be no question that for these the most satisfying method of meeting innovations is the authoritative condemnation of the new views, and the emphatic reassertion of the old ones. The ideal presentation of this method of controversy must be an infallible voice. If an authority, which is infallible just in the most sacred regions of human thought, defines decisively, once and for all, what is true and false in the matters under discussion, what more can anyone want? The scientific process of beating out the truth may go on, fast or slow as the case may be, but the believer, who cannot enter into the scientific debate, will wait calmly for the end, knowing that, if it is true, it will not differ from the utterance of his infallible voice.

It is difficult to see what could be gained by any new definition that fell short of this. To say that the Pope is infallible in the same sense as the Church, but at the same time to say that the aid of the Church is required to frame the Pope's decrees, to decide when the Pope is talking infallibly, and what he means when he does so talk, is, we think, a comparatively meagre assistance to the perplexed. We do not see what the Romanist gains by his Romanism, except the belief that the gift of infallibility which belongs to the Church is, in some not very clear way, concentrated in and exercised by the Pope. And we cannot imagine why this should be—why one Bishop should exercise this prerogative—superseding even the decisions of Councils—unless the object is to secure the unity of the voice. And what is the use of a single voice unless it is to be more decisive than the gradual expression of the Church's mind which comes out through history? Mr. Wilfrid Ward notes that the school

represented by his father failed to understand or value the Pope's 'complex action in giving breathing time, checking precipitation, protecting weak minds, occasionally enforcing the superior importance of other interests over the intellectual, acting at times justly as a ruling power by condemnations which were not philosophically exact, and might be ultimately cancelled' (p. 208). We cannot but feel sympathy with Mr. W. G. Ward in this matter. If an infallible authority is going to bestow condemnations right and left in philosophical matters, it ought to take care that they are philosophically exact, and it is a serious thing for an infallible authority to have to withdraw from any position to which it has committed itself. To be infallible and then wrong may lead to the reputation of being infallibly wrong.

We are quite prepared to admit that Cardinal Newman's view of the matter was the practical and possible one. Facts are too strong for the logical creations of Mr. Ward. But that does not prevent Mr. Ward's theory from being in closest harmony with Roman tendencies. For the essence of Romanism as a distinctive thing is applied logic. The Immaculate Conception, the worship of saints, the dogma of transubstantiation, are all translations into practice of logical principles; they are the concrete embodiment of logical deductions or intellectual requirements: the theoretical conception of the Pope as the concentration of the powers of the Church is as much a logical abstraction as a *summum genus*. Such logical creations may be difficult to work in practice, but, when there are so many of them, and when the practical account of them differs necessarily so widely from the theoretical, it becomes important to inquire whether they are desirable at all; the whole system which involves them becomes suspect. We do not know how the dogma of infallibility is now explained inside the Roman Church. We are sure of this, that it acts as an attraction to a certain class of minds, but we have never known of anyone thus attracted by it whose conception of it was not far more like that of Mr. Ward than that of Cardinal Newman. Their mistake is explained to them, no doubt, when they secede: perhaps in the face of the *Collectio Lacensis* and the book now before us, secessions will be more rare.

In his later days, when the view which he had combated upon the subject of Infallibility had made itself supreme, Mr. Ward accused himself of 'premature logical completeness.' There can be no question that this was one of his intellectual faults, as he himself admits. We have endeavoured to show that there was some justification for his attitude in the case

just discussed. We must now pass to his more definitely philosophical work, in regard of which he was no less of an effective influence, though the 'intellectual fault' in question is conspicuous by its absence. In Mr. Ward's days the empirical philosophy of Mill reigned supreme. This system, as everyone knows, was based ultimately on the philosophy of Locke and Hume. It was maintained almost as an axiom that nothing was known or knowable except 'states of consciousness.' The mind was passive and merely received impressions: it began business, so to speak, as a *tabula rasa* upon which the world of things made marks and signs. This, which was the primary type of knowledge, was also the ideal type. Through it the mind obtained hold on fact, on reality. All else, the abstractions, the universal notions, the relations between things (except so far as they were given in experience) were ascribed to the 'work of the mind' and held a lower place in the scale of reality than the empirical facts on which they were based. Association through frequent repetition of particular experiences was the means by which general truths were attained. The mind got into the habit of looking for the effect after the cause, until at last it came to believe that the sequence of cause and effect was necessary and indefectible. The philosophical position which was thus based was applied to the destruction of the arguments for the Existence of God, for miracles, and for freedom of will. The whole burden of experience, it was argued, points in the direction of uniformity. The reason why our conviction is so firm that nature admits no variation, is that our empirical associations are all in our way. No one ever *experiences* a change in the order of things: he does experience, and that not infrequently, the fact that men make mistakes—are deceived—regard as supernatural that which wider knowledge explains. Freedom, miracle, even the existence of God, involve in some sense the possibility of a breach of uniformity. And there is no immediate empirical evidence of the reality of such ideas. Is it not probable, therefore, that they are delusive?¹ But not only was the exceptional character of free activity a cause for criticism, it was argued that the phenomena of human action could be explained on other grounds. It was maintained that the action which resulted in any given case could always be explained out of the play of motives which were in operation before. Any surprises in the calculations of

¹ Mr. Mill in his later thoughts upon the subject admitted the possibility of the existence of a limited Creator. But it will be seen that this is hardly more than the final link in a chain of causation.

consequents must be accounted for by our incomplete knowledge of the antecedents.

Such is a rough and isolated account of those points in the dominant philosophy which Mr. Ward set himself to attack. The position of Mill hinged on two principles. It assumes the validity of association, and it denies the possibility of any intuitive method of knowledge, over and above the passive process of receiving impressions. The method pursued by Mr. Ward was to show the dependence of the principle of association upon the validity of the act of memory, and to demonstrate the intuitive character of memory.

'We would thus address,' writes Ward, 'some phenomenistic opponent. You tell us that all diamonds are combustible, and that the fact is proved by various experiments which you have yourself witnessed. But how do you know that you ever witnessed any experiment of the kind? You reply that you have the clearest and most articulate *memory* of the fact. Well, we do not at all doubt that you have that present *impression* which you call a most clear and articulate memory. But how do you know—how can you legitimately even guess—that the present *impression* corresponds with a past *fact*? See what a tremendous assumption this is, which you, who call yourself a cautious man of science, are taking for granted. . . . You gravely reply that you do *not* assume it as a first principle. You tell us you trust your present act of memory because in innumerable past instances the avouchments of memory have been true. How do you know—how can you even guess—that there is *one* such instance? Because you trust your present act of memory: no other answer can possibly be given. You are never weary of urging that *a priori* philosophers argue in a circle; whereas no one ever so persistently argued in a circle as you do yourself. You know, forsooth, that your present act of memory testifies truly, because in innumerable past instances the avouchment of memory has been true; and you know that in innumerable past instances the avouchment of memory has been true, because you trust your present act of memory. The blind man leads the blind, round a "circle" incurably "vicious" (p. 328).

This contention concerning the act of memory which was admitted by Mr. Mill gave an opening to the process of intuition as conceived by Mr. Ward. If, in a crucial instance such as this, Mr. Mill's principles could be shown to be deficient, the possibility always remained that other cases of intuition could be found. Mr. Ward found his further instances of the intuitive power of the mind in the conceptions of geometrical and moral necessity, and in the notion of Cause. The arguments used, as Mr. Wilfrid Ward points out, by him to establish this position, are similar to those of Kant.

'Certain truths are known not *a posteriori* or from experience,

and not analytically: they were *a priori* and synthetic. . . . Establish that the necessity of "must" belongs to a region outside contingent experience; that the sanctity and binding power of "ought" cannot be explained by the mere experience of the consequences of our actions to ourselves and others, and it is seen that the rational nature has taken flight from the ground; that it moves freely and securely, outside and far above the most developed and fully analysed grouping of the association philosophy' (p. 333).

The method of reasoning used by Mr. Ward consists in showing the impossibility of deriving the universal truths of geometry from sensuous experience, and the irresolvability of moral intuitions. It will not be necessary to reproduce them here. Though exceptionally clear and able, they are not widely different from many others which are now familiar. The point to which they are made to converge by Mr. Ward is the truth of Theism. 'If there be necessary Truth there must be a necessary Being on whom such Truth is founded' (p. 345).

In regard of the controversy upon Freedom, Mr. Ward attempted to prove the existence of some personal power over and beyond the force which was the resultant of previous history and of character. The passages relating to this question in the present work are not very many, nor are they very complete. We cannot but think that, though Mr. Ward's arguments are decisive against those with whom he was immediately in controversy, they are not valid against any one to whom the 'will's spontaneous impulse' is something more than the 'mere balance of emotional craving and excitement.' Mr. Ward shows by an analysis of what happens in a conflict of desires, or under the pressure of an ethical imperative, that something is present which is in no sense the result of desire. To this he gives the name of anti-impulsive resolve (p. 356). But though his contention is certainly valid so far, it does not seem to us to carry the case for Freedom, because it does not explain the relation of the man's self to the crowding host of impulses and desires which press in upon him. We shall return to this point later on.

We have now endeavoured to put before our readers in very rough outline the philosophical controversy in which Mr. Ward was engaged: and the question which now remains is this. What was the value of Mr. Ward's contribution? How far was the position assumed by him one of permanent interest and value?

I. In the first place, Mr. Ward was well advised in attacking the foundations of Mr. Mill's philosophy. Mill's views

about the existence of God, and about the moral sense, were the result of his first principles. It was futile, therefore, to batter away at these philosophical inferences so long as the principles remained undisputed or uncriticized. And further, it is always true in the last resort that it is the analysis of knowledge which determines the rest of a given philosophy. According to the theory maintained by a given philosopher as to the validity and certainty of knowledge, so will his view be as to the contents of knowledge. Hence Mr. Ward must be admitted to have been guided by a true philosophical insight in his method of attack.

II. It is not given to every one to cause such a sensation in the opposing ranks of philosophers as was produced by Mr. Ward by his intuitive theory of memory. For when the result of his analysis was realized in full, it was found to mean far more than the clever production of an *instantia contradictoria*. Mr. Ward's account of it was in no way an exaggeration. It did destroy the whole position of his opponents: it did prove that, on a logical construction of their own premises, they would not only be incapable of every advanced form of knowledge, but even of understanding the meaning of a single sentence. Mill and his school had completely forgotten the great complexity of those acts of thought which seem most simple. They had assumed that ordinary impressions and the ideas built upon them were beyond analysis. Mr. Ward's argument had the advantage of recalling them to the true state of the case. The memory, he showed, was involved in the most complicated manner in every act of thought. Mill, as we have noticed before, admitted the importance of Mr. Ward's argument, though he never saw the full significance of it. 'Bain contented himself with the admission that Mill's position was a surrender, and that the question was one to which he did not at present see an answer' (p. 329). But besides the advantage of causing a stir among philosophers, Mr. Ward's contention had another great strength belonging to it. It was an intelligible argument that required hardly any philosophical training to appreciate. The most ordinary common sense could see the vicious circle involved in the position of the empirical school. And it is no doubt due to this fact that the contention of Mr. Ward has had the effect which has been ascribed to it.

Notwithstanding this, however, it is open to criticism in regard of its finality. It is, after all, an argument from an instance: it is, therefore, valid as an objection—as an engine

of destruction to the opposing theory; it is not in itself, though it contains the suggestion of, a positive constructive principle of philosophy. The use made by Mr. Ward of his successful demonstration of intuition as a possibility was to clear the ground for the production of other instances—in geometry and ethics. And in dealing with these questions, he does not—if we may judge from the account in the present work—attempt to present his philosophy as a complete scheme; he shows the incapacity of empirical principles to prove universal truths. You have, in memory, an instance always before you, he seems to argue, of this philosophical incapacity. The strain, to which you are obliged to put your principles in dealing with mathematics and morality, is a sign of a similar incapacity in a much more abstruse region. Mr. Ward had implicitly in his possession that which seems to us to be the key to the whole position. The reason why the memory cannot be explained on the basis of empiricism is that in all thought the mind stands outside the stream of mere impressions, and by its own activity formulates them into thoughts. Memory is the typical instance, as St. Augustine knew, of the permanence of self-consciousness in all the life of the soul. This is not merely a difficult instance for the empirical thinkers; it is the substitution of a new principle of philosophical interpretation, valid, as we think, where theirs breaks down. They contrast the impressions as they come with the work of the mind. Regarding the work of the mind as essentially arbitrary, they ascribe superior reality to the unmodified impressions—if any such can be found. Ward showed the failure of this method in a conspicuous instance; the speculations of Green and some other idealist philosophers have carried on Ward's argumentation still further, and shown the fallacy of contrasting the real with the work of the mind. This is not so much a correction of an error of Ward's as an exposition of a principle already contained implicitly in his argument. The process of memory is a supreme instance, intelligible to the most uninstructed common sense, of the constitutive activity of the mind in all thought. But we can go further than this. Mr. Ward dealt with the philosophy of Mill before the doctrine of evolution had become so entirely master of the field. This means, of course, that each individual stood practically alone. His mental history was carried on within the limits of his own life. Hence Mr. Ward could discuss the problem of memory as belonging to an individual; he had not to take into consideration the influence of hereditary constitution. Since, however, the history of the race has been

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taken into account in dealing with the individual, the question of memory has reached a new stage. May it not be argued that the mechanical registering of experience which has gone on through so many ages has resulted in starting man with an hereditary confidence in the world? The cases of hereditary instinct in creatures to which we do not ordinarily assign a consciousness of self will be quoted. And it will be argued that the memory of man is just a more complex case of something hardly to be generically distinguished from these cases of instinct; that, therefore, Mr. Ward's argument is not valid for man's memory, seeing that the difficulty upon which it insists has been covered by the previous history of the race. We think that this would have been a serious difficulty for Mr. Ward to meet, so long as he confined himself to his own statement of the case. He had used memory as an instance, and his instance is now in a measure explained away. But the same argument does not lie against the assertion of the principle involved in Ward's instance. Whatever may be the antecedent history of the mental processes of man, there emerges in the end a self-consciousness, operative in memory and in all other intellectual activities, which is necessary to the explanation of thought as we understand it. If this necessity can be made out, and we think it can be and has been made out, the answer from the idealist side is complete, both in regard of principle and in detail. A principle of philosophic interpretation has been produced which not merely explains the facts which the empiricists explained also, but is satisfactory where they fail.

Once more, the arguments used by Mr. Ward in connexion with the idea of Cause and the idea of God, seem to lack system and coherence. If we have understood him rightly, Mr. Ward regarded geometry and ethics, causation and the existence of a necessary Being as separate cases in which the necessity of intuition as a principle of knowledge could be proved. He does not show—partly, we may suppose, owing to the unfinished state of his work on this subject—the unity which runs through the whole system of thought. Such an omission as this does not matter much so long as details only are in question. While the object is to prove, as against Mill, that mere experience will not give a satisfactory basis for universal principles, this may be done by the citation of isolated instances. But when it becomes necessary to rise above instances, and to show that so much necessary truth implies a necessary Being, it is imperatively required that the whole range and character of the necessity should be

displayed. And then it will be desirable to go much further. The existence of God, considered merely as a philosophical principle, is necessary to the validity, not only of necessary, but of contingent, truth. The final justification of all thought whatever lies in the assumption, if it may be so called, of the existence of God. Our whole right to interpret the world on our own principles, to read into it the laws of our own thought, depends upon our being able to regard the worlds of thought and thing as expressing the nature of the will, the reason of a necessary Being. If this conviction—call it assumption, or intuition, or what you will—if it fails, our knowledge fails as a whole; we have no guarantee of the validity of our experience; however little we may be inclined to it, however impossible it may be in practice, there is no philosophical barrier between us and scepticism—scepticism of a far more complete and exhaustive character than any that was professed by Mill. And, strictly speaking, it is not enough to prove the necessity of the existence of a first cause in order to protect the universality of the idea of causation. If necessity reigns only under the form of causation, and if beyond it pure contingency exists, then our universe is in the last resort governed by chance. It cannot be treated philosophically, except as a system; and the necessity of the existence of God, if it is to be adequately shown, must be made to appear as the demand of all forms of experience cumulatively considered. The various arguments for the existence of God are not so much separate processes of reasoning as the exposition under various heads of the final demands of experience under all its forms.

We think, then, that the deficiency in systematic completeness which we have noticed seriously impaired the value of Mr. Ward's arguments for Theism. We think also that his argument for Freedom suffers also from the want of a general determining principle. We have already noticed what seems to us to be a weakness in it, even from the point of view of an empirical philosopher. By a slight change of terminology we think that the empiricist could safely adopt Mr. Ward's anti-impulsive resolve. If, instead of describing the determining force as the 'balance of emotional craving and excitement,' they had called it the 'strongest motive,' we think that Mr. Ward's instance would have failed to prove them wrong. The error lies not so much in the description of given cases of conflict as in the empiricist's habit of treating the *self* as the mere passive scene of a conflict. Had Mr. Ward drawn out into the light of day the principle embedded

in his argument from memory, he would have made a much more decisive answer to the school of Mill. He would have been more successful even if he had confined himself to the position maintained by Aristotle, that whatever may be the source of the motives and impulses affecting a man, at least they are his, and he is responsible for their use. Moreover, as so often in controversies upon the subject of the will, there is no very clear account of the very point in dispute—viz., Freedom. What is it exactly that Mr. Ward affirms and Mill denies? Mr. Ward was 'disposed to consider that a very large proportion of life, in some men by far the largest, was passed in obedience to what he termed the "spontaneous impulse of the will;" and that the opponents of Free Will gave, on the whole, a true account of the genesis of that impulse.' What he did maintain was the existence of a 'distinct origina-tive force,' of which the determinist could give no account. But he nowhere, so far as we can find, explains how the two worked together; nor does he seem to realize that the characteristic of free action is that in it the *self* is realized, whether this self-realization is found in following the impulses of emotion or the counsels of reason.

It is, perhaps, a hard thing to try and estimate a philosophy from fragments. It must always be remembered that Mr. Ward wrote largely in the form of essays and articles appearing at considerable intervals of time, that the series he contemplated was never finished, and that the general character of his mind was such as to leave no logical possibility unconsidered, and no inference or consequence unforeseen. But with these reservations we must express our opinion that the work of Mr. Ward, brilliant as it is and effective as it was, is not sufficiently systematic or complete to stand upon its own merits as a philosophy. Every philosopher writes under the influence and in the terminology of his own age. The problems he discusses are those which his own age has brought before him, and which the men of his own age will understand. In this sense every man is of necessity the product of his period. But Mr. Ward is this in a sense which is not true of any of the philosophers of first rank. The questions he raises, the opinions he attacks, belong entirely to his own age; but he is controversial rather than constructive, and that means that his work is in danger of sharing the death of the systems which it destroys.

Mr. Wilfrid Ward must be congratulated on his success in reproducing so carefully and with such balanced judgment the various scenes in which his father lived. They are indeed

very various. From the Oxford life of sixty years ago to the academic life of St. Edmund's is one vast step. From the controversy over Infallibility to the Metaphysical Society and its discussions is another. And there are many things which, to the Anglican mind at any rate, are surprising in the last volume. It is curious to read a letter from Newman to Ward describing a miracle performed by the relics of St. Philip Neri. It is curious to find Wiseman promising Ward a relic of the saint after whom Ward's child is to be named, and asking in the same letter who the saint is; and perhaps still more curious to find Ward accepting a plenary indulgence once a month for himself and his family (p. 448). But these are the result of the great change from England to Rome; and, considering the magnitude of the change, we may be surprised to find that we are made to feel so completely at home with Mr. Ward—to see in him all through a type of a genial, highly educated, and deeply religious English gentleman.

ART. V.—HERBERT SPENCER'S 'PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS.'

The Principles of Ethics. By HERBERT SPENCER. Vol. I., Parts II. and III.; Vol. II., Parts V. and VI. (London, 1892-3.)

THE *Data of Ethics*, which occupies the first portion of the *Principles*, was reviewed in the *Church Quarterly* of January 1879 soon after its appearance; while the treatise on 'Justice,' which fills 250 pages of the second volume, was similarly noticed in July 1892. But the completion of the work calls for a respectful welcome at our hands. It is the fulfilment of that portion of the author's immense undertaking which he has ever regarded as its chief object. He informs us in the Preface to Part I. that his first essay, published in 1842, vaguely indicated certain principles of right and wrong in politics. 'From that time forward,' he writes, 'my ultimate purpose, lying behind all proximate purposes, has been that of finding for the principles of right and wrong in conduct at large a scientific basis.'

The Christian moralist must needs sympathize deeply with so grand a design. What is called science excludes, in the view of many of its most famous representatives, the province of morals altogether; and the religious teacher,

bent upon the training of those committed to his charge in the principles of righteousness, is expected to trim his course by definitions and prescriptions which quite ignore all that moral life which interests him, and view without sympathy whatever uplifts human beyond animal existence. He must needs feel deeply grateful to a man of science who sets the knowledge and practice of right and wrong in that place of pre-eminence which properly belongs to it.

The persistent intellectual energy and self-devotion with which Mr. Spencer has pursued his task through fifty years of hard and continuous thought makes us proud of human nature and of the English race. The praise and advancement which refresh other men in their toil have had no charms for him; and if a grave eloquence often lights up his pages its attraction lies in the author's contempt for display. It was impossible to read without deep sympathy the sentences which expressed his fear that health or life might fail him before the goal of his toil was reached. We are heartily glad that it has not been so, but that a revival of vigour has enabled him to complete the department most interesting in his own eyes and in ours, of a task worthy some mighty schoolman.

Perhaps some moralist, Christian or sceptical, may deem that the self-abnegation of such labour is the more sublime because it is carried on without the hope of personal immortality before it. But such an imagination is inconsistent with the principles of the author himself.

'Life in general,' says Mr. Spencer (i. 478), 'is a desideratum or it is not. If it is a desideratum then all those modes of conduct which are conducive to a complete form of it are to be morally approved. If contrariwise life is not a desideratum the subject lapses: life should not be maintained, and all questions concerning the maintenance of it, including the ethical, disappear. As commonly conceived, ethics consist solely of interdicts on certain kinds of acts which men would like to do, and of injunctions to perform certain acts which they would like not to do. Such private conduct as errs in the direction of sensual excess, like drunkenness, they do indeed include as subject to ethical judgment and resulting condemnation: a perceived injury primarily to self and secondarily to others being the ground of the condemnation. But they ignore the truth that if injury to self is in this case a reason for moral reprobation, then benefit to self (so long as there is no contingent injury to others or remote injury to self) is a reason for moral approbation.'

We do not quote this passage merely to protest that Christian ethics differ from this description of 'ethics as commonly conceived,' but such is the fact. Nothing is more characteristic of the ethics preached by the Lord and taught

by St. Paul than their universal application to all the acts of life, small as well as great, self-regarding as well as altruistic, pleasurable as well as painful. 'For every idle word that men shall speak they shall give account;' 'Whether ye eat or drink, or whatever ye do, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus.' But we point to the passage as showing that ethics in Mr. Spencer's view have reference to a living state, and lapse where life is absent or not desired, and that they include the desire for life and happiness on our own part. His own noble and self-denying labours, ethically regarded, must come, according to him, under the description of an attempt at the maintenance and extension of life primarily for himself, secondarily for others. Of whatever form this motive be, whether the intellectual life exercised upon a vast and important theme, or the help to high living afforded by his advice to others whose happiness has by a natural transformation become identified with his own, or the praise from those whose praise is best worth having which so devoted a life will earn: in any case the extension, or enjoyment, or improvement of life is a motive which, during every moment of his moral action, lies in the future as an object at which he aims. And how is it possible that ethical conduct, which so entirely depends upon life in this world, present and to come, should acquire a higher character if deprived of all expectation of a life hereafter? The desirability of life is the basis of ethics, and without it every moral question falls. Therefore it is moral to desire immortal life for ourselves and others, and to disbelieve a future existence is to abridge the meaning of life and the reason of ethics not only for self but for all.

If, therefore, we express an unfeigned admiration for the author's lifelong toil in the service of ethical truth and the improvement of human life, we must, on his own principles, lament and condole with him that his conceptions of the extent of human life should place so great limitations upon the operation of the ethical motives which he recognizes and upon the field of their effect.

The Christian moralist will find no chapter in this work devoid of interest and use. Many a year ago Mr. Spencer himself noted the fact that his principle of 'adaptation of constitution to conditions' was accepted even by his opponents, all of whom use arguments which presuppose its truth. They do it—

'when they attribute differences of national character to differences in social customs and arrangements: and again when they comment on the force of habit: and again when they discuss the probable

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influence of a proposed measure upon public morality : and again when they recommend practice as a means of acquiring increased aptitude : and again when they describe certain pursuits as elevating and others as degrading : and again when they talk of getting used to anything : and again when they advocate certain systems of mental discipline—when they teach that virtuous conduct ultimately becomes pleasurable, and when they warn against the power of a long-encouraged vice.¹

This witness is perfectly true. Common sense and the study of history forbid us to imagine for a moment that circumstances and antecedents are without their vast influence upon morality. What is more, Christianity distinctly recognizes all these agencies. Our religion does not come down from heaven to alter everything in human nature regardless of time and place. By its very origin in the Incarnation it is submissive to the laws of human life. Long and patient education of the race was needed to bring about 'the fulness of the time' when it appeared. And when the Son of God came He recognized the moulding powers of past history. The place of Jew and Gentile in the Church, and the influence of Greek and Roman life upon Christianity, and of it on them, are patent instances in point. It is not likely that a trained and truthful man of science could communicate his collections and his inferences as to the effect of historical circumstances upon human conduct, classified under the various species of virtues, without giving to the Christian inquirer abundant food for reflection.

But the very fact that his principles are universally recognized as useful and apposite in their way suffices to prove that something more than accumulation of facts of this nature was necessary to demonstrate a case against us. Our belief is that among all the circumstances which environ man's life, there is a spiritual element in him leading him to select, within the limits which are possible to him, the acts to which he should apply the terms right and wrong ; inspiring the feeling with which he shall practise the one or the other, and leading him gradually, and as circumstances permit, to improve his moral ideas and his practice of them according to the purpose of God.

We confess that not all our human sympathy with Mr. Spencer's character and earnestness, nor all our sense of the value and interest of the ethical specimens which he has collected and classed would induce us to rejoice in the completion of his work if we thought that he had succeeded

¹ *Social Statics*, ed. 1868, p. 76.

in reducing ethics to an affair of circumstances and expelled the spiritual element and the connexion with God. It is because we hold that he has absolutely failed to do so, that we consider the Church has still better reason to rejoice at seeing the great evolutionist's crowning work completed to the end, than either the author himself or the most devoted of his adherents. She rejoices not merely over what he has done, but over what he has failed to do. If he has not expelled God from the human conscience, no abler and no worthier champion will ever be found to undertake the task.

It will be no surprise to Mr. Spencer that we should express ourselves thus. He does not expect that his work will be effective with those who believe in God at all. 'Only to those who are not by creed or cherished theory committed to the hypothesis of a supernaturally created humanity, will the evidence prove that the human mind has no originally implanted conscience' (i. 470). A strange admission. For it is plain that all believe in a supernaturally created humanity who believe in a supernaturally created germ from which, at whatever distance of time, humanity was developed—even by causes which we call natural. Now it would not seem inconceivable that a man who could not help believing that the commencement of the course of nature must itself have been supernatural should yet be persuaded by sufficient evidence to believe the development of conscience in man to be wholly the result of natural causes. We have never been used to suppose that Mr. Spencer and his school were of those who absolutely denied the hypothesis of a supernaturally created course of nature inclusive of humanity. And the appendix to this work gives evidence (as we shall hereafter see) that he still retains some hold upon the idea of an unknowable cause of the world and its life. Does it, then, look like the consciousness of victory to find him despair of impressing the truth of his ethical system upon any who have not made a surrender so much beyond what he himself was wont to demand as that of an unknowable or supernatural origin of nature?

When we compare such an admission with the purpose which Mr. Spencer proposed to himself in the *Synthetic Philosophy*, we must not only maintain that he has failed in his original object, but even that he has himself surrendered it. The original design was that of a philosophy of Reconciliation between Science and Religion.

'We are obliged to regard every phenomenon as a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon: though Omnipotence

is unthinkable, yet as experience discloses no bounds to the diffusion of phenomena, we are unable to think of limits to the presence of this Power: while the criticisms of science teach us that this power is Incomprehensible. And this consciousness of an Incomprehensible Power called Omnipresent from inability to assign its limits, is just that consciousness on which Religion dwells. To understand fully how real is the reconciliation thus reached it will be needful to look at the respective attitudes that Religion and Science have all along maintained towards this conclusion. We must observe how, all along, the imperfections of each have been undergoing correction by the other: and how the final outcome of their mutual criticisms can be nothing else than an entire agreement on this deepest and widest of all truths.¹

But the careful student of Mr. Spencer has long ago perceived that religion, explained as the consciousness of an unknowable power, has by no means kept for him that co-ordinate place with science which the First Principles allots to it. It plays but the part of Richard to science's Bolingbroke. If one might have expected an effective office in the moulding of human beliefs to be anywhere assigned to the consciousness of the unknowable, it would be where Mr. Spencer treats of the origin and history of religion itself. But no! He traces religion, even in its highest developments, not to any consciousness of the unknowable, but to imaginary phenomena.

The reader will grant that the contrast is complete between these accounts of the subject. But here are Mr. Spencer's words:—

'The statement that God is a spirit is the application of a word which otherwise applied means a human soul, and only by its qualifying epithet is the meaning of the title Holy Ghost distinguished from the meaning of ghost in general. We still describe a divine being by the word which originally meant the breath which, deserting the human body at death, was supposed to constitute the surviving part. Do not these various evidences warrant the suspicion that from the ghost once uniformly conceived have arisen the variously conceived supernatural beings?'²

Never was an account given of religion more decidedly phenomenalistic than this. The consciousness of the unknowable, which First Principles presented to us as the essential and persistent element of religion, disappears, then, from view in the actual history of religious evolution, and we hear of it no more.

For our own part, we regard its departure without the slightest regret. It was something which was nothing; you knew it and you did not know it. The words shadowy,

¹ *First Principles*, p. 99.

² *The Principles of Sociology*, i. 324.

cloudy, unsubstantial, and vague, which we apply to ideas that escape our mental grasp, are all too concrete for its tenuity. And we do not wonder that Mr. Spencer for sheer want of company more substantial than the unknowable should have taken to the society of the ghost, though not ordinarily considered a person of substance. It is the practical surrender of his original position; but it liberates us from a pretender of whom we are glad to be rid. Nothing could have been more aggravating than a continued attempt to trace religion in its various forms to so negative a source, and we are thankful not to have to decide whether such an account is more absurd when applied to the coarse religions of the savage or to the refined piety of the Christian.

Mr. Spencer's pages read far more consistently in their undisguised phenomenalism and without the presence of this nonentity. At the same time we must say that something in his place is wanting. First Principles laid down in strong terms, but not at all stronger than the facts demanded, the notable persistence of religion in the history of human thought. Again and again it is defeated by science, and amidst the very pæans upon its overthrow it reappears as strong as ever. It was because of this irrepressible vitality that Mr. Spencer found the basis of religion in a consciousness underlying every experience of man. But no such persistence can be ascribed to belief in ghosts, and when the religion of the higher races and the noblest minds is attributed to such forgotten and obsolete imaginations, the absurdity equals—it could not exceed—that of tracing it to the presence of that which is indescribable, incomprehensible, and unthinkable.

The unknowable, which disappears from the natural history of religion, is bound to vanish equally from that of morals, and so it does.

'Between this Part IV. of the *Principles of Ethics* and my first work, *Social Statics*, with the constructive portion of which it coincides in area, there are considerable differences. One difference is that what there was in my first book of supernaturalistic interpretation has disappeared, and the interpretation has become exclusively naturalistic—that is, evolutionary' (II. ix.).

Again we say that we applaud the disappearance of a supernatural element which possessed no reality whatever: but Mr. Spencer appears hardly conscious of the great and essential change which this involves in the professed character of his philosophy. It was this slight aroma or *soupeon* of supernaturalism which constituted the difference between his teaching and that of the professed materialist. Many have

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professed themselves agnostics who would not have allowed that they were atheists; some vague imaginings of supernatural origin floated round their moral action. It must grieve them to know that their ablest thinker has recognized the necessity of erasing all tinge of spirituality from his moral system and confessing it purely naturalistic.

In this purely natural character, then, how fares the philosophy, and what reason do we find for believing that the key of the knowledge of good and evil is in the custody of Mr. Spencer? The clergy who work in parishes of varied class and character would be the last men in the world to reject the system of naturalistic morals as having nothing to say for itself. They know well how circumstances influence morals; how vainly external teaching, religious motives, and even genuine conviction in the mind of the moral agent himself, appear to strive with adverse conditions of life, and with the surrounding habits of the people. They are therefore ready to listen. At the same time, we find the exceptions to these imperious rules of the external life so many; character for good or evil so often surprises us by its contrast with what the soil seemed likely to produce; moral effort so constantly has some effect—coloured by the circumstances, yet real—in the way of influencing oneself and other people, that it will require an excessively complete induction of instances, and a most careful analysis of them, to assure us that we may follow Mr. Spencer in first reducing the supernatural element in ethics to a nonentity, and then dismissing it altogether.

But we call Mr. Spencer himself to witness that his induction of particulars is never sufficient. Thus, in respect to Revenge, the naturalistic principle is that 'vengefulness within each society is proportionate to the habitual conflict with other societies' (i. 368). Yet it is admitted that 'proofs that decline of vindictiveness and growth of forgiveness are associated with decrease of militancy and increase of peaceful co-operation cannot be clearly disentangled from the facts' (i. 367). Again, 'it is difficult to bring the various manifestations of pseudo-generosity and Generosity proper into generalizations of a definite kind. And the impediment due to the complexity and variable composition of the emotion prompting generous acts is made greater by the inconsistency of the traits which men, and especially the lower types of men, present' (i. 387). With respect to the virtue of Chastity there is, as Mr. Spencer himself would say, 'reason for suspecting' that he felt the insufficiency of his account of the matter even as he was writing.

In a militant tribe, he remarks, numerous children are of great importance for the maintenance of the fighting strength, and regard for chastity becomes unimportant in comparison. 'This fact seems to point to the conclusion pointed at by many preceding facts—that there is a connexion between unchastity and a military régime.' But his candid mind is struck by the exceptions to this dictum. The extreme profligacy of Rome, he notes, was reached only after centuries of conquest. He might have spoken much more strongly. For the Romans were a chaste as well as a truthful people during the ages while their conquest was proceeding. It was only after war had come to be only heard from the distant frontier, and the home and surroundings of the Roman were in absolute peace, that corruption of manners spread. At the time of the barbarian invasion we find Salvian describing the peaceful inhabitants of Roman Gaul, with centuries of quietness behind them, as sunk in laxity of life, and deprived of that love of truth which had been the conspicuous trait of their warlike ancestors, while the barbarians, those restless fighters, were remarkable for truthfulness and purity of life. Well, therefore, may Mr. Spencer admit that 'satisfactory interpretation of these many strange contrasts and variations is impracticable: the causation is too complex.' We shall all agree with him that 'without a prevailing chastity we do not find a good social state.' But as to the causes of unchastity, or the means of purity, his induction is conspicuously insufficient.

We cannot at all wonder that, fresh from this chapter, Mr. Spencer should enter upon his 'Summary of Inductions' with very little confidence in the clearness of the evidence which he has marshalled.

'The phenomena presented by the individual life are highly complex, and still more complex are the phenomena presented by the life of aggregated individuals. And their great complexity is rendered still greater by the multiformity and variability of surrounding conditions. To the difficulties in the way of generalization hence arising must be added the difficulties arising from the uncertainty of the evidence—the doubtfulness, incompleteness, and conflicting natures of the statements with which we have to deal' (i. 464).

Is it really upon evidence so imperfect as this that we are to be expected to surrender our personal and spiritual dealing with consciences, and to content ourselves with expecting from the long development of circumstances a moral change in ages to come, while we ourselves have but the most distant and insignificant power to influence the process?

If Mr. Spencer could succeed in his attempt to persuade us he would simply deprive us of a method of ethical effort which gives us ample interest and employment, and in which we or better men than we have reason to hope for some success: namely, the endeavour to influence men to follow Jesus Christ by the power of the Holy Ghost; and he would leave us gazing at the tedious course of evolution with the scientific faith indeed that all things good are to come of it in the future, but ill content with its present condition, which we cannot help.

We have a strong impression that this sorrowful humour and this sense of impotence is reflected in the pages of Mr. Spencer himself. He indeed assails with exaggerated severity the prevalent tone of ethical teaching, which he supposes to occupy itself with prohibitions and restrictions, but not to include within its sphere the sanction and approval of the ordinary joys of life. But there are few moral critics whose tone is more severe than his. Yet one would have thought that an evolutionist was peculiarly bound to be charitable, and even sympathetic, for those judgments and actions which, while falling short of an ideal perfection, are for that reason more adapted to the moral condition in which they find their place than those of an ideal state could be.

For instance, the state of war is recognized by Mr. Spencer as one through which human society is bound to pass. It has its grievous imperfections; it would not have any place in the evolutionist plan of growth if it had not. It has also its moral virtues of courage, self-denial, and endurance. Mr. Spencer remarks truly enough upon the enthusiasm of approval with which military services are viewed by our people. We feel entirely with him that this mania of military glory is a proof that we are far below the ideal state which both social science and religion set before us: yet, to say truth, we cannot ourselves avoid the craze. It is a sign that we have not yet passed out of the militant condition, and that we still require the virtues which that condition entails. But when we look out upon the state of the world do we not find that it is the feeling which suits our environment? It is a sad and lamentable fact that war and the virtues of war are still required, and that for England to renounce war and cease from admiration of her warriors would be to abdicate her place in the world with great detriment to the world's progress and peace.

Yet Mr. Spencer has nothing but sarcasm, and even misrepresentation, to apply to Lord Wolseley's rule for the

soldier—that 'he must believe that his duties are the noblest that fall to man's lot; he must be taught to despise all those of civil life'—a sentiment, says Mr. Spencer, with very doubtful truth, 'which is not limited to the "duties" of the soldier as a defender of his country, which in our day he never performs, but is extended to his "duties" as an invader of other countries, and especially those of weak peoples: the appetite for aggression transforms baseness into nobility' (i. 346). So vehement is his reprobation of Lord Wolseley's exaltation of his profession that he even reproaches him with the motto which the Wolseleys bore many ages before he was born. Whether 'Man is a wolf to his fellow man' was ever intended to express a bloodthirsty meaning at all is a point which admits of great question: but at all events Lord Wolseley had nothing to do with the choice of it.

Christian teachers come in for a plentiful share of Mr. Spencer's reprobation. He declares that the prospect of a condition 'where the life of internal amity shall be unqualified by the life of external enmity'

'will not be rejoiced over even by those who preach peace and goodwill to men: for the prospect is not presented in accordance with their creed. The belief that humanity can be made righteous only by acceptance of the Christian scheme is irreconcilable with the conclusion that humanity may be moulded into an ideal form by the continued discipline of peaceful co-operation . . . and it is by no means certain that their attitude is to be regretted: for there has to be maintained a congruity between the prevailing cult and the social state and the average nature. . . . It is, I admit, a tenable supposition that belief in a deity who calmly looks on while myriads of his creatures suffer eternal torments may fitly survive during a state of the world in which naked barbarians and barbarians in skins are being overrun by barbarians in broadcloth' (i. 474).

This is but an angry and sarcastic permission to entertain a low belief because our morality is of a low character. It is not what we have a right to expect either from candour or charity, or the science of development. Is it come to this, that the undeveloped animal is to be scolded for the tardiness of his evolution, and that backward creatures, who have not yet attained to philosophic heights of morality, are to be encouraged in their ethical progress by such pedagogic amenities as these? If this be the ideal form of charity to which the continued discipline of peaceful co-operation conducts us, it singularly resembles that which in Christian ethics passes for unjust and uncharitable judgment. Mr. Spencer has no cause to say that we should not rejoice in the prospect

of peace and goodwill from any quarter. We know well that the preaching of Christianity has been proved to require the civilizing agencies to assist its moralizing efforts. The operation of such agencies has ever been favourable to religion, and why should we fear them? Why should we do otherwise than long for their utmost prevalence? But Mr. Spencer, as he well knows, has not succeeded in making their unassisted victory probable to us or to anybody else. It is excessively unworthy of him to resort to the common rhetoric of meaner reasoners, and fill up the deficiencies of his argument by strength of invective.

The admissions which we have quoted from various chapters of the first volume prove well enough that the author does not consider his inductions sufficient to establish a scientific proof. The second volume more than confirms the impression, since the Preface contains nothing less than a confession of failure. The satisfaction, he informs us, with which he views his work completed

'is somewhat dashed by the thought that these new parts fall short of expectation. The Doctrine of Evolution has not furnished guidance to the extent I had hoped. Most of the conclusions drawn empirically are such as right feelings, enlightened by cultivated intelligence, have already sufficed to establish' (vol. ii. Pref.).

We cannot even allow that the conclusions are in any wise empirically drawn. Yet even the opinions and the feelings of so close an observer, furnished as he is with abundant knowledge in every department, must needs be of great value, especially because he carries his principles, as it is right he should, into the smallest matters, such as the tipping of railway porters and the over-payment of cabmen. But there is in all the volume nothing sufficient to set Mr. Spencer's system in contrast with Christian morality. We take all he has to give us, and add something of our own which he does not possess. His attention to small things is matched by Christian moralists, and the peculiar combination of earnestness with kindness which is needed to treat such matters rightly is nowhere so well acquired as in the school of Christ, in which the cultivation of conscience and good feeling in oneself is placed first, and every act of duty is uplifted by the sense of personal service to a Being in immediate relation to us and infinitely worthy of our love.

We sometimes find that Mr. Spencer's casuistry in small matters would be much the better of a Christian infusion. Instance the following:

'A game of skill is being played with one whose little boy is a spectator. The father's play is such as makes his antagonist tolerably certain of victory should he put out his strength. But if he is adequately swayed by the sentiment of negative beneficence he will, not obtrusively but in a concealed way, play below his strength so as to let the father beat him' (ii. 310).

We must be allowed to think that a son's belief in his father ought to rest on too sacred sanctions to be vulnerable by seeing him lose at chess. The voluntarily defeated player does not observe Mr. Spencer's own rule of 'refraining from complimentary usages which involve untruths' (p. 407), and comes under the condemnation of the ancient Egyptian Ptah-hotep that 'he who departs from truth to be agreeable is detestable' (p. 322).

Elsewhere (i. 529), Mr. Spencer, while giving a general approval to games which exercise the intellectual faculties, considers chess subject to moral drawbacks which do not apply to such as involve an element of chance:

'Chess, for example, which pits together two intelligences in such a way as to show unmistakably the superiority of one to the other in respect of certain powers, produces much more than whist a feeling of humiliation in the defeated; and if the sympathies are keen this gives some annoyance to the victor as well as to the vanquished' (i. 529).

A Christian moralist treats such questions differently. Without at all considering courtesy of small importance, he holds that the mental inequalities of men are facts, and therefore to be recognized and submitted to. These inequalities are inevitable and are revealed in every experience of life. And in the more important instances of them, as well as in so small and partial an instance as a victory at chess, Christian ethics will find an opportunity of simplicity and humility both in victor and vanquished. It is plain that this method of drawing interest and good feeling out of intellectual differences is far more natural than that of attempting to abolish the sense of variety in human powers. John Newton was of opinion that if two angels came to the world, one as a prince and the other as a shoeblick, neither would think his position more or less important than the other.

The ascetic element in Christianity, which Mr. Spencer always regards as inimical to human happiness, has in reality a totally different tendency. It imparts contentment and even joy to troubles and defeats: an ill service if these un-

pleasing incidents of life could be abolished by refusing to see them. But as there is no possibility of abolishing them, we must regard the adviser who bids us mark our intellectual defeats with the sign of the Cross and accept them for wholesome chastisements, as a greater friend to happiness than the adviser who whispers our competitor not to allow us to perceive our intellectual defects at all. His exultation will not be offensive if he too will take the warning of religion, and remember his own numerous defects of other kinds.

The 'insane subordination of reality to show' has a just place in Mr. Spencer's *Ethics*, and his intended treatise on *Æsthetic Vices* will be very much to the purpose in our times. But the best authorities have already taught us that adornment at the expense of use is bad art. Our Ruskin instructs us that true religion is the readiest and most effective opponent of the spirit of fashion and display by which Mr. Spencer is justly offended. It attacks the evil tendency in its home within the personal character, and substitutes for it a definite personal principle more serious and more lofty than the frivolous influences of the world. Mr. Spencer may complain of the cook who poaches his egg in shallow water to make it look pretty with the result that the displayed yolk in the centre is only half done (ii. 404 *n.*); but he has no motive to suggest to cook beyond the calm pleasure of helping an ideal development never to be enjoyed by her, in order to persuade her to employ her art with better regard to its true end. George Herbert has this motive to set before the housemaid, and another besides, when he says :

A servant with this clause
Makes drudgery divine :
Who sweeps a room as for Thy laws
Makes that and the action fine.

Mr. Spencer will doubtless consider us wholly mistaken : that is matter of moral judgment. Anyhow, his book is one of science ; and as matter of science it suffices us to observe that he does not make even a show of proving the ethics of evolution to have any advantage whatever over other systems in questions of conduct. And, therefore, whatever the interest of his chapters upon such subjects may be, they are quite without effect in helping to place ethics upon a scientific, that is to say, an evolutionary basis. That was the object which Mr. Spencer set before him. We were to have been provided with proofs that morals depend upon circumstances like those with which Darwin furnishes us in the physical

development of species. Special interposition of God was to be proved unnecessary in the one sphere as in the other. And the hope or petition for such interposition was to be proved useless by sheer demonstration that all they could effect is and can always be supplied without them.

Has any such demonstration been supplied? Our author does not even himself assert it. In the history of social change his induction leaves gaps and exceptions so vast in the proof of a connexion between circumstances and morals that there is the amplest room for the operation of spiritual agencies: and when we come to individual morals and the practical application of ethical principles in daily life the promised scientific guidance deserts us almost wholly, whether in accounting for their present condition or in attempting to improve them. We therefore conclude that Mr. Spencer's attempt to bring ethics within the limits of Natural Science by the application of the principles of evolution has failed—absolutely, completely, and undeniably.

In our last number we devoted a short notice to Professor Huxley's Romanes lecture. It is of great interest to compare it with Mr. Spencer's work. The one of these great scientists has but little trust in the moral tendencies of evolution. While he thinks those who seek in that process the source of human virtue are on the right track, he yet believes that the connexion is so far lost that the present business of the virtuous man is to fight evolution in its cruel progress. Mr. Spencer, on the contrary, is of those who, 'contemplating from the heights of thought that far-off life of the race, never to be enjoyed by them, but only by a remote posterity, feel a calm pleasure in the consciousness of having aided the advance towards it' (vol. ii. conclusion). The contrast is very marked; for with the one author goodness is the child of evolution, never doubting the righteousness of its parent, and considering its duty to consist in clearing away the obstacles which human folly places in the march of development towards the perfect happiness of the race; while the other regards the character of evolution as stamped by the cruel contest of the physically fittest to maintain his selfish advantage—and virtue, however it came to exist in such a scene, must resolutely set itself to impede the course of a stream of tendency so regardless of human good.

When we remember the anticipations of what the doctrine of evolution was to perform in the world of moral and religious thought which prevailed in many quarters a few years ago, the failure of so grand an attempt as that of Mr.

Spencer appears to us a very great event in the religious history of our time. Evolution has so much to do with morals that it seemed very plausible to expect that all morals might be due to it: just as in the physical world evolution is so effective in many changes, that it was taken for granted that it must cover all changes. But great men of science—like Mr. Wallace and Mr. Mivart—make reserves in their evolutionary faith, and point to particular occasions in the history of the world and man where the leap could not have been made without special interposition to aid it; and so in the ethical sphere, while we must allow much influence to the physical world and circumstance, we protest that this does not prove that we are to ascribe everything to it. And Mr. Spencer has failed to supply the missing links either of induction or inference.

But this, it will be said, does not suffice to show that religion supplies the want, and that where natural evolution does not account for the phenomena, the supernatural must be called in. Quite true; it is on no such negative grounds that Christianity founds its claim to ethical authority. It has its own claims to the interest and the faith of mankind: and Mr. Spencer shows himself singularly insensible to their nature. He never appears to think that the connexion of religion with ethics lies anywhere but in its future rewards and punishments; and he despises these as mercenary arguments which interfere with the advance of the truly ethical condition in which altruism and egoism shall be perfectly at one, and everyone be himself pleased to please his neighbour, every neighbour be pleased and profited by seeing a man take care of himself. But, as we have before remarked, the harmony of egoism and altruism is much more distinctly the note of Christian ethics than it is of those of evolution. That section of the Christian Church which is accused, and perhaps with justice, of dwelling too largely upon the question of reward, produced among multitudes of similar utterances the self-renouncing hymn of St. Francis Xavier

O Deus, ego amo te,
Nec amo te ut salves me
Aut quia non amantes te
Æterno punis igne.

Whatever altruistic applications Mr. Spencer can give to the egoism which he recognizes in man, and whatever egoistic explanations he can attach to the altruism which he demands, he may rest well assured that similar replies are as readily

forthcoming to similar objections against Christianity. His persistent treatment of religion as the mere addition of sanctions to a righteousness which it does not recognize as desirable in itself, misses the mark as wholly as similar accusations against himself would do. Pleasure for self and pleasure for others, pleasure for self in the pleasure of others, and pleasure for others in the pleasure of self, have all their part in both systems. And they are more vivid in the Christian, even though we admit them to be neither absent nor unreal in that of evolution.

The advantages which Christian ethics possess over those of Mr. Spencer seem to us to come chiefly under two great heads. One is regard for the design of the Creator, and the other is the Moral Ideal. As to other matters there is much in common. He cannot, as we have seen, show us anything in his system which distinguishes it from ours; nor do we pretend to conceal the immense benefit we may derive from his knowledge and his wisdom. But on these two points our ethics differ.

Yet neither regard for the design of the Creator nor yet the moral ideal are consistently absent from Mr. Spencer's system. The appendix to vol. ii. of his present work contains an interesting correspondence with Mr. Llewellyn Davies, in which the latter writer declares his belief as follows:

'The Unseen Power is gradually creating mankind by processes of development, and the human consciousness is so made as to be responsive to the authority of this Power; justice is the progressive order which the Maker is establishing among human beings, and it is binding upon each man as he becomes aware of it, and is felt to be binding because he is the Maker's creature.'

Mr. Spencer, before criticizing his correspondent, remarks that there is a curiously close kinship between the view thus stated, and certain remarks of his own in *First Principles*, § 34, and the *Data of Ethics*, § 62. This latter passage runs thus:

'If for the Divine will, supposed to be supernaturally revealed, we substitute the naturally revealed end towards which the Power manifested through evolution works; then, since Evolution has been and is still working towards the highest life, it follows that conforming to those principles by which the highest life is achieved is furthering that end.'

In reviewing the *Data of Ethics* we ourselves quoted this passage as involving a surrender of Agnosticism, since a power which can reveal its ends in nature and work through

evolution cannot be called unknowable. We still maintain the argument. But, as we have above proved at length, Mr. Spencer never makes an ethical use of any knowledge we may possess of the ends of the unknown Power. Our motives are found, according to him, in our likings more or less purified. But to Mr. Davies, as to every Christian thinker, the will of the Creator and the end which he pursues distinctly appear in the field of conscience as motives overpowering a thousand doubts, preferences, and speculations by the commanding proof which His known will gives of what is righteous, what is best for society, and what is best for ourselves. And if the end of the Unknown Power can in any way be known to us, as Mr. Spencer allows that it can, whether is it more fitting that it should operate thus immediately and mightily upon every creature who is conscious of it, or that it should be relegated back like a *Roi Fainéant* into absolute ineffectiveness?

With regard to the Moral Ideal, Christians have it in their Master. Mr. Spencer will assert that some barbarians imitate Him a great deal better than His own servants. Be that as it may, He is their ideal, and His life is a real existing fact. Mr. Spencer's moral ideal consists of an adjustment of organism and environment which has never yet taken place, and will not be realized until we shall have lain for ages in our graves. Which is the more powerful? which the better adapted to human nature, trained through all its history to live with men, while none but philosophers have learnt to live with ideas? High-minded and instructive as Mr. Spencer's work is, it will have little effect in comparison with a chapter from the Gospels.

ART. VI.—ST. MARY THE VIRGIN, OXFORD.

A History of the Church of St. Mary the Virgin, Oxford. The University Church. From Domesday to the Installation of the late Duke of Wellington, Chancellor of the University. By the Present Vicar. (London, 1892.)

IT was a happy inspiration which led its 'present vicar' to write the history of St. Mary the Virgin, Oxford. The task, upon the narrowest estimate of its bearings, is one of no ordinary difficulty, for the great University Church affords a striking illustration of the continuity of the Anglican Com-

munion, and it touches at numberless points the national history through the course of nearly a millennium. The elements of interest are many and varied, embracing, as they must, questions archæological and architectural, glimpses at educational changes and scraps of university history, notices of the modifications of Christian teaching which arose as generations passed on, and of the famous men through whom Oxford has become illustrious. To handle materials requiring for their lucid treatment considerable and diversified stores of learning so as to present a clear, well-balanced picture, and to draw from a multitude of facts their truthful and occasionally subtle conclusions, demand alike a well-furnished mind and a mature judgment. There is still, despite the multitude of books which have appeared on the history of the Church of England, ample room for any well-digested scientific record which shall bring out with adequate wealth of detail and with a firm grasp of leading Catholic principles the unique development of the Anglican branch of the Church Catholic; and a monograph like that before us is a valuable contribution to such a record.

If Mr. Ffoulkes has not succeeded in producing an ideal history of an English parish church it is because his pen is too frequently tempted into digressions, pardonable in themselves, but injurious to the unity of presentation; and because the theologian in him at times so far supersedes the historian as to introduce long epitomes of sermons that break up the thread of his narrative. Our criticism is not that Mr. Ffoulkes unduly magnifies his office. With the high rank he claims for *St. Mary the Virgin* in his opening paragraph we are not disposed to quarrel.

'Its history,' he says, 'cannot be written without reference to the city within which it stands, to the famous university that so long taught and still worships in it, to the famous college, to which, almost as soon as colleges were founded in Oxford, it was impropriated, and in ecclesiastical and even mundane revolutions, to the world at large. Our oldest and finest cathedrals are thrown into the shade by it, for the benefit it has been to this kingdom, both in Church and State. But its own history must not be thrown into confusion by these references, which must therefore be kept in check, and not occupy too much space' (p. 1).

We may have occasion hereafter to question whether the writer has throughout observed the rule of proportion here indicated, but the reader will be ready to pardon its transgression in consideration of the ample store of information contained in Mr. Ffoulkes's pages, and of the generous spirit

which pervades them. It is rare to find an author who combines so strong a grasp of Catholic truth with so kindly an appreciation of schools of thought which differ from his own.

The praise which we so readily bestow on the matter and spirit of the volume before us we are altogether unable to accord to its style. The book bears many marks of hurried writing, and its composition is rugged and confused. The writer constantly adds one thought or detail to another until his sentences resemble some of the Protozoa which can be broken into a score of fragments, each of which is in itself a perfect animal. Take the following passage as an example :

'Bari, for Englishmen, had then and has still a special interest as being the place where St. Anselm met the Greeks in council A.D. 1087, and was adjured by the reigning Pope, Urban II., in these words : "Anselm, our father, our master, where are you?" to come to the front and refute them, which his own theologians could not—and he made the speech, afterwards recast by him and published as a tract on the procession of the Holy Ghost, which immediately became standard, and is standard still' (p. 26).

Such a method of stringing half a dozen facts together is rather inelegant than faulty ; but what can be said for such slipshod and incorrect phraseology as that of which we give the following examples ?

'The opportunity no sooner came within his reach than it was seized in a grasp that would never let it slip, till the colophon had been placed on works, which by the blessing of God—which was *always the spirit in which he planned them*—should live' (p. 49).

'While there, they could not have failed to visit the palace where this great saint of Oxford as well as of Lincoln resided, whenever he could spare time, called Stowe Park, and been shown over the localities in its grounds that he had been known to frequent' (p. 52).

Upon the martyrdom of Cranmer, Ridley, and Latimer Mr. Ffoulkes observes : 'How they suffered, as Mr. Froude paints the scene, no meaner description of it is needed' (p. 218). Comparing Cranmer and Newman, he avers : '*Both* did the work that Divine Providence designed *each of them* to do' (p. 224). The ordinary reader will regard the information as not a little mixed which tells him that

'till the Sheldonian Theatre was erected, the exercises of the Act, answering to our Encaenia, were performed at St. Mary's, *for which*' (the exercises, we presume, not the University church) 'temporary scaffolds and galleries were put up, to be taken down when all was over, *and other costs incurred for repairs*' (p. 294).

It is yet more startling to read (the reference is to Newman's sermons, 'and the Oxford Tracts commencing with him and ending with him') that 'in their leanings towards Rome they simply reflected the *genius loci*, which is inherent in Oxford and far older than *him*' (p. 470). This latter solecism is, however, possibly a misprint.

But the climax of involution and obscurity is perhaps reached in a sentence which we quote in full, and which shall be our last example of the author's style:

'Walter Herby,' he writes, 'or Herdeby, as Tanner writes him in one place, but, by a slip of the pen, supposes another person of the same name, further on, to have written the sermon, who profited by the Arabians in his day, was an Augustinian friar, who studied at Oxford in the reign of Edward III., was famous for his erudition and for his lectures on the Old and New Testament' (p. 150).

Even with the aid of the author's punctuation, which we have faithfully copied, we confess ourselves incompetent to unravel the meaning of this unique paragraph.

It is in no carping spirit that we note these blemishes in a volume so replete with learning as the work before us. They afford a remarkable illustration of the degree to which one who has amassed considerable treasures of knowledge can disregard all concern about the manner in which he should set them before the general reader. Without accepting unreservedly the French dictum that 'the style is the man,' so flagrant a neglect of the art of composition is passing strange in a scholar of our great classic university. In so hurried an age as our own we look for finished and artistic work from those who have opportunity for learned leisure on the quiet banks of the Isis, and it is disappointing to find ourselves groping painfully amidst a bewildering labyrinth of words. The lack of discrimination which causes a writer to overcrowd his pages with a multitude of superfluous details is a serious drawback to the crisp and lucid handling which is essential when a great variety of subjects has to be treated within somewhat narrow limits.

The French adage already quoted is largely confirmed by the contents of Mr. Ffoulkes's volume. His diffuse, invertebrate style corresponds with the heterogeneous collection of ill-digested and extraneous matter gathered within his history. Subjects which, if discussed at all, should have been relegated to appendices are incorporated in the body of the work, and break very awkwardly the continuity of the narrative. It is only the slenderest thread of connexion which can be traced between the church of St. Mary and either schemes for

reunion or the most advantageous arrangement of portraits in the Bodleian Library; yet both these alien topics are dragged into the text. No less than twelve pages—enough for a complete magazine article—are devoted to an investigation of the birthplace of Langland, the author of *Piers Plowman*, a topic in itself of no little interest, but hardly germane to the University Church. Truth is that no sooner does a name which recalls a critical epoch in English history occur to him than the author flies off at a tangent, and empties all he knows on the matter at the reader's feet. At the period when the first Tudor came to the throne St. Mary's had fallen into decay, and a number of letters were despatched throughout the country to ask for contributions towards restoring it. The appeal issued by John Russell, Bishop of Lincoln, is an interesting illustration of a branch of Church work in the latter half of the fifteenth century with which we are in our own days sufficiently familiar, and its introduction *in extenso* into Mr. Ffoulkes's pages is reasonable enough. If to this there had been added a few examples of individual requests made to persons of some note in Church history, or under conditions of special importance, it would have exhausted all that a history of St. Mary's required. Instead of such condensation, more than four pages are filled with particulars of nearly fifty letters, eight of which are addressed to nameless persons, described only as 'Tua reverentia' or 'Vir humanissime,' while of no less than twenty-nine more we have the *nomina tantum* of those to whom they were directed. It is difficult to conceive the use of inserting such very dry bones into a tasty dish.

The notice of St. Mary's in Domesday proves that it was in existence before the Norman Conquest. Of the early Saxon edifice and its distinctive name of St. Mary the Virgin, which (in contrast with the French Notre Dame and the Greek Θεοτόκος) Mr. Ffoulkes regards as unconsciously symbolizing the part it would fill in English history; of the choice of Oxford as the capital of a shire and of the witenagemots held there A.D. 1015, 1036, and 1065; of the transference of its diocesan from Dorchester to Lincoln, and of its contact with national events under the latest Danish kings; of the confusion consequent on the invasion and the strange waste of 478 out of 721 houses within the city when the Domesday record was compiled, we have only briefest mention. If we dismiss, with Mr. Ffoulkes, familiar traditions as mainly legendary, solid historical ground is hardly reached before the days of Henry I., when Robert Pullen, in after years Cardinal

and Chancellor of the Roman Church, lectured for five years at Oxford. How eagerly we long for a vivid picture of the master and his pupils! We would willingly exchange the epitomes of Bampton Lectures, already in our hands, for some acquaintance with Pullen's sermons, which are still preserved at Lambeth in manuscript, and which we are provokingly assured are 'eminently spiritual and devotional' (p. 13), or for some extracts from his work on the Trinity, which 'will stand comparison with any work on the same subject by the schoolmen who followed him' (*ibid.*), but which is hardly more accessible to the general reader amidst the gigantic series published by the Abbé Migne. For Pullen furnishes a link between St. Bernard, the intimate friend of Pullen's master, Eugenius III., on one hand, and Nicholas Breakspear, the only English Pope, on the other. Nor can we gain a much clearer view of Pullen's successor, Vacarius, whose portrait by Mr. Green is ruthlessly torn to pieces in these pages. 'The first glimmer of light at once clear and true which dawns upon St. Mary's' (p. 16) is in the person of John of Oxford, its first registered incumbent, and also high in honour with the second Henry.

Mr. Ffoulkes enlarges with pardonable exultation upon the eminence reached by John of Oxford. The son of a simple burgher of a then obscure town, he won the confidence of three English sovereigns without forfeiting that of the high ecclesiastics with whom they were at variance, although the quarrels between the monarch and the primate placed John at times in a terribly critical position. In 1166 Henry II. made him Dean of Salisbury, and Becket immediately excommunicated him for so styling himself. Before Christmas, however, of the same year the Pope absolved him and restored him to his deanery. Nine years later he became Bishop of Norwich, and in 1189, as one of the king's justiciaries, held his assize court in his former church of St. Mary's.

'Certainly we should search in vain for incumbents of St. Mary's in ancient or modern times who have filled such high offices in both Church and State, and been employed on such delicate missions in exciting times, such as these were, conciliating all, moderating all, doing violence to none, getting a bad name with none, respected by two prelates of such eminent talents, yet of such opposite careers, as Becket and St. Hugh; the confidential adviser for twenty-five years of a many-sided monarch like Henry II., and a *grata persona* to both his sons in succession, Richard and John, as this son of a plain citizen of Oxford, and the earliest known incumbent of its University Church' (pp. 19, 20).

We cannot linger over the early architectural details which Mr. Ffoulkes supplies, nor upon his speculations about the alterations and additions made to the fabric of St. Mary's during the episcopate of St. Hugh. The great builder of Lincoln Cathedral did not confine his interest to the architectural condition of his own cathedral church, and during a second visitation to Oxford he re-dedicated St. Mary's, A.D. 1197, and added largely to its buildings. Nor can we dwell upon the problems, to which so many different solutions have been suggested, which are involved in determining the date and the architect of the old Congregation House, the Lady Chapel, the Tower, and the statuary with which it is adorned. The clear discussion of such particulars would absorb too much space, and the reader will find them fully examined in Mr. Ffoulkes's history. Peter de Kyllum, the first rector of St. Mary's acknowledged by the Crown, was congratulated on his appointment (A.D. 1249) by Adam de Marisco, the first Franciscan who read lectures in Oxford. A few extracts from his letter afford striking testimony of 'the unity of the faith' (Ephes. iv. 13) throughout the ages. It would seem that Kyllum had been reluctant to accept the rectorship, and the good abbot thus earnestly encourages him :

'How can it fail to be considered a call divinely inspired, in which neither ambition of perishable fame mingles, nor quest of high rank and affluence, nor greed of voluptuous gratification : but honour of the Divine Name, office vested with the power of doing good, emulation in contributing to the saving of souls : all linked together with indubitable faith. It is on this account, when, through gracious favour of the sovereign on formed [? formal] nomination by the brethren, the Pitier of souls has called forth your humble devotedness, reclining in the lowest place, to a high post of ecclesiastical *régime*—to wit, the government of the church of His own Mother in the town of Oxford, to which heaven prompted your aspirations, that I admonish you with sincere love . . . that, putting away all scruples arising from diffidence in your own powers, you accept the command in the Church Militant thus entrusted to you. . . . Surely there can be no cloak for diffidence . . . where Christ, the power of God, the wisdom of God, the sanctification of God, promises, in terms of such marked emphasis, that He will be with the rulers of His Church to the end of time.'

Then, after enlarging upon the special importance of 'a cure of souls so distinguished, so honourable, and so full of love,' he concludes :

'Does not the Author of evangelising say, "If you love Me, feed My sheep"? He, therefore, who, when specially called by God, refuses to perform the duty symbolised in *feeding* is proved an outlaw

from Divine Love. . . . But why deal any longer in suaves? From my heart I believe that a pious mind in a pious cause, of so clear and great cogency for the good of souls, needs no better suasive than the irrefragable words of the Scriptures and of Christ his Master' (pp. 28-9).

The elaborate redundancy of phrase in De Marisco's letter belongs to the century in which he wrote : its tone and spirit to the highest Christian thought of every age.

It was during the incumbency thus inaugurated that Mr. Ffoulkes recognizes the actual 'commencement of academical Oxford as a corporate body, with separate corporations in formal connexion with it as colleges.' Hitherto it had been the resort of a heterogeneous aggregate of teachers and students, who performed exercises and received degrees in divers faculties ; whose liberties and privileges were confirmed by royal charters and papal bulls ; whose turbulent scholars lodged in their special inns, were now forbidden all intercourse with the townsmen, now constrained to abstain from internecine war ; whose authority was jealously guarded against the encroachment of the monastic orders settled in the western quarter of the town ; and whose congregation at the summons of St. Mary's bell met to confer degrees or gathered hurriedly to arms. Already, in the quaint terms of the royal charter, it was the place

'where the Chancellor and University had established their Trivium and Quadrivium : where the theological faculty had burst forth as a fountain from the soil, and where the nude souls of men coming from afar have the robes of philosophy thrown over them' (p. 39).

Henceforth collegiate work was to proceed in accordance with formal statutes moulded by Walter of Merton and confirmed by Edward I., the latter of whom can boast of being the founder alike of the Parliamentary system whereon the constitution of England is based, and of the educational system, so happily combining secular and sacred learning, by which it has been sustained.

Mr. Ffoulkes waxes eloquent as he enlarges in turn upon the merits of the University, upon the beauty of its church, and upon the virtues of its royal and pious benefactors. Every detail of the sacred edifice now entrusted to his charge recalls sacred and historic memories that are pregnant with the deepest interest to him. In a glowing page he describes the twelve statues which adorn St. Mary's tower, whose every minute particular he deems a symbol of the person accounted worthy to occupy so distinguished a position.

'There they stand,' he writes, 'looking down upon each new generation as it arrived and left, and witnessing all that time to the foundation of both a national and a Christian University, with colleges endowed by private munificence to be the permanent homes of all duly qualified students, however poor; never to be forfeited by them after admission, except for misconduct, yet which all were free to leave when they pleased; with permanent accommodation secured to it in the church of St. Mary the Virgin, graciously beautified and enlarged for its reception by the bravest of kings and the purest of queens' (p. 55).

Nor is the writer's enthusiastic imagination exhausted by such a vision of his church's history. The groined roof of its Congregation House and the ornamentation of its tower probably supplied a model for Salisbury and for the rebuilding of Westminster. However this may be,

'two things,' he deems, 'are certain: (1) that the tower of St. Mary's must, on architectural grounds alone, be pronounced a *chef-d'œuvre* not easily matched of its kind; (2) that the numberless benefits conferred on England and the world at large, by those trained beneath its majestic shadow to work in various ways for God and man, present a total, that not merely Westminster and Salisbury, but all the cathedrals in England put together, would not be found to exceed' (p. 59).

At the foundation of Oriel by Adam de Brom the advowson of St. Mary's was handed over to the college, and the church from henceforth served the threefold purpose of a parish church, a college chapel, and the church of the University. The needs of the parishioners were met by the appointment of a vicar, and, whilst the right of the University to the Congregation House was specially reserved, all the other rights and appurtenances of the church were *appropriated* by the Crown to the Provost and scholars. In such a tripartite division there was abundant occasion for misunderstanding between the three distinct corporations who shared the ownership. Questions arose concerning the title to the chamber over the old Convocation House, concerning rights of attendance at Masses and of burials, which had to be determined in the law courts. The sacred building served for purposes that sound strange to modern ears, and was used for exercises and responsions which have long since been transferred to the schools. Even the bank of the University was first held within its walls, and various chests of funds designed for pious and charitable uses were deposited there for safety by their guardians. Not infrequently the Chancellor or his commissary held his court before the

tribunal in the church, or admitted at the same spot the principals of hospices and halls. It was within the south-west porch or parvis that exercises for admission to the University were performed, and that boys from country grammar schools were examined *viva voce* (there was no paper work in those days) before their matriculation. St. Mary's Church was the place, and the morrow of the feast of her nativity the day (p. 99), for the heads of halls to pay their caution-money. When the concourse of doctors and the convocation of regent and non-regent masters overflowed the narrow limits of the old Congregation House, the bedel cried aloud, at the bidding of the Chancellor,

"To your places, to your places; let the non-regents remain in the chancel, the graduates in theology in the congregation house, the graduates in canon law in the chapel of St. Anne, the graduates in medicine in the chapel of St. Catherine, the graduates in civil law in the chapel of St. Thomas, the proctors and regents in the Lady Chapel" (pp. 101, 102).

Their conference ended, the bedel proclaimed, 'Enter, masters, enter;' and they reassembled in the chancel as before. If, as Mr. Ffoulkes asserts, there was no misgiving about employing the church for such uses, and they were only discontinued when increasing numbers had outgrown St. Mary's, there was assuredly no little danger lest the sacred character of the building should be forgotten; else why the statutes which forbade all noisy dancing by persons disguised in masks and decked out with garlands in churches or their porches? One curious result of the connexion of St. Mary's with the University was that, on occasion, graces were passed in congregation to exempt from exercises certain applicants for degrees on condition of their contributing to the repair of the fabric. How many wealthy undergraduates in recent days would gladly compound for a degree by undertaking to pay for whitewashing the Congregation House or for mending its windows!

In a chapter with the quaint title of 'Sermons and General History' we are introduced to many important names—Cardinal Pullen and Bishop Grossetete, John Lawerne and the author of *Piers Plowman*, Hampole and Wycliffe, Thomas Gascoigne and William of Wykeham—all come in turn within the writer's ken. He observes that sermons were falling into disrepute just as Oxford and Cambridge were beginning to take definite shape, and no wonder, if Roger Bacon's complaint is well founded, that the prelates of his day,

'as in most things, were not much instructed in Divinity, nor in preaching, whilst they pursued their studies, and hence when they became prelates, and found preaching to be their duty, they borrowed quaternions of boys to preach for them, and by these boys a curious method was invented consisting of divisions and sounding periods, and alliterations, which shewed neither sublimity of speech nor wisdom of thought, but an infinite childish folly, that brought the Word of God into contempt; which childish folly, the good Friar adds, may God stamp out of His Church' (pp. 141, 142).

That such conceits did not form the whole staple of pulpit instruction, even in the darkest days of the Church, is proved by the examples of higher teaching which Mr. Ffoulkes inserts in his history. Amongst these a sermon of Dr. Pullen is of quite exceptional interest, both from its rarity, from the fact that it is now first translated from the original manuscript in Lambeth Palace Library, and from its characteristic intermixture of quaint adaptations of Holy Scripture with a lofty and true conception of its rightful use. The writer was evidently very largely imbued with that allegorical system of interpretation which has gained so singular a power over minds of a high order. He compares grammar and dialectics to Jacob's handmaids.

'For Jacob joined to himself handmaidens and freewomen—to wit, Zilpah and Bilhah, Leah and Rachel. Zilpah represents liberal eloquence, Bilhah juridical sentence; to both, it is granted, we may for a time be joined. But we must pass from the tie connecting us with handmaidens to the closer tie coupling us with freewomen. Accordingly the bondwoman must be cast out with her son. Leah then represents actual innocence, Rachel spiritual contemplation. At first we take for our wife Leah, who is bleary-eyed, symbolising that we now see darkly as through a glass whatever is known, but after a time we shall have Rachel for our wife: in other words, we shall see the Lord as He is' (p. 144).

After this we are prepared for the exegesis which makes Delilah carnal pleasure, that plucks out and blinds our inner eyes; Jezebel, desire of temporal glory, which extinguishes the flower of eternity and the germ of blessedness; the daughter of Herodias, disbelief in eternal things. Yet amidst such conceits there shines out clearly the exhortation to study Holy Scripture, not that we may appear wise, but that we may become righteous; not that we may learn science and sell our knowledge, but that we may be introduced into the chamber of life by the King.

We must refer the reader to Mr. Ffoulkes's pages for a full account of the ceremonial observed by an incepting doc-

tor of divinity, and of the elaborate benediction with which he was finally admitted to that degree in the church of St. Mary in the first half of the fifteenth century. Much light is cast on this period by the commonplace book of John Lawerne, a Benedictine monk, whose manuscripts are preserved in the Bodleian, and whose correspondence with the author of *Piers Plowman* affords Mr. Ffoulkes a theme for the long discussion we have already referred to. The period of the Wars of the Roses and the terrible plague of the Black Death brought evils from which Oxford was not exempt. Corruption and licence were widespread, and crept into the University's bosom. Here and there incidents are noted which reflect and illustrate the general decadence. Gascoigne complains that the regents would sell graces and dispensations for 'scholastic degrees, nay, degrees themselves, to those who would offer money privily for them. They would permit wicked and debauched persons to take degrees' (p. 163). As the number of Masses for which Oriel and the University were severally responsible was augmented, it was found increasingly difficult to obtain chaplains to perform them, and a contract is on record between the provost and scholars of Oriel and two persons, one of whom was a *skinner*, to provide, in return for the demise of certain premises, a priest to celebrate morning Mass at St. Thomas's altar for the well-being of the king and also to find vestments, chalice, book, and one candle for the same. Fierce conflicts broke out occasionally between town and gown, or between the partisans of rival parties in the University itself. A contest for the Chancellorship in 1349 was carried on with such violence that Chancellor Hawkesworth, Provost of Oriel, died of the injuries inflicted on him by his opponents at the funeral of some benefactor to the University. Six years later a bloody conflict between town and gown had to be quelled by the king, who condemned the town to a yearly fine and penance at St. Mary's.

One of the special charms of Mr. Ffoulkes's history is the persistent and pleasant charity which pervades it. Whatever good word can be said for anyone rises spontaneously to his lips, without preventing his frank acknowledgment of faults or foibles. His own convictions, which are neither disguised nor needlessly obtruded, do not blind him to the merits of men of varied schools of thought, and as we pass from one period of Church history to another he sets briefly before us the work which God had for good, yet imperfect, men to do. It is refreshing to meet with an author who can write at once with kindness and discrimination of Wycliffe and Archbishop

Cranmer, of Laud and the Puritan Commissioners, of John Wesley and Cardinal Newman.

Of Wycliffe it must be remembered that his life was spent during the most momentous period of struggle with the Papacy for the mastery over the Church of England, and that Oxford upheld the rector of Lutterworth in his audacious defence of the Church's liberties. Mr. Ffoulkes maintains the genuineness of the document professedly issued by the Chancellor, in which Wycliffe's character and acquirements are elaborately extolled in terms that accord with the concluding sentence, which runs as follows :

'Absit enim quod nostri praelati tantæ probitatis pro hæretico condemnassent, qui in logicalibus, philosophicis et theologicis, ac moralibus et speculativis inter omnes nostræ Universitatis, ut credimus, scripserat sine pari' (p. 189).

The faults of 'the morning star of the Reformation' were, indeed, neither few nor slight, but in his contest with the friars he had to deal with powerful and unscrupulous opponents, and the violent language of some of his tracts was the stern protest of outspoken indignation against the iniquity that defiled both Church and State. His pen ran on too rapidly to allow of measuring his words, and the number of his works, without counting his tracts, amounts to 225. Yet it would be difficult to surpass in felicity of thought or terseness of expression the following short extract from a sermon on the Blessed Virgin, which 'may well be thought to have been preached in her church' at Oxford.

'We should imitate the blessed Virgin in her humility, in her poverty and her chastity. By her humility the pride of the devil was confounded ; by her poverty the lust of the world was rebuked ; by her chastity the temptations of the flesh were disarmed. And though all Christians ought to be put on their guard against impurity, this is specially binding on a parish claiming the blessed Virgin for its patron saint. No inhabitant of the parish leading an impure life can expect any benefit from her patronage' (p. 193).

Mr. Ffoulkes exactly hits the mark when he asserts that Wycliffe's chiefest glory lay in his translation of the Bible into English. Forthwith the sacred writings became the standard of English literature and of the English language. The full effect of the movement which he inaugurated was not felt until the Bible was ordered to be set up in churches and was the one book familiar to every Englishman. It changed the moral tone of the entire people, and, in the language of a modern historian, 'the whole nation became a church.' It is

one of the most serious of the many shortcomings of Rome that she still withholds the Bible from her laity. Whilst Mr. Ffoulkes was writing the work before us an undergraduate took up a book from a friend's table and began to read it. 'What a charming book,' he said; 'what is it?' 'It is my Bible,' was the reply. '*Can I get a copy of it in Oxford?*' The questioner was a Roman Catholic student.

The accession of the Tudor line of kings found the older part of St. Mary's falling into ruin, and in its restoration our author discerns a foreshadowing of the impending Reformation. There is nothing to detain us in the letters which were issued, to ask for aid towards rebuilding the venerable fabric. A gift of forty oaks formed part of the king's donation, and no Oxford man of note in all probability escaped an appeal to his liberality. Of the *parishioners* of St. Mary's we learn that they were 'so mean and jejune that they had far rather exact contributions from others, than contribute themselves' (p. 203). The work was done in such unsatisfactory fashion as to require frequent renewal and to engender decay, which at the present moment is demanding serious consideration.

With pardonable and filial pride Mr. Ffoulkes records that Oxford had no share in the abandonment of King Edward's first Prayer Book; that her schools were not invaded by the foreign divines who strove to reverse the true Catholic tradition; that Collet and Erasmus, her most prominent Reformers, were men of moderation and judicious temper; and that in the later Reformation Jewel and Hooker did yeoman's work towards establishing the Anglican obedience on the impregnable rock of Holy Scripture, and the Catholic doctrine of the first six centuries. Of Wolsey and his master there is nothing special in this history. Nor does the severance of Oxford from the great diocese of Lincoln and its erection into a new bishopric call for remark. One scene, indeed, familiar to all students of English history, and fraught with the deepest pathos—the trial and martyrdom of Cranmer—meets with sympathetic treatment. The wiles of Roman officials are not entirely unknown to the writer, who notes that even in these days their action has been compared to that of a spider with a fly for the web, and to that of a cat with a mouse for the grip. So long and so often in their clutches, Cranmer simply lost his head, and then nobly redeemed his fall. In forming our decision upon a case of such complexity, we cannot do better than give full weight to Mr. Ffoulkes's wise and pregnant words:

'By all means let all be judged by the times in which they lived. Those times had a good deal in common with our own ; but in some respects they were removed as widely from ours as the poles. For the sixteenth century was an age teeming with events of the utmost significance, and with discoveries of unparalleled interest, proclaiming a host of new truths on the housetop to the minds of men, and forcing convictions upon them, that made the reformation of the Church which had been so long desired, but as often staved off, not merely possible, but imperative. Much of this is strangely similar to what we ourselves have gone through. On the other hand, it was an age that awarded ferocious treatment to the apostles of new opinions : who had commonly, therefore, to maintain them at the cost of their lives, and of sufferings infinitely worse than death. We, who live in days when rebellion is treated as a political offence, and all political offenders are let off with us scot free—when religious toleration is extended to all religions, including the religion of atheism—must throw ourselves into the condition of those who were liable to be burnt to death at any moment for denying a doctrine so repugnant to plain common sense as transubstantiation, before we can sit in judgment on human frailties and involuntary tergiversations in those who went about carrying their lives in their hands, and willingly parted with them in defending truths which most of us now account sacred ; but *which* not one in a million of this easy-going age would think it his duty to incur any loss to uphold in integrity, if it was attacked by men in power, or by men in possession of the public ear' (pp. 221, 222).

Mr. Ffoulkes remarks the singular coincidence that the pillar against which Cranmer leant during his trial is that by which Newman was wont to kneel when he was going to preach at St. Mary's. The three hundred years which severed them from each other hardly measures the distance between the aims they set before themselves ; yet each in his day fulfilled, although imperfectly, the work God had designed for him. We could wish that the archbishop had been less pliant, that the father of the Oxford revival had been able to set his face as a flint and to stand his ground in the Church of his forefathers ; but it is idle to enter upon speculations on what might have been or to attempt a solution of the deep mysteries of Providence. *Quisque suos patimur manes*. It was a refinement of cold-blooded cruelty which allowed Cranmer to have the first intimation of his execution during Cole's sermon as he stood opposite the preacher. Did the grace come then and there which turned the wrath of man to an occasion of praise ?

A scene enacted in St. Mary's before Queen Elizabeth presents a remarkable contrast to the hurried royal ceremonial of our own days :

'A large fair scaffold was set up for the performance of the disputations, reaching from the nether (west) end of the church to the door of the choir. Towards the upper end was a void place left, wherein a travys (cross-beam) was set up, and underneath, a cloth of state for the Queen, and by it a partition made for the ladies and maids of honour . . . Thither September 3, being Tuesday (1566), the Queen with her nobility went on foot (from Christ Church where she lodged) to hear disputations in natural and moral philosophy, continuous from 2 of the clock till 6. On September 4 she came again at the same hour, and stayed as long, to hear disputations in civil law. And on September 5 she was present for the 3rd time to hear disputations first in medicine, which were short, and then in theology which could not be finished, they were so long. Each day she is reported to have listened attentively to all that was said, and was free with her observations when anything struck her particularly for admiration or satire. About six of the clock (on the third day) the Queen, of her own benignity, concluded the Act, to the very great delight and rejoicing of many hundred then present, with a short speech in Latin of her own, ending with the words: "*Votum meum hoc erit, ut me vivente sitis florentissimi, me mortuâ beatissimi.*" The next day, after dinner, as she was about to leave Christ Church, Mr. Tobie Mathew spake an oration before her, which she liking very well, nominated him her scholar. Afterwards, accompanied by the Earl of Leicester, who was then chancellor, and a vast concourse, on reaching the forest of Shotover, and being told by him that the liberties of the University reached no farther that way, turning her face towards Oxford, she said, "Farewell the worthy University of Oxford, farewell my good subjects there, farewell my dear scholars, and may God prosper your studies, farewell, farewell" (pp. 244, 5).

As we draw nearer to our own days there is less that is unfamiliar in the history of St. Mary's. The opening of the sixteenth century witnessed one of those outbursts of violence which stain, at different periods, the annals of Oxford, between southern and northern scholars. At one of these on August 8, 1505, just outside St. Mary's in High Street, many graduates and undergraduates were killed. Even so late as the year 1714, amongst the decrees issued for the funeral of Dr. Radcliffe, there is one that jars strangely upon our ideas of the propriety which we should assume to be inviolable under the circumstances.

'All Bachelors of Arts,' it reads, 'and undergraduates are hereby strictly commanded to behave themselves in a manner suitable to so solemn an occasion. And all persons whatsoever are enjoined, upon the severest penalties, not to tear off the escutcheons, or to make any disturbance in the Church, the Divinity School, or in any part of the procession; and all magistrates are to take care that no disorder may happen through the whole course of the solemnity, or at least that no offender may go unpunished' (pp. 349-50).

Our paper has almost reached its permitted length ; nor is there need to dwell on the chapters which treat of the revolution and the dynasty of Hanover. In each the reader will find much that is worthy of his attention : much that will tend to correct current mistakes about epochs of Church history which we, perhaps, too complacently regard as very inferior to our own : much that will tend to soften harsh judgment even when we cannot honestly approve. The subject of the last chapter, Cardinal Newman as Vicar of St. Mary's, has been too frequently and too variously before us of late to admit of the fragmentary handling of which a final page could at best allow. For the finished logician, the deeply spiritual preacher, the devoted large-hearted Christian priest, Mr. Ffoulkes has unbounded admiration, and his sorrow is proportionate over the mistake which led him to pass over to a communion where the writer knows by experience he must have encountered—possibly in aggravated form—the ills he fondly hoped that he was leaving behind him.

The peculiarity of Mr. Ffoulkes's method of performing his task comes yet more prominently in its later chapters. A sermon of John Wesley's given at full length, a hymn by his brother Charles compared with the *Dream of Gerontius*, a long analysis of whole sets of Bampton Lectures, interrupt in singular fashion the flow of the narrative, and we turn with startling abruptness from theology to history, from discussion upon some of the deepest problems of divinity to descriptions which might grace the pages of the *Morning Post*. Yet in and through all these runs a clear thread of continuity. The great University and its church might truly arrogate to themselves the broad assertion—we are national in the best sense of the word, and nothing which has concerned the national history lies beyond the limits of our ken.

It has been extremely difficult within the limits of a brief review to notice and to bring to a focus so heterogeneous a mass of material as Mr. Ffoulkes has gathered into his pages. Great as is the variety of subjects we have touched upon, we have been compelled to omit many points of interest without so much as a passing reference to them. We would fain have given some particulars of the Church accounts and University expenses at different periods, of the fees paid for Masses and burials and other kindred topics, of the succession of St. Mary's vicars from the Reformation downwards, of the lines which connect the University church with the separate colleges, of the gradual detachment of the church from the exercises of the various faculties, of the royal festivities, of the notices of

men 'of light and leading,' which crowd the concluding chapters. As we recall the long line of names duly qualified to serve God in Church and State that must be marshalled in the briefest review taken by such a history, we feel that we are citizens of no mean country, and would take home the lesson which such memories suggest. From the days of Grossetete and Edward I. down to those of the Iron Duke, a lofty sense of duty has upheld the Church and the nation in the unique position to which both have attained. The glory and the empire of Great Britain have been acquired by men trained by a liberal education and disciplined by nurture in the fear of God. In these two primary elements Mr. Ffoulkes rightly discerns the secret of England's greatness. In their continued and combined influence over generations yet to come lies the only well-founded hope against England's gradual, if not speedy, decay.

ART. VII.—APOLLINARIUS OF LAODICEA.

1. *Texte u. Untersuchungen, &c., von Oscar von Gebhardt u. Adolf Harnack.* VII. Band, Heft 3 und 4. Apollinarios von Laodicea—sein Leben u. seine Schriften. Nebst einem Anhang Apollinarii quæ supersunt Dogmatica. Von Dr. JOHANNES DRÄSEKE. (Leipzig, 1892.)
2. *Gesammelte patristische Untersuchungen.* Von Dr. JOHANNES DRÄSEKE. (Altona und Leipzig, 1889.)
3. *Texte, &c.* III. Band, Heft 1 und 2. Leontius von Byzanz. Von FRIEDRICH LOOFS. (Leipzig, 1887.)

A HISTORY of the life and dogmatic opinions of Apollinarius is, in view of the fragmentary remains of that writer, which are all that we possess, a most difficult undertaking. Yet, thanks to the great and painstaking industry of his German editor, Dr. von Dräseke, this task has been accomplished with most interesting and useful results. It was a task which occupied the writer many years, and must have involved considerable research.

There were two Apollinarii, father and son, both well-known and able men. The younger was the heresiarch. Both father and son appear to have had a share in the famous translation of the Old Testament into Greek verse, epic, lyric, and dramatic, which they prepared for use in Christian schools when Julian forbade the classics to be taught by Christians.

We propose to confine ourselves to the merits of the

younger Apollinarius as a theologian. His literary power is of a high order, but our interest in him is mainly dogmatic. The researches of Von Dräseke have made it necessary to reconsider the traditional view about him, and may perhaps in some degree, though only in minor points, modify the prevailing impressions as to the character of his teaching.

Perhaps, too, we may be led to form a somewhat more favourable opinion of the heresiarch himself, though he must still be regarded as the author of a most pernicious heresy.

It will be as well to begin with a brief statement of what has hitherto been generally accepted as to his teaching. Canon Bright¹ gives the following account of his heresy :

'A learned and able prelate, an old friend of St. Athanasius, intent on opposing Arianism, he fell into error through ill-directed reverence. He appealed to the true and deep-seated Christian conviction of the singleness of Christ's Person, and of His absolute sinlessness. But he gave to these ideas a one-sided and erroneous expression. He assumed that, if Christ had all the constituents of Humanity, the "two complete" natures thus supposed would make two persons ; and that, although Christ might assume an "animal soul" or ψυχή, without compromising His Divine sanctity, the intelligent soul or νοῦς, the seat of choice, was necessarily instinct with capacities for evil, and therefore Christ had no such soul, but the Word supplied its place. . . . Apollinaris was condemned by Councils at Rome in 377, at Alexandria in 378, at Constantinople in 381. . . . Some of his adherents, from denying to Christ a human mind, proceeded to deny Him a human body. They revived in substance the old Valentinian notion, saying that His body was not formed from the Virgin, but was a portion of the Divine Essence clothed with matter. . . . Apollinaris himself, according to his own declarations, did not go beyond asserting that Christ's flesh, while really derived from the Virgin, might be called consubstantial with the Word, because of its close union with Him. . . . Language, indeed, was quoted as his, which went much further : and whether he was disingenuous or inconsistent, or, on the other hand, was charged with what he had never said, some of his friends and followers, at a very early period, had spoken of the Lord's body . . . as actually, in its own substance, divine. This was the view of the extreme section of the Apollinarians, led by Polemon and Timotheus, as against the moderate section led by Valentinus.'

It will be seen that Canon Bright hesitates to impute to Apollinaris the extreme opinions of some of his followers. A similar hesitancy is found in the late Dr. Swainson's *History of the Creeds* (p. 87) : 'We may possibly say that Apollinaris held that our Lord flowed through the Virgin, without partaking of her substance.'

¹ St. Leo's *Sermons on the Incarnation*, n. 32.

We believe that one result of Von Dräseke's researches is to remove this doubt altogether. Apollinarius was, to use Dr. Bright's words, 'charged with what he had never said.' Yet, whether he were responsible for the extreme opinions of his followers or not, he certainly taught an essentially and vitally heretical doctrine as to the Person of Our Lord. Denying that He had a human spirit, or a human mind, he practically denied that He was man at all, and thus undermined the very foundations of the Christian faith. It will be seen indeed presently that he tried to defend his peculiar teaching from this charge, but he was obliged to admit that even if he taught that Our Lord was perfect Man, he did so in an entirely transcendental sense. He was not, according to Apollinarius, man in the same sense that we are. Thus in the first place his denial of the human *πνεῦμα* in Christ was fatal to the whole doctrine of the Incarnation.

Again, the possibility of a human will, tempted to sin, but never falling into sin, capable of vacillation, but never vacillating, distinct from the Divine Will, but in perpetual harmony with it, is essential to the very idea of moral progress. If such an ideal had not been presented to the world in Christ, He would not have been the ideal Man. It was because Apollinarius could not conceive the possibility of moral conflict in Christ, that he fell into his grievous error. The coexistence of a human mind with the Divine Mind in the Person of Christ—in other words, the problem on its intellectual side—does not appear to have been so distinctly present to his thoughts. It was the difficulty of conceiving a human will, derived from fallen humanity, absolutely void of sin, which perplexed him. And if it was replied, 'But the union of that human will with the Divine will in the one Person of Christ rendered it sinless,' he would have said, 'That only leads to another difficulty: if there are two wills, there must be a double personality—which is impossible.' Thus his error arose, as Canon Bright clearly expresses it, from 'a one-sided and erroneous expression of these two ideas—the singleness of Christ's Person, and His absolute sinlessness.' Apart from his error on this point, Apollinarius appears to have been a champion of the orthodox faith, and to have done the Church considerable service by his writings against the Arians. He was a controversialist of great originality and power, if we are to accept the Arian treatises ascribed to him by Von Dräseke; but not only so. He was not only a polemical theologian, he was also the author of numerous commentaries, which are very highly spoken of by St. Jerome,

and he contributed not a little to the clear expression of some of the doctrines of the Church, especially in regard to the Person of the Holy Ghost.

But before we can establish these general assertions we must examine the literary question of the Apollinarian authorship of certain writings attributed to him by Caspari and Von Dräseke. These scholars claim¹ to have recovered some of his writings, hitherto either unknown or supposed to be lost. We will try to give some account of the way in which they came to do so. And as the examination of this point involves a somewhat tedious critical argument, we must crave our readers' indulgence if the next few pages are somewhat dry.

The little pamphlet known as the *Adversus Fraudes Apollinaristarum*, or, according to its Greek title, *Against those who confront us with certain works of Apollinarius with false titles, ascribing them to the Holy Fathers*, has come down under the name of Leontius, a theologian who wrote about the time of Justinian. Indeed, he appears to have been a personal friend of Justinian, and to have largely moulded the Emperor's religious opinions. But although the *Adversus Fraudes* has come down amongst his works, Professor Loofs points out that it is missing in one important manuscript, and that on the whole the evidence does not point to Leontius as the author, although its substance is repeated in other undoubted works of his. He thinks that the real author may be John of Scythopolis, who is also mentioned by Von Dräseke as having, *circ.* 500 A.D., devoted himself to investigating the genuine remains of Apollinarius.

But to return to the book itself. 'It is nothing else,' writes Professor Loofs, 'than a critical study.' The author declares that he will prove that several passages from the writings of the Fathers quoted by Apollinarians, Eutychians, or followers of Dioscurus, as against those who defended the formula of Chalcedon,² from Gregory Thaumaturgus, Athanasius, and Julius, and many other Fathers, were nothing else than writings of Apollinarius, falsely ascribed to those Fathers. He adduces the three following:

1. A short Exposition of the Faith, the *Katà μέρος πίστις*, falsely ascribed to Gregory Thaumaturgus.

¹ Cf. Robertson, *Athanasius* ('Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers'), p. lxxv.

² The Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451), the fourth General Council, decided that Christ is 'one Person in two natures,' thus condemning the Monophysite heresy. We believe that Apollinarius himself was not a Monophysite, in spite of his famous 'οὐ δύο πρόσωπα οὐδὲ δύο φύσεις' (*Fidei Expositio*, iv. 1 c.). See *Dogmatica quæ supersunt*, xvi. p. 377.

2. Some letters, ascribed to Julius of Rome.

3. A treatise on the Incarnation, ascribed to Athanasius.

He then proceeds to quote passages from the Apollinarians, Valentinus and Timotheus, in which quotations are made from these three writings, and ascribed by them to Apollinarius. They must, he argues, have known the words of their own master, and indeed internal and other evidence supports the conclusion of this ancient critic. Caspari has fully examined the question in *Alte und neue Quellen zur Geschichte des Taufsymbols*, and we cannot entertain any reasonable doubt that these writings are indeed the work of Apollinarius. The Presbyter Gennadius, indeed, in his introduction to St. Jerome's *De Viris Illustribus*, written *circ.* 480 A.D., speaks of one of the letters as written by Julius. But Gennadius, as a Western, may have been ignorant of the fact of the real authorship of this letter, for a still earlier testimony, that of the Emperor Marcian, immediately after the Council of Chalcedon, in the year 452, asserts in a letter to the monks at Alexandria¹ that the Council

'Eutychis quidem peremit impietatem, quem Dioscurus est secutus et alii quidam, qui libros Apollinaris non dubitaverunt plebi dispergere, vocabula sanctorum patrum eis attitulant, quatenus ad plenum simplicium mentes sua falsitate deciperent ;'

and the following words of Eutyches himself, in a letter written to Leo the Great in 448,² shows us who the 'holy Fathers' referred to by Marcian were :

'Ego autem, metuens definitionem a Synodo [Ephesina] nec adimere nec addere verbum contra expositam fidem a sancta Synodo Nicæna, sciens vero sanctos et beatos patres nostros Julium, Felicem, Athanasium, Gregorium, sanctissimos episcopos, refutantes duarum naturarum vocabulum,' &c.

It would seem clear, therefore, that the Council of Chalcedon, although, as Gennadius tells us, it was at first staggered by these authorities, decided that they were Apollinarian forgeries. There are grave difficulties involved in this conclusion, but the evidence seems quite strong enough to support it. To take only one example. A confession of faith,³ found in an address to Jovian, written in the year 362, was ascribed to St. Athanasius, and accepted as such by St. Cyril, who derived from it the formula *μία φύσις τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγον σεσαρκωμένη* — 'one Incarnate nature of God the Word.'

¹ Mansi, *Concilia*, tom. vii. p. 482.

² *Leonis Magni Opera*, tom. i. p. 740 (Ep. xxi).

³ *Dogmatica quæ supersunt*, iii.

Now three writers quote from this address as the work of Apollinarius: Anastasius in the *Patrum Doctrina de Verbi Incarnatione*, and Justinian and Leontius, each in a work against the Monophysites. The evidence, therefore, for the Apollinarian authorship is very strong. Else we might ask 'How is it possible that St. Cyril should attribute to St. Athanasius words which were never uttered by him?'

We naturally want to know when and by whom these forgeries could have been effected.

'The deception,' writes Caspari,¹ 'originated with certain Apollinarians—in all probability, however, not with Apollinarians who stood outside the pale of the Church, but with some (or perhaps even one) of the Apollinarians who, as Theodoret tells us, about the second decade or the beginning of the third decade of the fifth century, were reconciled to the Catholic Church without having in their hearts abjured their heresy, and who now used their new position to spread the opinions which they still firmly held amongst the Catholics.'

So far Theodoret's words will carry us. Caspari goes on to assume:

'With this end some of these supposed new Catholics provided certain books of Apollinarius, well known and valued by them, with titles in which they named Gregory Thaumaturgus, Felix, and Julius of Rome, and Athanasius as their authors. For this purpose they chose, not his greater writings, nor those of which it was generally or fairly well known that he was their author, but his lesser works, and those which were very little or not at all known.'

He proceeds to say that the parties in the Church at that day were ready to welcome these writings, and overlook their latent Apollinarian teaching, because of their more or less explicit assertion that the Incarnate Son had only one nature.

We may, perhaps, without much difficulty, accept such an hypothesis. To pass off a few letters, or even one of the immense number of confessions of faith then extant, under a false title, would perhaps have been comparatively easy, especially in an uncritical age when books were not multiplied as they are now. But to persuade the world that whole treatises on important subjects, such as the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, or the Arian heresy, were written by well-known writers such as St. Athanasius or St. Basil, when they were really the work of Apollinarius, must have been much more difficult. And yet this is what Von Dräseke undertakes to prove, and we must admit that he makes out a very strong case. We shall, however, leave our readers to judge for them-

¹ *Alte und neue Quellen*, p. 119.

selves, and only attempt to recapitulate the evidence which he adduces for the Apollinarian authorship of

1. The Correspondence with St. Basil, hitherto rejected as spurious.
2. The treatise against the Arian Eunomius.
3. Three Dialogues on the Holy Trinity.
4. A treatise on the Holy Trinity.

1. Four letters purporting to be the correspondence of St. Basil and Apollinarius were marked as spurious by Cotelier at the end of the seventeenth century and placed at the end of the Benedictine edition of St. Basil's works, numbered 361-364. But Von Dräseke discovers internal grounds for believing them to be genuine. In the first, St. Basil writes to ask Apollinarius the exact meaning of the term *οὐσία*, 'since those who are throwing everything into confusion, and have filled the world with reasonings and disputations, have rejected the term *οὐσία* as alien to the Divine Oracles.' It must be confessed that this exactly describes the conduct of the Arians at the Councils of Ariminum and Seleucia in 359. They succeeded in persuading the bishops to reject the term *οὐσία* as unscriptural. So it was not unnatural that St. Basil should write to Apollinarius asking how the Fathers used the term, and whether he had discovered it anywhere in the Scriptures. He also asked for an explanation of the real meaning of *ὁμοούσιον*, confessing that he inclines to the semi-Arian formula (*ἀπαρλλακτῶς ὁμοῖον*). Apollinarius replies in a courteous letter illustrating the common *οὐσία* of the Divine Nature by the common *οὐσία* of our human nature. St. Basil writes back a short note to thank him. His soul is now more than ever possessed with a passion for the knowledge of the Divine Oracles.

The fourth letter is not an answer to the third, but a strong invitation to St. Basil to do his share in defending the faith against its present aggressors. After certain remarks, in which the notes of place and time connect very well with what is known of St. Basil's movements at this period, Apollinarius goes on to describe the Council of Alexandria:

'You must know that since I last wrote to you there has been a gathering of Egyptian Bishops, and a Synodal letter was despatched, one in perfect harmony with the letters of the ancients, both the Divine Epistles themselves and those written in accord with them at Nicæa . . . and the question of the Nature of the Holy Spirit was referred to, and He was declared to be in the same Godhead (with the Father and the Son).'¹

¹ *Apollinarios von Laod.* p. 118.

There can be no reasonable doubt that the proceedings of the Council of Alexandria are here described.

2. The treatise against Eunomius has come down under the name of St. Basil. The external and manuscript evidence is as follows: St. Jerome mentions the fact that Apollinarius and Didymus wrote against Eunomius. Philostorgius, as we learn from Photius, tells us that Apollinarius replied to the *Apology* of Eunomius. He also informs us that Eunomius replied in *five* books to a polemic of St. Basil's against him. Photius, however, speaks of this work of Eunomius, which he himself had read, as consisting of *three* books. Probably in copying the passage from Philostorgius he substituted E for Γ. But the tradition lived on that St. Basil had written five books, the number being naturally supposed to correspond to the five books of Eunomius mentioned in this extract of Photius from Philostorgius, and a fourth and fifth book were actually found in the manuscripts of St. Basil. Since the time of Erasmus these so-called fourth and fifth books of St. Basil's work have been rejected as spurious.

Von Dräseke's theory is that an Apollinarian, about the beginning of the fifth century, added Apollinarius' reply to the *Apology* of Eunomius to St. Basil's work, in order to preserve his master's work for the Church. And as a matter of fact the fourth and fifth books of St. Basil's work were originally one. In one manuscript, Cod. Reg. IV., the title of the whole (the fourth and fifth books taken together) is *Τοῦ αὐτοῦ πρὸς Εὐνόμιον περὶ τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος λόγος δ'*. But at the beginning of the fifth book in this manuscript, and in Cod. Reg. V. no division occurs, but *περὶ τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος* is written on the margin, where the so-called fifth book begins. A later hand has written *λόγος ε'* before the *περὶ τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος* in Cod. Reg. III.

St. Jerome says Didymus wrote against Eunomius in *two* books; so he cannot be the author. It remains that Apollinarius must have written it. Now, Eunomius wrote his *Apology* about 360, when he was forced to resign his bishopric at Cyzicus. So that Apollinarius probably wrote this book, his reply, soon after that date. At that time we know him to have been one of the champions of the orthodox Church, and so we are not surprised to find that the *Contra Eunomium* is thoroughly orthodox. The style, and especially the doctrine of the Holy Ghost, is, so Von Dräseke contends, strictly Apollinarian. The Holy Ghost is most unequivocally declared to be God, and a group of Pauline passages in proof of his Divinity is found almost in the same order in the

Contra Eunomium, the Κατὰ μέρος πίστις, and the Three Dialogues.

3. We will now turn to these Three Dialogues. The success which attended the pious fraud which preserved the address to the Emperor Jovian, and its Confession, under the name of St. Athanasius, suggested to Von Dräseke that other works of Apollinarius might have been preserved in a similar way. So he was naturally led to examine carefully the Seven Dialogues, which are ascribed, partly to St. Athanasius, partly to Maximus Confessor, and are partly anonymous. Garnier supposed all seven to be the work of Theodoret. Möller first asserted that none of them could have been written either by St. Athanasius, or Maximus, or Theodoret. Now the first three dialogues always occupy the same place in the manuscripts, and their contents are far more than the half of the whole set. In the edition of Stephanus (1570), and the Benedictine edition, the dialogues against the Apollinarians (numbered 6 and 7 in Garnier's Theodoret) are numbered 4 and 5; while the dialogues against the Pneumatomachi (Macedonians), which are numbered 4 and 5 in Garnier, are the last in the other two editions. This variation in the order of the last four dialogues is significant. The first three are clearly the original kernel, to which writings of a similar nature have been added at different times, and in a different order.

In the first two dialogues an 'Orthodox' believer argues with an Anomæan. In the third a 'Macedonian' and an 'Orthodox' join issue. No one has ever denied the unity of authorship of these three, which differ altogether in style and method from the rest of the dialogues. In the middle ages these first three were quoted as the work of St. Athanasius. The titles in the manuscripts are of no value, because they are different in some manuscripts, and wanting in others. The fact that they were quoted as the work of St. Athanasius goes for no more than the fact that the *Contra Eunomium* was quoted as St. Basil's. Von Dräseke holds that they were probably added to the works of St. Athanasius as the *Contra Eunomium* was to St. Basil's. Internal evidence, which we would gladly describe in detail, but want of space forbids us, confirms this supposition, and we must candidly admit that there is a very strong presumption, amounting almost to certainty, that the author of the *Contra Eunomium* is also the author of the Dialogues. There is, however, an utter absence of any external evidence for the Apollinarian authorship. Still we are satisfied on internal grounds, that if Apollinarius

is the author of the *Contra Eunomium*, he must also be the author of the Dialogues.

4. There is external as well as internal evidence for the Apollinarian authorship of the *Περὶ τριάδος*. It has come down under the name of St. Justin Martyr. But there is a passage in it which could hardly have been written by St. Justin. It is as follows :

‘For tell us, you who make a show of being the leaders of Christianity ; you who to the annihilation of the the two natures pursue such pretentious inquiries ; you who busy yourselves with nonsense about a “mixture” and “confusion” of the natures, and the “change” from a body into Godhead, and other such abstruse questions,’ &c.¹

Clearly this is the theology of an age long posterior to St. Justin. Now Gregory of Nazianzus, in his first letter to Kledonius, written 381–3, speaks of a work of Apollinarius *Περὶ τριάδος*, and evidently as well known, for he prefixes the article. In this work he admits that Apollinarius taught the Divinity of the Holy Ghost, but declares that he made a distinction of great, greater, greatest, between the Three Persons of the Holy Trinity, by comparing them to the Sun, His Rays, and His Brightness (*ἥλιος, ἀκτὶς, αὐγή*). He further states that Apollinarius appealed to it to prove the faith of the orthodox unsound. Internal grounds, again, point to Apollinarius as author, though we must confess that the apparent zeal of the writer for the ‘two natures’ seems rather strange. But he may very well have held that our Lord had two natures in the generic sense. In fact, in the *Κατὰ μέρος πίστις* it is, so far as the assertion of two natures implies two persons, that he denies it, *οὐ δύο πρόσωπα οὐδὲ δύο φύσεις*. No doubt, like St. Cyril, he was ready enough to admit that our Lord was ‘of two natures,’ though His second nature—that is, His human nature—was assumed by the Divine nature as a garment. He spoke of our Lord as a King hiding His majesty beneath a sordid robe. But the *Περὶ τριάδος* connects so closely with the *Contra Eunomium* in its general line of thought and expression (*cf.* especially the way in which the terms ‘Begotten of,’ ‘Unbegotten,’ ‘Proceeding from’ are in both treatises said to be ‘modes of existence’), that we cannot help suspecting that it was, in its original form, written about the same time as the *Contra Eunomium*. We feel no doubt that Apollinarius is the author. Indeed, we have made up our mind that we must accept the theory of these rather extensive forgeries. The object of the forger, we may presume, was rather to preserve some of his beloved

¹ *Apollinarios von Laod.* p. 173.

master's works than to proselytize. The smaller fragments appear to have been thus preserved with the special object of vindicating the memory of Apollinarius from false charges, such as that he taught the consubstantiality of Christ's Body with the Godhead, or, as is the case with the *Katὰ μέρος πλῆστις*, that he taught Sabellian doctrine. Presently, when the Monophysite question caused the writings of the Fathers to be diligently searched to see what they said on the subject, the frauds were not for the moment discovered. It is a most curious and interesting literary problem.

We are free now to return to the general question of the theology of Apollinarius. And the first question we naturally ask is, whether these newly discovered writings of Apollinarius throw any new light on the nature of his teaching. The earlier and longer treatises may be said to contain no indication at all, or scarcely any, of his peculiar views. This is hardly to be wondered at, as they deal with the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, and not with the doctrine of the Person of Christ. Only once have we come across a passage which indicates the direction in which his thought was moving. It is in the *Contra Eunomium* (293 c): 'But in all this we do not speak of two Persons, God separately and man separately (for He was one), but we distinguish the nature of each in thought (*κατ' ἐπίνοιαν*).' The orthodoxy of these Arian treatises is unimpeachable, and the arguments are always forcible though sometimes finespun. The thoughts are often very suggestive. The proof-texts are taken very largely from the Old Testament, the writer being partial to the allegorical interpretation of Scripture.

These earlier works, then, do not throw much new light on the teaching of Apollinarius as to the Person of our Lord. But when we come to the Address to the Emperor Jovian already referred to, which follows the Dialogues in order of time, we are suddenly introduced into a different atmosphere. The Trinitarian question has ceased to be the question of the day. The Christological question is occupying men's minds, and Apollinarius without hesitation declares his belief that 'Christ derived the substance of His flesh from the Blessed Virgin, but in His Spirit He was God.' 'If anyone says the Flesh of our Lord was from above, and not from the Virgin Mary, the Catholic Church anathematizes him.' Here he does not explicitly deny that our Lord had a human spirit, but he implies that the only part of His human nature which He received from the Blessed Virgin was His flesh. Indeed he adds: 'It was not only by His partnership with us in the

flesh, which He took from Mary, that He was man.' A curious remark, only to be explained by his theory that the Logos took the place of the human spirit. He does not appear to have yet adopted the Pauline psychology, according to which man consists of a body, an animal soul, and a human spirit. But in effect his peculiar view was already dominant in his mind. We also note here how strongly he condemns what he elsewhere calls the 'insane' teaching that the flesh of Christ is consubstantial with God, and 'came down from heaven,'¹ and was therefore not really derived from the Blessed Virgin. He repeatedly and in the most emphatic terms renews his condemnation of this doctrine. These disavowals are mostly found in the writings which are quoted by Valentinus, as we learn from the *Adversus Fraudes*, as the work of his master. Valentinus wrote a book with the special object of exonerating Apollinarius from the charge of teaching this doctrine, which is practically Docetic. But it is not only in the places quoted by Valentinus that these disclaimers occur. In a fragment preserved by Anastasius, in his collection of the opinions of heretics on the Incarnation, we find a quotation from Apollinarius, the words of which are found in a tract, still extant, and traditionally ascribed to Julius of Rome. Now in this tract the writer says: 'His Flesh had also the peculiar properties of ours by virtue of His Birth from the Virgin.'² So again in the *Περὶ τριᾶδος* he says: 'He took a part of her nature.'³ We may therefore fairly set aside the lingering suspicion that Apollinarius gave any countenance to what Canon Bright justly calls the 'wild theory,' that our Lord's Body was of a celestial substance.

On the other hand, both Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa, whether fairly or not, accuse Apollinarius of teaching such absurdities. We think this only proves how early his followers perverted his doctrine, and how universally it was believed that this popular perversion represented the real views of Apollinarius. Both the Gregories quote from Apollinarius's most famous Christological work, the *De Incarnatione*,

¹ This was one of his own favourite expressions with regard to our Lord. 'The second Man is from heaven,' 'The Son of Man came down from heaven,' by combining which with 'The Word was made Flesh,' he argued that the most essentially human part of our Lord 'came down from heaven,' and was united to our flesh. This most essentially human part, the true man, was the spirit (*πνεῦμα*); hence St. Paul wrote: 'The last Adam was made a quickening Spirit.' But he postulates here that the *σῶμα* did not come down from heaven.

² *Dogmatica*, xx. *ad fin.*

³ *De Trinitate*, 381 C (*Dogmatica*, xi. p. 358, l. 10).

of which only fragments survive, chiefly in Gregory of Nyssa's polemic against it. Von Dräseke has carefully collected all the genuine fragments; but as those who have preserved these quotations from this work of Apollinarius do not carefully distinguish what he actually said from their own remarks, it is difficult to know exactly what he did say. Gregory of Nazianzus, in his first letter to Nectarius (we quote from Dr. Swainson on the Creed, p. 82), writes:

'He misinterprets St. John iii. 13: "No one has ascended up into heaven, but He that came down from heaven, the Son of man, who is in heaven," as if He was the Son of man before He came down from heaven, and came down bringing with Him His own flesh which he had had in heaven, being, as it were, itself eternal, and made co-essential with him (*προαιώνιον* and *συνουσιωμένον*).'

Gregory of Nyssa again expresses himself to the same effect. He says that Apollinarius

'declared that the Son, being Wisdom (*νοῦς*) Incarnate, was born of a woman, without having become Flesh in the Virgin, but that having passed through her as through a channel (*παροδικῶς*), just such as He was before all worlds, He was then manifested as God Incarnate, or, as He himself names it, Wisdom Incarnate.'

Probably in the above passage all that is really Apollinarian is the assertion that Christ was *νοῦς ἐνσαρκος*. The rest is Gregory's deduction, based in all probability on what was being popularly taught by the Apollinarians with whom he had come in contact. The real teaching of Apollinarius may be gathered from his own words in a letter to the exiled bishops in Diocæsarea, written in the year 377:

'We confess, not that the Word of God dwelt in a holy man, which was true in the case of the prophets, but that the Word Himself became Flesh without taking a human mind (*νοῦς*), a mind which is necessarily subject to change and enslaved by unclean thoughts, but being Divine Unchangeable Heavenly Wisdom (*νοῦς*) Himself.'

It will be noticed that both Gregories accuse Apollinarius of teaching men to believe that the flesh of Christ was pre-existent (*προαιώνιον*). Dörner is of opinion that he did teach that the manhood of Christ was pre-existent. He explains the difficulty of Gregory of Nazianzus as to a 'climax of Divinity' in Apollinarius's comparison of the Three Persons of the Holy Trinity to three degrees of light, by the fact that he taught (1) an economical subordination of both the Son and the Spirit to the Father, and (2) a 'side in the Logos

¹ *De Incarnatione*, Zacagni's edition. p. 180 (*Dogmatica*, xvii. p. 385, ll. 1-3).

² *Dogmatica*, xviii. p. 393, ll. 5-10.

Himself related to finality.' What does Dorner base this assertion on? Apparently on certain statements in Gregory's quotations from the *De Incarnatione*, which might seem to speak of a pre-existent manhood. A careful examination of these statements inclines us to believe that they are either deductions of Gregory from the words of Apollinarius, or that they do not refer to the pre-existent state of the Logos, *e.g.* such an expression as 'the Humanity of the Logos' (τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τοῦ λόγου) is naturally interpreted of the assumption of Humanity by the Logos at the Incarnation. In one case Gregory quotes Apollinarius's Commentary on Heb. i. 1 as a proof that he held the Humanity of the Logos to have pre-existed (προαιώνιον); but this again appears to be a deduction of Gregory's from Apollinarius's words.

We would suggest that this word προαιώνιος was used by Apollinarius of the Logos, that his followers extended it to the Humanity of our Lord, which in a sense Apollinarius himself did say 'came down from heaven'; but what he said only of the Spirit of Christ his followers applied to the whole human nature, including the flesh of our Lord. It was impossible for the adherents of Apollinarius to understand his fine distinctions.

We have thus examined the peculiar teaching of Apollinarius, as it emerges in his successive writings. And it is natural for us to ask, 'How came he to invent such a strange doctrine?' Of course one understands his moral difficulty as to our Lord's sinlessness, and his difficulty as to the Unity of Person. But how did he come to propound such an arbitrary and unnatural solution of these difficulties? He might indeed find texts to support it; but surely he must have sought some deeper philosophical ground for his belief. We would suggest that his opinions originated in his own mind, somewhat as follows: He did hold that 'the spirit' was indeed the most distinctive part of 'human nature.' By it man was something more than a ψυχή, or animal soul. At the creation, he would have said (*vide Contra Eunomium*, 304 A), this distinctive part of our Humanity was given μετὰ ψυχῆς, *i.e.* was given to mankind once for all, as a part of their natural endowment. It was, however, corrupted by sin, and so the gift of the Spirit had to be renewed. Now, in this renewal, the Spirit is given supernaturally, no longer μετὰ ψυχῆς but εἰς ψυχὴν, breathed into each individual soul, as it accepts Divine Grace. In Christ the Divine Spirit entirely usurped the place of the old corrupt spirit. What is done partially in believers, and by slow degrees, was done

completely and at once in the Soul of Christ at the Incarnation.

Now, this of course postulates an absence of moral conflict in our Lord, which would make Him altogether superhuman. But Apollinarius felt that nothing short of this would be consistent with the sinlessness of Christ. A human spirit, which receives the tradition of human weakness, must be sinful. And moreover a human spirit could not coexist with the Divine without introducing a duality of persons. But we believe the moral difficulty was that which principally led Apollinarius to his peculiar view.

Now, there is nothing in all this to suggest a pre-existent manhood, except the identification of the most essential part of man, his spirit, with the Logos in the Incarnate Christ. But Apollinarius would appear to have held that the addition of the Logos made Christ's human nature truly human. Without it, it would not have been human, but only animal. At the same time he did not hold, we believe, that the Logos was Himself in any sense human before the Incarnation. The result of the *ἔνωσις*, or the Hypostatic Union, was a 'mixture of God and man,' so he himself says in the *Syllogisms*, quoted as his work by Justinian. The way in which he arrives at this conclusion is very Aristotelian.¹ 'No mean has both the extremes, between which it is a mean, in their entirety (*ἐξ ὁλοκλήρου*). Christ is a mean between God and man. Therefore He is neither entirely man, nor entirely God'—a conclusion which justly shocks us, though perhaps Apollinarius did not mean by it that Christ is not Perfect God and Perfect Man. For in the *Κατὰ μέρος πίστις* he distinctly says that our Lord 'constituted Himself a perfect and holy and sinless Man;' and we know how earnestly he contended against Eunomius that Christ was perfect God. We therefore understand him to mean that since the Incarnation the two natures have become the complement of each other, if we may so say—the inseparable accompaniment of each other. It is not true since the Incarnation to say that Christ is only God or only man. This seems to show that Apollinarius did not assert that the Logos was in any sense man before the Incarnation. Indeed, as an Aristotelian, we may suppose him to have had no bias towards the idea of an eternal Prototype of Humanity, which is an emphatically Platonic notion.

An interesting light is thrown on this question of the genesis of his peculiar views in the mind of Apollinarius by a

¹ *Dogmatica*, x. 352, 8-11.

statement of Nemesius, quoted by Von Dräseke, from which we gather that he was a Traducian. Nemesius writes :

'Apollinarius is of opinion that souls are begotten of souls, as bodies of bodies. For the soul passes by succession from the first man to all those that are born after him, just as is the case with bodies. For he says that neither do souls pre-exist, nor does God create each one by a special act.'¹

He is clearly denying on the one hand the Platonic doctrine of the pre-existence of souls, and on the other the doctrine of Creationism. But how, we ask, could Apollinarius deny that our Lord's Spirit came to him by the law of succession, if he was really a Traducian? Two answers seem open to us: either (1) that Apollinarius would have admitted that our Lord's human spirit was there in germ, but never developed because its functions were performed by the Divine Spirit; or (2) that he would have said that, while in ordinary men the human spirit must be supplanted by the Divine Spirit, or at least entirely merged into it by perfect submission, in the case of our Lord the Succession was forcibly broken, because of the innate sinfulness of the human spirit. We incline to the latter supposition. It was probably because Apollinarius believed so strongly in heredity that he could not believe that our Lord, even though Virgin-born, could have inherited from his human parent a sinless spirit. He had advanced one step beyond that fruitful parent of heresy, a belief in the essential evil of matter. He saw that the root of sin was in the human will or spirit. But he appears to have been still, in a sense, a dualist. Matter and spirit were for him distinct entities, though possibly eternal correlatives. Nemesius² tells us he believed the abyss to be that which was laid down by the Creator as the groundwork of the rest of Creation, yet he could not bring himself to admit that it was created out of nothing. He would only say it was 'generated.' Here then he tends at any rate to an ultimate dualism of Creative Will, and that which it had eternally generated, protoplasmic matter.

It is a relief to turn from the errors of Apollinarius to his general merits. We may perhaps say that he deserves the gratitude of the Church on the three following grounds: (1) For his defence of the Nicene Creed against the Arians, and specially for his share in defending and establishing the doctrine of the Godhead of the Holy Ghost; (2) for guarding

¹ Nemesius, edit. Ant. p. 47 = edit. Matth. pp. 108, 109.

² Nemesius, *Περὶ στοιχείων*, ch. 5 (edit. Ant. p. 74 = edit. Matth. p. 166).

the truth of the 'One Person' without compromising the 'two natures' of our Lord; (3) for his vigorous and unflinching denial of all humanitarian views of Christ. Let us take these points in succession. (1) On the doctrine of the Holy Trinity generally, the *Dialogues*, the *Contra Eunomium*, and the *De Trinitate*, are a storehouse of Scriptural proof, and arguments of great depth and insight, and with regard to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in particular we have seen what satisfaction he expresses in his letter to St. Basil at the assertion of His true Godhead by the Council of Alexandria in 362. And we now also possess his own defence of this doctrine in the second half of the *Contra Eunomium*. The charge brought against him by Gregory of Nazianzus,¹ that while he admitted the Holy Ghost to be God, he introduced a 'climax of Divinity' into the Holy Trinity, has perhaps its ground in the fact that his teaching on the subject moved on somewhat the same lines as that of St. Basil, who rendered the Doxology 'Glory be to the Father, through the Son in the Holy Spirit.' In a somewhat similar vein Apollinarius said, that as the Son was the image of the Father, so the Spirit was the image of the Son;² or again, as the Son was the *Λόγος*, so the Spirit was the *Ῥῆμα*;³ or, as the Son was the hand of God, so to say, in Creation, so the Spirit was the finger;⁴ and in the Incarnation the Flesh of Christ redeems us through the indwelling of the Spirit.

(2) Indirectly Apollinarius exercised considerable influence upon St. Cyril, who, as is well known, made much use of his formula, 'One Incarnate Nature of God the Word.'⁵ This formula, as Professor Loofs in his interesting discussion of St. Cyril's use of it points out, guards the truth of the two natures. For there is a great difference between 'one Incarnate nature of God' and 'one nature of God Incarnate.' The question is, 'Do the words signify a *new* nature, neither Divine nor human, but a "Christus-natur"?' as Loofs calls it. If so, the formula is unorthodox. He has little difficulty in showing that St. Cyril did not so understand it, for he was quite willing to speak of our Lord as *ἐκ δύο φύσεων*, 'of two natures.' But was this the meaning which it had for Apollinarius? Probably it was. We think Apollinarius would have said that our Lord's human nature was superimposed upon His

¹ *Basili et Gregorii Nazianzeni Op. Dogm.*, ed. Goldhorn, in Thilo's *Biblioth. Patr. Gr. Dogm.* (Lipsiæ, MDCCCLIV), ii. 556, cap. 16, t. ii. p. 92.

² *Contra Eunomium*, 302 A.

⁴ *Ibid.* 298 D.

³ *Ibid.* 304 E.

⁵ *Dogmatica*, iii. 341, 25.

Divine as an outer robe, and that while He remained one Person—the one eternal Logos—yet He might be said to possess, after the Incarnation, though indissolubly united, both a Divine and a human nature. Yet he would clearly have insisted, as St. Cyril did, that the two natures were to be distinguished only in thought (κατ' ἐπίνοιαν, or, to use St. Cyril's phrase, θεωρίᾳ μόνῃ).¹ The truth of the 'Communicatio Idiomatum' is also emphasized by Apollinarius, who insists on the one hand that God is impassible, and yet on the other that it was really God who suffered in the Flesh upon the Cross. For this he was abused by his contemporaries, who accused him of Sabelianism, but justified by posterity, for in the Theopaschite controversy of the sixth century the Church finally accepted this truth; the monks, it will be remembered, rather questionably asserting the dominant thought of the Church by adding the words 'Who wast crucified for us' to the Trisagion.

(3) In the third place, we must give Apollinarius all due credit for his earnest defence of the truth of Christ's Divinity. He assisted St. Athanasius most efficiently in the Arian struggle, and the first part of the *Contra Eunomium* is practically a treatise on the Divinity of our Lord. Similarly he prefaces his *De Incarnatione* with the statement that both the infidels and the heretics really went about to prove the same thing, viz. that Christ was only a holy man, in whom God dwelt in larger measure than in other men (ἄνθρωπος ἔνθεος).² And of course the very nature of his heresy, which practically denies the reality of our Lord's human nature, shows that he was strongly opposed to any humanitarian views of Christ. But his zeal carried him too far. Yet it must be allowed that it was better to err on the side of too great reverence for our Lord, than to fall into the opposite error.

From the general merits of Apollinarius as a theologian, we pass to the character of the man himself. What personal estimate ought we to form of him? From the way in which his friends speak of him, he appears to have been greatly revered for his learning, and for the greater part of his life he was the close friend of St. Athanasius. Epiphanius, when first informed of his heresy, was very unwilling to believe anything against the venerable old man, and wrote to St. Basil for further information. But St. Basil could then tell him nothing more than he knew already. Indeed, he showed

¹ *Contra Eunomium*, 293 c.

² *De Incarnatione*, editio Zacagni, p. 130; *Dogmatica*, xvii. 381, 8-12.

an equal indisposition to credit the sinister reports which his monks sent him of the strange doctrine which his old friend was now disseminating, and would take no steps to inquire into the matter, unwilling again to disturb the peace of the Church. But subsequently even St. Basil was obliged to break off communion with one who had departed from the faith. Thus we see that Apollinarius for the greater part of his life was personally most highly esteemed by his friends, and respected by the whole Church. His general orthodoxy appears to have never been called in question till the eighth decade of the fourth century. Indeed, his writings give one the impression not only of an orthodox, but a deeply reverent mind, willing to submit unquestioningly to what is *de fide*. This appears in such passages as the following :

'In approaching God, to ask "how" is a clear proof of unbelief.'¹ 'It is clear to all that mischievous and over-curious inquiries about the Divine Being, especially in a spirit of unbelief, are the offspring of a diseased soul.'² 'For I will not blush to confess ignorance, nay, I will rather boast of it, believing, as I do, in what no tongue can utter, and initiated into mysteries the very conception of which is beyond the powers of reason and intelligence.'³ 'But whenever I encounter difficulty in my search after Divine truth, then I exclaim at the wonder of the Christian mystery, how it passes our powers of mind, of reason, of comprehension.'⁴

It seems strange that he should have violated his own principles so conspicuously. But we are tempted to think that, in spite of these protestations of intellectual humility, the great reputation which he enjoyed as a teacher insensibly led him to some degree of intellectual pride, and that he came to regard his own expositions of doctrine and Scripture as infallible. He was most certainly grievously wrong, not only in promulgating his own private speculations, but also in originating a schism in the Church. In reply to the anathemas of the Church, he appears to have summoned a Council himself, and to have issued a synodal letter in justification of his views ; so that, even if the Gregories and others largely misunderstood his real teaching, there can be no doubt that his universal condemnation was based on just grounds.

In conclusion, we must express our thanks to his German editor for the most interesting study of his life and writings which he has given us. Both the preservation and the re-discovery of his writings are extraordinary. The original fraud by which they were preserved, the chain of circum-

¹ *De Trinitate*, ch. xiv. 386 B.

² *De Trinitate*, ch. xi. 382 B.

³ *Contra Eunomium*, p. 313 C.

⁴ *Ibid.* ch. xvi. 388 B.

stances which in an uncritical age led to the partial discovery of this fraud, and the skill and ingenuity which have enabled scholars of the nineteenth century to reveal still more extensive forgeries than the scholars of the fifth and sixth centuries suspected, are alike remarkable.

ART. VIII.—PREPARATIONS FOR THE SECOND PRAYER BOOK OF EDWARD VI.

Some Scarce Published Works of 1549-52.

IN our notice of the scarce publications of the early part of the reign of Edward VI. we had occasion to describe only those which had preceded the publication of the First Prayer Book of 1549 which was intended to be in use in all churches from June 9 of that year. It was designed as a halfway house towards a second Prayer Book, which should be more unequivocally Protestant in tone. And that this was so is abundantly evidenced in the correspondence of the day. Thus Bucer, writing from Lambeth, April 26, 1549, says he will send the First Prayer Book as soon as it is translated into Latin to the ministers at Strasburg, and affirms that some concessions have been made to the prejudices of the laity, which are only to be retained for a time lest the people, not having yet learned Christ, should be deterred by too extensive innovations from embracing his religion.¹ We now proceed to notice some subsequent publications which have not attracted as much attention from writers of history as they deserve.

It was observed in the preceding article that one John Mardeley had been made the scapegoat of the Council for publishing a treatise which they thought it expedient to disavow. Accordingly, on August 13, 1549, it was resolved that if John Mardeley or any others should publish any book that should not obtain the licence of the Protector and Council, they would be punished; and on the same day 'An order was taken that from henceforth no printer should print or put to vent any English book but such as should first be examined by Mr. Secretary Peter, Mr. Secretary Smith, and Mr. Cicill, or the one of them, and allowed by the same.' Thus it appears that all the books we have now to notice are authoritative,

¹ *Zurich Letters*, ii. 534.

and show what were the belief and intentions of the Protector, the Archbishop, and the Lords of the Council.

There were many other publications which preceded the First Prayer Book which want of space obliged us to pass by unnoticed: There is one, however, which has been erroneously attributed by Lowndes to the year 1555, but which in all probability belongs to the year 1549. The volume is addressed as follows: 'To the (right) Congregation of God, of which your grace is supreme head next immediately under God, to which those only are admissible who are baptized through the Holy Ghost, and become one body, who are holy, no longer earthly-minded, and who crucify the flesh.' And the principal point of doctrine contained in it is the figurative explanation of the words of institution: 'It is convenient that Christ called the bread His body and the wine His blood, because that we should remember thereby His death and passion.'

It is by one Thomas Lancaster, and is entitled, 'The ryght and trew Understandyng of the Supper of the Lord and the Use thereof.'¹ That it was printed after August 13, 1549, though probably written before that date, seems plain from the words of the writer that he should be glad to print it if it should be licensed, and from his request that it may be examined by God's word. We need not make extracts from it. The tone is thoroughly Zwinglian and of a piece with all the other publications we have noticed. It contains the strong assertion that 'those eat to themselves damnation who attend the abominable blasphemy of the daily sacrifice, who receive in one kind only, and are such beastly heretics as to believe the abominable doctrine that bread can be very flesh, and receive the supper of anti-Christ in one kind only.'

With regard to the proper minister the author says: 'The supper of the Lord must be ministered of him that is called of a Christian congregation compelled through the Holy Ghost to come into the Lord's vineyard or heavenly harvest, that is found without fault according to the declaration of God's word both in his life and learning.' The passage seems worth quoting from its suspicious resemblance to the words of the Twenty-third Article.

There is one important point dwelt upon alike by Catholic and Protestant writers of the period, viz. the extreme deterioration in the morals of both ecclesiastics and laymen during the whole of the reign of Edward VI. This is testified to

¹ Bodleian, 8vo, B. 8, Med. B. S. A copy is also in the British Museum (3932, a. 29).

by most of the writers of the period, *e.g.* Bradford, Hutchinson, Veron, and others. So also Traheron, writing to Bullinger, June 12, 1550, says: 'Religion is indeed prospering, but the wickedness of those who profess the gospel is wonderfully on the increase.'¹ Later, on September 10, 1552, he asks Bullinger about Predestination, most people adopting Calvin's views.² There was concurrently with this a remarkable increase in what even the authorities of the time designated as heresy. The increase of Arianism was attributed by one of the speakers at the great meeting held in St. James's Hall twenty years ago to the immigration of Anabaptists from the Continent, and to this he also attributed the necessity felt for the one alteration in a Catholic direction which appears in the order of the Second Prayer Book of 1552, that the Athanasian Creed should be said thirteen times a year in churches, instead of six, which had been the limit fixed in the First Prayer Book. And there is a remarkable publication of the end of the year 1549, which strikingly falls in with the suggestion. It is entitled, *The Fal of an Arrian*, written by John Proctour.³ In it the writer describes his argument with an Arian, who had been summoned to answer for his heresy before the Council. The Arian avows that he had drawn his belief, not from Sarcerus or Conrad Pellican, but from the sacred fountains, from which he argues that God is represented as infallible, Christ as ignorant, and so far from being of the same substance, that he is spoken of as inferior to the Father. He will only admit that Christ is the most elect vessel, more than a prophet, the first-begotten, but among many brethren. There is little of novelty in the reply to these assertions, but it is remarkable that the colophon bears the date December 9, 1549, and that the work ends with a copy of the Athanasian Creed, which had so lately been reduced from being part of the Service at Prime for every day, to being ordered to be said only six times in the year. But the book is chiefly remarkable for its preface, which extends over the first four sheets, and describes both the lamentable increase of heresies and deterioration of morals. After congratulating his readers on Henry VIII. having got rid of the peevish Pope, and the light of the Gospel put into the hands of people by the young Josiah, he says that, in spite of all this, people who were half-blind before now saw nothing, and whereas they formerly sought pardons on paper for sins, now they sinned without repentance in their

¹ *Zurich Letters*, p. 324.² *Ibid.* p. 326.³ Bodleian, Tanner, 73.

hearts; formerly had much zeal without knowledge, now they had much knowledge without zeal. Instead of true Gospellers, they had become Anabaptists, Ariens, Pelagians, and foul and blasphemous heretics. He continues:

'And as ye exceed in all heretical and blasphemous opinions, so retain ye also all uncleanness and filthiness of life. When hath there been heard of such intolerable pride, of such insatiable greediness than have lately reigned amongst them which were in authority our rulers, and in godly conversation of life should have been heads and captains also? When hath there been heard of the like headiness, flattery, ambition, and rashness as nowadays is yet practised even in the pulpits? When hath there been heard of the like dissoluteness, disorder, disobedience, and dangerous liberty as is presently in use amongst the commons?

'And ye that are preachers. Many of you have and do very lewdly behave yourselves, not regarding whether the souls committed to your charge go with you to the devil, or without you to God. And ye hearers, ye have wondrously abused that comfortable treasure of God's sweet word. Ye have heard, read, and searched it, but your life proveth that ye have read as if ye read it not, ye hear it as if ye heard it not, ye search it as though ye searched it not. Many of you are mighty talkers, jolly braggers. Some of you seek matter of talk, some strange opinions, some proofs and arguments to maintain your concepts and mad imaginations be they good or bad. What marvel is it if ye be given into wrong and corrupt sense which sought not after the pure and right understanding thereof, if so many schisms and heresies be sprung among you which so irreverently, so unworthily presume to abuse the reverent and worthy word of God?'

The same state of things is borne witness to by the complaints alleged by the bishops in the House of Lords, that they had no means of stopping the progress of immorality (Nov. 14, 1549), because their jurisdiction was so checked and straitened that they could summon no offenders before them, punish no vice, nor exert the discipline of the Church. A Bill which was brought in for the purpose was negatived at the first reading, because it seemed to entrust too much power to the bishops. Another Bill to the same effect reached a second reading in the Commons and then was dropped.

And the interval between the two Prayer Books was spent in getting rid of the obnoxious bishops who refused to conform to the new order. Thus Bonner of London, Gardiner of Winchester, Heath of Worcester, and Day of Chichester, were deprived to make room for Ridley, Poynt, Hooper, and Scory, and Ridley knew very well what he was doing when he anticipated the orders of the Council in destroying the altar at St. Paul's, and sanctioning the removal of altars throughout his diocese.

One of the earliest publications which followed that of the First Prayer Book probably was *A Tragoedie or Dialoge of the unjuste usurped Primacie of the Bishop of Rome*, by Bernardine Ochino, which bears date 1549. It seems to have been written in haste in Latin, as Ochino did not understand English, for the purpose of being translated by Ochino's brother prebendary of Canterbury, Dr. John Poyntet. This work was dedicated to the King. Previously to this there had been printed six of Ochino's sermons, which were speedily followed by another edition containing several other sermons containing the most pronounced Calvinistic doctrine. This has a preface stating that the author was the most notable preacher of all Italy, and that he was now seventy years of age. If this is true he must have been born in 1477, instead of 1487 as has been supposed. It is difficult to account for the career of Ochino on any other principle than this, that his vanity was mortified at his being cited by the Pope to answer for his sermons, which were directed against the vices and scandals of the time, and that, having once freed himself from the yoke of Rome, he lived a life of sheer hypocrisy, accommodating himself to the amount and advance of Protestantism that he found in the country where he was living. He must have been an old man when he married, for he was still an admired preacher as a Capuchin friar in 1541, so that the child whom he mentions as sending her compliments to Musculus in 1548 could not have been more than six years old if she was born in lawful matrimony. With Ochino's subsequent development into Socinianism, and with his alleged recantation of Protestantism on his death-bed, and his reconciliation to the Church of Rome, we are not here specially concerned, but only with the particular influence he exerted over the course of the English Reformation. It is true his influence was not very direct, for he was not, as far as we know, actually employed in the remodelling of the Prayer Book, his chief work whilst he resided in England being the preaching the doctrines of election and reprobation to his Italian countrymen resident in London. The *Tragedy or Dialogue* is a scarce work, of which there is an imperfect copy in the Bodleian, and a perfect one in the British Museum. The latter has a manuscript note signed by H. Stevens, 'This copy has the second leaf of dedication as first published, containing the name of the Protector Somerset; also signatures Y 1 and B b 4 contain the name of the Protector. These three leaves were cancelled and are generally wanting.' From this it may be inferred that the book was issued before the first arrest of Somerset,

14 Oct. 1549, after which time the allusion to the Protector was suppressed, and this may, perhaps, be the reason why the last dialogue between the king and his uncle does not appear in the Bodleian copy.

The book consists of nine dialogues, which are equally remarkable for the sprightliness and wit with which the conversation is kept up, and the virulent abuse with which the Bishop of Rome is assailed. The first dialogue is supposed to be between Lucifer the chief and Beelzebub a subordinate fallen angel, and opens with Lucifer informing his companion of a plan he had made to set up a kingdom against God, so as to prevent the spread of religion through the world. Beelzebub, after complimenting his chief upon his superior wits, expresses a doubt whether Christian men which excel in wisdom and judgment could be brought to this point, to believe that the kingdom of the devil is the kingdom of God and that the supreme head of that kingdom, being the very great devil of hell, ought to be adored and worshipped for a God in earth, and his members honoured for saints. Lucifer replies by saying that he will contrive it by means of setting up ceremonies and the doctrine of free will, and by persuading people that their election depends wholly on themselves and their works, but admits that the thing must be accomplished warily. Rome is to be the kingdom, and the authority of canons and decrees shall be set up in the place of Scripture, and the Bishop of Rome shall be his principal agent. Upon Beelzebub asking how one man can possibly do so much mischief, Lucifer rejoins: 'Brother, ye be very dull. Anti-Christ is not one but many,' and adds that he will begin with Boniface and make him adopt the ambitious view of Papal Primacy. Accordingly the second dialogue is held between Boniface and Dr. Sapience, the secretary of the Emperor, who informs the Pope that the world is full of heresies, and that the churches will be undone if there is not one head and chief over them all set up. Dr. Sapience at once sees through the ambition of Boniface in spite of the Pope's appearing to demur to the acceptance of universal dominion, however good it may be for the Church and the empire; but nevertheless goes to the Emperor and persuades him that if Boniface is not made universal bishop, some one else, perhaps not a subject of the empire, may be put into the place. He then returns and arranges the matter with Boniface, after which ensues the third dialogue between the people and the Church of Rome, the object of which is to show that Rome, which is a daughter church of Jerusalem, has usurped dominion over the mother Church, and sets up

for an infallible guide, the Pope being even above a General Council. In the fourth dialogue the question is discussed why Paul rather than Peter was not the universal bishop. In this and the following dialogue the interest of the work somewhat flags, the latter being occupied with some long-winded remonstrances from ambassadors from Constantinople, Antioch, Jerusalem, and Alexandria, representing that they were highly offended at the usurpation of the title of Universal Bishop. But all the arguments are overruled by the arbitrary decision of the Pope. This state of things leads to another conference on the part of Lucifer and Beelzebub, who seem pretty well satisfied with the result of their plot. This is followed by an interview between Christ and the archangels Gabriel and Michael, after which the overthrow of the kingdom set up by the fallen angels is described in two dialogues, the first of which takes place between Henry VIII., Papista, and Thomas, Archbishop of Canterbury. This opens with a question on the part of the King as to whether the Pope be Anti-Christ or not. Papista thinks it wrong to raise such a question, but the King thinks that truth will shine the brighter for being discussed. Thomas of Canterbury then proves most conclusively from the doctrine of pardons, &c., that the Pope is Anti-Christ. The remonstrance of Papista that then Councils must have erred is set aside by the remark that the Pharisees also erred, and the suggestion that the King would lose his title of Defender of the Faith is met by Henry's answer: 'Nay, we will be called the Destroyer of the false faith of Anti-Christ.'

It is needless to say that, violent as are the expressions used against the Pope, no such work as this could have been published during the late King's reign. But the last dialogue, which is the most important of all, shows how Edward and his Council were bent from the very first on one object, which had been steadily kept in view. There never was, as has been pretended, the least idea of making the First Prayer Book final. It was only a half-way house towards the development of the Zwinglianism apparent in the Book of 1552, and the forty-two Articles which followed it. The ninth dialogue is between the young King and his uncle. It begins with a short speech of Edward's, saying that he intended to pursue what his father had begun, and for the glory of God extirpate the very name of Anti-Christ. The councillors reply that they are glad he has taken upon him the cause of Christ and His elect against all the enemies of God. The King then declares his method of procedure, which is to drive Anti-

Christ out of the hearts of men by the sword of the Spirit, which is the Word of God, and to that end he must find faithful ministers—if not procurable in this country, to be brought over from abroad. The answer of the councillors indicates a suspicion that the affections of the people were not with the men of the new learning. They say, however, that they think it will be easy to make subjects obedient from natural fear of their king, especially when the thing attempted is just and godly, and that there need be no fear of tumult, as Christ himself confirms the power of princes and magistrates. The King is made to reply that a sick body requires medicine, and 'we cannot let our subjects perish of spiritual disease.' And to this the reply of the Council is as follows :

'Lette us doe all oure indeuore. And as concernynge the Articles of the faythe, the worde of God ought to be sufficient, except we wyll seem wiser than God hym selfe ; and as touchynge woorkes the lawe that God hym selfe hathe made, which is most pure and holye, shall be sufficient. Whose preceptes be without spot, sounde and cheerful to the mynd. Whereunto Christ's interpretation muste be annexed : And as for prayer and invocacion, what shall wee rather alowe than the Lordes prayer, whiche the Son of God hymselfe taught us, which teacheth us plainly and fullye what we ought to ask of God ; and it also teacheth howe we ought to aske all gifts of God, through the Christe oure Mediatoure. Forsooth it is a wicked thyng to desire to be more wise than was Christ hymselfe, who delivered us that prayer as a perfecte forme of prayer ; wherefore it canne not bee well to adde anythyng thereunto. Trulye all doctrine that is necessary to salvacion is playne and cleare yf we darken it not with the darkness of mannes inventions. We will therefore dooe our dyligence to put away all such thynges as may be a hindrance to the goinge forward of the Gospel, and having always Goodes honour before oure eyes, and the helthe of soules. We will pray that he wyll graunt unto us that purenes and earnestnes of spirit, that we may sette forth His glory and serve Hym in holines, and that we may, through Jesus Christ our Redemer, gyve all prayse, glory and honour to God the Father everlastynge. Amen.'

The work was printed by Lynne, *Cum privilegio ad imprimendum solum*. It consists of signatures B–Cc. The copy in the British Museum is marked C. 25. e. 31.

The first step taken as regards ecclesiastical matters after the publication of the First Prayer Book was the enactment in Parliament, which began November 4, 1549, that all the old service books should be destroyed, as likely to interfere with the free course of the Book of Common Prayer, and that all images in churches, excepting those of persons who were not saints, should be removed ; the assertion being made that

the new Book was agreeable to the use of the Primitive Church. After this another Act passed for a new Ordinal, to come into effect on April 1, 1550. After the insurrections had been put down, the Council felt more secure in pushing alterations forward. And yet the New Prayer Book was still so unpopular, that the young King was obliged to issue two commands to the bishops to enforce its observance, complaining that in many parts of the realm it was either not known at all or not used, or at least very seldom and in irreverent sort. His first letter was dated July 23, 1549, but seems to have had little effect, for in the following December a similar letter was issued, noticing how upon the fall of Somerset some people had begun to suppose there would be a restoration of the old service, the new book having been considered as due entirely to his exertions and inspiration. In this letter it is ordered again that all old service books should be defaced and abolished lest they should 'be at any time a let to the godly uniform order.' It seems that many times the Holy Communion had been omitted on Sundays, because the people refused to provide bread and wine for the purpose. And the real reason for making such distinct alterations in the coming Prayer Book was that the Communion at St. Paul's was, under the First Prayer Book, used as a very Mass, so great was the attachment to the Old Service.¹ It was, now that the insurrections had been suppressed, no longer an object to represent the New Prayer Book as nothing more than an English version of the old Liturgy, with certain modifications made to make it more intelligible and acceptable to the laity. The difference between the First Prayer Book and that which was designed to supersede it was quite recognised among Roman controversialists of the period. Stapleton, in his preface to his translation of Staphyle's work, written in 1564, says :—

'The order of Communion now practised in England differeth as much from the first order of Communion used in King Edwardes time as the Lutherans do from the Zuinglians, and as the Illyricans do from the Melanchthonistes. For the first bothe allowed the real presence in the Sacrament as Luther did, and used also many old ceremonies of Christ his church as the Melanchthonistes and the ciuil Lutherans do yet in Wittenberg, in Misnia, in Franconia, at Norimberg, at Ulmes (where passing by of late we sawe in the church the holy Roode and altars of stone yet standing), in the dukedom of Wirtemberg, at Breslaw, at Briga in Silesia, and in many other places. The last and present order of Communion denieth the real presence

¹ *Council Book*, October 11, 1550.

as Zuinglius and Calvin do, and rejecteth the ceremonies of the Masse as the Zuinglians and Calvinists do in the five cantons of Switzerland, Basil, Zurich, Berna, Schafusa and Clarona, at Geneva in Savoye, in Scotland, and among the seditious rebels in France.'¹

It was quite recognised now that it was a time for the destruction of altars and the substitution of Communion tables in their place, for abolishing the service of the Mass, and establishing matins in its place on week-days, and 'the order for the administration of the Lord's Supper, or Holy Communion' without the addition of the words, 'commonly called the Mass,' on Sundays. And to this end the most virulent invectives against the Pope were encouraged, with the view of taking advantage of people's prejudice against papal exactions to excite them against all Romish doctrine. Accordingly the Council now permitted the publication of Bale's scurrilous book 'The Image of the two Churches,' the first edition of which bears the date of 1550, whereas it had been completed more than two years earlier, and extracts from it and references to it had been inserted in the notes to Tyndale's Testament, which had been so freely circulated in 1548 and 1549. We need not shock our readers by extracting from this work the epithets so plentifully showered on the Pope and the Roman priests. They may be read in the edition published by the Parker Society, with the exception of a few words which were omitted here and there, their place being supplied by other and more decent phrases. It will suffice here to call attention to the fact that the whole object of the work is to draw out the contrast between the old Church and what it was hoped the new Church would be. Other works of Bale were published about this time in the same sense. They are so shockingly blasphemous and indecent that one can only wonder that any churchman could have written them, or any censors of the press have authorised their publication. These works are of course not included in the very select works of the author, published by the Parker Society. That they were approved by the Council is evidenced by the fact of their being licensed, as well as by the subsequent promotion of their author to the bishopric of Ossory.

The opportune death of Wakeman, Bishop of Gloucester, at the end of the year left the see vacant. It was offered, May 15, 1550, to John Hooper, who had just before published his *Godly Confession and Protestacyon of the Christian Fayth*. He made no secret of his opinions.

¹ *The Apologie of Fridericus Staphylus*. Translated by Thomas Stapleton (Antwerp, 1565).

In writing to Bullinger, March 27, 1550,¹ he speaks of the First Prayer-Book as in parts impious, and says that unless it is altered he would not communicate according to its orders. He evidently regarded the book as a first instalment likely to be improved upon. How he reconciled it to his conscience to conform to it, or whether he did conform when he accepted the bishopric of Worcester with that of Gloucester in *commendam*, does not appear. It is plain therefore that no objection was alleged against his doctrine of the sacraments, which he looks upon as signs, seals, and confirmation of grace, placing Baptism exactly on a level with Circumcision, and the Lord's Supper with the Passover, and saying :

'As for those that say circumcision and baptism be like, and yet attribute the remission of original sin to baptism, which was never given unto circumcision, they not only destroy the similitude and equality that should be between them, but also take from Christ remission of sin, and translate it unto the water and element of baptism.'²

And again :

'As for the supper of the Lord . . . I believe it is a remembrance of Christ's death, a seal and confirmation of his precious body given unto death, wherewith we are redeemed. It is a visible word, that preacheth peace between God and man, exhorteth to mutual love and godly life, teacheth to condemn the world for the hope of the life to come, when as Christ shall appear, and come down in the clouds, which now is in heaven, as concerning his humanity, and nowhere else, nor never shall be, till the time of the general resurrection.'³

He then proceeds to avow his disbelief in any succession of bishops, cardinals, or such like, 'but unto the only word of God.'⁴

At this time also (1550) was published *The Spyrytual and Precious Pearle*, by Thomas Becon, a thorough Calvinist, who two years before had been made chaplain to Cranmer, whose scurrilous and blasphemous words we forbear to quote, as they may be read in the collection of his works published by the Parker Society.

The next step taken was to appoint preachers to condemn the late rebellions, and justify the King's proceedings, both in suppressing the chantries, and in establishing the use of the Book of Common Prayer. Among the first of these preachers

¹ *Zurich Letters*, i. 79.

² *Ibid.* p. 90.

³ *Later Writings*, p. 89.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 90.

was Thomas Lever, who, though not yet in deacon's orders, preached at St. Paul's on February 2 (Septuagesima Sunday, or, as he styles it, the 4th Sunday after Twelfth Day—of course no notice being taken of Candlemas Day). Lever was honest enough, whilst he praised the King and the courtiers for their godly proceedings, to inveigh in the strongest terms against the oppressive dealings and covetousness of those employed by them. He preached three times this year, and though he had before his third sermon been ordained by Ridley, first a deacon and a few days afterwards priest, he seems not to value ordination as worth anything. He says:

'We ought truly to esteeme and take theym onely to be mynysters of Christe whyche for the loue of mercy, grace, and ryghtuousnesse shewed of the father vnto theim in Christ do kylle the lustes of theyr owne fleshe, dyspyse the vanytyes of the whole worlde, and forsakyng theyr own pleasures and commodities do take the crosse of paynfull diligence and walke after Christ in doynge of theyr duties.'¹

It is important also to observe that on June 7 of this year (1550) there was published by E. Whitchurch, the celebrated printer, *Cum privilegio*, an English translation of the Prayer-Book, Offices and Catechism in use at Geneva, together with some godly prayers. The book was translated from the French by W. Huycke, and is introduced by a preface from the pen of T. Broke. A copy is in the Grenville Library, 12137.

Meanwhile there were five different editions of Tyndale's New Testament, with the Calvinistic notes, issued in 1550, whilst a new revision of Tyndale, which we may call Jugge's revision, was being prepared, and was issued in 1552, apparently just before the appearance of the Second Prayer-Book.

This, which from an historical point of view is one of the most important publications of the period, has been left unnoticed by historians. It was first noticed in the *Saturday Review* of February 2, 1878. The writer of that article devoted his attention to the notes and marginal references, observing that the text was that of Tyndale's with few and unimportant variations. The same observation was made in one of the three articles of June 5, 12, and 26, 1886, which appeared in the *Athenæum*. The changes introduced into the text are not indeed of any great importance, though they have had some influence over every subsequent version from the Genevan to the present time, but instead of being few they are very numerous, as has been pointed out by the late Mr. Francis Fry, in his *Bibliographical Description of the Editions*

¹ Arber's edit., 1871, of *Lever's Sermons*, p. 104.

of the New Testament, of Tyndale's version, which was shortly afterwards published. We have collated some of the chapters, which contain twenty or thirty, and in some cases more than forty, changes in each. So that this is quite entitled to be called a new version. It must have been executed by a scholar who understood Greek, and who in almost every case improved upon Tyndale's translation. And it is remarkable how in the Genevan version Whittingham and his colleagues followed this edition in most cases where it varied from Cranmer's Great Bible of 1540. However, it is not the text that need occupy us now. The notes are of the greatest importance, because it is impossible to deny that they represent the teaching which Cranmer, Ridley, and Goodrich must have consented to, whether approving of them altogether or not, at the bidding of the Council. So completely was it authorized that in the licence to print it the proviso is made 'forbidding all other men to print, or cause to be printed, this or any other Testament in English.'

The licence is as follows :

'The copye of the bill assigned by the kinge's honorable counsell for the Authorisinge of the Testament.

Whereas Richarde Jugge printer, having the Kynges Maiesties licence and privilege to print the new Testament in English forbidding all other men to print or cause to be printed any manner of Testament¹: was (the same licence² notwithstanding) bounden by³ recognizance in a certain sum of money that he should not sell nor⁴ utter the bokes of the same New Testament when they were printed but at such prices reasonable as should be by us appointed, Forasmuch as the same bokes be now comen forth in print,⁵ he hath made humble sute unto⁶ us that we would cause the same to be perused and visited, and that the same done, we would set upon the same such prices as we should think⁷ good, and to be⁸ answerable with the charges and labour that he hath sustained in the printing of the same books. Wherefore having caused them to be overseen by persons mete for that purpose, who have made relation unto us that the same books have been printed with great diligence and care upon due examination of his charges and expenses, we have esteemed that the price of twenty & two⁹ pence for every book in papers and unbound is a reasonable and convenient price for the same according.¹⁰

'The which price we have agreed upon with the said Richard, charging him not to exceed nor transgress the same.

'At Grenewich the X of June MDLII.'¹¹

¹ [in English. 12mo, 1553.]

² [priveledge, 1553.]

³ in, 1553.

⁴ omitted, 1553. ⁵ [in that kinde of volume which is called the octave, 1553.]

⁶ omitted.

⁷ to be, 1553.

⁸ om. 1553.

⁹ xii, 1553.

¹⁰ ly, 1553.

¹¹ At Westminster the xxix of Marche, 1553.

The notes to this volume, which was twice reprinted in the following year, and again in 1566, are entirely distinct from those of any preceding issue. They are rather more confined to doctrine, and have less of geographical or historical explanation. But they are more distinctly Calvinistic than what had before appeared. They were probably influenced, partly by the *Consensus Tigurinus* of August 30, 1549, and possibly by the *Consensus Genevensis* of January 1, 1552. The significance of this volume is great, for it represents the last attempt of Protestantism of the reign of Edward VI. We must content ourselves with but a few specimens of the notes, many of which, though capable of an orthodox meaning, yet, taken in conjunction with others which we shall quote, were evidently written in the interests of Calvinism. Thus, in a note to Matthew xx. we have :

‘All nations of people are by the outward preaching of the Gospel called, but only they that are ordained and chosen unto life everlasting do believe and give credit unto the same.’

One of the notes on Rom. ix. is as follows :

‘It is evident by this text that our works or merits do not justify us, but that our salvation doth wholly depend upon the free election of God, which, being the righteousness itself, doth choose whom it pleaseth him unto life everlasting. We ought in no wise to reason or to murmur against God, but rather we must persuade ourselves, that whatsoever he doth, the same he doth most righteously, though to carnal reason it seemeth far otherwise.’

On 1 Tim. ii. there is the following :

‘Here we learn that God refuseth no nation, whether they be Jews or heathen ; also that he refuseth no estate, whether they be poor or rich, kings or subjects, it is all one to him ; he hath no respect of persons, but will have his Gospel to be preached unto all nations and estates, that such as be preordained unto life may come to the knowledge of the truth.’

As regards the indefectibility of grace there is this note on Heb. vi. :

‘They that do believe truly and unfeignedly do continue or abide stedfast in the known truth. If any therefore fall away from Christ, it is a plain token that they were dissembling hypocrites, and that they never believed truly, as Judas, Simon Magus, Himeneus, and Philetus were, which all fell away from the known verity, and made a mock of Christ, which Paul doth call here to crucify Christ of new ; because that they, turning to their own vomit again, do most blasphemously tread the benefits of Christ’s passion under their feet. They that are such can in no case be renewed by repentance.

'For they are not of the number of the elect, as St. John doth say. They went out from us, but they were not of us; for if they had been of us they would have remained with us to the end. If such men do repent, their repentance is as Judas's and Cain's repentance was.'

The solifidian notes which abound in this edition are of the same class, though not identical, with those of previous editions. And the same remark applies to the disparagement of the sacraments. As regards Baptism, we have on Matt. iv.:

'The doctrine of John and the doctrine of Christ be all one, therefore their baptism touching the extreme and outward ministration be all one.'

And again on Acts xix.:

'Baptism in this place is taken for the doctrine and not for the laver of baptism. For the baptism of Christ and the baptism of John which is done in the water is all one; else Christ, who was baptized by John, ought to have been baptized again. Here then we do gather that these folks were not twice baptized with the baptism of water, but were twice instructed, and at length, after perfect instruction, they were baptized with water in the name of Christ.'

The view enunciated in this passage helps us to understand the somewhat ambiguous argument of the following note on 2 Tim. i.:

'As in the baptism the outward ministry or mystical washing doth regenerate, wash away sins, and cleanse or purge us from our filthiness, so doth the imposition of hands give us the gift of the Holy Ghost. But the outward and mystical washing doth only represent unto us that in Christ's blood our sins are clean washed away.'

The suppressed conclusion, we suppose, must be that the imposition of hands in holy orders does not convey grace. The following passage illustrates the remark that there are notes capable of a good meaning if they were not found in such company. On Acts xxii. there is:

'We ought not to think that water washeth away the sins, but the mercy and grace of God, which is signified and represented unto us by the water. Ye shall note that, by a figure called *allogiosis*, the same is ascribed unto the outward sign, which doth only pertain unto the grace and election of God.'

On this subject one other passage will suffice. On Matt. xxi.:

'Here the baptism of John is taken for that heavenly doctrine which he taught. For as water doth wash away the filthiness of the

body, so doth true doctrine make the soul clean, delivering it from superstition and erroneous doctrine.'

Their belief in the other ordinance to which they limited the designation of sacrament may be judged from the following passages. On Matt. viii. the note is :

'The corporal presence of Christ is nothing necessary and needful unto us. For it is His word only, received through faith, that healeth us.'

This note is repeated in different words on Luke vii. On Luke xxii. we have :

'As the cup is the New Testament, so the bread is the body of Christ. By the New Testament he understandeth the forgiveness of sins (Heb. 8). But the cup doth only represent unto us the New Testament, that is to say, the forgiveness of our sins that we have in the blood of Christ.'

There are other notes in this Testament of considerable importance, many directed against the Anabaptists, and others advocating divorce for adultery on the woman's part, the marriage of priests, the equality of priests and bishops, &c., which we forbear to notice. Enough has been given to enable the reader to interpret for himself the meaning of the Second Prayer Book, which was published in 1552.

But we have been anticipating, and must now recur to some earlier publications, which after the appearance of the First Prayer Book of 1549 were sanctioned by the Council with a view to smoothing the way for the acceptance of the Second Prayer Book of 1552. There is a copy of the following at Lambeth (xxxi. 8. 17 [4]), 'The baterie of the Pope's Botereulx commonly called the high Altare. Compiled by W. S. in the yere of our Lord 1550.' It is dedicated to Lord Chancellor Rich by William Salisburie. The chief point of the work seems to be to make the Papist defend the idea of Sacrifice from the Old Testament, and the answer triumphantly to refute him from the New Testament, which abolishes both sacrifice and law. He says (Signat. A₂) :

'Your lordship, having such power given you by God and your prince to suppress and beat down and utterly abolish all vain superstitions and false religion as you have, doth now by the abundant grace of Almighty God working in your heart openly repugn, suppress, and beat down those vain ceremonies and superstitious observances founded by the bishop of Rome that heretofore ye have to the most part of men been thought to favour, uphold, and maintain.'

Afterwards (Signat. A₃) he says :

'And to declare my opinion of your lordship, I have thought it

my duty, being moved in conscience, to write against the devilish abuse of altars so stiffly maintained by the stiff-necked Papists.'

In the preface the author speaks of the 'godly proceedings of the victorious metropolitan of England, who as redoubted grand captain hath first enterprized on this most notable feat . . . to pluck down and remove the popish altars out of Christ's churches or temples.' In the course of the work he says:

'Let us leave to heathen imbring days to the Pope his hallowed altars. When I was a holy papist I heard mass and did superstitious penance, and it was all right. . . . Now I am changed, and think of Christ's death. . . . Is Christ's religion . . . so beggarly that it must borrow imbring fasts of the heathen, borrow altars of the Pope, and borrow vestments of the Jews, beside an innumerable sort of other like baggage, which hath been weeded now of late out of Christ's religion, and now restored home to the owners thereof' (Signat. D₈). 'Wherefore, good Christian brethren, let us that are homely fellows not be ashamed of the old terms that we have at our home in the text of holy Scripture, which calleth the reverend and healthful remembrance of the Lord's death by breaking of bread by the name of the Lord's Supper, the communion and partaking of the body and blood of Christ. And the thing whereat we sit devoutly to eat the Lord's Supper, let us both have it and call it the Lord's board or the Lord's table, and not a borrowed towell, nor a Popish stone altar, nor yet a wooden altar with a *Superhaltare*.'

And here there is opposite the word *sit* a marginal note: '*Vel propter artolatricam vitandam tutius erit ut sedens quam genuflectens mensæ dominicæ populus accumbere assuescat.*'

'Now, because I trust that we have vanquished and given an overthrow to the chiefest part of the Pope's soldiers; bated and beaten down to the ground the only Botereulx and the great stay of his strong hold and fortress, therefore shall our trumpet blow a retreat in this battle. Praised be the Lord. Amen.' (Signat. G₆). 'Imprinted at London by Robert Crowley, 1550, *Cum privilegio ad imprimendum solum*.'

And here, whilst we are still dealing with the year 1550, it is worth while to notice the identity of teaching that exists between the English and the Swiss divines. In this same year Bullinger published his third and fourth decades dedicated to Edward VI.¹ in March and August respectively, and

¹ This dedication had been suggested to Bullinger by Hooper in a letter written from London December 27, 1549 (*Zurich Letters*, p. 73). He also recommended Gualter, Bithander, and other friends at Zurich to dedicate whatever they wrote to the king. He afterwards asked Bullinger to dedicate a book to the Marquis of Dorset, which he did in March 1551,

praising him for pulling down all that was not according to the word of God, and exhorting him to continue in his likeness to Josiah, as the Scriptures are quite sufficient to reform the Church. The whole tenor of his teaching is to represent sacraments as not conferring grace, but only being signs of grace, and to disavow any efficacy distinct from that of other ordinances. Thus the power of the keys is represented as meaning the ministry of preaching. Baptism was instituted by John the Baptist, and is equivalent to circumcision, the Lord's Supper being the same as the Passover, and yet strangely enough he sometimes uses the expression *efficacia signa gratia*. In all the correspondence from this time down to the reign of Elizabeth it is either taken for granted that there is almost a complete agreement between the churches of England and Zurich, or else expressions of regret for trifling deviations on the part of the English churches from those of Zurich.

There is another publication of the year 1550 which illustrates the intentions of the Council in a remarkable way. John Veron, a French refugee, had published in 1548 two treatises, one of which was entitled *The five abominable Blasphemies contayned in the Masse*, and another in which one of the running titles was *The Masse is an Idol*. But these had gone far beyond what suited the Council at that time. In the same year he had ready for publication another treatise called *The Godly Sayings of the old auncient faithful Fathers upon the Sacrament of the Bodye and Bloude of Chryste*. He states at the end of the book that it was 'Written at Hackeney, y^e laste day of October in the year of our Lord, M.D.XLVIII.' But this book was suppressed for two whole years, as the colophon gives the date October 11, 1550. But now, according to the Order in Council of August 14, 1549, it was issued with the full authority of the Council, '*Cum privilegio ad imprimendum solum*.' A copy is in the British Museum (692. a. 41). The whole object of the treatise is to explain away all the expressions of the Fathers who call the Sacrament the body and blood of Christ, on the ground that signs in holy Scripture frequently take the name of the thing signified. He will only allow that it is a sign, a testimonial, and a witness. He speaks of his view as being in exact accordance with that of the Council, trusting that people 'will be the more ready to forsake their blind error and to follow and embrace the truth

when he published the last of his decades. Cox, also writing to Bullinger, November 1, 1550, tells him that there was no reason to fear any exception being taken to his books as long as the king lives (*ibid.* p. 120).

which our most sovereign lord the King and his honourable Council hath set forth.'

The work is apostyled throughout with marginal annotations, of which we extract a few specimens, as for our present purpose they are the only important part of the work: ¹

'The young babes being baptyzed are also partakers of the body of the Lord, though they do die afore they receive the Sacrament' (p. 41).

'By these wordes ye may see that the Sacrament is not the very body of Christ, else the wicked which dwelleth not in Christ should eate his fleshe' (p. 68).

'To believe in Christ is to eate his body and to drinke his bloude' (p. 76).

'Mark how that he saith that it is called the body of Christ and not it is the body of Christ' (p. 78).

'The sacraments doo take the names of the very things whereof they are sacraments' (p. 87).

'Baptisme signifieth burying, and yet the Apostle saith not we signify burying, but we are buried, so that this verb *est, is*, must be here taken, for it signifieth Christ in his last Supper did deliver the figure of body unto his disciples' (p. 88).

'The Lord saith this is my body when he gave a figure of it' (p. 90).

'We drink a similitude of Christ's blood' (p. 94).

'As the sacrifices of the old lawe were shadowes of the flesh of Christ which should be offered, so the sacrament is a figure of it being already offered' (p. 107).

'Mark that he doth call it a sacrifice, which nevertheless is but a remembrance of that only sacrifice' (p. 108).

'We do eat the body of Christ and drink his bloud in the redyng of the scriptures' (p. 112).

'That heavenly bread which is Christ is signified by the sacrament' (p. 118).

'Here holy Chrysostom and all other faithful fathers doo use this word sacrifice for a memoriall and remembrance of that only sacrifice once offered for ever, as Augustine also witnesseth in the 38th book against Faustus, much contrary to them which craftily have brought and induced into the church of Christ this cursed sacrifice of the Masse' (p. 121).

'Understande here that as the lambe being taken oute of the flocke and applied to the sacrifices of that passover is called the passover of the lord, so is that bread which is broken in the remembrance of the body of Christ called the body of Christ' (p. 127).

'We feed daily upon the body and bloud of Christ spiritually, not in a mystery only, but in the reading and hearing of the scripture' (p. 133).

¹ This work has been reproduced by the Rev. C. J. Daniel, M.A., in 1846. The references have been made to this edition, which is more easily procurable than the original.

In the following month there was published one of the numerous editions of Tyndale's New Testament. It was probably edited by Sir John Cheke. It is without notes and has, parallel with the text, the Latin version by Erasmus. The significance of this for our present purpose is that in the Preface the editor J. C., whoever he was, praises the King for the changes in religion he was about to introduce, as all Europe was aware, thus emphasizing the view that they had thus early intended to improve upon the First Prayer Book of 1549.

We observed in our previous article on the 'Preparations for the First Prayer Book,' that most of the publications, with the exception of Dr. William Turner's, steered somewhat clear of extreme Calvinism. Walter Lynne, who was author as well as printer, had issued several little works in the year 1548 and the earlier part of 1549, which we did not refer to in that article. They were issued without any *imprimatur* for the most part, but on January 20, 1550 (*i.e.* 1551 according to present computation), he published an important work which is full of the most pronounced Calvinism. It is entitled *The true beliefe in Christ and his Sacramentes, set forth in a Dialogue betwene a Christen father and his sonne, verye necessary to be learned of all men, of what estate soever they be*. It was dedicated to the Lady Ann, Duchess of Somerset. The writer professes it to be a translation from a Latin version of a treatise by an unknown writer 'in the duche tong.' The printer evidently was also the translator. And it must be remembered that it had the full sanction of the Council, from which it may be gathered that Cranmer's influence at the Council board was small, as the work undoubtedly does not represent his opinions or views of doctrine in this respect. Before describing its contents it may be worth while to mention that in the month of May preceding the same printer had issued another volume entitled *A Spirituall and Precious Perle*, the preface to which had been written by Somerset himself. For our present purpose we confine our attention to the later publication of the two. It is noticeable that the paper and print of the first four leaves is different from that of the rest of the book, which looks as if it had been printed at Zurich, and if so had probably been kept back till it was thought safe to publish it. Our extracts were made from a copy in Queen's College Library at Oxford. There is another copy precisely resembling it in the British Museum Library (3932 a), A₁ to A₄ in English type; b₁ to g₄ in 8s, apparently in Zurich, certainly in foreign type.

The earlier part of the catechism is taken up with teach-

ing solifidian doctrine and the indefectibility of grace in the elect, and concludes with the Son putting as a question, 'I see well a Christian man may sin.' To which the Father answers :

'Man sinneth two manner of ways. The ungodly to death, through their obstinate mind and great maliciousness whereby they persevere in the works of darkness, and that because they are vessels of wrath and know nothing how to hope in god, nor yet to trust unto his godly promises. Contrariwise the godly by fragility only of their flesh, and that full sore against their will having always in them the seed of faith which assureth them of the mercy of god their father, wherefore they cannot sin unto death nor yet remain in works of darkness, but causeth them to believe that Christ is their brother and through his blood to be cleansed from sin.'

Afterwards the Father says :

'We are all from the beginning reserved by his eternal pre-ordination and godly wisdom either to death everlasting or else predestinate unto life eternal. Which godly secret shall first be declared in the last day of judgment ordained alonely for to reprove openly the vessels of iniquity, utterly appointed unto the perpetual fire of hell (being ever dead though they seem to live) And also for to approve the lively and quick vessels of mercy which live in Christ Jesu manifestly admitting them unto joy. Which man was never able neither to see, to hear, nor yet to imagine.'

The dialogue professes to go through the Article of the Holy Catholic Church, the communion of saints being here designated 'an holy christen church, the company of saints.' The writer puts all objections out in the plainest language and replies to them. Upon the question, how if Christ ascended He can be with us, the answer is that He is present spiritually, but only by commemoration, and on this point the Father entirely acquiesces in the doctrine enunciated by the Son :

'The effect of thy saying after mine understanding is only that this should be but a remembrance how that Christ freely gave his body and blood for the redemption of as many as god his father from the beginning of the world had predestinate to become partakers of his son's blood, by the reason whereof each one of Christ's flock stedfastly may believe himself to be cleansed from sin and delivered from bondage of death and hell by this acceptable sacrifice made and done betwixt Christ our saviour and god his father.'

To this the Father answers, 'I can none otherwise imagine.'

There is much more to the same effect, but we cannot afford space for further extracts.

There were many other publications of the years 1550

and 1551, in which very advanced anti-sacramental views were promulgated. Such were several works of Bishop Hooper and translations from Bullinger, but we do not reproduce any extracts from them here, as these may be read in the modern reprints of the Parker Society, which may be procured by any one who cares to possess them in their original uncut state, at the low price of sixpence a volume. Many of these, such as Hooper's and Bullinger's writings, have not the same tone of Calvinism, for though the doctrines of Calvin were spreading fast through the country, they had not obtained the same hold over the religious world as they had in the reign of Elizabeth. It is easy to trace the gradual development of Calvinism as well in the publications as in the correspondence of the reign of Edward VI., and no doubt it was considerably helped on by the *Consensus Tigurinus* of August 30, 1549. The twenty-six Articles of the Consensus were drawn up by Calvin himself, assisted apparently by Farel, and agree almost entirely in their expressions about the Sacraments with what Bullinger and the English reformers professed. Thus they all agree that the words of institution, *Hoc est corpus meum*, are figurative; that Sacraments do not confer grace, and therefore it is a sophistical fallacy to say that they confer grace on all who do not prevent it by the obstacle of mortal sin; that the grace of God is given before and independently of them, and that faith is only confirmed and increased by their use. But the sixteenth and seventeenth Articles of the Consensus are expressed in a way which the teachers of Zurich had probably consented to with some reluctance. Bullinger had not been in the habit of using the words, the elect and the reprobate, yet they appear in both the sixteenth and seventeenth Articles, the former distinctly asserting that the elect who are ordained to eternal life alone receive the benefits of the Sacraments.

Concurrently with the spread of Calvinistic doctrine in England there was also an enormous increase in the number of Anabaptists—Latimer speaks of there being more than five hundred in a single town. And many publications of the period were specially directed against this sect, who appear to have given the Government a considerable amount of trouble. Several other publications also allude to them incidentally. And it seems probable that the very existence of this formidable body of heretics exercised an influence for good on the retention in our Baptismal Service, throughout all the changes of the Prayer Book, of the orthodox doctrine as regards this Sacrament. No one who is familiar

with the works of the reformers, whether of this reign or of that of Elizabeth, can have failed to notice the contrast between the language used as to the efficacy of the Sacrament in the Second Prayer Book equally with the First, and those expressions which recur so frequently in their writings implying that baptism conveys an increase of faith which is supposed to exist before, and which, it is hoped, will in time be developed. It is true that several expressions in the Second Book are far less definite than those of the First. There is, for instance, the significant omission in the opening address of the words 'that by this wholesome laver of regeneration whatsoever sin is in them may be washed clean away.' There is also the omission of the Exorcism and the giving of the Chrisom, as well as of the words used when the child's head is anointed, 'Our Lord Jesus Christ who . . . hath given unto thee remission of all thy sins.' There is also the alteration of the words used in the office of Private Baptism, of 'made the child of God' into 'received into the number of the children of God.' Whatever be the meaning of these changes—and it has to be remembered that they are not mere casual or accidental differences, but alterations deliberately adopted—it still remains the fact that the obvious interpretation of both the offices is that original sin and actual sins are washed away by Baptism, though the Second Book contains no such definite words as those of the First, viz. 'the innocency which by God's grace in this holy Sacrament of Baptism is given unto thee.'

From all the writings of the period we should have expected a much less orthodox view of Baptism to have been found in the Second Prayer Book of 1552. As we have said, we think the preservation of the doctrine is mainly due to the necessity of making a protest against the Anabaptists. The Reformers felt the difficulty they were placed in by their appeal to Scripture, and the Anabaptists fairly enough objected that there was no precept in Scripture for the baptizing of infants as there was in the Old Testament for the circumcision of a child on the eighth day. Thus, in the work we have been noticing, the Son puts the question, 'I would gladly hear one precept or commandment given in Scripture that we should baptize them as the law compelleth to circumcise men's children the eighth day of their birth.' And the answer given is to the effect that there was no need of any special command, it being included under the general direction to do all things to the honour of God, Christians being under the law of love, our fathers having been under that of constraint. The

fact was, they had to make the most of baptism in order to maintain the baptism of infants as against the Anabaptist theory, which was that no one ought to be baptized unless he had previously faith in the promises. The Anabaptists placed them in a great difficulty. They had no means of answering them on principles which they themselves had adopted, which are represented in this volume as follows :

‘*Son.* What prevaileth baptism unto babes?

‘*Father.* It bringeth to our remembrance the promises of the great goodness and mercy of god, whereby he declareth himself to be our merciful father. And for this cause are the children committed unto their elders and church, which are bound to nourish and bring them up as members consecrate only unto the glory of god, whereby the children shall have great occasion to live honestly and in the fear of god and elders’ obedience,’ &c.

The answers in defence of infant baptism are somewhat in the style of Luther and Melancthon, who both felt the difficulty caused by their own teaching of justification by faith alone, and urged that there might be in infants actual, or at least imputed faith. But Protestantism in England had at this time advanced far beyond the ideas of either Luther or Melancthon. And the almost universal teaching of the reformers was that the sacraments were to the eye what reading or teaching the Word was to the ear, a means of increasing a faith which already existed in some form, and therefore they indignantly resented the representations of the Lutherans that they made them bare signs, and so were driven to assert that they were efficacious signs of grace. We do not find the reformers of this time using such expressions as that of the Augustan Confession, ‘*per baptismum offertur gratia Dei*,’ or that of the *Apologia*, ‘*salus cum baptismo offertur*,’ though these by no means come up to the strong expressions which in 1528 Luther had used—‘*qui nos per baptismum tam ineffabili et abundanti gratia cumulat ut ipse regenerationem vocet qua ab omni tyrannide diaboli peccato morte et inferno liberati filii vitæ et hæredes omnium bonorum Dei immo Dei filii et hæredes Christi effimur*.’¹ And exactly the same difficulty was felt by Peter Martyr, from whom the expressions of the 27th Article were borrowed, if, indeed, he was not the compiler of the whole Article, which asserts that the promises of God are visibly signed and sealed, faith is confirmed, and grace increased, by virtue of prayer unto God. The retention of baptism of children, too, is argued on the ground of its being agreeable to the

¹ Seckendorf, lib. i. p. 233.

institution of Christ. So Luther had contended, but with an argument instead of a mere assertion, that it had been the custom of the Church for more than a thousand years.

The English Reformers almost invariably adhere to the doctrine, first promulgated by Zwingli, and presented to the Emperor, that the children of Christians are already in covenant with God, and belong to the Church of God, and therefore have a claim to baptism which countersigns that claim. Zwingli had also distinctly enunciated his view that sacraments do not confer grace; but this doctrine was as yet only developing in England, and did not reach its full consummation till the reign of Elizabeth.

During the year 1550 the Polish nobleman, Alasco, was living with Cranmer at Lambeth, and was exerting considerable influence over the Archbishop. In a manuscript note written about this time, in a treatise on the effect and use of sacraments, there is the following:

'Nothing is given or conferred on anyone by sacraments. They are only symbols of the thing previously given and received; for that God has from eternity elected his own by his covenant, *I am thy God*. He afterwards confirms them by the symbols of Baptism and of the holy Supper to be his own, and to have been previously his own.'¹

Cranmer would certainly not have agreed in this, and he was under the influence of other foreigners who were living with him at Lambeth, and especially of Bucer, who was at Cambridge, and who would have dissented from this view. But Calvinism nevertheless was gaining ground against Zwinglianism. And Bucer's death, in February 1551, left the way clear for Peter Martyr and Alasco to propagate their opinions. And it is evident that though Martyr was mostly resident at Oxford, his influence was greater than Alasco's during the years 1551 and 1552, whilst the Prayer Book and Articles were being prepared. This is shown in the second Exhortation in the Communion Service of 1552, parts of which are taken almost verbatim from Martyr's works, and is further evidenced by the deference shown to Martyr's opinion in the omission of the following rubric of the First Prayer Book:

'And if the same day there be a celebration of the Holy Communion in the church, then shall the Priest reserve . . . so much of the sacrament of the body and blood as shall serve the sick person, and so many as shall communicate with him . . . and so soon as he conveniently may . . . shall go and minister the same,' &c.

¹ Gorham's *Gleanings*, p. 149.

It seems Bucer had taken no offence at this, or at least had expressed no disapprobation of such acknowledgment of the Real Presence; but Martyr's opinion is very express in condemnation of any such view. He says:

'I have only wondered how you could have omitted to disapprove the order which is given in the Communion of the Sick, if it shall happen to be on the Sunday on which the Lord's Supper is celebrated, that the minister should in that case take with him a portion of the elements, and so should administer the communion in the house of the sick person. In which matter it offends me that they do not there repeat those things which particularly belong to the Lord's Supper; since I agree with you in thinking that the words of the Supper belong more to men than to bread or to wine. I stated that it clearly seems to me that all things that are necessarily required for the Lord's Supper should be both said and done in the presence of the sick person, and of those who communicate with him; and it is indeed wonderful that they should scruple to say those words in the presence of a sick person which might be very profitable to him, though they choose to repeat them uselessly whenever it happens during communion in the church that wine is wanting in the cup, though the persons who take the sacrament have already heard them.'¹

Of course it is notorious that manual acts were omitted in the Prayer Book of 1552, and the words used in the distribution of the elements altered to a Zwinglian sense; yet Churchmen have been found to assert that the prayer was meant for a consecration prayer. If so, it may be asked, Why in the Communion of the Sick there is no provision made for any consecration at all, the direction of the first Prayer-Book from '*the Preface . . . Unto end of the canon*' having been altogether omitted and nothing substituted in their place, where in our present Prayer Book we have 'after which the priest shall proceed according to the form before prescribed for the Holy Communion, beginning at the words ["*Ye that do truly,*" &c.]

One of the important publications of the year 1551 was an English edition of Bullinger's *Absoluta de Christi Domini et Catholicæ ejus Ecclesiæ Sacramentis Tractatio*. It was published at the express wish of Cranmer.² It contains a letter of Alasco's to the same effect as the rest of the volume. It had been published by Bullinger, who had sent it to Alasco three years before. We need not comment on Bullinger's opinions as exhibited in the book, as they may be read in his works as published by the Parker Society. A concise summary of them may be seen in Gorham's *Gleanings*, pp. 249-260.

¹ Gorham's *Gleanings*, p. 228.

² *Ibid.* p. 247.

We should only weary our readers if we were to reprint extracts from other publications of the day in illustration of the prevailing tone of doctrine, but there is one publication which immediately preceded the appearance of the Second Prayer Book which is of considerable importance, as it gives the objections and the answers made to them as to the practice of Infant Baptism. It is entitled *A most sure and strong Defence of the Baptism of Children*, by John Veron Senonoys, printed at Worcester by Ihon Oswen, 1551. It has been omitted by Lowndes in his catalogue of Veron's works, but there is a copy in the Bodleian (8vo, B. 8. Med. B. S. (5)). The work takes precisely the same ground as the notes to the Tyndale Testament published in the reign of Edward VI., consisting of a dialogue between Simon, who defends the rebaptization of grown persons, and Joiada, who refutes that doctrine. The preliminary ground taken is that *baptism* is often taken in Scripture merely as a synonymous term with *doctrine*, as in Matt. xxi. and Acts xix. The pamphlet proceeds with the assertion that as the doctrine of John the Baptist and that of Christ are the same, so the baptism of Christ and of John are identical—baptism under the new dispensation being precisely the same as circumcision under the old, and the baptism of John must be the true baptism, else Christ would not have been well baptized. The second of the three dialogues enters upon the main subject. The first argument is derived from the commission which was given to teach and baptize all, and when Simon objects that children cannot be faithful, as not being possessed of reason, the answer given by Joiada is that God had promised to be 'thy God and the God of thy seed after thee,' and that consequently the children of the faithful are counted faithful, and are already within the covenant. Simon continues with the further objection, 'What if parents should not really be faithful, but only feign to be so?' And the answer to this is that we must believe a person's profession, exactly as St. Peter did that of Simon Magus, who nevertheless deceived him. To the next objection, 'What if the child were not really of the elect?' The answer is given in the form of a *reductio ad absurdum*, that in that case no one could be baptized, as we could not be certain of election; and here again the analogy of circumcision is pressed, it being alleged that Ishmael and Esau were circumcised though they were not amongst the elect. Soon afterwards appears the following account of Infant Baptism (Signat. D 2):

'The infant therefore is not baptized for the intent that by

M 2

baptism—that is to say, by the outward washing of water—he should be made the child of God, but he is therefore baptized because he was afore the child of God through grace and promise. Wherefore if they die afore that the water of baptism be poured upon them, they are nevertheless the children of God, and are saved through the grace and promise of God by the force and strength of the covenant, by the satisfaction of Jesus Christ that he made on the cross for all mankind.’

After this an apology is made for the great effects which are attributed to baptism, as follows :

‘When therefore these godly and spiritual things are attributed unto baptism, they be not attributed unto the outward washing, but to the whole action, which containeth the faith of the minister, of the church, and of him that is baptized ; also the grace, election and promise of God. It is then chiefly attributed unto that which is signified by the pouring on of the water.’

To the question ‘Why, then, are infants baptized?’ the answer is ready, that circumcision is as great a sacrament as baptism, and was administered to infants ; and confirmation or bishoping was used amongst the ancient fathers as an establishing of things begun in baptism. Accordingly when the question is asked, Where does Scripture command to baptize children? the rejoinder is, Where does it forbid it?

The third dialogue continues the defence of Infant Baptism by the fact that the practice had continued from the Apostles’ times, and from the argument from Scripture that whole households were baptized, and by reference to old writers such as Origen, Lactantius and Chrysostom. The colophon is as follows :

‘Imprinted at Worcester by Ihon Oswen, Anno. Do. 1551. *Cum privilegio ad imprimendum solum.*’

As to what was commonly understood to be the meaning and intention of the Second Prayer Book at the time of its publication, Peter Martyr, who contributed so much to its composition, is undoubtedly a competent witness. In his letter to Bullinger, dated at Oxford, June 14, 1552, he says of it that ‘all things are removed from it which could nourish superstition.’ He seems to approve entirely of Cranmer’s action, but speaks of his being hampered by opposition on the part of others who still thought that grace was conferred by the Sacraments.

‘There have been some who . . . were desirous that this doctrine should be established by public authority. But when others clearly saw how many superstitions such a determination would

bring with it, they made it a primary point to endeavour in all ways to show that nothing more is to be granted to the Sacraments than to the external word of God, for by both these kinds of word is signified and shown to us the salvation obtained for us through Christ which as many as are made partakers of as believe these words and signs; not indeed by the virtue of the words or of the Sacraments, but by the efficacy of faith. Moreover it was added that it was impossible that the Sacraments should be worthily received unless those who receive them have beforehand that which is signified by them, for unless faith is present, they are always received unworthily; but if they who come to the Sacraments are endued with faith, they have already received through faith the grace which is proclaimed to us in the Sacraments, and then the reception and use of the Sacraments is the seal and obsignation of the promise already apprehended. And as the external words of God avail to the quickening and exciting our faith which is often torpid . . . this same thing also the Sacraments can effect by the power of the Holy Spirit; and their use is of no little benefit to confirm our minds otherwise weak concerning the promises and the grace of God. But in the case of children when they are baptized, since on account of their age they cannot have that assent to the Divine promises which is faith in them, the Sacrament effects this—that pardon of original sin, reconciliation with God, and the grace of the Holy Spirit bestowed on them through Christ, is sealed in them, and that those belonging already to the Church are also visibly implanted in it. Although of those that are baptized, whether children or adults, it is not to be denied that much advantage and profit comes to them from the invocation of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, which takes place over them. For God always hears the faithful prayers of his Church. We were anxious that these things should be determined and established by authority, concerning the Sacraments, that their use might at length be restored to a state of purity and simplicity. But it was opposed; and many are of opinion, and those otherwise not unlearned nor evil, that grace is conferred as they say by virtue of the Sacraments. Nor are they willing to grant that little children are justified or regenerated previous to baptism. But when we come to their reasons, there are none which do not most readily admit of solution.¹

Such is a specimen of a few of the publications designed to pave the way for the acceptance of the Second Prayer Book of 1552, which the Council palmed off upon the nation as being an explanation of the previous book of 1549, in the following words of the Statute, cap. i. of the Parliament held January 30, in the fifth year of the reign:

‘And because there hath arisen in the use and exercise of the aforesaid Common Service in the Church heretofore set forth divers doubts for the fashion and manner of the ministration of the same,

¹ Gorham's *Gleanings*, p. 282.

rather by the curiosity of the Minister and Mistakers than of any other worthy cause ; therefore as well for the more plain and manifest explanation hereof as for the more perfection of the said Order of Common Service, in some places where it is necessary to make the same prayers and fashion of Service more earnest and fit to stir Christian people to the true honouring of Almighty God,—The King's most excellent Majesty, with the assent of the Lords and Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, hath caused the aforesaid Order of Common Service entitled The Book of Common Prayer to be faithfully and godly perused, explained and made fully perfect, and by the aforesaid authority hath annexed and joined it so explained and perfected to this present Statute.'

ART. IX.—SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE.

The Poetical Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Edited, with a Biographical Introduction, by JAMES DYKES CAMPBELL. (London, 1893.)

SINGLE-VOLUME editions of the great poets are, as a rule, intended rather for the lover of literature than for the student of literary biography. The publishers of the volume of which the name stands at the head of this article have issued several such editions, which answer very well to the ideal of what such an edition should be. It should contain all the works of the poet whom it claims to represent, and therewith a short sketch of the poet's life which may put the reader into the proper position to understand and appreciate his writings. The nature of such a sketch is perhaps better understood by the French than by ourselves. The best critics of French literature have constantly been employed to write the prefatory essay to popular editions of the great writers. With us, the work has too often been left to obscure or anonymous hack-writers, who can be trusted neither for accuracy nor for sane appreciation of their subjects. But although the best critical ability can most usefully be employed on such a task as this, the irreducible minimum makes a much less serious demand, which can be satisfied by the possessor of the two pedestrian but valuable qualities, accuracy and modesty. The purchaser of a popular edition of a great poet has a right to expect a sketch of the poet's life as brief as is possible consistently with supplying all the details really necessary to a proper appreciation of him ; and if he gets in addition an estimate of the poet's genius, in which the writer really aims

at the elucidation of his subject, and not at an exhibition of his own literary qualifications, he should take with thankfulness the goods which the gods have provided.

Mr. Dykes Campbell, in his edition of Coleridge's poetical works, which in external form ranks with the same publishers' editions of Wordsworth, Shelley, Tennyson, and Arnold, has given the reader far^{*} more than he has any right to expect; he has also, in one respect, given him less than he may desire. In the first place, his edition is by far the most complete collection of Coleridge's poetry which has ever been brought together. No less than 157 pieces are distinguished in the index by an asterisk which notifies that they are here printed or collected for the first time; and though many of them are trivial enough, still they constitute collectively a great advance in completeness over any previous edition. Indeed, it may be assumed with some confidence, that nothing of any real importance has escaped Mr. Campbell's industry. With the original poems are included all the translations, notably the great versions of Schiller's dramas. Further, a series of appendices, occupying some eighty-five pages, contains the earlier versions of poems (such as *The Ancient Mariner* and *Dejection*), which underwent much alteration after their first appearance, together with a complete bibliography of the title-pages and introductions to the original editions. To the appendices succeed 100 pages of notes, giving full information as to the circumstances of the original composition and publication of each poem. And, finally, to the whole volume is prefixed an Introduction of 124 pages, containing the fullest and most accurate account of Coleridge's life which has yet been published. One clear impression, therefore, which remains with the reader of this volume is that of gratitude to and respect for the editor of it. Mr. Dykes Campbell is well known as a most careful student of literature and literary history, and in this edition he has produced a work which will, if possible, increase his reputation in this respect. On the lines which he has laid down for himself, nothing could have been done more admirably.

After saying so much, it may seem not only ungrateful but inconsistent to suggest any disapproval of the volume thus described; and if the criticism could be taken as implying any censure on the editor, it would not be written. It is, however, the scheme of the edition, and not the execution of it, which seems to be open to question. Mr. Campbell's work is admirable; but it does not seem to make its appearance in the proper form. This edition is primarily suited to the

student of literary history, not to the mere lover of literature, still less to one in the early stages of the acquisition of that love. We should hesitate to put this volume into the hands of a schoolboy who is just in that first delightful stage of omnivorous love of poetry. If he began at the beginning, as schoolboys will, his ardour would be damped by the 124 closely printed pages of biographical detail, which tell him much of Coleridge's life, but little of his genius; and he would not have gained the guidance, so valuable at such a stage, as to the special characteristics of the poet's genius and the poems in which it is best displayed. The more experienced lover of poetry, if he does not care for minute biographical details, may of course skip the Introduction and the notes; but some tender consciences are so constituted as to dislike skipping, and it is a pity to place an offence in their way. Let the popular edition have introductions and notes suited to the popular edition; and let the student's edition appear with such outward form and circumstance as suits its character.

This doubt as to the suitability of a minute biographical Introduction to a popular edition of a poet may be pushed further, till it becomes a doubt as to the desirability of such biographies at all. That in the present age of desire for detail, and especially for personal detail, such biographies are inevitable, can hardly be denied; that, if they are inevitable, they should be executed in the spirit in which Mr. Campbell has worked here, with admirable industry, perfect taste, and total avoidance of sensationalism, cannot be denied at all; but that this is not the ultimate ideal of literary biography would, perhaps, be admitted by Mr. Campbell himself. It is indeed impossible to put bounds to the investigations into the circumstances of a poet's life, and it cannot be denied that there is some interest in any personal details connected with a man of eminence; but one may fairly maintain that the taste for such details interferes with a proper appreciation of the poet's writings, and that they are happiest about whom least is known. It is not merely that the details of a poet's life are sometimes discreditable to him, and may even disqualify him for the position of inspired teacher which he might otherwise have held. It is that in reading his biography we meet the poet on a lower plane, the plane of everyday life. We learn that he was human, perhaps very human, when it had been better for us to think of him as he was in his hours of inspiration, as a being apart, having insight into a world of truth and beauty to which we have no access save through him

and his fellows, participating, no doubt, in the circumstances of our common life, but hardly influenced by them—in it, rather than of it.

It may possibly be objected that this is mere cavilling; that biographies of eminent men must be written, and that the best biography is the one which tells us most about its subject, thereby enabling us to realize what manner of man he was. The answer to this depends on the general theory of biography. The ground upon which biographies are justified (apart from those memoirs which are intended solely for circulation among a few personal friends, and make no claim on general attention) is that they describe lives in which there was something uncommon, something above the ordinary run of human nature, or beyond the ordinary range of human achievement. The interest may sometimes be due more to the events in which the subject of the biography was an actor than to any extraordinary qualities in himself; but either in the events or in the character there must be something unusual in order to justify a claim upon the attention of the general public. And the skill of the biographer is shown in bringing out the part of his subject which is uncommon and consequently of real interest, while passing lightly over that in which there is nothing specially divergent from the common run of humanity. Here is the principle on which literary biographers should be distinguished from almost all others. In the life of a statesman or a soldier the details of their external activities are everything, while the statement of their views on intellectual or literary or religious matters should generally be made quite subordinate, being given only for the purpose of making the portrait complete. Conversely, in the life of a man of thought, not of action, the biographer should give us as full a description as possible of the genius and intellectual development of his subject, with only so much of his external life as is necessary for completeness and for the proper understanding of the works to which he owed his eminence. It is not true that every detail of a poet's life should be recorded. The biographer should select, and, in our opinion, he should select with a sparing hand. He should never lose sight of the principle that a biography is intended to bring out, firstly and chiefly, those characteristics or those actions by virtue of which the subject of the biography differed so markedly from other men as to deserve to be set up on a pedestal, *are perennius*, for their study and admiration.

We do not at all wish it to be supposed that Mr. Dykes Campbell has written one of those offensive biographies, full

of personal trivialities, which are somewhat too common at the present day. But the argument of the last paragraphs may explain the complaint at the beginning of this article, that he has given us more than we have any right to expect, yet less than we might desire. He has written an excellent account of Coleridge's external life, with as much accuracy as is attainable in such a mass of details; but we would gladly have exchanged much of these details for a fuller study of his intellectual life and achievements. When the reader reaches the end of Mr. Campbell's Introduction he knows how Coleridge passed the days of his life on earth; but he does not know, unless he knew it before, why he was more remarkable than thousands of other men. Wherein does the greatness of Coleridge consist? What are the works in which it is most shown? These are the primary questions which a literary biography should answer, but which Mr. Campbell has, of set purpose, refrained from answering. The subsidiary question, Under what circumstances were these works written? he has answered as fully as could be desired, only that the precise bearing of the circumstances on the works is not always clearly brought out.

We are not anxious to rush in where Mr. Campbell has feared to tread; for the questions which he has left unanswered, fascinating though they must be to all lovers of literature, are not easily to be solved. Coleridge is one of the most difficult figures in our literary history. Everybody knows three of his poems; everybody who is really fond of literature knows a few more; but no one cares for many of his poems; hardly anyone reads his prose works; and while no one would deny that his is among the foremost names in English literature, few would find it easy to say in what qualities precisely his greatness consists. And the elusiveness which surrounds his literary work marks also his character as a man. His life is not pleasant reading. His pecuniary difficulties, his quarrels with his friends, his self-consciousness and self-assertiveness, and the fatal indulgence in opium which broke up alike his intellect and his will, combine to make a picture which is not agreeable to study; and yet the devotion to him of his friends, especially of such a friend as Charles Lamb, and the boundless respect with which his intellectual capacities were regarded by them, are proof of a charm and a power which we rarely find in his writings, but which must, nevertheless, have been fundamental characteristics of the man as he really was.

Coleridge was born in 1772 and died in 1834. He was

educated at Christ's Hospital (with Lamb) and Jesus College, Cambridge, where he was a brilliant but irregular scholar, more interested in politics than in the classics. In 1794 he made the acquaintance of Southey, and with him and others concocted the scheme of 'Pantisocracy,' the essence of which was the formation of a colony of twelve gentlemen 'of good education and liberal principles' with twelve ladies (education and principles not specified) in the back settlements of America, there to devote themselves to a communistic life of self-improvement and education. In pursuance of this scheme, Coleridge engaged himself to Miss Sarah Fricker, whose sister was already betrothed to Southey; but beyond this step Pantisocracy never progressed, chiefly for want of funds, and its main interest now is as a sign of the ideas which filled Coleridge's mind at this period. Like Wordsworth and all the young poets of his generation, he was filled with enthusiasm for the principles of the French Revolution; like Wordsworth, he withdrew his admiration from the subsequent developments of the Revolution. The years which followed were full of schemes of literary work and of much correspondence with literary friends. The literary work was not sufficient to support him, with his wife and an incipient family, but his friends made up the deficiency. At the end of 1796 he settled at Stowey, in Somersetshire, writing poems, preaching in Unitarian chapels, cultivating potatoes, and corresponding with his friends; and here it was that he first made acquaintance with the Wordsworths—William and Dorothy—an acquaintance so full of importance for all of them. The Wordsworths settled at Alfoxden, in order to be near Coleridge, and their intercourse was almost daily. This was probably the happiest period of Coleridge's life, as it was certainly the most fruitful in good work. In 1798 it was nearly cut short by an offer of the charge of the Unitarian chapel at Shrewsbury; but the generous gift of an annuity of 150*l.* for life from Thomas and Josiah Wedgwood, sons of the potter, enabled him to refuse the invitation, and once more devote himself to literature. During the Stowey period were written *The Ancient Mariner*, the first part of *Christabel*, *Kubla Khan*, and the *Ode to France*—in short, the best work that Coleridge ever did. In 1798 he made an expedition to Germany, in company with the Wordsworths, but soon parted from them, settling down to study the German language and literature for a year, principally at Ratzeburg and Göttingen. On his return to England he took lodgings in London, occupying himself with contributions of

poetry and political articles to the *Morning Post* and the translation of *The Piccolomini* and *Wallenstein*; but the attraction of the Wordsworths, now at Grasmere, proved too great, and in 1800 he settled at Greta Hall, near Keswick.

One is accustomed to regard Coleridge as one of 'the Lake Poets,' and consequently to think of the Lakes as the chief scene of his literary activity. But in truth the migration to Keswick marks the beginning of his decline. The second part of *Christabel* was indeed written in 1800; but for the most part Coleridge was occupied with metaphysics and abortive schemes of all kinds, which never even approached execution. The failure of his will power and application, never very strong, first becomes manifest now. He complains of his health, complains of his work, writes letters on metaphysics, propounds all sorts of schemes for work—in short, does everything except actually work. And the cause of all—of hope and depression, of schemes of work and inability to carry them out, of failure of health and failure of will—was no doubt the same. It was during this period that he became a slave to opium. On this subject one would wish to say as little as possible, but it is so all-important a factor in Coleridge's life that it cannot be entirely ignored. He had taken opium before this date, notably in 1798, when *Kubla Khan* was produced as the result of an opium dream; but, as usual, the bad effects were not evident for some considerable time, and it was not until after the removal to Keswick that they manifested their full force. The wreck of Coleridge's powers, especially so far as concerns poetry, dates from 1802. A melancholy landmark remains to indicate this stage. The last poem worthy of Coleridge's powers is *Dejection*, written in 1802. The poem was written during a period of broken spirits, due to ill health, to a consciousness of failure, and increasing estrangement from his wife; and in it he laments the decay of his poetic faculties:

' But now afflictions bow me down to earth :
Nor care I that they rob me of my mirth ;
But oh ! each visitation
Suspends what Nature gave me at my birth,
My shaping spirit of Imagination.'

It is a melancholy poem, and still more so when we remember that the remainder of his life only proved its truth. He was only thirty when he wrote these lines, and he lived for thirty-two years more, but so far as poetry of the first rank is concerned he might have died when this poem was completed.

It must not be supposed, however, that Coleridge's mind failed entirely from this period, though to the student of poetry there is little satisfaction in dwelling upon the remainder of his life. On the contrary, most of his prose work was done after this date, and his intellect remained at intervals powerful to the last, though his health and his will power were broken. For two years (1804-1806) he was abroad, in Malta and Italy, and for some time after his return he lived a peripatetic life, staying with friends, writing letters, still scheming schemes, and still doing nothing. One year was better occupied by the issue of his periodical publication, *The Friend*; but after a characteristically irregular existence it finally expired in March 1810. In November of the same year he went to London, where he wrote articles for the *Courier* and delivered several courses of lectures on English poetry. The Lake country was less attractive to him at this period, owing to a quarrel with Wordsworth—brought on by the exceeding ill judgment of a mutual friend—which was not composed till 1812, and even then only partially and for a time. In 1813 Coleridge's tragedy *Remorse* (originally composed in 1797, and then entitled *Osorio*) was acted at Drury Lane, and ran successfully for twenty nights. From 1814 to 1816 he was mostly resident at Calne, trying to rid himself of his bondage to opium, lecturing to the people of Bristol, and, under the impulsion of his friend Morgan, writing instalments of *Biographia Literaria* and *Sibylline Leaves*. In the spring of 1816 his final move was made, to Highgate. Of the rest of his life little is to be said. Lectures and newspaper articles represent the greater part of the work actually accomplished, though but a small proportion of the schemes devised and discussed. Neither the epic on the Siege of Jerusalem nor the *magnum opus* which was to revolutionize metaphysics, nor any other of the great visions which flitted across his brain, ever reached so much as a beginning. Yet the Highgate time was not entirely unfruitful. The name of Coleridge was enough to attract many visitors of a congenial spirit, and to them Coleridge talked as only he could talk. This portion of his work, in some senses the greatest, because the most far-reaching in its influence on others, is practically lost to us. Printed table talk can never be anything but scattered members, without the life which once animated the whole body. The inspiring effect of actual conversation is something quite apart from the spoken words, especially when the latter are recorded only in summary, or according to the memory of a hearer. If one is sometimes inclined to ask what Coleridge

did that should make his name stand so high as it did in the first half of this century, the answer is to be found, not in his too scanty fragments of divine verse, nor in the miscellaneous collections which make up his published prose, but in the conversations, or rather the declamations, of his later years at Highgate. One is willing to forget the failure of his life and the personal faults to which that failure was due, and to look at Coleridge with the eyes of those who visited him in these later years, who saw in him only an old man of splendid intellectual powers, talking divinely. One is glad to think that a calmness settled upon him as he reached the close of his life, and in peace he breathed his last on July 25, 1834. 'The end crowns all,' if not with the final glory of a great achievement closing a life of triumphant action, then at least with the sense of rest after years of distraction and bewilderment, of occasional high success drowned in continual failure and imperfection.

To posterity Coleridge can be great only as a poet; and here his performance was perhaps the scantiest in quantity that ever entitled a man to rank among the great poets. The poems containing his best work can be summed on less than the fingers of both hands. *The Ancient Mariner*, *Christabel*, *Kubla Khan*, the *Ode to France*, *Love*, *The Ballad of the Dark Ladie*, and *Dejection* sum up all that is really of first-class importance in his poetry, though there are other poems, such as *This Lime-tree Bower*, the *Hymn in the Vale of Chamouni*, the *Lines to a Gentleman*, and a few more, which may be read with pleasure. In these last-named poems, however, and still more in the inferior verses which fill most of the pages in his collected works, he is speaking in a tongue which did not wholly suit him. This is the Coleridge of 'the Lake School,' the Coleridge who is parodied in *Rejected Addresses*, the Coleridge of the style in which only Wordsworth could be successful, and he not by any means always. The friendship with Wordsworth, though an incalculable pleasure and advantage to Coleridge in general, was not without some bad influence on his poetry. Coleridge had a natural bent towards philosophizing, and Wordsworth's example encouraged its indulgence in verse, in which philosophy can rarely co-exist with poetry. His earliest verses show a meditative tendency, with a fondness for personifications of abstract qualities, which he perhaps caught from Gray. To none other of the poets of the preceding generation does he appear to owe much, always excepting, of course, the inspiration which he avowedly received from the sonnets of Bowles. But in these earlier poems,

except to some degree in *Lewti*, he does not touch the notes by which his greatest successes were to be attained. His favourite style is that of *Religious Musings*, *Lines* composed on various occasions, trivial poems addressed to friends, and occasionally humorous verses. His true note was not struck until the composition of *The Ancient Mariner*, and then he reaches perfection all at once. This is the baffling feature about Coleridge's poetry, that his best work is different from his inferior, not in degree only, but in kind. All his life he was meditating, reflecting, philosophizing, and most of his verse is written in this frame of mind; yet on a few isolated occasions, all comprised within the limits of five years, he produces a handful of poems of a wholly different genus, in which he reaches an eminence of unchallenged success. There is nothing quite like it in all the history of literature.

The manner in which Coleridge's success is so marked is narrative tinged with mystery. In both *The Ancient Mariner* and *Christabel* this is plainly the case. The poems are mainly narrative, but in both the interest of the narrative arises from the mysterious and supernatural influences which surround it. Even in the short fragment of *Kubla Khan* there is a sense of something unnatural and weird, both in the scene described and in the 'ancestral voices prophesying war.' But the mystery is not all. In these poems Coleridge achieves a mastery of language and rhythm which is nowhere else conspicuously evident in him. He is not one of those laborious cultivators of a poetic style whose manner remains characteristic and evident even when their matter or their inspiration fails them. In Spenser, in Milton, in Tennyson, there are many passages in which the style successfully carries off a weak or commonplace thought, and their style is constant under all circumstances. But with Coleridge it is not so. There is no trace of the music of *Kubla Khan* in the *Lines to a Young Ass*; nor in general does he appear to have cultivated the exact diction of his poems with that laborious care which is generally the essential condition of a perfect style. Yet in these three poems the language is modulated to the meaning with a perfection which has perhaps never been equalled. *Kubla Khan* in particular is the most perfect piece of word-painting in English literature, and the 'person on business' who interrupted its transcription and thereby destroyed the recollection of the dream in which it had been composed, has much to answer for to posterity. There the perfection is, and we cannot account for it. At times one is tempted to refer the inspiration (as in the case of *Kubla Khan*

one is authorized to refer it) to the stimulus of opium; and it may be the case that the use of the drug, in these early years before its harmful effects began to work themselves out, fired the imagination with which the poet was naturally gifted. But at most this can only have been the stimulus, not the cause. If opium would make second-rate poets write poems like *The Ancient Mariner* and *Kubla Khan*, one would be tempted to form a Pro-Opium Society for the administration of it to a selection of our living poets.

The poems just named, together with *Christabel*, are the three supreme works on which the general reputation of Coleridge rests, and with them may fitly be joined the less known but extremely beautiful piece entitled *Love*. This is in the same manner as the three greater poems, save that there is less of narrative and less of mystery, with more of personal emotion; and the charm of language is the same. That Coleridge himself thought highly of it appears from his own words to his friend Allsop. '*The Ancient Mariner* cannot be imitated, nor the poem *Love*; they may be excelled, they are not imitable.' The criticism is a true one, and might be extended to *Kubla Khan* and *Christabel*, despite the hardihood which has led sundry persons, otherwise believed to be sane, to write conclusions to the latter poem. But these four poems sum the whole achievement of Coleridge in this supreme vein. *The Ballad of the Dark Ladie* is a fragment in the same style which might have been successful; *The Three Graves*, also fragmentary, is a failure, perhaps because Coleridge's imagination was hampered by adherence to the actual facts on which the poem was based. The two great odes, *To France* and *Dejection*, form a separate class by themselves, and owe their greatness to a combination of personal emotion and fine rhetorical language. They are works of which any poet might be proud, but they are less peculiarly characteristic of Coleridge than the poems previously named. Beyond these it is needless to look. Coleridge wrote several other poems which one would be sorry to lose, but nothing which would of itself have entitled him to a place among the greatest poets; and in some instances their interest is more as having been written by him than for their own intrinsic merits.

The tendency to arrange poets, at least in one's own mind, in classes and orders of merit is almost irresistible; but the critic who tries this task with Coleridge must find it more than usually baffling. Coleridge's poetic achievement is mixed of gold and clay; and the clay preponderates so greatly, the gold is so scanty, that he doubts whether the

latter can be allowed its full value, without deduction for the mass of the former. It is all very well to say that a poet must be judged by his best work, but in practice we do not reckon so. Blanco White is not classed among the great poets on account of his one fine sonnet, nor Dr. Wolfe for his poem on *The Burial of Sir John Moore*. Volumes of selections bring together (and have their chief justification when they do so) isolated pieces by minor authors which in themselves are fit to rank with the work of the *dii majores*. Yet in these cases the fact that the general achievement of their authors was so much less is allowed to exclude them from the roll of the great poets. With Coleridge, however, it is universally recognized that his best work is of such supreme merit as to compel his admission to that roll; and it is also contained in a sufficient number of compositions to show that it was not merely a single accidental flash. By virtue of this handful of poems Coleridge is among the immortals, and he occupies among them a place apart. He cannot be classified either with the poets of meditation or with the poets of rhetoric, with the poets whom we read mainly for their matter, or with those whom we read mainly for their style. We read him for both. We do not find in him the luxuriance of Keats, or the wild music of Shelley, or the rhetoric of Byron, or the sublime insight and meditative charm of Wordsworth; but we find imaginative narrative combined with delicate harmonies of language and rhythm which are unique in our language. His own judgment was right. 'They may be excelled, they are not imitable.'

There remains one side of Coleridge's greatness to which passing reference has already been made, but which no edition and no biography of him fully brings out. We know Coleridge's poems, we know the details of his life; we do not fully know him as he was known by his friends. We read the story of his wasted life with some impatience, and we are apt to forget that those whose knowledge of him was the most intimate looked upon him as a man of unequalled powers, and combined their admiration of him with love. Throughout his life his pecuniary wants were relieved by gifts from men who, not always too well off themselves, were ready to contribute what they could to keep one, whose supreme gifts they recognized, free to devote himself to the pursuit of literature. Cottle, Poole, Estlin, Lloyd, Wordsworth, De Quincey, and, above all, the Wedgwoods, all at different times provided funds to meet his necessities; and these are not by any means all who testified their belief in him in this practical way. And their

admiration went with their money. To him Wordsworth dedicated *The Prelude*, as to the friend who had, more than any other, shared his thoughts and aspirations in all things literary and intellectual; and of him he wrote the loving and pathetic description contained in his *Stanzas written in the 'Castle of Indolence.'* Lamb's testimony is well known, but cannot be too often repeated, for the honour that it does to both friends.

'Come back into memory, like as thou wert in the day-spring of thy fancies, with hope like a fiery column before thee—the dark pillar not yet turned—Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Logician, Metaphysician, Bard! How have I seen the casual passer through the Cloisters stand still, entranced with admiration . . . while the walls of the old Grey Friars re-echoed to the accents of the *inspired charity-boy!*'¹

So Lamb wrote in 1820; and the story is well known, too, how during the few months by which he outlived his friend the words 'Coleridge is dead' were continually on his lips. 'His great and dear spirit still haunts me; never saw I his likeness, nor probably the world can see again.' This is not the place for collecting all the testimonies paid to Coleridge's character by his friends. Probably the testimony of Lamb—such a testimony from such a man—will be felt to outweigh them all. Yet these friendships were not without their vicissitudes, due generally, it must be confessed, to Coleridge himself. He had quarrels with nearly all his friends—with Wordsworth, with Southey, with Lamb, with Lloyd; but the quarrels were part of the general decay of moral power and self-control which wrecked his whole life. One would rather dwell on the pleasanter side of these friendships, and recover, if it be possible, some trace of the power with which he influenced all with whom he was brought into contact. It is to be hoped that the forthcoming biography by Mr. E. H. Coleridge will deal fully and satisfactorily with this aspect of Coleridge's life. It is here, if anywhere, that his greatness as a thinker is displayed. With his pen he effected little, but with his tongue much. His residence in Germany had imbued him with a taste for German metaphysics, and he did much to introduce the Kantian philosophy into England. But the great works on metaphysics which he was always hatching never came to the birth, and the only concrete shape which his thoughts on this subject took was in letters to and conversations with his friends. The biographer of Coleridge would do well to devote himself mainly to the illustration of

¹ *Essays of Elia*, p. 30. London, 1892.

the intellectual gifts of his subject as poet and thinker, and to pass as lightly as may be over his moral qualities and the details of his life. From the former there is much to be learnt by every lover of literature and every earnest man; from the latter little but warning and painful reflection on what might have been. We wish to think of him, not as the man of transcendent powers and brilliant promise wrecked by self-indulgence, losing will-power, and conscience, and self-restraint in the slavery of opium, dependent on other men's charity, and always promising work which never was performed, but as the author of *The Ancient Mariner* and *Christabel*, as the inspirer of high intellectual thoughts in many minds of those who walked with him in his youth or sat at his feet in his old age, as the friend of Wordsworth and the friend of Lamb.

ART. X.—FOREGLEAMS OF CHRISTIANITY.

The Foregleams of Christianity: an Essay on the Religious History of Antiquity. By CHARLES NEWTON SCOTT. New and Revised Edition. (London, 1893.)

ON the first page of his book Mr. Scott speaks of the Science of Religions as a 'recently created department of history,' but this statement cannot be accepted without reservations. He himself shows that there are suggestions tending towards such a science in St. Paul (we would add, St. John), and that they were recognized and pursued by St. Justin Martyr and St. Clement of Alexandria, to whom he might have added Origen and St. Augustine. It could not be otherwise. Converts, whether from Judaism or from heathenism, could not fail to consider how much they had retained of the creed in which they had been reared; the full Christian light explained as well as rectified the dim perceptions and aspirations of their earlier thoughts. They had not cast off the faith of their childhood as an old garment; if part of it had to be discarded, part was retained and glorified. Every appeal on the part of Christian apologists to the consciences of the heathen was, in some sense, a declaration that the heathen knew already in some degree the truth, and could be judged by it; and to know the truth is, in the eyes of the Christian, to know 'Him that is true.'

Yet, it cannot be denied that a less sympathetic view of heathen religions has often prevailed. From an original re-

velation, which was presumed to be full and precise, the heathen nations were supposed to have fallen into various degrees of ignorance by their own malice. The words of St. Paul were quoted as if they covered the whole truth instead of half of it—that 'even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind' (Rom. i. 28). It would be interesting to endeavour to trace this way of regarding heathenism to two apparently contradictory sources: Calvinism, which was unable to recognize in fallen man a longing after God; and the stress laid upon natural religion, as if every man might know God by the light of nature, and, if he failed to do so, failed by his own perversity. To the revival of a more sympathetic tone of thought several causes have contributed: the apparent remoteness of Paganism enables Christians to regard it without the prejudice which was so natural while it was a living and aggressive neighbour; the pursuit of classical literature forces thoughtful men to study the convictions and aspirations which it embodies; the union of heathen and Christian empires under a single crown, and the recovery of the languages of Egypt and Assyria, have forced upon us the consideration of men remote from us in place, time, and modes of thought; and, perhaps chiefly, the prevalence among us of an evolutionary type of thought disposes us to consider rather the sources and environment out of which Christianity seemed to spring than to regard it as a wholly new creation sent down from heaven. To these considerations must, we fear, be added a somewhat prevalent desire to reduce Christianity to a merely human level, and to regard it as no otherwise distinguished from earlier religions than as modern political institutions are distinguished from the primitive family or tribal governments. Such causes as these have developed the Scriptural and early patristic interest in heathen opinions into the elaborate Science of Religions as we have it now.

It cannot cause surprise that the present state of the inquiry has alarmed some devout Christians. The study of the Gospel in the light of other religions has seemed to degrade the religion of the Saviour to a naturalistic position. That God gave this religion, while man invented those, has seemed to be the only safe assertion. But this somewhat cowardly position has not satisfied more confident theologians. Bossuet, Döllinger (to whose *Heidenthum und Judenthum* we are surprised to find no reference in Mr. Scott's pages), Maurice, are examples, out of many, of thinkers who hold with all their hearts and minds what M. de Broglie calls the 'Transcendence

du Christianisme,'¹ and yet see in the history of religious thought a constant evolution toward Christianity; and to this class Mr. Scott belongs. He is evidently a devout Christian, a sincere Catholic, a loyal son of the English Church; yet, at the same time, he is ready to see glimmerings of the Divine Light in other religions, however rudimentary or debased. He brings to his task several gifts of great value: a firm conviction of the truth of the Gospel, a wide study of several forms of heathenism, a talent of accuracy, a keen eye for the bearings of facts and expressions, and a great acquaintance with the modern literature of the subject, especially the researches of French students, so little known in England, but here introduced to our notice by long and very interesting quotations. Such faults as he seems to have may be mentioned at once: an occasional way (in which also we detect French influence) of theorising on small grounds and pressing indifferent facts into a theory, and a style which is at times cumbrous and obscure. With these small reservations we have nothing but thanks and congratulations to offer to the author of a book which seems to us eminently calculated to be useful in strengthening faith in the Gospel.

His position is that of an evolutionist; but evolution, which in some of its eminent adherents is identified with nominalism (p. 63), is quite as susceptible of an idealistic interpretation. Things evolve, but towards what? An ideal. It is quite as legitimate to reverse the order and say that the ideal, fully revealed at last, was gradually disclosed in a series of less adequate manifestations. The Christian student of the Science of Religions starts from the point where the light is pure and the ideal completely manifested. From this central point in the world's history he looks back into the twilight, and sees there dim anticipations of the Perfect, which he has learned to recognize in the full light, just as the archæologist interprets by the help of his full knowledge of architecture those masses of ruin which seem to the more ignorant eye shapeless and purposeless. He sees in the earlier forms of religion, not so much the rudimentary conceptions of men as the obscured revelations of God; and he does not interpret Christianity by Paganism, but rather Paganism by Christianity. He regards with sympathy such longings after light as are expressed in that touching Egyptian prayer: 'O my God! O my God! that thou wouldest reveal to me the true God;' because his longing is satisfied, 'the darkness is past, and the true light now shineth' (1 St. John ii. 8).

¹ See his admirable lecture with this title (Paris, 1885).

Mr. Scott affirms three modes of revelation of Deity to man: '*External*, from a sense of Deity in what is outside of us; '*internal*, from a sense of Deity within us; and '*divinatory*, by means of signs' (p. 3). We venture to demur to his description of the third mode. Revelation by 'signs' seems to be common to the first and the third modes, for how does external nature disclose God except as it is regarded as a 'sign' of something higher than itself? Mr. Scott's meaning would perhaps be better expressed if he described 'divinatory revelation' by the terms oracular, authoritative, or dogmatic.

The book then proceeds (pp. 8-100) to investigate the gradual evolution of the *external* revelation of God by means of the world around us. In this evolution he notes seven stages:

(1) The first stage on emergence from materialism is fetishism—the revelation of God in matter. This early form of religion is closely related to, if not identical with, æstheticism. The beauty of the tree, the dark solemnity of the cavern, rouse æsthetic emotions which easily pass into religious awe. Accordingly we find religion and religious art to be twins, for the savage not only worships the tree, but he makes a fetish of an artistic arrangement of feathers and the like. Mr. Scott (who is evidently a student of art) reminds us that an object is not necessarily inartistic because it seems to our modern culture neither wonderful nor beautiful; and he gives us some interesting information about the artistic powers of the quaternary race of Cro-Magnon and others (p. 15). The æsthetic sense points to 'a mysterious *correspondence* between the material and the spiritual world' (p. 17); it has its eminent dangers, when the *eidôlon* ceases to be the symbol of the spiritual, and becomes its substitute; but its office is recognized in higher forms of religion; the sacred dance inspires the muse of Æschylus and of Sophocles, and finds its place in the religion of Miriam and the prophets; and the ceremonial of the Catholic Church, often rebuked as fetishism, does in fact embody, while it guards and consecrates, that sense of the religiousness of beauty of which we see the beginning in the lowest savages.

(2) When man began to reflect, and to recognize the distinction between his own soul and body, he projected this distinction into the external world, recognized that things were beautiful or wonderful because of something beyond them which made them so—and became a Pantheist. He had gained a new truth; but with it came new and greater danger of error. The truth was the presence in matter of

something greater than matter: the danger, that of exaggerating 'the connexion in life between spirit and matter, and, from analogy, between the Divine and Nature;' but this is

'most dangerous when Pantheism has passed from a Polytheistic to a Monotheistic phase, and has found a philosophical expression in the doctrine of Emanation, according to which *all* other things, both spiritual and material, and both good and evil, are *generated* by, and consequently consubstantial with, the one self-existent Being' (p. 25).

Mr. Scott points out excellently how inconsistent such a view is with the reality of the Christian warfare, and the importance of the virtue of hope in the religion of the Gospel involves the truth that we are fighting against enemies, and not merely subjugating 'blind impersonal forces fresh from the Creator's hands;' and he quotes a lucid passage from Emile Saisset, which shows how, in Christian theology, 'le monde n'est pas engendré de Dieu, c'est-à-dire formé de sa substance; il ne procède pas de Dieu dans la rigueur théologique; il est librement tiré du néant, c'est-à-dire créé' (p. 27). Thus Christianity secures, what Pantheism misses, the freewill of God, on which is based the freewill and the moral responsibility of His creatures. Nevertheless, Mr. Scott recognizes (though hardly so emphatically as we should desire, in view of the expression of St. James i. 18, *βουληθεὶς ἀπεκύησεν ἡμᾶς λόγῳ ἀληθείας*), that creation is not an act *merely* of the will of God: it is an act of generation by the Will and the Word; His Will acts in accordance with His Being, and creates all things in and after the Divine Ideal or Logos. In this manner Christianity has preserved that which was precious in Pantheism; the world is revealed to be distinct, but not separate, from God; God is immanent in His creatures without confusion. Pantheism 'fosters pride, quietism, and perilous intercourse with the invisible world' (p. 35), because it tends to become a merely intellectual theory of the relation between the Divine and Nature; while Christian mysticism recognizes that our union with God is *love*. All that Mr. Scott says on this point is good and true; but we fancy he might with advantage have said more about the mystical element, which in Christianity is held in healthy check by other elements, while in Pantheism it runs riot to destruction.

(3) The transition from an 'undetermined' Pantheism (p. 37) to Polytheism is in great measure due to the development of the analytic faculty: from 'here is a god' men advanced to say, 'here is one god, and there another.' Poly-

theism gained its plausibility from the apparent multiplicity and contradictoriness of nature and of morals; and that there is much that is plausible in it is evident from its deep and wide hold upon races far dispersed, and, many of them, advanced in reflection. Its chief danger is that no one god out of many has a right to claim 'the *entire* surrender' of the worshipper's 'heart and will' (p. 38). The power of many gods is dispersed, rendered antagonistic, and weakened; and polytheistic religion ceases to be submission, and becomes a method of influencing or controlling the Divine. Mr. Scott attributes to this tendency the preference for female objects of worship, as if out of the weakness of goddesses more might be got than out of the sternness of gods; but, at least in the Greek and Roman mythologies, the goddesses show no signs of feminine weakness, and we rather suppose that the worship of the female arose from the mysterious facts of generation, and from the strange influence, so like religion, which woman exercises over her ruder mate.

Of Polytheism it may be said that it prepared the way for the truth of relativity in the Godhead—of the generation by the Father of a Divine Son, of the procession of a Divine Spirit, of a certain commerce and correspondence between the Blessed Persons in the Holy Trinity. In a dangerous form Polytheism has survived in saint-worship, in which 'there is always this danger . . . that, its apology being the likeness to God of His saints, it is, on the contrary, the hope of a certain unlikeness to Him that is apt to recommend it' (p. 39). Our readers need not be reminded how, in some popular theologies, the womanly tenderness of Mary is represented as likely to be more amenable to the prayers of sinners than the justice of her Son.

(4) Polytheism passed from a pantheistic to an anthropomorphic phase (p. 44) as men became more conscious of themselves, their freewill, their intelligence. The transition was favoured by the creations of art, and by forgetfulness of the original meaning of names given to deities, as when Zeus no longer meant 'the sky,' but the god who rules in it. Anthropomorphism, personifying and deifying such human qualities as were felt to be excellent, tended rather to encourage such popular virtues as bravery than to discourage such vices as were not yet discerned as vices; and consequently vices were enthroned in heaven, and men, from worshipping a vicious god, learned to justify their own vices by his example. Yet we may say that each anthropomorphic effort was a reaching out after the true manifestation of God in Man, which

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is also the declaration of man's fitness to be the manifestation of God. And, even short of this, anthropomorphic polytheism found room for a moral dualism which had no place in pantheistic polytheism. Winds might war against waves, force against force, without moral meaning; but the Hercules who wrestled with serpents is the same Hercules who came to wrestle with vice and death; as those know well who have listened to the interpretation of the lovely tale of *Alcestis* at the mouth of Balaustion. If anthropomorphism did no more than consecrate hero-worship, it prepared the way for the worship of perfect humanity in Christ. And the human gods, who gradually drove into the background the Nature-powers of pantheism, were at least capable of attracting the human heart. If pantheism seeks to satisfy man's intellect, anthropomorphism finds room for his affections.

It must not be supposed that the higher developments of religion extirpated the lower. A curious instance of the absorption of fetishism by anthropomorphism is just alluded to by Mr. Scott (p. 59), and has been worked out with great diligence and skill in a recent book on the strange priesthood of *Aricia*,¹ the holder of which was consecrated by the murder of his predecessor—not, however, until the aspirant had torn from a tree in the sacred grove a mystic 'golden bough.' According to Mr. Frazer, the soul of the venerated tree was regarded as residing in the golden mistletoe which crowned it, a purely fetishistic conception. But the tree was also identified with the god, and he was regarded as incarnate in his priest, whose physical fitness to be an incarnation of the deity had to be secured by a very simple process of natural selection: when he ceased to be strong, another slew him and took his office. Here we have a strange transition from fetishism to anthropomorphism. In the same work there are abundant instances of the sacrificial feast regarded as a feast on the flesh of the god to whom the sacrifice was offered. It is needless to point out what high mysteries of the Christian religion were dimly suggested by these ancient conceptions of a priest who was an incarnate god, and of a god who gave a communion of his flesh in a sacrificial feast.

We are inclined to set down to an anthropomorphosed fetishism that strangest form of Roman religion, the worship

¹ *The Golden Bough: a Study of Comparative Religion*, by J. G. Frazer. It may be permissible to state that an almost daily familiarity with the woods near Nemi for several months has not enabled the present writer to discover a single plant of mistletoe, which Mr. Frazer assumes to be the *ramus aureus*.

of the emperor, to which we are surprised to find no allusion in Mr. Scott's book. The sight of the immense power of the Empire raised in the minds of Romans of the age succeeding Julius Cæsar the same sort of semi-religious awe which had been excited in their ancestors by the forces of nature. But how was this awe to be expressed in worship? Partly by a pantheistic worship of the abstraction, Roma. But it was no longer easy to be satisfied with the worship of an abstraction when literature and art had long accustomed the world to the embodiment of abstractions in a personal form—when men no longer worshipped the sky, but Jupiter; no longer the fruitful Earth, but Cybele. Under what human form could the Empire be so fitly represented as under that of him who swayed its powers? His personal character seemed unimportant; he was the representative of awful Power, and so was worshipful. However greatly the popularity of such worship may have been aided by flattery, it will be impossible to assign that vice as its sole cause when we remember the curious discussion by Tacitus (*Ann.* iv. 37, 38) of Tiberius's reluctance to accept divine honours—whether it deserved unwilling praise as a sign of modesty, or whether it was rather to be regarded as a pusillanimous indifference to the attractions of glory.

On the most modern representative of anthropomorphism—the Humanity worship of Comte—Mr. Scott makes a few caustic remarks (p. 61). It is the worship, not of heroes, still less of ideal humanity realized in Christ, but of the whole race, 'not abstracted from even its most degraded specimens,' and therefore 'can neither pretend to the purity of a god of Dualism, nor to the grandeur of a god of Pantheism, nor to the refined and inspiring beauty of the old dear gods of Anthropomorphism,' and we have no right to expect for a religion whose object of worship is not venerable a greater practical success than that which is achieved by the 'Church of Humanity.'

(5) Hero-worship involves the perception of that which is not heroic, and thus anthropomorphism melts into dualism—the conception of evil as radically different from good, and not as a less perfect form of good (p. 63). Here comes in the development of sacrifice from a bribe to angry or reluctant gods into a means of expiation for sin; and here too is recognized the need of a *pastoral* clergy, enabled by calling and discipline to instruct the people in religious casuistry. Hence, too, not only hilasmic rites for the purgation of sin, but also catharmic rites for entrance into a new life of righteousness.

At this point Mr. Scott refers to the anticipations of a 'suffering and victorious Messiah'—the *πάθῃ* of Dionysus, the worship of Agni-Soma, and (he might have added) the myth of Persephone. 'The great defect of all these conceptions was, not that they were too anthropomorphic, but that they were not anthropomorphic enough, Christ alone being "perfect Man"; that they represented an ideal which not only never had been realized, but never could be genuinely realized in humanity.' Men might weep for the suffering Dionysus, or the Soma crushed in the wine-press, or Demeter robbed of her child; but sympathy with such imaginary sufferings could not 'exert a lasting influence on their everyday lives' (p. 74). The Cross has transformed characters because it tells of the real sufferings of One who is not a personified Nature-force, but Very Man.

At this stage in the history of Greece came the development of the worship of Apollo,¹ the identification of beauty and morality (so pregnant an idea, yet so fatal in its perversion), and the moral elevation taught by the Delphic oracle. But the dualistic recognition of evil, not adequately balanced with a doctrine of atonement, could only lead to self-righteous stoicism or to despair; for such sacrifices as the heathen knew 'could not make him that did the service perfect, as pertaining to the conscience' (Heb. ix. 9). It played the part which pessimism seems to play in modern thought: it laid bare the wound of humanity, and at least made it unreasonable to expect rest except in a Redeemer.²

(6) The term Dualism has not, perhaps, usually borne the meaning which Mr. Scott attaches to it. It generally (though not necessarily) indicates a religion, like those of Zoroaster and Manes, in which a self-originated Evil stands opposed, even if inferior, to the self-originated Good. The danger of such a heresy (which tends ultimately to the division of the empire of the world between a good God and an evil) was obviated by the growth of Monotheism, a process which Mr.

¹ Mr. Scott exempts Apollo and Athene from the irreverence with which he (after Curtius) thinks that Homer treated the gods. But perhaps irreverence and frivolity are not the right terms to apply to a poet who, conceiving the gods to be like men, could not carry out his conception without ascribing certain human infirmities to his deities. This may be the right place to remark that Mr. Scott is wrong in thinking that the *Divina Commedia* was so called because it is in parts 'larded with burlesque' (p. 24). Dante himself explains the name as given because the poem was written in vernacular or, so to speak, village language, and also because it ends happily.

² A great work of allied arts, Wagner's *Parsifal*, illustrates the way in which pessimism may lead to the hope of a Redeemer.

Scott rightly calls syncretistic, as the one deity of a nation began to absorb all the attributes which had previously been distributed among many, but which probably led past the half-way house of Henotheism, where many gods were recognized, but only one selected for worship. Mr. Scott does not notice how the discarded gods prepared the way for the recognition of a hierarchy (if we may so use the term) of evil powers, which is a terrible, but a most essential, part of the Christian revelation of the spirit world. We have had, of late years, abundant justification of Dr. Maitland's warning, that Satan's most successful stratagem would be to persuade people that he does not exist. The scourge of so-called Spiritualism (against which Mr. Scott gives a brief but weighty caution on p. 111) is a curious and not very rational Gnosis, dualistic in its form, but practically destitute of the good element in dualism, according to which all matter is vile and all spirits are divine, although some are less advanced than others in their development. The practical result of the former part of this medley is too often the ancient one, *δεῖν παραχρᾶσθαι τῷ σώματι*: that of the latter part that it is impossible *παραχρᾶσθαι τῷ πνεύματι*. It is probably true that the thaumaturgic aspect of spiritualism is less prominent now than it was twenty years ago, but its quasi-philosophical side has had an Avatar in Esoteric Buddhism, and we find its traces mixed with much that is good in a recent volume called *Things to Come*.¹

(7) Mr. Scott alleges, as a stage above Monotheism, what he calls Theism, and describes (p. 5) as the 'Revelation of God in History.' We are not sure that he is right in considering this a distinct stage of religion, and we are pretty sure that he is not happy in his description of it. For every form of religion worthy of the name is a revelation of God in history; the fetishist sees Him in the earthquake which shatters his village; the pantheist in the force which underlies such phenomena; the polytheist sees behind the Trojan war the strife of heaven; the anthropomorphist sees gods fighting among men at Lake Regillus; the dualist sees Him in the ethical institutions of his country, ascribed to Divine inspiration; the monotheist when he maintains that the only God has sent His prophet to found a universal empire-church. It was reserved for Mr. Herbert Spencer to conceive a religion which declares the existence of the Absolute, but

¹ May we give the warning that this work is not to be confused with the earlier, and very different, work by Mr. J. B. Johnson called *Things Present and Things to Come*?

refuses to consider its relation to the world. We should therefore prefer to abolish Mr. Scott's seventh class, or rather to fill it, not with Theism, but with Christianity, in which all other religions are summed up and perfected in the revelation of God as love.

At this point two other streams, already noticed, pour their floods into the river whose course we have been tracing. The one is Mysticism—the internal apprehension of God as love—which accorded but ill with the lower stages of religion, for it was impossible to ascribe infinite love, or to return the best love of which we are capable, to a fetish, or a cause, or partner in a distributed Godhead, or a god with human faults no less than human virtues; or a god who, dividing the world with a contrary power, loves only his own share of it; or, finally, a god who stands apart from his world in barren isolation. If men at such stages did love God (and they did) their love was evoked, not by the external forms of their creeds, but by the concurrent tendency of mysticism, always lovely, but, at these stages, hardly reasonable. The Christian religion alone apprehends with the mind a God to whom the heart can safely yield entire devotion.

But Mr. Scott points out admirably that not only do external conjectures as to God, and internal devotion to Him, meet in the Christian religion. A third stream here flows fully into the river—that of 'divinatory revelation': the witness which God bears to Himself, not merely by the courses of nature, *φωνᾶντα συνετοῖσιν*, but by the authoritative and dogmatic voice of oracles, pre-eminently the *λόγια ζῶντα* given to Moses (Acts vii. 38), and chiefly to Christians (Heb. v. 12), as the keynote of their speech and thoughts (1 St. Peter iv. 11). He maintains—and we think rightly—that a current of such divinatory revelation is to be traced all through history—a tradition perhaps from Paradise; a word spoken through prophets who have been since the world began; the raising up of prophetic teachers even among the heathen; and especially the authority in Greece of the Delphic oracle and the Eleusinian mysteries. We do not exalt the Hebrew or the Christian revelation by denying all such divinatory revelation to the heathen; rather, it is their glory to be more fully what such heathen oracles were in a small degree, until the history of God's providential guidance is summed up in the Incarnate Word.

But is Christianity, then, an eclectic religion? Have men selected that which was precious in earlier creeds, and blended their treasures in the Gospel? One argument ought to suffice

to answer this question : the original teachers of Christianity were not in a position to be eclectic. Here we have no case of many men of learning in a busy city contributing to a common store their several opinions or traditions. The Founder of this religion was a Peasant, who (if He was not also God) certainly had no opportunity of learning about religions remote in place and time, and no sympathy with other forms of worship than those which were accepted as Divine in His quiet corner of Palestine. Eclecticism belongs to cities and universities, not to Galilee and a carpenter with a following of fishermen. If Christianity, then, sums up and perfects all that was good in earlier forms of religion, it is not because assiduous hands gathered various gems out of their mire, but because God had in all those religions been drawing men to seek after Him ; and because the same God now gave to be heard, seen, handled, that which was from the beginning the Word of Life.

Into the latter part of Mr. Scott's book we do not purpose to enter with so much detail. He proceeds (pp. 101 *sq.*) to consider the history of religious progress and corruption in the chief races of antiquity which have left the literary remains which are necessary for the inquiry ; and he argues that progress has been associated with organized pastoral clergies, and decay with the growth of democracy. As to the latter position, we venture to think that he misses the real point. Growth of civilization necessarily leads to democracy, because an ever-widening class takes an interest, and therefore demands a share, in the government ; and growth of civilization is (as he shows well on p. 103) quite compatible with religious corruption, both because it enlarges the possible sphere of transgression, and because by its increased luxury it increases the number of those who are unwilling to submit to the restraints of religion—itself concurrently, in consequence of mental progress, continually rendered more exacting. He is more happy, we think, in his attempt to prove that religion as it develops is more and more in need of a pastoral clergy to preserve it ; and his argument will perhaps be commended to some sensitive persons by the fact that his name does not occur in the Clergy List. The primitive priesthood of the head of the family yields step by step to the prophetic order, which provides for the conduct of religion men who are called and trained for the purpose, and thus unite the conservation in an organized body of ancient tradition, the absence of pre-occupation which might hinder mystical contemplation, and

the credit which belongs to authoritative teaching. This fact ought to give pause to those who think that the nineteenth century is so advanced that it no longer needs a priesthood, but each man can manage his affairs of religion for himself. The most interesting passage in these later pages is that (pp. 166-172) in which (after M. Boissier and the charming romance of Mr. Pater, *Marius, the Epicurean*) he traces the revival at Rome from the atheistic tone of the Ciceronian age to the deeply religious spirit which we find in M. Aurelius and in Epictetus, which he ascribes in great measure to the organized school of Stoicism, not without an infiltration from despised Christianity. He observes sagaciously that this reformed paganism not only prepared 'the highest class of Roman society for Christianity,' but 'prevented it from accepting the same prematurely' (p. 170). We think he is rash in concluding that Boethius was a pagan (p. 171); it is true his 'Consolations' have no distinctly Christian element in them, but it is far from certain that the theological works ascribed to him are spurious.

Finally, Mr. Scott draws three conclusions from his investigations :—

'1. That Christians need not fear to be called fetishists and the like; for the Christian religion finds the proper place for the vital truths of all the religions which have preceded it.

'2. That, the more spiritually advanced a religion is, "the more necessary are the doctrines, complementary to each other, of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement, to secure its metaphysical system from contradiction either with facts or with itself."

'3. That the Incarnation was delayed until the "fulness of the times," for its apprehension was come' (p. 200).

It will be seen that his purpose is not so much to convince the unbeliever as to enable the Christian to appreciate his faith more highly when he sees it, in detail, the fulfilment of ages of expectation, and the conciliation of many surmises. The purpose is at once modest and ambitious: there is no profession of a short and ready way with unbelievers, and yet there is the high aim of setting, however concisely, the religious history of the world in its true light. We are of opinion that many Christians will be indebted to Mr. Scott for a deeper and fuller understanding of their faith, and of the way in which it meets the cravings of humanity; and we venture to hope for his work a success somewhat beyond his purpose.

For—we have in mind a candid unbeliever, of whom we ask the question—can anything be more striking than this

fact: that among a set of uneducated Jews there should have risen a religion which so sums up and completes all that was best in earlier religions? It is, as we have seen, eminently not an eclectic religion, but a simple and self-consistent proclamation of a few central articles of faith; it neither possesses the learned complexity and delicate balancing which usually characterize eclectic creeds, nor has it experienced that tendency to disproportion, inadequate amalgamation, and disruption which usually attend them. Nor can it be maintained that its earliest teachers regarded it as the conciliation of earlier religions: they maintained that it was a gift from God, not a compilation of human skill; if they perceive in it the fulfilment of Judaism, they hardly hint that it is the fulfilment of paganism as well. Is it not reasonable to regard the apparently fortuitous relation between the earlier religions and the religion of Christ as really indicating a Divine purpose? Is it not the case with theology as with other sciences, that teleology, far from dying before the face of evolution, springs up in a new birth? And when, after gazing at the panorama of developing religions, we contrast with them the permanence of the Christian faith, not assuredly rising from want of vitality, but from a conviction of possessing the truth, does not the contrast go far to indicate the Divine fulfilment of a gracious plan, and the coming of the 'Desire of all nations' from His right hand who gave the nations the power to desire?

How this book may meet the difficulties of unbelievers must be left for God to show. For ourselves, we can but thank the author for enabling us to grasp more coherently the fulfilment of all hopes in Christ, and to see the goodness of God, who, in the times of man's ignorance, left him not without such witness as might enable him to hope.

ART. XI.—WILLIAM LAW.

1. *A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life.* By WILLIAM LAW, M.A. ('The Ancient and Modern Library of Theological Literature.') (London, 1888, and again in another form in 1892.)
2. *The Spirit of Prayer ; or, the Soul Rising out of the Vanity of Time into the Riches of Eternity.* By WILLIAM LAW. (Republished by a Member of the Society of Friends in 1888, and again by Griffith, Farran, and Co. in 1892.)
3. *The Spirit of Love.* In Dialogues. By WILLIAM LAW. (London, 1892.)
4. *William Law's Defence of Church Principles : Three Letters to the Bishop of Bangor, 1717-1719.* Edited by J. O. NASH and CHARLES GORE. (London, 1892.)
5. *The Works of the Rev. William Law.* Nine Volumes. Now being privately reprinted in their original form by G. MORETON.
6. *Character and Characteristics of William Law, Nonjuror and Mystic.* Selected and arranged, with an Introduction, by ALEXANDER WHYTE, D.D., of St. George's Free Church, Edinburgh. (London, 1893.)

THERE has been of late years a remarkable revival of interest both in the life and writings of William Law. Indeed, 'revival' is not a strong enough term ; for there seems to be growing up a wider interest in him now than there was even in his own day. In his lifetime he never had more than a little coterie of disciples—one might almost call them worshippers—who really sympathized with him ; while, with the exception of the *Three Letters to the Bishop of Bangor*, *The Serious Call*, and its predecessor, *The Christian Perfection*, we doubt whether his writings ever had a very extensive circulation. He never made anything like the sensation which his quondam disciple John Wesley—who was incomparably inferior to him in point of intellectual power, and not a man of so high a type of saintliness—made. And no wonder ; for Law was altogether out of sympathy with the spirit of his age. It was the *saeculum rationalisticum*—the age which derived its philosophy from Locke and its theology from Tillotson. It was the age when Methodism rose among the lower classes, and Evangelicalism was beginning to rise among the higher ; an age distinguished by its worldliness and also by its 'other-worldliness,' to adopt an expressive term first used, we believe,

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by George Eliot. Both its religion and its irreligion had a certain grossness and coarseness about them. Wesley and Whitefield in the religious world were really the counterparts of Walpole and Chesterfield in the secular; and the Georges were the ideal sovereigns for such an age. It had its good points, as they had theirs; there was a certain robustness about the time which is refreshing; but there was an utter want of refinement and delicacy of touch in its dealings with sacred as with secular matters. You recognize this want quite as distinctly in the furious abuse which the Calvinists and anti-Calvinists poured upon one another, and in the defence of Christianity by such writers as Warburton, with his 'crews of scoundrels' and his determination 'to trim the rogue's jacket for him,' as you do in the unblushing venality, cynicism, and worldliness of the men who were certainly not 'professors.' Law was hardly more in sympathy with the religious than with the irreligious world of his own time.

And again, it is not in the least surprising that he should have remained practically unknown for more than a century after his death; for the whole period during which he lived, and its writers, were under a cloud. Bishop Ewing, indeed, republished the second dialogue of *The Spirit of Love* in his *Present Day Papers on Theology*, and Mr. F. D. Maurice the *Remarks on Mandeville's Fable of the Bees* in 1844; but these republications took no great hold on the public mind. It was not until the present generation that the history of the eighteenth century, and especially of the Church of the eighteenth century, at all became a subject of general interest; but when it did it was inevitable that appreciative minds would at once recognize the merits of William Law. One of the first to do so was a man of singularly different views, Mr. Leslie Stephen. His vivid account both of Law's life and writings, in his *English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, shows that he was evidently fascinated both by the man and the writer; as is also indicated by the fact that, though the biographer of Law was one of the earliest and most regular contributors to the *Dictionary of National Biography*, Mr. Stephen undertook the article on Law himself, and wrote it remarkably well. After Mr. Stephen's work on the eighteenth century followed that of Mr. Lecky; and here again we have an equally full and able account of Law, though the writer does not give us the impression that he was personally so fascinated by Law as his predecessor had been. Then came Messrs. Abbey and Overton's *English Church in the Eighteenth Century*, where Law appears prominently in connexion with

'Enthusiasm,' and less prominently in connexion with the Evangelical Revival. Then came Canon Overton's biography of Law, which, in Mr. Stephen's judgment, 'gives all information obtainable, and a very interesting account of Law's doctrines.'¹ Then, within the last four or five years, there have been no less than eight separate publications of treatises, or extracts from treatises, written by William Law, the names of which are placed at the head of this article. There is not much to be said about these reprints, because those who have put them forth have been wise enough to let the writer tell his own tale. Law is really not a writer who requires a commentator. He writes plainly enough for those 'who have eyes to see and ears to hear'; and those who have not will not have the deficiency supplied by any commentator. It may seem strange to some that one of the reprints of *The Spirit of Prayer* should have been issued by a member of the Society of Friends; but we are bound to say that in Law's mystic works, and especially in *The Spirit of Prayer*, there is some ground for a Quaker to think that he finds sympathy with his own views. It is a curious instance of the irony of fate that it should be so; for personally Law had a strong objection to the Quakers, as a people who amassed money—a deadly offence to the austere ascetic. The short Introductions to most of the reprints are satisfactory enough in their way. Those, by Mr. Gore and Mr. Nash, prefixed to the *Three Letters to the Bishop of Bangor*—we cannot quite reconcile ourselves to the new title, *William Law's Defence of Church Principles*—are, as might be expected from the authorship, of a more cultured and scholarly type than the rest; but there is one sentence in Mr. Nash's Introduction which has puzzled us exceedingly. He writes on p. 23:

'His [Law's] later mind and writing were considerably affected by Böhme, the mystic, but Mr. Overton thinks he has scarcely received justice, and at least it may be pleaded that in the dissensions among the Nonjurors he stoutly upheld the Church of England against the "usagers," and to the last was constant at service and Communion at his parish church.'

Now we find a long note at the close of Mr. Overton's volume giving seven reasons for believing that William Law was *not* 'against the usagers.' Are those reasons inconclusive? One of them, the fourth, seems, on the other hand, so conclusive as to render the others unnecessary. If among 'the books of piety to be lent to the neighbouring clergy' in

¹ *Dict. Nat. Biog.*

William Law's library at King's Cliffe one is a book written by one of the chief writers among the usagers (Bishop Archibald Campbell), and on the very subject of the 'usages,' is it possible to conceive that Law would thus go out of his way to propagate what he believed to be erroneous? The last clause in Mr. Nash's sentence, that Law 'to the last was constant at service and Communion in his parish church,' is undoubtedly true; but does that prove that he was a 'non-usager'? Let us remember that the question between the usagers and non-usagers was simply a question between the First and Second Prayer Books of King Edward VI. Many excellent clergymen—yes, and high dignitaries—of the time would certainly have preferred the First to the Second Book: that is, in other words, they would have inclined to the side of the usagers, not to that of the non-usagers; but they nevertheless remained members and officers of the Church of England. To mention only two: John Johnson, Vicar of Cranbrook and author of *The Unbloody Sacrifice*, and John Sharp, one of the best of the Archbishops of York, certainly took this view; and will it be contended that these two were not, in the phrase of the eighteenth century, 'Church of England men'? From a long study of the life and writings of William Law we have not the slightest doubt that he would fall under the same category. We have dwelt with some emphasis on this point, because it really is a very important one. The first of the usages in question was that of the mixed chalice; and, in view of a recent trial, one would have thought that a book coming out under the sanction of an examining chaplain of the Bishop of Lincoln would not have given up so great a name as William Law to the other side except on very good authority. But the authority is very bad; it is simply that of Thomas Carte, the historian, which has been echoed over and over again by others. Now Carte was an able man and a good man; but the ablest and best men do not know everything, and, by his own showing on other points, Carte knew little or nothing about William Law.

Again, we do not think that in any of the Introductions to Law's writings now before us nearly sufficient stress has been laid upon the fact that Law's extraordinary infatuation about Jacob Behmen (we spell the name as Law always spelt it) did not in the least interfere with his high sacramental views. He held quite as strongly after he became a mystic as he had before, the doctrines of Baptismal Regeneration and of the Real Presence in the Holy Eucharist. *The Grounds and Reasons of Christian Regeneration* and *A Demonstration of*

the *Gross and Fundamental Errors of a Late Book*, called 'A Plain Account of the Nature and End of the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper,' were both written when the spell of the 'Teutonic Theosopher,' 'the inspired cobbler of Gorlitz,' was upon him; and in both these works Law's trumpet gives no uncertain sound on the subject of the sacraments. The first of them Law himself regarded as the best exposition of his later views. He declares that if he could afford it he would have 'this little book sent gratis into all parts of the kingdom.' And this is the way in which he writes of Holy Baptism in this treatise:

'Our baptism is to signify our seeking and obtaining a new birth; and our being baptized in, or into, the "name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost" tells us in the plainest manner what birth it is that we seek—namely, such a new birth as may make us what we were at first, a living, real image or offspring of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. It is owned on all hands that we are baptized into a renovation of some Divine birth that we had lost; and, that we may not be at a loss to know what that Divine birth is, the form in Baptism openly declares to us that it is to regain that first birth of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost in our souls which at the first made us to be truly and really images of the Holy Trinity in Unity. The form in baptism is but very imperfectly apprehended till it is understood to have this great meaning in it. Baptism is the appointed sacrament of this new birth; and how finely, how surprisingly, do our first and our second birth answer to and illustrate one another! At our first birth it is said thus: "Let us make man in our Image, after our own Likeness." When the Divine birth was lost, and man was to receive it again, it is said, "Be thou baptized into the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost," which is saying, "Let the Divine birth be brought forth again in thee," or, "Be thou born *again* such an image of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost as thou wast at first."¹

To prevent a possible misconception it may be added that the context clearly shows that the terms 'we,' 'us,' 'our first birth' refer to man generally before the Fall, not to any individual man after the Fall.

Now let us see what he says about the other great sacrament of the Gospel in answer to his old antagonist, Bishop Hoadly, for there is little doubt that the *Plain Account* was written by the late Bishop of Bangor, now raised to the wealthy see of Winchester.

'You must,' he writes in a fine passage, 'consider the Sacrament purely as an object of your devotion, that is to exercise all your faith, that is to raise, exercise, and inflame every holy ardour of your soul that tends to God. It is an abstract or sum of all the mysteries that

¹ *Works*, v. (2), 28.

have been revealed concerning our Saviour, from the first promise of "a seed of the woman to bruise the serpent's head" to the day of Pentecost. Jacob's ladder, that reached from earth to heaven, and was filled with angels ascending and descending between heaven and earth, is but a small signification between God and man, which this holy Sacrament is the means and instrument of. Whatever names or titles this institution is signified to you by—whether it be called a *sacrifice*, propitiatory or commemorative—whether it be called an *holy oblation*, the *Eucharist*, the *Sacrament of the body and blood of Christ*, the *Sacrament of the Lord's Supper*, the *heavenly banquet*, the *food of immortality*, or the *Holy Communion*—all these names are right and good, and there is nothing wrong in them but the striving and contention about them; for they all express *something* that is true of the Sacrament, and therefore are every one of them, in a good sense, rightly applicable to it; but all of them are far short of expressing the whole nature of the Sacrament, and therefore the help of all of them is wanted.¹

We do not mean to imply that Law's mysticism did not modify his Churchmanship: it *did* in many ways, and not altogether to his advantage; it turned his thoughts inwards rather than outwards; it tinged both his theology and his philosophy with an element which in its extreme form becomes sheer Pantheism; it made him lay far more stress upon the Christ within than upon the Christ of history, though it is fair to him to add that he expressly guarded himself against the suspicion of making light of the latter; if it did not make Law himself depreciate the Written Word in comparison with the inner light, we are by no means sure whether this has not been the disastrous result upon some who have been readers and admirers of his writings: in other words, whether Law has not been indirectly responsible for some of the free handling of Holy Scripture, or what is called the higher criticism. But, whatever his mysticism did, it never made him cease to be a dutiful son of his mother Church, which had been but a stepmother to him; and it never made him cease to sympathize with those 'Catholic views' which, since the Oxford Movement, have at any rate become perfectly intelligible to Englishmen, though in Law's time they were intelligible to but few.

But all this will be better elucidated by turning to the detailed history of Law's career. His outer life was singularly uneventful. He was born at King's Cliffe, in Northamptonshire (not, as Mr. Nash says, in Bedfordshire, p. 231). In 1708 he went as a sizar to Emmanuel College, Cambridge. In 1711-12 he took his B.A. degree, received holy orders,

¹ *Works*, v. (1), 121-3.

and was elected Fellow of Emmanuel. He remained at Cambridge, taking pupils and occasional duty in church, until 1714, when his conscience would not allow him to take the oath of abjuration of 'the Pretender' and that of allegiance to George I. He thus became a Nonjuror of the second generation, resigned his fellowship, and after a time was admitted into the household of Mr. Gibbon at Putney, as a sort of domestic chaplain, and tutor to the family. We very much doubt whether the inferiority of the position of a domestic chaplain in the eighteenth century has not been greatly exaggerated; at any rate Law was the very last man in the world to submit to being trampled upon. There does not, indeed, seem to have been the slightest inclination to attempt the impossible effort; on the contrary, Law appears to have ruled the family—as he always did rule in whatever circle he was. He gained his ascendancy, however, not only by a strong will, which he had to a fault, but by the respect which his lofty character inspired. 'In our family,' writes Edward Gibbon, the great historian, who was the son of Law's pupil and grandson of the head of the establishment at Putney, 'he [Law] had left the reputation of a worthy and pious man, who believed all that he professed and practised all that he enjoined.' He accompanied Edward Gibbon, father of the historian, as governor, to Emmanuel College, Cambridge; but the pupil was a feeble youth, who had to leave the University without a degree. Law was at Putney (with alternations of Cambridge) for more than twelve years. His friends seem to have had the freest access to him; and they used to come and consult him as a sort of spiritual director. Among the most famous of his disciples were the two brothers John and Charles Wesley, and John Byrom, the 'poet' and stenographer. The Wesleys soon abandoned Law's teaching—much to their disadvantage—but Byrom remained his faithful follower through life. On the death of old Mr. Gibbon the Putney establishment was broken up; and after some little interval Law settled down in his native village in a house which he had inherited, and which still belongs to a Law. Here he formed a little religious community, something after the fashion of Little Gidding under Nicholas Ferrar. It consisted of Mr. Law himself, a Mrs. Hutcheson, widow of the M.P. for Hastings, Miss Hester Gibbon, who had sat at his feet at Putney, and the necessary household. Schools and almshouses were founded, and the care of them, and the visiting of the poor in the parish, and the constant attendance at every service in the parish church, week day

and Sunday, formed the chief occupation of Law's outer life. He died at King's Cliffe, in the full assurance of faith, at Eastertide 1761.

Law's influence outside his own little sphere was of course chiefly conveyed through his pen. His first publication of any note was the famous *Letters to the Bishop of Bangor*, which were certainly the most brilliant and unanswerable of the many pieces called forth by the wearisome but very important Bangorian controversy. He took the position of a very pronounced High Churchman of the spiritual type; and he never, consciously at least, abandoned that position. He was the very last man in the world to conceal his opinions; and there was no motive for his doing so; for as a Nonjuror he was perfectly free from any restrictions except those which his own conscience laid upon him. He certainly never retracted one single syllable of what he wrote in his early life; and, being frank even to a fault, he would have done so had he found reason to change his mind. No doubt in later years his early Churchmanship was crossed by another influence which materially modified his views, but it did not alter them substantially. *The Christian Perfection* and *The Serious Call* (the most popular and influential of all his works) were simply devotional treatises of a very lofty type, and did not touch upon questions of a controversial nature. His *Case of Reason* dealt with matters on which all Christians would agree, and is notable chiefly for its masterly demolition of the arguments of the ablest of the Deistical writers, Matthew Tindal. The same may be said of his powerful *Remarks on Mandeville's Fable of the Bees*. But what are we to say of his so-called mystic works, which appeared during the last twenty years of his life? Well, in these he did undoubtedly traverse the popular theology of the eighteenth century; but we really must beg to be excused from identifying Catholic truth with the popular theology of the eighteenth century, for that was a singularly narrow, inelastic period so far as original thought was concerned, though it was lax enough in regard to practice. The Evangelical Revival did not in the least tend to widen the horizon of men's views. It awakened their spiritual consciousness, but it added nothing worth mentioning to the domain either of theology or philosophy. The lives of its leaders are edifying, but their books are quite unreadable. On the other hand, the writings of the apologists are perfectly admirable in their way; but, from the nature of the case, and perhaps also from the constitution of the writers' own

minds, they are not very suggestive of original thought. In fact, the general tendency of the age was to agree with the immortal Mr. Peter Magnus: 'I am not fond of anything original. I don't like it; don't see the necessity for it.' In such an age a writer who was singularly fertile in originality would naturally be suspected and disliked. But to those who desire to find food for thought it is quite refreshing in that dreary period to come across a writer like Law amid the feebleness of the pietists and the defensive attitude of the apologists. Law combines, more than any of his contemporaries, the spirituality of the Evangelical leaders with the robustness and intellectual vigour of the school of Butler, Waterland, and Warburton. As specimens of English prose, if for no other reason, all his works deserve to be rescued from oblivion; for we have not such a superabundance of really first-rate writers of English prose that we can afford to allow even one to slip out of remembrance.

It is embarking upon a very deep and wide ocean, but we must not conclude without at least touching upon two or three salient points in Law's later teaching.

'God is Love, yea, all Love, and so all Love that nothing but Love can come from Him.' This was the fundamental axiom of Law's later theology, and he proceeded to work out the necessary deductions from it with a mind which has been well said to have been as sensitive to logic as it was to conscience. He applied his axiom to the two great doctrines of Christianity, the Fall of Man and the Redemption of Man. It materially affected his view of the Fall of Man, not, indeed, making him explain away the Scriptural account, but rather making him take that account more literally than is generally done. The possibility that man could fall, or separate himself from God, was, in Law's view, an illustration of the love of God. For how was it possible? Simply through the fact that God had bestowed on man the loving gift of a free will, thereby making him equal to the angels. And the warning about the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil was another proof of God's love. It was not an arbitrary command, nor yet a trial of faith and obedience; but it was a loving intimation of the necessary consequences of his exercising the divine gift of free-will. 'In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.' This, again, was not a threat of punishment, but a loving disclosure of the inevitable result of his abuse of his free-will. And Law took the text quite literally. He could not be content with what he considered a gloss upon the words 'thou shalt surely die' as meaning

'thou shalt be subject to death.' No! in the very day that man should eat thereof he should surely die—die to the life of God that was in him—only exist in his earthly, bestial nature. This was man's Fall. How was his Redemption to be accomplished? Simply by a revival of the life that was lost. 'As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive.' This was the Atonement. Law could not accept the forensic theory of the Atonement. The idea that God could not be satisfied without a costly sacrifice seemed to him inconsistent with his fundamental axiom. But the Atonement, in his sense of it, was the very pivot of his system; it was not to reconcile God to man, but to reconcile man to God. And that Atonement or Redemption—for in Law's view the two words meant the same thing—applied not only to man, but to all nature. Here again we have another instance of Law's literal interpretation of Holy Scripture. 'Cursed is the ground for thy sake; thorns and thistles shall it bring forth unto thee.'

'When you see earth and stones, storms and tempests, and every kind of evil, misery, and wickedness, you see that which Christ came into the world to remove, and not only to give a new birth to fallen man, but also to deliver all outward nature from its present vanity and evil, and set it again in its first heavenly state.'¹

It is impossible to follow Law, within our limits, through all his speculations, some of them wild and fanciful, but all pious and beautiful. It must suffice to quote one passage in which he sums up what he believes to be the true doctrine of the Atonement—that is, the gist of Christianity:

'The whole truth of the matter is plainly this: Christ given *for us* is neither more nor less than Christ given *into us*. And He is in no other sense our full, perfect, and sufficient Atonement than as His nature and spirit are born and formed in us, which so purge us from our sins that we are thereby in Him, and by Him dwelling in us, become new creatures, having our conversation in heaven. As Adam is truly our *defilement* and *impurity* by his birth in us, so Christ is our *Atonement* and *Purification* by our being born again of Him, and having thereby quickened and revived in us that first Divine life which was extinguished in Adam; and therefore, as Adam *purchased* death for us, just so, in the same manner, in the same degree, and in the same sense, Christ *purchases* life for us; and each of them solely by their *own inward life within us*.'²

Law's eschatology is a question which must not be entirely unnoticed; but it must be treated delicately, because it was a question on which he was very reticent. He felt so

¹ 'Spirit of Love,' *Works*, viii. 21.

² *Ibid.* viii. 99.

vividly the evils and the direful consequences of sin that he shrank from writing anything which could by any possibility tend to palliate those evils, or make men dread less those consequences; but there is no doubt that his intense conviction of the all-powerful love of God led him to hope that the restoration of all things would be at last accomplished. This was the subject of his last conversation with an intimate friend on the Easter Day just before his death, 'when,' says that friend, 'he spoke like an angel.' He believed most fully in the 'everlasting burnings,' but he thought those fires were purgative rather than punitive fires. In other words, he believed, not in 'the Romish doctrine concerning purgatory, pardons, &c.,' but certainly in a purgatory which would finally purify all created nature.

This leads us to consider his attitude towards the Church of Rome. He never had the slightest inclination to join that Church, but he regarded it with much less abhorrence than the average Englishman of the eighteenth century did. His *Letters to a Lady Inclined to Enter the Church of Rome* (1731-1732), which are singularly interesting and suggestive, are a proof of this. We are, by the way, in a position to state as an absolute fact that the lady was Miss Dodwell, daughter of the famous Nonjuror. Some have thought it was a Miss Lee; but it is, we trust, no breach of confidence to say that the original letters, in Law's own handwriting, are now in the possession of one who inherited all the letters received by Miss Dodwell. Law found some of his most valued 'spiritual writers,' as he always termed the mystics, in the Roman Church, and he expresses his surprise that it should be so in this fine passage:

'O my God, how shall I unlock this mystery of things? In the land of darkness, overrun with superstition, where Divine Worship seems to be all show and ceremony, there, both among priests and people, Thou hast those who are fired with the pure love of Thee, who renounce everything for Thee, who think of nothing, write of nothing, desire nothing but the Honour, and Praise, and Adoration that is due to Thee, and who call all the world to the maxims of the Gospel, the Holiness and Perfection of the Life of Christ! But in the regions where Light is sprung up, whence Superstition is fled, where all that is outward in Religion seems to be pruned, dressed, and put in its true order, there a cleansed shell, a whited sepulchre, seems too generally to cover a dead Christianity.'¹

It will be seen that it was simply the spirituality of these writers and the supreme importance they attached to the 'vie

¹ 'Appeal to All that Doubt,' &c., *Works*, vi. (2), 283.

intérieure,' not their distinctively Roman tenets, that attracted Law. In fact, a want of spirituality was the one thing that Law abhorred. Mandeville's cynical theory that private vices were public benefits, Trapp's alarm about the danger of being righteous over much, Hoadly's grovelling conception of the Holy Eucharist, Tindal's exaltation of reason at the expense of Revelation, Warburton's whimsical proof of the Divine Legation of Moses from the fact that a Future State was ignored in the Mosaic system—these were the sort of ideas against which he felt it necessary to utter his emphatic protest. On the other hand, he never wrote against the Methodists and Evangelists, though they violently disagreed with him, and certainly laid themselves open to his attacks.¹ The *Dialogue between a Methodist and a Churchman*—Law himself, of course, playing the part of the Churchman—is an apparent, but not a real, exception to this rule; for he wrote this dialogue simply against Calvinism, which by its theory of election and reprobation seemed to contradict his cardinal doctrine that 'God is Love—yea, all Love,' &c.

Whether Law will ever become a popular writer we greatly doubt; but it is a hopeful sign, both of the spiritual and the intellectual tendency of the age, that he is now attracting the amount of attention which he appears to be. It is impossible to enter into the spirit of any of his writings, whether in the earlier or the later stage of his development, without receiving both a mental and a spiritual stimulus which must be most wholesome.

ART. XII.—THE PARISH COUNCILS BILL.

The Local Government (England and Wales) Bill, 1893.

THE Ministerial measure designed 'to make further provision for Local Government in England and Wales' is one so certainly important in its aims, and so probably far-reaching in its effects, that we make no apology for inviting our readers

¹ How he *would* have written about them may be judged by some characteristically caustic remarks he made to his friends. He described John Wesley's attack on his mysticism as 'a juvenile composition of emptiness and pertness unworthy of a man who has been serious half a twelvemonth.' About Hervey's *Theron and Aspasio* he writes privately, 'You tell me, my friend, that the seraphic Aspasio is quite transported with the thought of the imputation of Christ's righteousness to the sinner. It may be so. Transport seems to be as natural to Aspasio as flying is to a bird. My friend, let any old woman preach to you rather than these doctors.'

to consider both as citizens and as Churchmen the circumstances of its introduction and the scope of its operation. And the Bill demands the more careful study in view of the fact that it stands for second reading on the reassembling of the House of Commons not many days hence.

That some such Bill might naturally have been looked for was a foregone conclusion, independent of the last General Election. Parish councils have been for several years a leading feature in the Liberal programme. And, to some extent, a scheme of local self-government in rural districts is the natural development of the policy embodied in the Local Government Act, 1888,¹ passed under Conservative auspices. That Act may be broadly described as having municipalized the counties. The county administration had theretofore been in the hands of the justices of the peace assembled in quarter sessions. The justices were Crown nominees, practically appointed on the recommendation of the Lords-Lieutenant of the various counties. The Act of 1888 transferred the bulk of their administrative, as distinguished from judicial, functions to the newly-constituted county councils. These councils are, in their main lines, framed on the model of the reformed municipal corporations. The chairman of the county council, the county aldermen, and county councillors correspond, with some minor differences, to the mayor, aldermen, and councillors of a borough. In particular, the aldermanic system, which has been always rather a 'red rag' to the extreme school of reformers, was advisedly reproduced in the county councils. The councillors in counties as well as in boroughs are the direct representatives of the rate-payers constituting the electorate, and are elected for a term of three years. To these bodies, then, the administration of county affairs throughout England and Wales was deliberately committed five years ago. The essential difference, however, between town and country conditions is of such a potent and permanent nature as to defy any attempted assimilation by the Legislature. Parliament, it has been said, is omnipotent, with the single exception that it is powerless to turn a woman into a man or a man into a woman. We should be disposed to add the limitation that Parliament cannot turn country into town. Indeed, it would be most unfortunate if it could. 'God made the country, and man made the town.' Urban and rural districts are so diverse, that it is impracticable, as we believe it to be also undesirable, to treat a county as a borough. The borough being circumscribed and com-

¹ 51 & 52 Vict. c. 41.

fact, its needs will always be homogeneous; the county, contrariwise, is a collection of scattered village communities, too widely separated by distance, and too essentially distinct in character and requirements, to allow of united action or uniform treatment. The Jews had more dealings with the Samaritans than the hop-growers around Farnham have with the Thames-side rustics of Surrey, or the Dean Forest miners with the agriculturists of North-east Gloucestershire. The force of circumstances necessitates some mode whereby each village community can govern itself. The assembly known as the parish vestry has been from time immemorial the village parliament. The inhabitants 'paying lot and scot' (or, in its modern equivalent, rated for the relief of the poor) were accustomed to meet in the vestry-room of their parish church for the transaction of parochial affairs, civil as well as ecclesiastical. The assembly itself gradually acquired the name of its place of meeting, and came to be spoken of as the vestry. The parson¹ of the parish was naturally the official head of the vestry, and occupied the chair by right. Any other chairman must be elected *ad hoc*. Next to the incumbent were the churchwardens, nominated at the vestry, but admitted by the ordinary, the principal lay officers of the parish for all purposes, and not merely the custodians of the fabric and finances of the church. Voting in vestry was by show of hands, but on the demand of any ratepayer a poll must be taken. On a poll there was a scale of plural voting, by which a ratepayer might have from one to six votes according to the amount of his rateability. Open voting was the rule, not the ballot. This picturesque and time-honoured body has regulated the rural parish from the time of legal memory. Its functions may be transferred to the parish council, but its essential qualities will survive in the parish meeting. The chairmanship of the incumbent and the admixture of ecclesiastical affairs are the principal marks uniting the vestry in civil parishes of to-day with the Church. To say that the clergy dominated the vestries is quite wide of the truth. Still the clergy, especially the country clergy, are not always the best men of business, and their pervading influence in the civil affairs of the parish is not a universal desideratum. The

¹ 'Parson' (*persona*) in its original legal signification is the exclusive title of a rector. In a secondary sense it may be not improperly applied as above to any incumbent, whether rector, vicar, or perpetual curate. It is an honourable title in either case. Its colloquial, *quasi*-contemptuous application to ministers of all denominations is unwarrantable. The common phrase 'a Methodist parson' is a contradiction in terms as well as a barbarism.

presence, too, of Dissenters at a parish vestry, having equal rights with Churchmen in matters purely ecclesiastical, is too high a price to pay in exchange for a certain traditional prestige in things secular.¹ And so, though the Church as a whole would hardly urge of herself the snapping of an historical link to the State, she may well look on with equanimity when the task is undertaken as a part of the evolution of nineteenth-century politics. Her main care must be that the process involves no damage to her sacred duty—a duty to her sons and daughters of the past no less than of the present and future.

The ancient common law authorities for regulation of civil affairs in rural districts were thus the justices in quarter sessions as regards the counties at large, and the parish vestries as regards the several civil parishes. Between these two, however, stand several intermediate authorities. Chief amongst them are the boards of guardians, who, originally charged with the poor law administration, have, under the Public Health Act, 1875,² become constituted the rural sanitary authorities for their respective unions. We have seen that the administrative duties of the quarter sessions have been transferred to the county councils. To supersede the rural vestries, and what we have called the intermediate authorities, by parish and district councils respectively, we may take to be the *raison d'être* of the Bill under discussion.

We have so far tried to clear the ground for a survey of the principal features of the Bill. It was introduced by Mr. Fowler, the President of the Local Government Board, on March 21 last, who expressed the intention of the framers in these clear and unambiguous terms: 'We draw a broad dividing-line between civil and ecclesiastical matters. We do not touch the parish in its ecclesiastical aspect at all; we do not interfere with its ecclesiastical functions or powers.'³ An excellent keynote to strike, and one from which it might be concluded that the provisions of the Bill were set in the same strain. But we must not anticipate.

To turn to the Bill itself. In addition to the name of

¹ It must not be assumed that the Bill under consideration removes this injustice, which it might be expected to do, if only as a *quid pro quo*. On the contrary, it leaves the parish vestry in full vigour as regards the 'affairs of the church.' And, by inference, it introduces the anomaly that in civil parishes churchwardens, who are to be stripped of all civil duties and to become purely ecclesiastical officers, will be elected by the parish at large, and not by the portion of the parish assigned to the mother Church for ecclesiastical purposes.

² 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55.

³ *Times*, March 22, 1893.

Mr. Fowler, the Bill is 'backed,' in parliamentary language, by those of Mr. Asquith, the Home Secretary; of Mr. Acland, the Vice-President of the Council; of Mr. Shaw Lefevre, the First Commissioner of Works; and of Sir Walter Foster, the Parliamentary Secretary of the Local Government Board.

Part I. constitutes a parish meeting for every rural parish (that is, a parish in a rural sanitary district), and a parish council for every rural parish having three hundred or more inhabitants by the census of 1891. Rural parishes of less than three hundred inhabitants are to be grouped with some other parish, and the group is to be a parish for the purposes of the Bill, with parish meeting and council.¹ The parish meeting is to consist of all the parochial electors—*i.e.* those on either the local government or the parliamentary register for the parish. There is no plurality of voting at the meeting. The meeting is to assemble at least once a year, and proceedings are to begin between 6 and 8 P.M. A poll consequent on a parish meeting is to be by ballot. The parish council is constituted of a chairman and such number, from five to fifteen, of councillors as may be fixed by the county council.² Parish councillors are to be elected annually on April 15 by the parochial electors. By clause 5 the power and duty of appointing overseers of the poor is vested in the parish council, the churchwardens cease to be overseers, and the legal interest in all property vested either in the overseers or in the churchwardens and overseers of a rural parish 'other than property connected with the affairs of the church' is to vest in the parish council subject to the trusts affecting the same. Clause 6 transfers to the parish council, *inter alia*, the powers, duties, and liabilities of the vestry 'except so far as relates to the affairs of the church,' and the powers, duties, and liabilities of the churchwardens 'except so far as they relate to the affairs of the church or to ecclesiastical charities.' The con-

¹ It does not seem to be provided that the parish of less than the prescribed population shall be grouped with some *contiguous* parish. Nor does there appear to be any provision for limiting the benefit of charities, confined by the founder to the parish so grouped, to that parish. On the contrary, the grouped parishes are apparently to constitute a parish for all purposes of the Bill.

² It seems that the chairman is not necessarily included in this number of elective councillors. Clause 3, subsection (1), runs: 'The parish council shall consist of a chairman and councillors, and the number of councillors shall be' as stated above. Subsection (7) provides that the parish council shall elect 'from their own body or otherwise' a chairman. The Municipal Corporations Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 50), s. 15, conferred a power on the council of a borough to elect as mayor a person qualified to be, though not actually, a member of the council.

tents of clause 13, subsections (1), (2), and (3), are so important that we reprint them *in extenso* :

'13.—(1) Where trustees hold any property for the purposes of a public recreation-ground or of public meetings, or of allotments for the benefit of the poor of a rural parish, whether under Inclosure Acts or otherwise, or for any like public purpose connected with a rural parish, they may, with the approval of the Charity Commissioners, transfer the property to the parish council of the parish, and if the parish council accept the transfer they shall hold the property on the trusts and subject to the conditions on which the trustees held the same, or on such other trusts and subject to such other conditions as may be agreed on between the trustees and the parish council with the approval of the Charity Commissioners.

'(2) Where the overseers of a rural parish, or some of them, are, either alone or jointly with any other persons, trustees of any parochial charity, such number of the councillors of the parish, not exceeding the number of the overseer trustees, as the council may appoint, shall be trustees in their place, and, when the charity is not an ecclesiastical charity, this enactment shall apply as if the churchwardens were specified therein as well as the overseers.

'(3) Where the vestry of a rural parish are entitled, under the trusts of a charity other than an ecclesiastical charity, to appoint any trustees or beneficiaries of the charity, the appointment shall be made by the parish council of the parish.'

We shall return later to the consideration of these provisions.

Part II. of the Bill deals with guardians and district councils. The mode and time of the election of guardians is altered. The functions of urban and rural sanitary authorities are to be transferred to district councils. In the case of urban districts being boroughs the change will be one of name merely, the municipal corporation purporting to act as the urban district council instead of as the urban sanitary authority. The chairman of a district council is to be an *ex-officio* justice of the peace for the county. In the case of urban districts not being boroughs, the mode of election of councillors is regulated, and, in particular, the champions of women's rights seem to have got a foothold here, for 'every person, male or female, shall be qualified to be elected and be a councillor.'¹ In rural districts the district councillors are to be the guardians, and 'guardians as such shall not be elected.' These last words look rather like an Irish

¹ We see nothing in the Bill to prevent a woman, if elected a district councillor, from being elected "chairman" of the district council, and so becoming an *ex-officio* justice of the peace for the county under clause 21. If we are to have lady magistrates some more direct mode of enactment is at least desirable.

bull, seeing that the Bill has already made elaborate provisions for the election of 'guardians.' Parts III., IV., and V., entitled respectively 'Areas and Boundaries,' 'Supplemental,' and 'Transitory Provisions,' call for no special notice here, with the exception of clause 58, the interpretation clause, that most material part of a modern Act, by which some expression of clear or ambiguous meaning is often either extended or restricted in a most arbitrary and unexpected manner. We select the following definitions as bearing upon some comments we shall have to make :

'The expression "trustees" includes persons administering or managing any charity or recreation-ground, or other property or thing in relation to which the word is used.

'The expression "ecclesiastical charity" means a charity the income whereof is either wholly or partly applicable for any spiritual purpose which is now a legal purpose, or for the benefit of any spiritual person as such, or for the erection, maintenance, or repair of any ecclesiastical buildings, or for the maintenance of divine service therein, whether such purpose has or has not now failed.'

The Bill as a whole seems to us an honest endeavour to democratize the rural districts. There is nothing in its main ostensible purpose to which thoughtful citizens can object. Rather will they welcome any scheme for giving a generous meed of autonomy to 'the inhabitants of the villages.' We believe it will be found, however, that there is much room for criticism and amendment by experts. The provisions of the Bill seem to us to be needlessly intricate, cumbersome, and costly, particularly those relating to the district councils. If the Bill is to be persevered with in the ensuing Autumn session we should not be surprised if Part II. has to be dropped for the time.¹ The creation of district councils is really matter for separate legislation. The parochial scheme is the *crux* of the Bill, and the popular instinct has already fastened on the parish councils as giving the Bill its colloquial title. We have, as citizens, no objection to the main lines of the Bill regarded as a measure of civil parochial government.

¹ The more natural course would be to proceed with the district councils scheme first.

'Freedom broadens slowly down
From precedent to precedent.'

District councils would come in logical sequence to county councils, and would be the connecting link between county and parish councils. But, for the reasons given above, we think the parish councils would have priority if either had to be temporarily sacrificed.

As Churchmen, however, we have to inquire whether the promised 'broad dividing-line between civil and ecclesiastical matters' has been actually drawn, because, unless this is done, no amount of friendly professions, or even intentions, on the part of the framers will avail. And it is here, we must at once confess, that we approach the most vulnerable portion of the Bill, and one which, unless speedily rectified, will hopelessly alienate the great body of Church opinion, in other respects well disposed towards the Bill, and will certainly tend to jeopardize the passing of the Bill in any shape. There is something intolerable and repulsive to the English mind in the stealthy, hole-and-corner mode of settling vexed questions. Let everything be open and above board. If it be intended that endowments of land or money given by the forethought of past generations for pious purposes are to be diverted from those purposes and placed under alien management, let us at least have a clear issue to meet, and let the battle be fought out in the light of day. We are far from saying that the promoters of the present Bill have any such intention, and, in view of Mr. Fowler's explicit disclaimer, it would be imputing to him, and indeed to the Cabinet generally, a degree of bad faith which, for the credit of English political life, we should be sorry to attribute to any body of Ministers. But legal experience shows that a careless draughtsman, especially if his efforts are seconded by a clever judge, may often make an Act of Parliament do very much more or very much less than that nebulous creation, the mind of the Legislature, at all anticipated. So we may be pardoned if we prefer to see the 'broad dividing-line' made a little more visible to the naked eye. The first point that strikes us is the want of a clear definition of the phrase 'affairs of the church.' Archdeacon Sinclair has an interesting criticism on this head¹:

"Affairs of the Church" is a phrase which, unless defined, might quite possibly receive legally a perfectly fallacious interpretation. Every religious body has three main aspects in its work: (1) matters of worship; (2) matters of education; (3) matters of philanthropy. Matters of worship are in reality subsidiary to the other two; they exist in order to produce religious education and philanthropy. Unfortunately, the word "Church" is used in two senses: (1) the building in which the religious body worships; (2) the body itself. It does not need to be said that the second is infinitely the more important meaning. But in a court of law a tribunal of narrow views and secularistic tendency might conceivably choose, under the cover of

¹ *Review of the Churches*, September 1893.

the fallacy of ambiguity, to say that the word "Church" meant the building and the concerns of its worship, not the body and the concerns of its activities. It is probable that Mr. Fowler, in introducing the Bill, intended to use the words "Church" and "ecclesiastical" in their full sense as implying the affairs of the whole body, as in the phrase "Church of England," "Church of London," "Church of Gloucestershire."

'What is needed is that those who drafted and those who have charge of the Bill should realise that "the affairs of a Church" do not mean merely the concerns of its public worship, but that the two great duties of the education of its members and philanthropy are no less important provinces in its sphere.'

Whether the Archdeacon is correct in his surmise as to Mr. Fowler's intention or not we cannot say, but we hazard the opinion that the words 'affairs of the church' (spelt, be it observed, with a small initial 'c'), occurring in an exception to an enabling act, would receive the most restricted construction in the Courts, and would probably be judicially interpreted to signify merely affairs relating to the fabric and services of the particular parish church in respect of which the vestry and churchwardens had powers and duties.

We have already quoted the proposed definition of 'ecclesiastical charity.' This appears from a marginal reference in the print of the Bill to be founded on a definition of the same words in section 5 of the City of London Parochial Charities Act, 1883.¹ But, as Chancellor Dibdin points out in an excellent letter,² the City charities are all ancient and applicable to a state of things which has entirely passed away, there being now practically no resident population. In the same letter the Chancellor well comments on the proposed definition, and the consequent effects of clauses 6 and 13 :

'A "spiritual purpose" is vague, but probably would be held to cover a charity to provide for a special sermon or anniversary service, or some other distinctly religious object. Apart from this, "ecclesiastical charity" is practically restricted to endowments of the clergy and trusts for church building, repair, and maintenance. Every other sort of Church charity comes under the operation of the Bill.

'Churchmen can best appreciate what this involves by considering the effect of the Bill in regard to particular cases, and I give three, all charities of first-rate importance :

'1. Elementary Church schools are very frequently indeed so constituted that the churchwardens are *ex-officio* managers. It seems clear that in all such cases the Bill would substitute parish councillors for the churchwardens.

¹ 46 & 47 Vict. c. 36.

² *Times*, August 31, 1893.

'Thus the long controversy as to the direct representation of the ratepayers in the management of State-aided Church schools would be settled, and settled adversely to the views of the majority of Churchmen, by a few words thrown into an unobserved corner of an Act of Parliament directed to an entirely different subject.

'2. Parish rooms.—These most modern of Church endowments have been created by the efforts of the clergy, with money given by Churchmen, to meet the needs which the great development of Church work in the last generation has produced. The trusts are usually very comprehensive. The churchwardens are certainly very often, it would probably be accurate to say usually, *ex-officio* trustees. It would be extremely difficult, I fear, to bring most parish rooms within the narrow exemption stated above. But if not, these parochial charities (for they are all charities in the legal sense) would pass, to a greater or less extent, under the control of the parish council, a result which, I suppose, even the Liberation Society would hesitate to defend.

'3. Dole charities.—I need not remind your readers of the vast number and general distribution throughout England of these charities, nearly all of which are post-Reformation. They represent the Church's endowments in trust for the poor. This particular form of charity does not greatly commend itself to modern ideas, although there is much sound wisdom in a remark which the Archbishop of Canterbury made the other day at his Diocesan Conference, that the failure of doles is, more often than not, due to a lack of tact in their administration. But we have not got to consider the abolition of doles, and the Charity Commissioners have ample powers to guard against abuses. The question is whether the Church officers whom the founder, being desirous to establish not merely a charity but a Church charity, appointed as his almoners are to be displaced in order that the secular control of the parish council may be substituted. That is the effect of the Bill. For myself I object to the seizure by the State of Church property held in trust for the poor as strongly as to other forms of disendowment.

Mr. Dibdin's view, so far as we know, has never been contradicted, and it remains on record as the opinion of an admittedly competent expert on the probable working of the Bill as drawn.

The only approach to a challenge has been a vague statement in the public press that the Government are advised by their law officers that 'ecclesiastical charities' are exempt from the operation of the Bill. In vain is this net spread for us. We do not require the authority of the Attorney or Solicitor General to convince us that an 'ecclesiastical charity,' as defined in clause 58, is, by the terms of the Bill, expressly exempted. But we have too much faith in the professional acquirements of both Sir Charles Russell and Sir John Rigby to attribute to either of them the deliberate opinion that, as a

matter of law, a churchwarden's position as trustee or manager of national schools, parish rooms, and dole charities, would be unaffected by the Bill as drawn. Their views will be awaited with interest in the debate on the second reading. In any case, we have a right to insist that the matter be put beyond the domain of reasonable doubt.

The recent remarks of Lord Cross at the Carlisle Diocesan Conference were especially timely and interesting, as showing the view taken by a peer of cabinet standing—a view likely to be shared on the Conservative benches in the House of Lords. We are glad to think that there is little prospect of opposition to the main principle of the Bill. We are equally glad to know that Churchmen are being gradually roused to a sense of the danger underlying the Bill in its present shape.

The *Record* newspaper has, last month, in a series of articles and statistics, shown the extent of the danger. By so doing it has laid Churchmen under signal obligations, which, we will not say in spite of, but rather in consequence of, past divergences of view, we have unfeigned pleasure in here acknowledging. We regard it as a specially hopeful sign of the times that in these days of stress and storm, of restless change and activity, the thoughtful minds within our Church are being drawn closer together. A covert and disingenuous attack—in fact, if not in intention—lurks within the folds of this Bill, and we believe it will be found that Churchmen, sinking their minor domestic differences, are prepared to ward it off at all costs.

An open scheme of disestablishment and disendowment all along the line would, in the opinion of many, be preferable to the partial, irritating, sidewind course set on foot by the Bill in its present form. The Welsh dioceses, as in some respects the weakest part of the English Church, have been selected for preliminary attack. So, in the rural parishes, the Church is felt not to be so strong as in the towns, and therefore she may be safely plundered there under cover of breaking down the influence of the squire and the parson in things civil. The leading Liberal journal, the *Daily News*, has given a commission to its Special Correspondent to rake up every little piece of local tittle-tattle against the rural clergy. The series of readable and racy letters which has resulted from his pen only proves how hard it is to make bricks without straw. Still, the attempt has been made, and that fact, we fear, shows that, whatever the original intention of Ministers, an unscrupulous party behind them are trying to press forward a professedly secular Bill to the detriment of

the Church. She may well exclaim, 'It is not an open enemy that hath done me this dishonour.' The most 'familiar friend' may be led into strange company by political exigencies, and 'evil communications corrupt good manners.' If our diagnosis prove unfounded we will gladly cry *peccavimus*. If Ministers meet the House with their Bill weeded of its objectionable provisions, or with those provisions so modified as to make it clear that they can have no oppressive effect, we shall bid them go on and prosper with their Bill. If, on the other hand, they make no sign, we shall conclude that our worst apprehensions have been justified, and we trust that the challenge thus thrown down will be taken up unhesitatingly. In either case, we shall not have written in vain.

NOTE.—As we go to press we observe with satisfaction that the general tone of the Church Congress towards the Bill, both in the President's Address and in the discussion on the following day, was one suggestive, not of opposition, but of amendment.—See *Times*, October 4 and 5, 1893.

SHORT NOTICES.

Cambridge Companion to the Bible. (Cambridge University Press, 1893.)

THIS long-expected book has at last made its appearance. It is far more elaborate and complete than any of its predecessors, and will, on the whole, be found to be a most valuable help to all who desire to understand the Bible themselves, or to explain it to others. It contains articles on the structure of the Bible, and on its limits and growth, by Professor Ryle: to which the Bishop of Durham adds a learned Appendix on the Sacred Books of other faiths. Dr. Sinker deals with the preservation of the Text and with the ancient translations of the Bible. Dr. Moulton writes on the English translations. The Rev. J. O. F. Murray handles the Textual Criticism of the New Testament. The Bishop of Worcester, Professor Lumby, Dr. Charles Taylor, Dr. A. B. Davidson, and the Rev. J. O. F. Murray write the Introductions to particular books, and Professor Ryle gives a short Introduction to the several books of the Apocrypha. The Rev. A. Carr writes the history of the Old and New Testament, Professor J. Armitage Robinson that of the Apostolic age, Professor Stanton a history of the progress of Revelation and the Messianic Hope, and there are two most valuable Appendices on the history of the Nations surrounding Israel and on the Jewish people, the Roman Empire, and the Greek World in the Apostolic age, written respectively, and most ably, by Professors Robertson Smith and Gwatkin. Professor Lumby writes on the difficult question of Bible chronology, and in the article

on Bible antiquities deals with military affairs and literature. Dr. F. Watson deals with the religious observances and the political and judicial institutions of Israel, as well as with the schools of the prophets. Mr. Awdry takes the domestic and social ordinances and customs. Mr. Bevan takes the Arts mentioned in the Bible, the divisions of time, as well as weights, measures, and coinage. The physical, political, and historical geography of the Holy Land, as well as its geology and climate, are entrusted to Professor Bonney, than whom no man is more capable of dealing with them. Mr. Houghton takes Bible Zoology and Botany. Professor Skeat, who is *facile princeps* in his own line, undertakes the glossary. The indices of proper names and of subjects have been given to Mr. Chapman and Mr. Lias, of Emmanuel College, while Mr. Lord is responsible for the concordance.

This brief account will show that the various portions of the *Companion* have been placed in competent hands, and the manner in which the work has been executed, on the whole, is worthy of high praise. It is almost invidious to particularize, when the work has been so well done. But we must confess to have been specially struck with the Bishop of Worcester's analysis of what he terms the 'Hexateuch,' Dr. Taylor's sketch of the poetical books, and Mr. Murray's clear and able analysis of the Epistles, Professor Stanton's sketch of the growth of religious ideas in Israel (in which, however, we are convinced he attaches too much importance to the so-called higher criticism), and Dr. Watson's exposition of the religious and political institutions of Israel. The Bishop of Durham's paper on other ancient religions, as well as Dr. Moulton's account of the English translations of the Bible, strike us as a trifle too academical. The first gives a somewhat meagre outline of the contents of the books in which the other religions of the world have come down to us, together with very detailed accounts of the sources from whence further information is to be obtained. But there is scarcely a word on the point which would be most useful to the class of students for which the *Companion* is designed—namely, the characteristics in which the various religions differ from revealed religion and from each other. The Bishop, it is true, tells us that the non-Christian religions are unhistorical, retrogressive, and partial, and so far so good. But on their theology and anthropology, and the similarity or dissimilarity of their utterances to one another and to the teaching of the Bible on these important points, we are left without any information whatever. And these, we venture to think, are just the points on which information would be most interesting and valuable. We are surprised, too, that, in his references to recent works on Buddhism, the Bishop of Durham makes no allusion to the *Buddhism Primitive and Present* of his brother Bishop Copleston, of Colombo. Dr. Moulton's contribution is of a similar type. He gives valuable details as to the work of the principal translators of the Bible. But there is not a word about that which stamps Tyndale as the *corypheus* of them all, in that he has set the example to all future translators of an idiomatic force, a musical ring, which has

made the English Bible one of the wonders of the world. This characteristic of Tyndale's translation, we may observe, is duly remarked upon in the Oxford *Helps*, noticed below.

It were to be wished, too, that the new criticism had not intruded itself so pointedly upon our notice. The value of the *Companion* is considerably diminished in our eyes by its acceptance, in some parts, of critical conclusions which, after having been far too readily accepted for a brief moment, are already beginning to be discredited, and are destined, in our belief, ultimately to disappear. Professor Ryle is the chief offender in this respect, though Professor Stanton, as we have already indicated, makes needless concessions to theories which, in the nature of things, cannot possibly be proved, and may probably, in the end, be shown to be utterly baseless. Professor Ryle's statements, moreover, are not in accordance with those of other writers in the *Companion*. Indeed, it is somewhat difficult to make them agree with one another, or with those of the books on which he is writing. Thus he states (p. 4) that 'in the early periods of the history of the chosen people there is no evidence of any special appeal to the authority possessed by writings.' No doubt this is true, if we grant that Deuteronomy is not earlier than the time of Josiah. But this is to assume what needs first to be very conclusively proved. The Bishop of Worcester, at least as competent a judge as Professor Ryle, writes on p. 39 that 'there are serious difficulties in the way of this theory.' Dr. Sinker, too, says (p. 22) that 'the written word was withdrawn for a time,' after Hezekiah's death. The Bishop of Worcester continues, 'The writer or redactor of the book distinctly asserts that Moses is the author of the legislation, and that he provided for its custody (xxx. 24-26) and transmission.' And the author of Deuteronomy, whoever he may be, 'distinctly asserts' something more. He 'distinctly asserts' that the law was written (Deut. xxxi. 9), and that Moses wrote it. The fragment of the Pentateuch known as 'JE,' acknowledged by the critics at present in fashion to be the oldest written document that has come down to us, makes precisely the same statement in Exod. xxiv. 4. It seems to us that it is hardly fair for Professor Ryle to make unproved assertions of this definite kind in a volume such as that of which we are writing, when such assertions are contrary to the opinion of competent scholars in his own Church and University, to say nothing of their being opposed to the direct statements of what are admitted on all hands to be the oldest Hebrew documents which have come down to us. Professor Ryle, it is true, does not commit himself to any precise theory about the period when Deuteronomy was written. But the earlier the date of Deuteronomy, the earlier the statement of an historic document that the Jews *did* rely on 'the authority possessed by writings.' Dr. Sinker (p. 22), moreover, points to Exod. xvii. 14, Deut. xxxi. 26, Josh. xxiv. 26, and 1 Sam. x. 25, in proof of the opposite view to that adopted by Professor Ryle. He might also have referred to Josh. i. 8, 9. It is quite true that this is supposed by some to be from the hand of the Deuteronomic redactor. But we must repeat that, in the present condition of our knowledge, it is absolutely impossible to *prove* that

such is the case. And, therefore, we cannot withhold our protest against treating these assumptions as established facts, especially when we consider the class of persons for whom the *Companion* is intended. Dr. Lumby is so free from any bias of this kind himself, that it is still more surprising that he has permitted it to dominate any portion of the volume for which he is responsible. Professor Gwatkin, we may add—whose reputation as an historical scholar and critic stands very high—insists repeatedly and emphatically in his essay on the fact that after the exile the Law was visibly growing old.

Professor Ryle, again, asserts that the reference to the Law in Is. i. 10, ii. 3; Hos. iv. 6, viii. 1; Amos ii. 4; Mic. iv. 2, refer, not to 'a written code, but to the oral instruction of priest and prophet.' He adds, 'that this oral instruction was committed to writing no one would deny.' Then how can he possibly prove that the reference is to an oral and not a written version of the Law? If, as he admits, it existed in a written form, that would unquestionably be the authoritative form in which prophets would appeal to it, unless we are to assume—a very large assumption—that they were unable to read. Would Professor Ryle say that if a clergyman in the present day referred to the Catechism, which is orally taught by priest to people, he was referring to the 'oral instruction' given in the words of the Catechism, and not to the document itself, as it stands in the Prayer Book? Here again, too, he is contradicted by Dr. Sinker, who says (p. 22) that we have several early notices in Scripture of writings in the possession of the Israelites reputed to be sacred. Again, Professor Ryle states that the first direct citation of the Law of Moses is found in 1 Kings ii. 3. He is mistaken. The first citation occurs in Josh. viii. 31. It is true that the passage in question, like the narrative of the woman taken in adultery, is not found in the same place in all the copies, and is regarded by Meyer, De Wette, Knobel, and others, as an interpolation. But it is by no means proved that it was not written long before the First Book of Kings, and it certainly, therefore, is not open to anyone to assume the contrary.

We cannot but think it unfortunate that unproved assertions of this kind should have been introduced thus prematurely into a book for general use. When they have been conclusively established on sufficient evidence it will be time enough to call upon the religious public to accept them. At present, however, they are not only energetically disputed in many quarters, but they rest upon the *ipse dixit* of a score or so of German critics and their English disciples, and we have no security whatever that they will not be as obsolete in another quarter of a century as other theories once as loudly proclaimed and now entirely abandoned. Even the view of the Bishop of Worcester, that there are two separate narratives of the Creation embodied in Genesis, and that the narrative of the Flood was compiled from two separate narratives, though, of course, it is in itself by no means unreasonable or improbable, cannot be regarded as a demonstrated truth. This, however, is a minor matter. But statements which tend to bring down the compilation of the Law in its present

shape to a period later than the Exile, and which labour to impress the reader with the idea that Israelite religious institutions were a mass of floating tradition until the time of Josiah, are calculated to weaken the authority of the Old Testament as a trustworthy record of the Divine education of the world, and must therefore be regarded as a blemish on a work which in other respects deserves the highest commendation.

Helps to the Study of the Bible. Oxford University Press.
(London: Henry Frowde, 1893.)

THIS volume is not, like the Cambridge *Companion*, a new book, but a new edition. It has, however, been carefully revised under the editorship of Canon Maclear, Warden of St. Augustine's, Canterbury, whose name will be a guarantee to all sound Churchmen of the character of the work. Were it not that the editor is a Cambridge man, we should have said that the volume is an evidence that Oxford is at present less stiffly academic, more in touch with the outer world, than the sister University. For the type in these *Helps* is not, like the type of the Cambridge *Companion*, calculated to reduce the vision of the reader to the same condition as that of a German student, but is large and clear. The *fac-similes* of ancient MSS., statues, coins, inscriptions, and the like, with the brief descriptive letter press below, are precisely what is wanted to give life and animation to the information afforded in a volume of the kind, though it is altogether wanting in the Cambridge *Companion*. Among those who have re-written or revised the various articles are Canon Girdlestone, Canon Churton (who has revised the section on the Apocrypha), Dr. Budge, Dr. Maunde Thompson, Dr. Head, Mr. L. Fletcher, and Mr. Carruthers (all of the British Museum), and Sir John Stainer. Professor Skeat has compiled a list of obsolete or ambiguous words, and the subject-index has been re-examined. A new article has been contributed on the political condition of Judæa in the first century A.D. The summaries of the books, the summary of Old Testament history, the sections relating to Biblical Chronology, those relating to the travels of St. Paul, and that on Jewish sects and parties, have been entirely re-written. And it is most important at the present time to note that a new section has been most wisely introduced on the 'Witness of Modern Discoveries to the Old Testament Narrative.' Such a section is conspicuous by its absence from the Cambridge volume. That the section in question is compiled in no narrow or partisan spirit will be seen when it is stated that, in addition to Canon Girdlestone, the names of Dr. Rost, Librarian of the India Office, of Dr. Bezold, Dr. Budge, and Dr. Maunde Thompson are connected with this section. In the matter of maps, the palm must be given, both as regards clearness of type and finish of style, to the Cambridge *Companion*. Both volumes seem to have made some better attempt to grapple with the difficulty of defining the boundaries of the central Israelitish tribes than was the case some years ago. This may be seen by comparing the maps printed in 1880 with those which are now in vogue.

On the whole, the Cambridge *Companion* will be found of more use to the scholar, the Oxford *Helps* to the public at large. There are in the latter no minute analyses of St. Paul's Epistles, like those of Mr. Murray in the Cambridge volume; no historical sketches answering to those of Professors Robertson Smith and Gwatkin; no exhaustive articles corresponding to those of Dr. Watson on Jewish institutions. The summaries of the various books in the Oxford *Helps* are more compendious, and the whole character of the book more popular. The subject-index in the Cambridge volume seems composed on a different plan, and to contain some headings which are not to be found in the Oxford *Helps*. But the chief point in which the Oxford book is to be preferred to the Cambridge one is the wise conservatism of its attitude in regard to the vexed question of Old Testament criticism. We have already expressed our objections to the embodiment, at the present juncture, of what are termed 'the results of modern criticism' in a book intended for the general public, because we are convinced that it is at least premature to represent these conclusions as established. That the discussion of them will have a good effect in promoting a broader and freer treatment of Old Testament criticism than has hitherto been permitted, we are not concerned to deny. But we are convinced that a treatment so broad and free as to question the accuracy of Old Testament history as a whole will not only be found derogatory to the Old Testament as a teacher of religious truth, but will be found eventually to be destitute of any foundation in fact.

We therefore welcome the attitude of reserve and caution with which Old Testament criticism has been approached in the pages of the Oxford *Helps*. That it is no mere obstinate and blind conservatism will be found from the following quotation:—'This conclusion [the antiquity of the Pentateuch], however, does not oblige us to believe that Moses wrote every word of the Pentateuch, but that he was the original *compiler* from such documents as were then accessible' (p. 24). It is worth noting, by the way, that the barbarous word 'Hexateuch' never occurs in the *Helps*. We are heartily thankful for the omission. But to return. Exodus is regarded in the *Helps* as written either by Moses, or 'under his immediate direction and authority,' Leviticus and Numbers under his 'oversight' or 'supervision,' and Deuteronomy as having assumed its present form in the days of Joshua, the various books having been 'enriched with numerous notes, archæological and explanatory, from the hands of later editors and revisers.'

Whether this view can ultimately be sustained or not, it is not for us to say. But that it is the only one which can safely be put forward in the present state of the controversy, we are well assured. It stands on the ground of an ancient tradition, the accuracy of which has never been impugned until the present century. That tradition must be maintained in our public teaching until far stronger arguments and a far more general consent than any at present before us can be pleaded in favour of its abandonment. Nor have we any right to ignore the confirmation of that ancient tradition which is to

be found in the support given by the monuments to the general accuracy of the record. On the testimony of the monuments the Cambridge *Companion* is strangely and, we think, somewhat unfortunately silent. For whatever tends to confirm the accuracy of the record tends also, so far as it goes, to establish the accuracy of the tradition of its early origin. No doubt it is in the Cambridge volume that we find the strongest argument, from linguistic considerations, in favour of the traditional view. Dr. Sinker tells us¹ that 'in the earlier books of the Bible the language is found in a much higher degree of purity than in the later, into which many foreign words, especially Aramæan and Persian, entered, through the increasing intercourse with foreign nations.' But, on the whole, we must maintain that the Oxford *Helps* is the better volume for general use at present. The 'new criticism' is too new to the English mind, and is based on *criteria* altogether too uncertain to be employed with safety in so sacred a work as that of religious instruction.

The Old Testament and the New Criticism. By ALFRED BLOMFIELD, D.D., Bishop Suffragan of Colchester. (London: Elliot Stock, 1893.)

'A considerable portion' of this able and interesting volume appeared originally in the pages of the *Contemporary Review* (May and June 1892). Those two articles seem to have caused considerable irritation among the advocates of the 'Higher Criticism,' though they failed to elicit any formal or adequate reply. There were angry complaints of misrepresentation, and insinuations that their opponent was entirely ignorant on the subject with which he presumed to deal, but that was all. And yet the points to which his arguments were directed were by no means outside the province of educated men in general, and the arguments themselves were clothed in the language of a gentleman and a scholar. It is too often forgotten that the question of the genuineness of the Pentateuch does not turn upon any minute acquaintance with the peculiarities of the Hebrew and cognate tongues, but upon literary and historical investigation on principles common to every language and race. In fact, your destructive critic gives a very wide berth, as a rule, to questions of language. He is far too wise to enter upon them, for he would be confronted with the fact that there is a marked difference between the Hebrew of the post-exilic books and that of an earlier date, and that the Hebrew of the Pentateuch, while not widely different from that of the other historical books, nevertheless displays characteristics of its own which disappear in the later narratives. Professor Driver ventures further into the linguistic argument than anyone else. But even his analysis of the phraseology of the Pentateuch is by no means complete, and he steadily ignores the facts that many words found in the Hebrew Scriptures occur in the Pentateuch alone, and many others are used in the Pentateuch in a sense in which they are never used afterwards. The other critics whom we are now bidden to follow, Wellhausen,

¹ *Companion*, p. 21.

Kuenen, and Robertson Smith, scarcely enter upon the linguistic argument, but base their theories almost exclusively on historical and literary considerations. On questions like these, the Bishop of Colchester, or any other intelligent man, is as competent to form an opinion as the experts whose utterances we are commanded blindly to accept. Any person of ordinary acquaintance with literary composition is as capable as our Hebrew Professors of estimating the probability that the Hebrew histories were compiled in the slavish and patchwork fashion in which it is now the custom to represent them as being compiled. To take an instance from Professor Driver's work: it needs no special acquaintance with Hebrew to decide whether it is likely that the first twenty verses of the twelfth chapter of the book of Exodus were written by the author of the Priestly Code; whether the verses from 21 to 27 were the joint composition of Elohist and Jehovist; whether v. 28 was by the author of the Priestly Code; 29 and 30 by the Jehovist; 31-36 by the Elohist; whether 37a was taken from the Priestly Code, 37b to 39 from the Elohist, 40 to 51 from the Priestly Code. And, under the extremely improbable supposition that the narrative was so composed, it needs no very deep knowledge of Hebrew to form an opinion whether we possess sufficient data in the characteristics of style and language to be able to separate the component parts without risk of mistake. Any educated man is as capable as a Hebrew expert of judging of the *a priori* reasonableness of trusting to a process of this kind. We may go further, and assert that he is very frequently *more* capable of judging, because, unlike the expert in question, he is not blinded by devotion to a preconceived theory, or bound, like a captive, to the chariot-wheels of a fashion by which he is enthralled. The Bishop of Colchester, then, as a man of sense, is justified in expressing his opinion on a question of this kind. Still more has he a right to investigate the peculiar laws of historical evidence, invented almost exclusively for this particular branch of study, which it has pleased modern Biblical critics to lay down. And men of sense in general will be disposed to weigh his arguments, and to submit critical as well as other dogmas to the test of sober reason.

The Bishop (p. 3) modestly compares himself to one of the inferior warriors who followed in the train of the great heroes of antiquity—men whose names are forgotten, yet without whose aid the mighty deeds of the heroes would have been in vain. He insists (p. 4) that experts should make good their claims, not only to knowledge, but to common sense in the use of it. He enlarges on the shortsightedness of those excellent men who go on preaching 'peace when there is no peace,' imagining (p. 5) that the question at issue relates to the *inspiration* of the Old Testament Scriptures, instead of to their veracity and credibility. He disputes, as we have already disputed, the possibility of arriving at any certainty on the results of an analysis so minute as that to which Professor Driver, following the German critics, has subjected narratives on the whole so intelligible and coherent as the histories in the Pentateuch. And he illustrates his position by a reference to the joint work of men like Beaumont

and Fletcher, in whose case the critics differ even as to the large evidences of separate authorship, and never dream of assigning an isolated sentence—or certainly not a part of a sentence—to one or other of the authors. He might have gone on to refer to the 'Two Noble Kinsmen,' in which, while the first act and the conclusion of the play are supposed by Dyce and other authorities to be by Shakespeare, other critics dismiss their contention as absurd. He might have defied the critics to point out accurately the respective authors of portions of the joint works of Dickens and Wilkie Collins, or Besant and Rice, even though in this case we have writings in our possession written separately by Dickens and Wilkie Collins, and by Besant without Rice. And if the complete accomplishment of this task be—as it most certainly is—utterly beyond the competence of the acutest critic that ever lived, even when dealing with works composed in his own language, how much more is it beyond the competency of anyone, be he never so learned or never so acute, to accomplish it in the case of a narrative written more than three thousand years ago, in a dead language, and when we not only have no other writings of the alleged contributors to judge by, but no historical evidence whatever that they ever existed at all!

The Bishop comments in a caustic vein on the proposal he has discovered in Dr. Driver's works that, 'in dealing with persons of limited education,' we should substitute, in the place of 'the Word of God,' the expression 'the Word of God mediated by a human agency.' The Bishop thinks the suggestion 'a measure of Dr. Driver's appreciation of the value of the Old and New Testaments, and of his practical acquaintance with the understanding and capacity of a rustic audience' (p. 23). He makes a passing reference to Professor Driver's practical denial to the prophets of any predictive power beyond that of shrewd and far-sighted persons in our own day, who are able to divine 'the issue,' for instance, 'of a present political complication,' and very naturally regards it as depriving their writings of their special claim on our reverent regard. The Bishop explains the contradictions in the Pentateuch on the law of tithes by the by no means unreasonable suggestion that the law was modified in the Lawgiver's mind during the passage through the wilderness. He is justifiably severe on Professor Driver for saying that if the author of Deuteronomy should have framed 'discourses appropriate to Moses' situation,' he 'would be doing nothing inconsistent with the literary usages of his age and people.' There is no evidence whatever, as the Bishop reminds us, what the 'literary usages' of that 'age' were. And there can be little doubt, we think, among straightforward men, that if the writer endeavoured to claim what would be practically Divine authority for the figments of his own brain, he would be doing what the public opinion of any 'age and people,' except, perhaps, the present generation of Englishmen, would stigmatize as dishonest.

We are elsewhere presented with a very apposite quotation from the late Bishop Lightfoot's papers on *Supernatural Religion*, which supplies a salutary caution in these times. Speaking of the character of Rabbinical learning, Bishop Lightfoot admits that the Rabbis were

'learned, painstaking, minute,' in a similar way to the 'Rabbis of neologian criticism.' But their work 'was conceived in a false vein. It was unhistorical, and therefore it could not live. *The modern negative school of criticism,*' continues Bishop Lightfoot (the italics are ours), 'seems to me equally perverse and unreal, though in a different way, and therefore I anticipate for it the same fate.' The Bishop of Colchester has done well in reminding us of this important expression of opinion. Would that such a calm, far-seeing, shrewd, and courageous mind were to be found among our great scholars now!

In pp. 54-60 we find a discussion of the new criticism, as founded on a rejection of the supernatural. This principle, whether theoretically admitted or not, is practically made the test of the credibility of a narrative. Under this system 'all the familiar figures and events of the childhood of the world disappear at once.' Moses, it is true, is spared to us. But Professor Driver 'is careful to inform us in a note, that in this rehabilitation of Moses he has the support of Wellhausen, and that the verdict of both is "supported by Kuenen." Nothing like this, surely, has been heard of since the days of the first French Revolution, when the National Assembly "decreed the existence of the Supreme Being"' (p. 60). What would have become of Moses if he had not thus been approved by Wellhausen and 'endorsed by Kuenen,' the Bishop does not 'dare to contemplate.' The criticism of the critics in pp. 76-93 is worth reading, but we cannot stop to quote from it. Surprise is not unnaturally expressed that Mr. Gore should only find 'unconscious idealising of history' in a process equivalent to 'reading back,' say, 'the first Post-communion prayer of the Anglican office in its present position into the Missal or the Breviary.' In regard to the certainty claimed for the theories at present in vogue, the Bishop says:

'Any English reader who carefully examines such a book as the *Introduction*, or still more, such a book as Dr. Cheyne's *Bampton Lectures*, and "verifies his quotations," letting in at the same time on the subject a little of the common sense which he would employ on any other subject, will soon discover for himself how slight and unsubstantial are the foundations on which much of the solid-seeming fabric of the "Higher Criticism" really rests. How forced and unreal a view it obliges us to take of many of the books of the Old Testament; how often assertion, repeated and emphasized, is made to do duty for argument; how many *lacunæ* have to be filled up by conjectures in no degree more probable than those which have sometimes been offered on the conservative or traditional side; how often a difficulty is invented or an explanation of a real difficulty rejected, simply because it is an explanation, and its acceptance involves the loss of an item in the rationalistic indictment; how impossible it is satisfactorily to fit together the pieces of the ingenious puzzle which the critics, in their theories of different documents, have invented, and which rivals in its intricate complications the mysteries of "the Rules called the Pie;" on what insufficient grounds they have reduced to incoherent fragments which have at least long been held in esteem and veneration, even independently of that "inspiration," that guidance of the Holy Spirit, which some rationalistic critics themselves admit, in a vague and general sense, for the Old Testament as a whole, while they practically deny it in detail to all its particular parts. On

those points, in which the English reader must trust to the judgment of others, he need not be afraid to set against the authority of the Oxford Professors, Dr. Driver and Dr. Cheyne, the names of Dr. Stanley Leathes, Principal Cave, and Professor Robertson at home, or Professor Green in America. Finally, with regard to the school of criticism now most prominent among Continental scholars, it is no insular prejudice, but a long experience of their arbitrary and unsound principles, which leads us to apply to them the words in which Dr. Driver has described the characteristics of some Jewish Biblical interpreters: "Jewish scholars are often exceedingly clever and learned; but they are somewhat apt to see things in a false perspective, and to build, upon superficial and accidental appearances, extravagant and far-reaching hypotheses" (pp. 131-133).

Then it is pointed out how the critics, who differ on almost every conceivable point, differ on the question of the literary characteristics of the Priestly Code. In Wellhausen's view its contents are 'indescribable pedantry.' The author has 'a passion for classifying and drawing plans.' He 'passes over' what is 'interesting.' He 'describes with minuteness' what is 'of no importance.' He confuses your mind by the multiplicity of his details. Yet the style of this very irritating, pragmatical, and confusing writer appears to another critic, Riehm, to be 'quiet, simple, and free from all rhetorical and poetical ornament,' and his expressions have a kind of 'epic uniformity.' The fact is that they very frequently occupy the place of what among ourselves would be an index, or table of contents, inserted, however, by the author in the body of his narrative, instead of being placed, as is now the fashion among ourselves, at the beginning or the end.

'What is it to us,' continues the Bishop, speaking of the conflict among the critics, 'if one writer disagrees with another as to the date of a document by a few centuries or so; as if Chaucer might be hereafter represented by one school of critics as of the same age as Tennyson? What does it matter if one dissects the books he is criticising as Izaak Walton enjoys the angler to deal with the fish, "tenderly as though he loved him," while another mangles the remains with all the bloodthirstiness of the giants Pope and Pagan in *Pilgrim's Progress*? They may be mutually left to destroy each other.'

'From north to south
Austria and France shoot in each other's mouth' (p. 137).

We are next reminded how the so-called silence of the writers of the Pentateuch is very frequently 'in part artificial,' as having been 'created by the critical separation of documents.' Even Mr. Watson regards it as 'startling' to find 'no allusion to sacrifice and altar' in the passages extracted from the 'Priestly Code.' Not one whit more startling, replies the Bishop, than to find a pack of cards without any aces, if the aces have all been 'previously and purposely removed' (p. 172). Does 'the violation of a commandment,' the Bishop proceeds to ask, in reference to another very common argument of the critics, 'imply its non-existence?' If so, what becomes of the admission, made by the vast majority of English critics, that the Ten Commandments at least were given by Moses? For they were

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systematically violated by the Israelites as a nation during the whole of their historic existence. At least, the argument cannot be applied to history in general, or we should be compelled to infer from parts of our own literature at certain periods among ourselves that there was then in this country 'no Church, no Bible, no religion, no God' (p. 177).

The critics have treated very scornfully the appeal to the common sense of the average Englishman. But it is before the tribunal of that English common sense that the question must ultimately be pleaded. Our countrymen have no doubt been slow in grasping the question which has been brought before them. But though slow, they will be found sure. Every effort to discuss the principles on which the question is to be settled is a help to the formation of a sound judgment upon it, and is to be welcomed accordingly. Therefore we wish the Bishop of Colchester's book a wide circulation, not only among the teachers of religion, but among the taught also. 'For,' as Archdeacon Watkins remarks in his 'Bampton Lectures,' 'the mere novelty which is necessary to an original essay for a young doctor's degree, or for the pages of a *Zeitschrift* waiting for the press, ingenious and interesting though it often is,' will not 'be as convincing to all readers as it is to the author.'¹ And though the appeal to common sense be scouted by Old Testament critics of the present day, it is allowed by men to whose opinion even they must pay some respect. Dr. Salmon, in his *Introduction to the New Testament* (p. 17), says of German criticism on the New Testament :

'I feel ashamed of repeating such nonsense, but it is necessary that you should know the things that are said ; for you may meet these German dreams retailed as sober truth by sceptical writers in this country, many of whom imagine that it would be a confession of inability to keep pace with the progress of critical science, if they ventured to test, by English common sense, the successive schemes by which German aspirants for fame seek to gain a reputation for ingenuity.'

And again :

'I have spent more time than you may have thought necessary in refuting an utterly baseless hypothesis ; but my excuse is that this hypothesis is treated as authentic history in almost all modern works in England, Germany, and France, which profess to give the latest results of critical science as applied to our sacred books' (p. 32).

The Bishop of Colchester asks, and we echo the inquiry, why we should be afraid to apply these words to the critics of the Old Testament. It is strange to find the conviction so universal among us that an acquaintance with the last learned, laborious, and ingenious paradoxes of a German professor is a more indubitable proof of scholarship than the most exact acquaintance with the subject-matter of the volume criticised, or the soundest views as to the methods such criticism should adopt.

¹ Watkins, 'Bampton Lectures,' pp. 170, 171.

Book by Book: Popular Studies on the Canon of Scripture. (London: Isbister and Co., 1892.)

It is proverbially impossible to please everybody; and the very fact which has been adduced by some captious critics as a defect in this book would strike most reasonable persons as its principal merit. That fact is that it has been written by different authors. For thus we gain the immense advantage that the Introduction to each class of books in the Bible has been written by one who has a special acquaintance with this subject, and therefore a special fitness for treating it. The publishers introduce it to us—and, on the whole, they have not exceeded the truth—as ‘a complete and scholarly survey of the questions affecting the Sacred Canon which have of late years caused so much anxiety.’ It originally formed the ‘Introductions to the various books of Holy Scripture in the “New Illustrated Bible.”’ Written, as it is, in an enlightened and yet conservative spirit, by competent scholars, it constitutes the best guide to perplexed souls on the subject of Biblical criticism which our recent controversies have as yet produced.

The Pentateuch falls into the very capable hands of Professor James Robertson. Those who know his *Early Religion of Israel* will know what to expect in his Introduction. The arguments in that valuable book are here very ably and briefly summarized. The Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch is not asserted, on the ground (p. 5) that it is ‘not claimed’ in the Pentateuch itself. But we are reminded that Moses *is* said to have written certain things to be found in it, and that the book of Joshua ascribes the authorship, ‘not only of a law, but of a book of the law,’ to Moses (p. 6). Professor Robertson, moreover, does not, with critics of the German school, reject the possibility of marginal notes having ultimately become embodied in the text. This, of course, would account for a good many passages of evidently later date found here and there in the narrative. The critical view is pronounced (p. 12) to be ‘revolutionary,’ on the ground that ‘the order of succession is no longer “Moses and the prophets,” but the prophets and Mosaism.’ It is rejected on the following three grounds: (1) that the principle which rejects the existence of a law on the ground of its non-observance is an unsound one; (2) that the difficulties suggested by the theory are more serious than those it professes to remove; and (3) that the whole theory depends upon the assumption of a purely natural evolution of thought, instead of the development of a germ of Divine teaching supernaturally revealed. We must not pass over one fact mentioned by the Professor—that while the Samaritan Pentateuch is identical with the Hebrew the Samaritan book of Joshua widely differs from the Hebrew, a fact which suggests a very strong argument indeed against the ‘Hexateuch’ theory.

The historical books are assigned to the same author, who in regard to the question of date does not pass over the fact that ‘in both the books of Kings there are a number of passages which speak of the kingdom of Judah as still in existence and the Temple still

standing' (p. 92), and that the 'frequently recurring formula "till this day" seems always to refer to the period before, and chiefly to the period immediately before, the Captivity.' The accusations against the books of Chronicles are dismissed as 'superficial and unjust' (p. 116). We are further reminded that 'a charge of falsifying history should not be made without very clear proof,' and that 'it is suspicious that it is brought precisely against those books which do not square with certain notions of the development of Israel's history' (p. 117). Professor Davidson deals with the poetical books, with the exception of the Psalms, which are fitly entrusted to the hands of the Bishop of Worcester. Professor Davidson treats his subject with the spirit of chastened liberality with which readers of his books are familiar. Job, according to him, is a poetical book with a substratum of fact underlying it. Ecclesiastes is probably the latest book in the Canon, and was written from the point of view Solomon might have been supposed to take of 'the dark age of Jewish history,' between 350 and 150 B.C. (p. 189). Solomon's Song is regarded as having more probably 'a northern than a Judean origin,' and the 'beloved' is supposed not to have been Solomon, but 'a youth who had won the Shulamite's affections before she had engaged the attention of the king' (pp. 195, 196). The idea, however, that any political motive underlies the book, as Professor Davidson suggests, appears quite inadmissible.

From the Bishop of Worcester we should naturally look for a defence of the Davidic origin of at least some of the earlier Psalms, and for a vindication of the Messianic character of many portions of the Psalter. And we shall not be disappointed. His discussion too of what are sometimes called 'the *cursing* psalms' is very impartial. He does not attempt to defend the expressions as they stand, but reminds us that Old Testament morality necessarily stands on a lower level than that which was revealed by Jesus Christ. He says—and here his language is a little too strong—that the psalmists 'are not influenced by *personal* hatred' (p. 168). Some of the expressions are distinctly, and not a little fiercely, personal. No doubt, as the Bishop remarks, they are 'the mouthpiece of injured innocence'; but they are none the less personal for that. On the other hand he has passed over the obvious fact that the indignation of the writer is fired by the thought that it is God's cause which is struck at through him—that his oppressors are God's enemies.

The Dean of Gloucester's contribution, which treats of Isaiah and Jeremiah, strikes us as the most disappointing in the book. Not only does he not grapple with the argument on which the theory of a second Isaiah is based—namely, (1) that the writer appears to be at Babylon; and (2) that he does not threaten Judah with captivity, but confines himself to predicting the downfall of Babylon and the release of the remnant of God's people—but there is a strain of sentimental rhetoric throughout the Dean's contribution, which strikes us as unsuited to a volume of the class to which *Book by Book* belongs. Nor is the rhetoric good of its kind. If so, such an expression as 'studiedly silent' would not find a place in it.

Professor Stanley Leathes takes Ezekiel and Daniel, and deals ably, but with commendable brevity, with his subject. He points out the true connexion of Ezekiel with Leviticus. In treating of Daniel he has been charged with ignoring altogether the argument for the spuriousness of the book derived from the occurrence in it of Greek words. It is a serious thing to ignore arguments *against* the genuineness of Scripture. Arguments *in favour* of it, or against the theories of its critics, on the contrary, may apparently be ignored whenever they are not particularly easy to answer. But Professor Leathes would probably tell us that he has passed over the argument in question, because the recently discovered Tel-el-Amarna tablets have conclusively refuted it. He has, however, brought forward one or two arguments in favour of the genuineness of Daniel which it is certainly unfair to pass over. Not only is Daniel mentioned, but his words are quoted in the First Book of Maccabees. His existence is further mentioned in Ezekiel, and as a revealer of secrets (Ezek. xxviii. 3). And the accretions found in the LXX, but absent from the Hebrew, point to the book being of a date at least some time earlier than the LXX itself.

Of Professor Elmslie's most useful work on the Minor Prophets we have no space to speak. We must pass on to the New Testament. And here we are able to say that the Gospels could not possibly have been in better hands. Professor Sanday has given us a masterly analysis of the question of the origin and authority of the Synoptic Gospels, and of the object and character of each of them; and he has done so in as few words as the subject permits. We are glad to find that Professor Sanday does not commit himself to the theory in favour with some of his brother professors, that the original form of the matter found in the three Synoptic Gospels is that which is common to all. A scholar of Professor Sanday's breadth, as well as depth, would not be likely to accept a proposition so clearly contrary to all acknowledged laws of historical criticism. St. Mark's *history*, as distinct from the other matter of his Gospel, is the fullest, not the most condensed, form of the Gospel story. And yet Professor Sanday does not doubt that in it we have the nearest approach to the original matter, of whatever sort it was, from which the portions common to the Synoptic Gospels were drawn. What that matter was we shall in all probability never know. The hypotheses that one of the writers of the Gospels copied from another, and that they extracted their matter from a common document, or that their coincidences were due to the embodiment of oral tradition—in fact, *all* the hypotheses with which scholars are familiar—have each difficulties of their own. Too much time, we may make bold to say, has been wasted on the settlement of this question. Professor Sanday, unlike critics of the dogmatic school, who ask us to accept the solution of difficulties, not on the ground of sober reason, but on the authority of great names, is content to leave it *sub judice*. We must conclude our notice of his contribution to the work by a description of the view of the Synoptic narratives to which he declares the Christian conscience to be 'slowly gravitating'—namely, that which regards them as

'in the first instance historical authorities for the acts and words of Christ, not altogether perfect and infallible authorities, fragmentary, incomplete, varying from time to time in the nature of their authentication, and embodying along with the facts something also of the conceptions of simple and unscientific minds; and yet guarded against any wide possibilities of error by the assured primitiveness of their date, bearing on their face a thousand marks which stamp them as the product of a still living and faithful tradition, and guaranteed above all by their consistent preservation of a single, unique, and commanding figure, which neither their authors nor any other hand of man could have invented' (p. 372).

There is only one thing wanting in this view—the recognition of the fact that we have in the Synoptic Gospels an *inspired* portraiture of the 'unique and commanding figure' of God 'manifest in the flesh.'

Dr. Salmon, to whom 'The Writings Ascribed to St. John' have been entrusted, has perhaps aimed at *too* much condensation. But what he *does* give us is marked by his accustomed clearness and force. He has, naturally enough, grouped St. John's Epistles and the Apocalypse with his Gospel, from which they are practically inseparable. Writing as he does for the English reader, Dr. Salmon very properly eschews topics, such as the testimony of the Fathers and textual criticism, which would be foreign to his purpose. He contents himself 'with testing by internal evidence the various points of the traditional belief.' And the result is a masterpiece which makes this introduction the gem of the volume.

Archdeacon Farrar's introduction to the Acts of the Apostles is characteristic. It is picturesque and pointed, as we should expect, but there is a trifle too much eloquence and somewhat too many notes of admiration for our taste. He is doubtless correct in defending the view that the object of St. Luke was to write an Eirënicon between the Jewish and Gentile Christians, or rather, perhaps, to show the substantial identity between the action of St. Peter and that of St. Paul in regard to the admission of the Gentiles to the Church. One can hardly expect an orator to imitate the *Sparsamkeit*, to use his own phrase, of men like Professor Sanday and Dr. Salmon. Consequently Archdeacon Farrar's contribution lacks the grave and dignified kind of eloquence contained in the extract just given from Dr. Sanday. But his matter is at least eminently readable, and on the whole to be depended upon. We are disposed, however, to wish that he had retrenched that fine passage about 'mighty iambs,' the 'fire signals of Agamemnon,' the "courier-flame" gleaming from Ida,' &c. &c., so as to have found space for a few lines describing the actual character of the infant Christian Church as depicted by the Evangelist.

Of Dr. Marcus Dods's Introductions to the Pauline Epistles we cannot speak very enthusiastically. They have neither Archdeacon Farrar's eloquence nor the compressed force of Professor Sanday and Dr. Salmon. Little light is thrown in them upon the contents of such remarkable Epistles as those of the Romans, Galatians, and Ephesians. In fact, they do not rise above the level of the common-

place. Nor is the Bishop of Ripon's Introduction to the Pastoral Epistles much better. Dr. Maclear's treatment of the Epistle to the Hebrews, as well as those attributed to St. Peter, St. James, and St. Jude, is careful and painstaking, as his work always is. The best part of it is his discussion of the evidence for the genuineness of the Second Epistle of St. Peter and its relation to that of St. Jude.

Dr. Milligan seems very much embarrassed by the small amount of space allotted to him; and no wonder, considering the general ignorance in the Christian Church about the true canons by which the Apocalypse should be interpreted. He refers his readers to his larger works on the subject, and with good reason; for it is absolutely impossible to treat so large a question adequately in the space to which he is confined. But there lives no higher authority on the subject, and his contribution is equal in merit to any in the volume. Altogether, though the various portions of *Book by Book* are of unequal excellence, we must repeat our opening statement that no work equally useful has appeared in 'the present distress.'

Studia Biblica et Ecclesiastica: Essays, chiefly in Biblical and Patristic Criticism. By Members of the University of Oxford. Vol. III. With Facsimiles. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1891.)

THE subjects dealt with in the third volume of *Studia Biblica* are varied. In the first place we have an essay from Dr. Neubauer's pen on 'The Introduction of the Square Characters in Biblical MSS., and an Account of the Earliest MSS. of the Old Testament.' This is followed by a short study of the argument and interpretation of Romans ix.-xi. by Mr. Gore. Next come two essays dealing with Syriac subjects, in the first of which Mr. Gwilliam examines with great care, and with the thorough command we should expect from him in such subjects, the 'Materials available for the Criticism of the Peshitto New Testament;' while in the second Mr. Woods deals in rather a slighter manner with 'The New Testament Quotations of Ephrem Syrus.' Next comes what Mr. Rackham modestly calls 'a small contribution to the work of forming an accurate text of the Canons.' In this we have a tentative text of the Canons of the Council of Ancyra, based on a group of MSS. which Mr. Rackham has selected as the best out of a very large number of authorities collated by him, the readings of which appear in an *apparatus criticus*. The guiding principles of the selection are explained in a scholarly and careful essay. To this are appended accounts of the Syriac and Armenian versions of the same Canons, for translations of which Mr. Rackham is indebted to Professor Margoliouth and Mr. Conybeare respectively. The last essay in the book is an examination of the points of interest raised by Professor Mommsen's discovery, so long ago as 1885, of a list of the Canonical Books of the Old and New Testament and of the writings of Cyprian. This list was found in the Philipps Library at Cheltenham, and is ascribed to the year 359. Dr. Sanday touches, and makes interesting, a number of points to which we shall make fuller reference. His essay

is followed by an appendix, in which Mr. C. H. Turner deals with some of the same points as are discussed in the essay.

The beautiful and accurate 'get up' of the whole volume, which we look for and always find in books published by the Clarendon Press (especially when *facsimiles* are included, as in this volume), must make them expensive, and their cost is a great drawback. Is it too much to ask that the Clarendon Press authorities should imitate the plan on which the *Texts and Studies* are published at the Cambridge Press, and issue these essays as separate *fasciculi*? We feel sure that financially the publishers would not lose, while the gain to students would be very great. In the meantime, while the price continues prohibitive for a large number of scholars, we feel it desirable to give in this review of the volume a fuller account than we might otherwise have done of the contents of the several essays; and in doing this we shall not indulge in the minute criticism which is expected of reviewers where the volume deals only with one subject or branch of a subject.

One of the interesting points in connexion with the Hebrew language is the period at which the alphabet in use changed from the earlier Phœnician characters to the so-called square characters in which our Biblical MSS. are written. Dr. Neubauer shows that the Talmudical tradition ascribes the change of characters in writing the text of Scripture to Ezra, and his conclusion is as follows:

'We have seen that the undeveloped forms of the "square" letters are to be found in the papyri of 400 B.C., and more distinctly on the stele of Saqqarah, 482 B.C. In the lately discovered Aramaic inscriptions of Teima, which are at the latest of the fourth century B.C., the square form of the η is already met with. Thus the new Aramaic writing may safely be attributed to Ezra or his immediate successors, and be considered as having been simultaneously used along with the old Ibri letters, passing out of use after the triumph of the Maccabees—except among the Samaritans—for Biblical texts. It was at that time, when the MSS. of the Pentateuch became rare, that new copies, exclusively in Aramaic characters, were introduced among the Jews.'

The second part of Dr. Neubauer's essay is disappointing, while its personal tone is unpleasant. We had hoped from the title of the essay to find in it 'an account of the earlier MSS. of the Old Testament,' but what we get is in the main a somewhat sarcastic criticism of Dr. Schiller-Szinessy's ascription of a manuscript in the University Library at Cambridge to the ninth century, while most other scholars refer it to the thirteenth.

Mr. Gore, in considering the difficulties of interpretation, especially in regard to predestination, which have gathered round the argument of St. Paul in the ninth to the eleventh chapters of the Epistle to the Romans, suggests certain general principles which must be borne in mind before we can get a right estimate of St. Paul's words. These general principles are three in number. Firstly, St. Paul is 'an argumentative writer,' and each particular stage in the argument 'looks before and after,' and 'to isolate it is to rob it of its true force.' Secondly, his method is abstract, *i.e.* 'he

makes abstraction of the particular aspect of a subject with which he is immediately dealing,' and 'does not guard himself or correlate his different points of view like a modern writer.' Lastly, 'he argues mostly *ad hominem*,' and so 'he is only understood rightly when we keep constantly before us a clear idea of the opponent's position which he is combating.' On this last point Mr. Gore especially lays stress with reference to the chapters with which he is dealing, and points out that St. Paul is in these chapters dealing with an objector who is 'representing a Jewish plea that God had committed Himself to the race of Abraham simply and unconditionally,' and that 'the whole point of St. Paul's argument is to *emphasize* the sense of responsibility by making it plain that God's election is a challenge to faith, not a substitute for it.'

Mr. Gwilliam, in his examination of the authorities, on the evidence of which the *Urtext* of the Peshitto is to be reconstructed, mentions the most important manuscripts of the version, dated and undated; he then gives some account of the Syriac version, known as the *Karkaphensian*, which he regards as a kind of *Massorah*, an 'attempt to preserve the best traditions of the orthography and pronunciation of the more important or difficult words of the Syriac vernacular Bible.' Its usefulness, however, is 'more for the philologist and grammarian than for the textual critic.' To the versions derived from the Peshitto, and to the patristic quotations of it, such as those of Ephrem and Aphraates, Mr. Gwilliam attaches little importance, because of the number and excellence of the manuscripts in which the version is contained. It will be interesting to note that, as the result of much careful examination of authorities, Mr. Gwilliam's opinion is that 'the differences between a fifth-century and an eighth-century Peshitto MS. are in number less numerous than those which distinguish an English Bible as printed at the present day from Bibles which were published at the beginning of the seventeenth century.' Mr. Gwilliam ends by discussing the statement that the present Peshitto is 'the gradually formed product of several successive revisions'—in regard to which Mr. Gwilliam says, 'If the "revisions" ever really took place, time has swept away nearly all the chips and shavings of the work'—and by pointing out the way in which the existing materials should be used for a critical edition of the Peshitto. Mr. Wood examines the quotations made by Ephrem, and is of opinion that Ephrem in the main used the Peshitto text, with which 43 out of 168 quotations examined agree exactly. In regard to the other passages quoted they show that he had access also, if not to a complete text of the New Testament, at any rate to a collection of passages quite independent of the Peshitto.

Mr. Rackham's essay is, if we have to offer any criticism, too much over-weighted with facts. The foundations have, of course, to be laid, as they are laid in this essay, but it is the superstructure raised on them which is of more general interest. The student of the methods to be followed in dealing with a mass of conflicting, or at any rate diverging, manuscript material will learn much from this essay, but students in general are, we are disposed to think, inclined

to take the *apparatus criticus* as read, though they will no doubt carp if they do not find it. It is of especial importance in regard to the Canons of the Councils that we should have an accurate text; and we hope Mr. Rackham will increase the size of the small contribution, so that, with the work which Mr. Turner of Magdalen College is known to be doing in regard to the Latin authorities, we may, before very long, have a thoroughly trustworthy text.

The list which Professor Mommsen discovered at Cheltenham gives the books of the Old and New Testament in order, then appends a note by the compiler or copyist of the list explanatory of the *stichometry* which he has given for each book, and concludes with a list of the writings of Cyprian. In regard to all these points Dr. Sanday has much to say, and it is unnecessary to add that what he says is scholarly and freshly written. The list of Old Testament books given in the Cheltenham MS. is compared with other lists, which are carefully tabulated, in regard both to the order and the number of books included. Dr. Sanday reminds us that so long as the separate books were written on separate rolls there was nothing except tradition to fix the order in which they succeeded each other, but that when bound volumes, or *codices*, were substituted for these rolls there was a tendency to a definite fixed order. 'The change, as far at least as Church books are concerned, was already accomplished at the beginning of the fourth century, and is thus thrown back some way into the third.' The Cheltenham list makes the Old Testament books twenty-four in number, corresponding to the twenty-four elders of the Apocalypse, and so differs from a great number, who, following the Jewish tradition, make the number of books twenty-two. It has one or two other peculiarities, noted by Dr. Sanday, as, for example, the placing of Numbers before Leviticus and Daniel before Ezekiel. In the New Testament the points on which stress is laid, in the examination of the list, are (p. 244) the omission of the Hebrews, the inclusion of the Apocalypse, the abridged list of Catholic Epistles, the order of these Epistles, the order of the Gospels, the order of the different parts of the collection. Of these Dr. Sanday treats at greatest length the points raised by the references to the Catholic Epistles, inasmuch as the reference to them in the list raises the question as to how many were included at that time in the Canon. In discussing the stichometries Dr. Sanday points out (p. 263) that they had for their object to find a standard of measurement for literary works. This, which had been guessed at before, was confirmed by an explicit statement as to the method and purpose of stichometry, Dr. Sanday's comment on which is well worth quoting at length (p. 264): 'The booksellers cheated their customers by suppressing the stichometries, by which at once the pay of the scribe and the price of the book were reckoned, and were asking more than the book was worth; for this reason the author of the note had taken care to set down a full stichometry in his margin.' Dr. Sanday shows that there is a general agreement with the stichometry of the Vulgate, that the MSS. of the Vulgate in which stichometries are found are none of them earlier than the Caroline period, and that the oldest

authority in which they are found is the archetype of the Cheltenham MS. The whole discussion of this question, on which much has been written recently, is most interesting.

The last point discussed is the evidence afforded by the list as to the writings of Cyprian, as to which we may note that 'all the treatises usually regarded as genuine are included in the list, with the exception of one—*De Idolorum Vanitate*—which is sufficiently attested elsewhere.' It also includes two spurious pieces. The rest of the paper is taken up with an elaborate examination of the authorities for the letters of Cyprian, and the order in which they are found. Mr. Turner, in the appendix to the Essay, goes over the same ground, and discusses in minute detail points connected with the stichometry and list of Cyprian's writings, supplementing or criticising Dr. Sanday's views.

The volume will be generally interesting to students, but will be found rather heavy reading for any others. It is a sufficient testimony to the accurate and exact methods which are followed by theologians in dealing with the many points of textual criticism which are raised at the present day.

Missale ad Usam Ecclesie Westmonasteriensis. Nunc primum typis mandatum curante JOHANNE WICKHAM LEGG. Fasc. 2. (Londini, 1893.) (Printed for the Henry Bradshaw Society.)

WE are glad to see that the 'Henry Bradshaw Liturgical Text Society' has been able to complete its tale of six volumes due to its subscribers in the course of the three years of its existence.

The second *fasciculus* of the Westminster Mass-book, edited by Dr. Wickham Legg, is somewhat more bulky than the former part, which contained only the Kalendar, the form for blessing holy-water, and the *Proprium de Tempore* throughout the year from Advent to the twenty-fifth Sunday after Pentecost, with the office for the anniversary of the dedication of a church, as well as seven facsimiles of illustrations, and a short introduction.

The volume now before us contains the *Præparatio ad Missam*, the Ordinary and Canon of the Mass, and the order for its conclusion; a Benedictional, containing a series of *benedictiones episcopales* corresponding, so far as we have examined it, with those contained in the tenth century copy of Egbert's (eighth century) Pontifical, or with the fuller tenth century Benedictional of Ethelwold of Winchester, edited by J. Gage. These benedictions for Sundays, holy days, commemoration of St. Gabriel, weddings, &c., pronounced by the prelate with staff and mitre over the congregation at Mass, after the fraction and before the *Agnus*, are here interspersed with benedictions of various persons and things, such as *pain bénit* for Sundays, apples of St. James's Day, Ashes, Palms, and, what is noticeable in a monastery, the font at Easter, a Bishop's *natale* and ordination, &c. The Maundy ceremonies and washing of the altars are not included in the great Missal itself, but Dr. Legg gives the Westminster forms for these occasions in the notes from another manuscript.

Following the Benedictional we find the orders which specially

belong to the Use of Westminster—those for the coronation of a King and Queen, for a Queen alone, and the rubric for the royal obsequies. To the last named Maskell has devoted a chapter of his *Monumenta Ritualia*. Next follow the *Sanctorale* from New Year's Eve to the feast of St. Thomas the Apostle, the Common Service of Saints who have no proper office (ranging from an Apostle to a matron), a full collection of votive, ferial, commemorative, and occasional Masses; Masses, &c., for the Dead, and, at the end, the orders for profession of monks and nuns, the blessing of a widow's habit, and the taking of the veil.

Of the ordinary monastic forms contained in this last, as in some of the earlier sections, we find what may be commonly observed in comparing one monastic Use with another—namely, evidence of a tradition of the ritual form of words common to all alike, and derived, as it would seem, from one common source extant in the earliest time before the monasteries of the West had thrown out their earliest offshoots; but, on the other hand, we see rubrical directions couched in most varied language, and employing in one monastery and another different terms for the same objects, and different phraseology even when the ceremonies described in the different communities are intended to be identical. The language of monastic (as to a great extent is true of the language of other rubrics also) is thus seen to be considerably later than the prayers and other liturgical forms. The book is rich in commemorative Masses, such as Alcuin is said to have arranged for days of the week when not appropriated to festivals. There are here no less than thirteen which may come under this description. The Mass *Benedicta sit* is suited for Sundays, *Adorate* and *Nos autem*, as is expressly stated, are devoted to Monday and Friday. One of the Masses of the Blessed Virgin Mary, *Rorate* or *Salve*, serves for Saturday. Then *Spiritus Domini* here, probably (as elsewhere, certainly), is the Wednesday Mass. No 'Mass of the Venerable Sacrament' appears to have found its way to Westminster by the latter part of the fourteenth century, but we have commemorative Masses of St. Peter and Paul (*commemoratio festi sancti loci*, as it would be styled in Sarum Use), and of St. Paul alone. Commemorations of St. Edward the Confessor, of St. Benet, and of the Relics, are also connected with the Abbey. And a commemoration of St. Thomas the Martyr, which by a constitution of Canterbury was assigned to every vacant Tuesday, had clearly become established at Westminster, at least for occasional use, some years before that constitution was promulgated; for this did not take place until twelve years after the death of Abbot Lytlington, who gave the Missal to his monastery church.

As the Westminster Kalendar has been before us since January 1892, it will sufficiently describe the *Sanctorale* if we state that this contains an office (or at the least a *memoria*) for every occasion mentioned in the Kalendar, with two or three exceptions. We do not reckon among these the *Resurreccio Domini* noted on March 27 or the *Oblacio Marie V.* on November 21, which Richard Whytford placed on the 20th, and which refers to the occasion when, according to apocryphal

gospels, Joachim and Anne took her at the age of three years to the Temple, and she went up the fifteen grices or steps unaided, and she was placed 'on the third step of the altar, and the Lord gave her grace, and she danced with her feet, and all the house of Israel loved her.' The Kalendar, which no doubt was constructed afresh with special care in the fourteenth century, has at July 26 '*Sancte Anne matris Marie virginis*,' but the *Sanctorale* contains no corresponding office. And the like is true of the Translation of St. Edmund, Archbishop of Canterbury, noted with a 'commemoratio' on June 8. The feast of St. Anne was not enjoined for England until three or four years before the death of Abbot Lytlington, although some fifty years earlier a custom had grown up in some places to add a clause in her honour to the brief *Ave* then in use. On the other hand, the name of St. Barnabas is omitted in the Kalendar. This is worth noticing, because his name has been strangely treated in two editions of the Book of Common Prayer. Although (like the Westminster Missal) all editions of our Prayer Book contained Collect, Epistle, and Gospel for 'S. Barnabe,' his name is omitted in the Kalendar of 1552, as in that of this manuscript. Marmaduke Fothergill, in the seventeenth century, states that the name of St. Barnabas was not observed of old, because he was not one of the Twelve, and in the Elizabethan Kalendar of 1559 his day, like the Conversion of St. Paul (whose 'commemoratio,' along with St. Marcial, is omitted in the Westminster Kalendar for June), was printed in black letter, and, not unnaturally, their feasts were sometimes overlooked by the clergy, as Bishop Wren found to be the case at Norwich in 1636. In our modern Kalendar the name of St. Cyprian of Carthage is not on September 14, as it remained at Westminster, but being removed to make way for the Exaltation of the Cross it is translated, not to the 16th, as was a later mediæval and modern custom, but so as to supersede the other Cyprian (magician) and Justina, martyrs. At Westminster—then as now—these last were little regarded: the minor Cyprian is not even mentioned, and Justina, though noted in the Kalendar, has no memorial in the body of the book.

Of the non-Sarum holy days a fair proportion are found in Hereford Use (Milburga, Guthlac, Ethelbert, Edburga, and Paulinus. This last is in the York books, as also Ven. Bede, and, at a different date, St. Hilda).¹ One or two prayers in the *Ordo Missae* of Westminster are common likewise to Hereford Use ('Agimus Tibi Pater' before reception, and a prayer over the chalice which here follows 'In spiritu humilitatis,' which last, however, is wanting in the Hereford Missal). The 'Collect for Purity' follows 'Veni Creator' after the washing of the hands, where Hereford has '*Ure igni*,' &c.

¹ St. Erasmus, who became a very popular saint in England, is noted on June 3. Other Westminster names not found in ordinary secular uses are: Austreberta (in Feb.), Athanasius and Neot, Wulsin Bp., Fursey, Ethelwold (April), Mellitus, Transl. Yvonis, Mildred, Wulmar, Philibert, Genesius, Antoninus M., Ethelburga, and Judoc. St. Mary of Egypt April 2. Some of these occur in Kalendars belonging to Peterborough, St. Albans, and Lincoln.

In connexion with the decision in the Lambeth Judgment in 'Read v. the Bishop of Lincoln,' it is interesting to note that at Westminster the chalice was prepared by the mixture of wine and water before the beginning of the service—in fact, while the priest was vesting, after he had put on the maniple and stole, but before he took the chasuble. This, as Dr. Wickham Legg tells us in a monograph on the subject (contributed to the 'St Paul's Ecclesiological Society,' *Transactions*, iii.), was the custom also at Mâcon and Châlons-sur-Marne, and at the monastery of St. Martin at Ainay, Lyons, while, practically speaking, much the same was practised at Rouen, Orleans, Bec, Cluny, and many other places.

Visitors to the Abbey, or to the Stuart Exhibition three or four years ago, will recollect the waxen effigies which once lay in state. One of these is depicted, with ecclesiastics, nobles, and mourners watching round the body, in an illumination in the Missal which has been reproduced as a collotype in Dr. Wickham Legg's edition. There is a representation also of the Shrine of St. Edward the Confessor. These, like the illuminations in the former volumes, are presented by Canon W. Cooke and the Rev. E. S. Dewick. Mr. Birkbeck's name vouches for the accuracy of the twelve facsimiles of the music to the Coronation Service, comprising sixteen or seventeen antiphons or other liturgical pieces *cum nota*. He promises to give an account of the music in the third *fasciculus*, which is to contain also some other Westminster Kalendars, and the occasional offices for baptism, marriage, visitation of the sick, &c., &c., from manuscripts in the British Museum and in the Rawlinson Collection at Oxford. In Fasc. ii. the most distinctive portions are enriched, illustrated, and occasionally supplemented by collations from other manuscripts connected with the Abbey.

The Coronation order for a King and Queen of England is no doubt the most important section of this volume, and we shall look forward to any account of it which Dr. Wickham Legg may be able to include in the third portion of his work. The very title itself used in the manuscript, '*Ordo Consecrationis Regis*,' is suggestive. Among the numerous sovereigns in the mediæval world no more than four had the indefeasible right to be anointed at their inauguration. These were the Kings of England, France, Sicily, and Jerusalem. A King of Scotland, for instance, had to apply to the Pope for a special order to be anointed. And even the Kings of Sicily and Jerusalem could not claim to be hallowed with the most sacred of the three holy oils, the cream or unguent reserved for confirmation of the faithful and for the making of priests and bishops. Thus Kings of France and England alone could in a special sense claim to be so 'by the Grace of God,' and we need not be surprised that it was a maxim of English law that 'kings anointed with sacred cream are capable of spiritual jurisdiction.' In his account of the vesting of King Richard II., among the ceremonies of his coronation Holinshed mentions the 'stoale,' as well as, what seems to have been sometimes at least in danger of confusion with it, the regal bracelets. Such a name as the 'stole' applied to the *armilla* is perfectly correct,

although her present Most Gracious Majesty is said to have had it placed over one shoulder only, like a deacon's. And in reading any account of the *regalia* or of the ceremonies of the coronation, even in the case, for example, of King George III., we can hardly fail to be reminded of the vesting of a prelate at the high altar when he celebrates pontifically. Alb, dalmatic, buskins and sandals, gloves, stole, and *planeta*, or chasuble, all are represented among the regalia, and, in spite of some modifications in modern times, all the ancient regalia, excepting the ampulla and spoon, having been plundered in 1642 and 1649, the pattern of such '*Bishop's gear*,' as is distinctly said, in the old official orders or '*devyces*' of the ceremonial, to have been solemnly put upon our kings (when they '*rayde hym lyke a bysshop shuld say masse*'), remains sufficiently evident. Only, of course, crown and rod and '*mound*' (the orb, or crowned *mundus*) take the place of mitre, staff, and maniple; as supremacy and jurisdiction is conferred without authority to minister in the congregation, or to exercise the office of a priest or bishop in the Church of God. One of the most curious effects of the theory of our English constitutional divines and lawyers that the sovereign has a mixed personality, '*by the grace of God*,' half sacred and half lay, is noticeable in the pages of the current edition, among others, of Crockford's *Clerical Directory*. This contains Her Most Gracious Majesty's name on p. lix. col. 2, of the Introduction as tenant of the first stall of prebendaries cursal of the Cathedral Church of St. David's, a chapter which had customs older than the '*Old Foundation*.' We do not know whether Mr. Gladstone was fully aware whose honours among others he was attacking when he introduced his Suspensory Bill for the Church in Wales. The present Archbishop of Canterbury, in a paper which he contributed to *Essays on Cathedrals* in 1872, tells us that '*although sovereigns were (Charlemagne in several churches) frequently canons of their chief chapters with or without prebends, it was probably in their sacred character. Charles V. was a canon of Bologna. The Emperors Henry VII. (1311) and Frederic III. (1452) canons of St. Peter's. Of the last it is recorded that he '*non injucunde cantavit*' his portion of the service. Our Henry II. was a canon of St. Stephen's, Westminster.*' Dr. Benson, however, proceeds to mention instances of laymen and hereditary canons, sometimes installed '*with a surplice over their armour, the amice on the left arm, and a hawk on fist, and pronounces these, and apparently the hereditary canonry of Kings of France (at St. Martin's of Tours) among them, as either a peculiarity of the particular cathedral, or else an abuse*' (pp. 255-6). When the Queen has attended matins or evensong in choir at Westminster within our memory she has taken her place in the dignitaries' stalls.

The anointing cream in modern times has been hallowed early in the morning of the coronation day by the Dean of Westminster (if, as has frequently happened in past days, he has been a bishop) attended by the prebendaries. In case they have not a bishop for their Dean who is successor not only of a series of Abbots but of the Bishop of Westminster, an order of Sancroft's time prescribes that

the Archbishop himself shall bless and consecrate the unguent. The Bradshaw Society has printed in its second volume the formula of the ingredients used in 1626 and the benediction which Laud pronounced, with the account of the coronation of King Charles I.

According to the ancient rules none but a bishop might wash the King's person after his decease, on account of 'his holy annoyment.' In the time of William and Mary the presentation of the Bible was introduced as a ceremony in accordance with what had been a popular feature in the Elizabethan pageant. On the other hand the custom of two bishops holding a towel of white silk or fine linen as a houselling cloth before the King when he received the Sacrament was retained as late as the coronation of King George IV., and afterwards appears to have been discontinued. But, taking them as a whole, it is gratifying to observe how closely the modern forms used at a coronation follow the Latin of the *Liber Regalis* of the old Use of Westminster.

Officium Ecclesiasticum Abbatum secundum Usum Eveshamensis Monasterii. Nunc primum typis mandatum curante H. AUSTIN WILSON, M.A. (Londini, 1893.) (Printed for the Henry Bradshaw Society.)

THIS little book, to which Mr. Wilson has decided to give the short title '*Liber Evesham*,' may be said to be *sui generis*. In some particulars it might be classed with a Westminster book in the Rawlinson Collection (c. 425) in Bodley's Library at Oxford, whereof Dr. Wickham Legg has made some use in the notes or collations for his edition of the Missal of that church under the symbol 'O'; but this latter manuscript has certain characteristics peculiar to a *Benedictionarium*, and some others common to an Abbatial Pontifical (if we may be allowed to use the term); but these are wanting in the Evesham book.

The heads of our more important abbeys, invested as they were with ring and crozier, and crowned with the mitre, exercised certain of the functions which for the secular churches were still vested in the Bishop alone; but naturally there yet remained certain acts which were still confined exclusively to the episcopal order; and consequently an Abbatial book cannot cover the entire ground which belongs to a Pontifical. For example, Confirmations, Ordinations, and the blessing of Holy Oils are reserved to the episcopal order; the Abbot of St. Albans could not hallow the sick man's oil which he, or the prior, was to use for the dying monks, but—to save him from the appearance of submission to diocesan authority, which Robert de Chesney, Bishop of Lincoln, had claimed—he acquired, about the year 1165, for his own abbey and for fifteen favoured churches the privilege of applying for the oils to any bishop in the Church that he pleased to ask; and a like choice was granted by the Pope for successive Abbots of St. Albans to seek consecration where they would.¹

The Evesham book, which is now in the Barlow Collection at Oxford (MS. No. 7), was written about the year 1300 for the Abbot's

¹ Dugdale, *Monast.* vi. p. 1276 no. 63.

use, and may originally, as Mr. Wilson suggests, have consisted of three separate parts, partly compiled for an early thirteenth century original, and subsequently combined in a single volume; somewhat as Bishop Hamilton of Salisbury had certain episcopal offices for various occasions drawn up for his diocese in little separate pamphlets, which for safety and convenience were in course of time bound together into a small manual for his use.

The first portion of the book before us may be described as a monastic manual of occasional offices. Like the Parish Priest's *Manuale*, it contains the ritual for making a catechumen (the remainder of the baptismal service will be found supplied in another section of the volume), solemnization of matrimony, benediction of palmers, and various sacerdotal benedictions—of bread, apples, pears, grapes, beans, various priestly vestments, church linen and ornaments. There is no collection of 'episcopal' benedictions such as were used by the Abbot at Westminster for High Mass, and it appears that such were not in use at Evesham. But there are benedictions provided for the lessons at matins ('nocturnales,' as they are properly styled). Interspersed among these are the occasional services which give the book its abbatial character. These are the order for conferring the tonsure, the profession of a novice, and the admission of lay brethren; and prefixed to the whole there are directions for the Abbot's part in the round of monastic life. Comparing the second of these with the form for making a monk's profession, as we can now read it in the Westminster book, we find that the rites are practically the same, the prayers almost identical; but the rubrics are couched in entirely different language, the ceremonial is distinct, and the terminology differs in the two. To take a simple instance out of many that present themselves, the paper on which a monk makes his profession at Evesham is called a '*libellus*,' at Westminster his '*cedula*,' and at the latter place, though not at the former, he is directed to make a cross upon it with ink, and to kiss the Abbot's hand. In this respect the Pontifical of Edmund Lacy, Bishop of Exeter (1420), agrees with the Westminster book, but it differs from the monastic books in the position of *Veni Creator*, and has again rubrics quite differently expressed. Mr. Wilson, in his excellent brief notes, points out several other varieties. In addition to the illustrations which he gives to describe the *veniae* or monastic prostrations, a curious passage from the St. Ouen's Ritual, Rouen (cited as *Ordo ix.* in Martène, *De Antiq. Eccl. Ritibus*, bk. ii. cap. 2, tom. ii. p. 167 b, ed. 1788), may be quoted.

The first pages of the Evesham book sketch the duties of the Abbot on seven principal festivals, the manner of his preparation for vespers, and his part in the service; the washing of his feet, his attendance on the daïs ('*ad digitum*') in refectory at *collatio*, and afterwards at compline, with the threefold orison and aspersion of holy water which follow. Then comes his order at matins, his Mass, his sitting in cloisters hearing confessions or reading, in chapter, various processions, sermon, and High Mass.

The second booklet contains the special ceremonies for Candlemas,
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Ash Wednesday, Palm Sunday, Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, and Easter Eve (here supplying the baptismal service which Clement Maydeston considered to be such a ridiculous anomaly in a house of celibates). The benedictions for nocturns of All Hallows are appended, being here separated from the ordinary collection of such forms, as they are also in the Sarum Breviary.

The third portion of the book contains such a manual as the Abbot of Evesham would require to have carried or provided for him when he visited the infirmary of the monks or the cemetery of the convent. It contains the orders for the visitation, confession, communion, and unction of the sick; the man's further visitation, if he lingers longer than was expected; the commendation of the passing soul, the office *in agendis mortuorum*, and the funeral. There is also a form to be said daily at the grave for thirty days; the funeral of a lay brother, and the reception of a corpse in procession. Later fourteenth century additions comprise a form for installation of an Abbot, the reception of secular persons to fraternity of St. Mary and St. Egwin, intercessions for King Edward III.; and the like have been added for King Henry IV., and other royal personages at various periods.

Martène, in his collection of monastic rites, has two curious sections setting forth the systems of telegraphy by which monks were allowed to make signals one to another in times when silence was enjoined by their order. Thus, instead of saying, 'Please pass the mustard,' or 'Hand me a Missal,' the Cistercian would pinch his nose, or (for the latter) would imitate the leaf of a book with the open hand, and make a cross to indicate the species of book required, for the cross was the sign for Mass. But it appears from the rubrics of the Evesham book that there was also what may be almost styled a code of telephonetics among the Benedictines, who understood what the Abbot meant when he jingled his spoons, or when he struck the board with his open hand. But what the 'signs of his order' were which the Abbot of Evesham made when he sat at table, and which the prior made when he was going to attend compline, Mr. Wilson does not tell us. Martène gives signs for indicating Mass, terce, nones, and vespers, but not, so far as we are aware, for compline.

Mr. Wilson has furnished the book with an index of liturgical forms which we hope to find, in its measure, as useful as that which he has previously given us from the Cambridge Press with references to the *Liturgia Romana Vetus* of Muratori. He appends to the Evesham Book a paper on altars and chapels at Evesham, and a note of vestments belonging to the abbey. It is scarcely necessary to say that the name of the Lady Godiva appears here, as it does in all lists of charities which date from the eleventh century. There is a note, contributed by Dr. Wickham Legg, upon the subject of liturgical colours, in which he has been for many years the leading authority. We hope no modern master of ceremonies will read it, even though he may have recovered from the shock of hearing that white was the principal colour in use in England 'in Catholic times.' We wonder what he

would think of the colours in the sequence for Christmas at Evesham, and that in early use at the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem !

Some years ago we asked Mr. Maskell the meaning of the word *billio*, which occurs in one of the *Manuale* rubrics printed in his *Monumenta* (i. p. 22, ed. 1882), and he was unable to give us an answer. Mr. Wilson has supplied the information which we sought, on p. 201.

The Progressiveness of Modern Christian Thought. By JAMES LINDSAY, M.A., B.D., B.Sc., F.R.S.E., F.G.S., Minister of the Parish of St. Andrew's, Kilmarnock. (Edinburgh and London : Blackwood and Sons, 1892.)

FROM one point of view this is a most remarkable book. When we think of the persecutions, excommunications, deprivations, that fell on men like Irving, Macleod, Campbell, and Story of Roseneath, for daring in the least degree to contravene the dogmas of Presbyterian orthodoxy, we cannot but marvel at the impunity enjoyed by the 'Minister of the Parish of St. Andrew's, Kilmarnock,' in flinging to the winds, not only the Westminster, but almost every other confession of faith. We are not clear whether Mr. Lindsay would leave us any definite ancient creed whatever, so entirely does the contemplation of the theology of the future in his volume swallow up the regard for the theology of the past. As far as we can gather from his volume, however, he would permit us to retain the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement, Justification by Faith, the Future Punishment of the Wicked, only transfigured in the light of modern scientific speculation. The doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body, if we understand him aright, is to be replaced by the doctrine of the future spiritualization of the body.

The book is a somewhat pretentious one, as might be gathered by the array of titles with which the author adorns himself in the title-page. And the continual bead-roll of German and other names with which his pages are plentifully garnished—Clement, Origen, Athanasius, Anselm, Abelard, Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Oehler, Schmid, Reuss, Weiss, Schulz, Kuenen, Descartes, Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Hartmann, Schleiermacher, Harless, Rothe, Wuttke, Schmid, Gass Hofmann, Martensen, Kähler, Dorner, Luthardt, &c., &c.—seem, like those in that unfortunate treatise *Supernatural Religion*, to have been transferred bodily to his pages from other authors, without his having taken even a glance at their writings himself. Sometimes, though he can quote them, he cannot spell their names, as when 'Weizäcker' occupies a place in one of his catalogues of authorities. Sometimes he makes a slip in a quotation, showing that he is not quite so familiar with languages as he would have us believe, as when he writes *sapiensia* for *sapienza*, or *בראשית* for *בראשית*. This display of cheap erudition is characteristic of authors of a certain class, and certainly does not deserve to be encouraged. Nevertheless, it is but fair to add that sometimes Mr. Lindsay seems to have read the authors he cites, as when he speaks of Mansel's 'Agnosticism,' as he calls it, as having 'had its danger divined by Maurice in England, and more ably by Dorner in Germany,' and as having

been turned to account on behalf of Agnosticism in the *First Principles* of Herbert Spencer.

The book abounds with phrases such as 'science leads to a transcendental destination : science, determined to know nothing of Christian theology, remains a torso.' Yet Mr. Lindsay does well when he quotes Du Bois-Reymond as saying that, 'paradoxical as it may seem, modern science owes its origin to Christianity.' The purpose of the author is no doubt good. He is labouring from his point of view to secure the reconciliation of science and theology. But there are abler and sounder labourers in the field, and much has been and is being done in that direction by men better qualified for the task than our author. As a sign of the times Mr. Lindsay's work is most important. But as a means of bringing about a most desirable result we cannot, we are afraid, speak very highly of it.

The Clergy Discipline Act, 1892, and Rules ; and the Church Discipline Act, 1840. With Notes by FRANCIS H. L. ERRINGTON, M.A., of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister, Legal Surrogate for the Dioceses of Durham, Exeter, and Rochester. (London : Reeves and Turner, 1892).

THE discussion which the passing of the Clergy Discipline Act of 1892 produced will be in the remembrance of most of our readers, and Mr. Errington has done good service by printing the Act at length, with notes and explanations of the fourteen sections of which it consists, together with the preceding Act of 1840, the greater part of which is repealed. The whole pamphlet is drawn up in the clearest style. Not only have we both the Acts, but, in order to facilitate reference, we have here, in a schedule printed at the end of the Act of 1892, all the enactments of that of 1840, which are still in force, reprinted at length.

Not the least useful part of the work is the table of cases, extending from 1841 to 1892, and certainly not the least interesting is the historical sketch of Church discipline as it has affected spiritual and lay persons from the end of the fifteenth century. As regards the number of such cases, the writer cites from Archdeacon Hale's *Precedents in Criminal Cases* the fact that between Christmas 1496 and Christmas 1500 no less than 1,854 persons were cited before the court of the Commissary of London for crimes of adultery and others of like nature. In the seventeenth century we find about 1,800 citations before the court of the Archdeacon of London for various offences of a less heinous character, such as breaking the Sabbath and non-observance of saints' days. In 1832 the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts over laymen was pronounced by the Commission to exist, but was only to be exercised in cases of defamation and brawling. This has since been abolished by two Acts of Parliament, in 1855 and 1860. But, though the jurisdiction in certain other cases has never been annulled, it has long been in abeyance. As regards ecclesiastical persons there remained still unrepealed until 1840 'an Act for Bishops to Punish Priests for Dishonest Life.' In that year the changes effected were rather in procedure than in

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ecclesiastical law. And the new Act of 1892 still further simplifies matters.

The principal enactment is that of the first section, which provides that when a clergyman has been convicted of certain grave misdemeanours his preferment shall be declared vacant by the bishop, and he shall be incapable of holding preferment. Of course the writer does not enter into the merits of the question whether the bishop ought to be allowed to exercise his own discretion as to the deprivation of the clergyman, his business being to give an account of the Act and explain its provisions. Neither is it desirable for us again to enter upon this question, which was sufficiently discussed at the time.

Each section is accompanied by explanatory notes and references. And it is curious that even in the provision which forms the second section of the Act there is an ambiguity in the expression that in case of the person convicted receiving a free pardon from the Crown before the institution of a successor the bishop, after receiving notice of such pardon, shall reinstate him. Mr. Errington justly observes that

'this section does not seem to provide for the case of a clergyman being pardoned before the institution of another clergyman, but the bishop not receiving notice of such pardon till after the institution. It would appear from the cases that if the clergyman comes under a general pardon he would be restored by force of it, in spite of the institution of another, but that if under a special pardon he would have no claim' (p. 13).

We need not give any further account of this Act, with which some of our readers are already familiar, and others may learn all about it from the work itself. The specimen we have given will suffice to show how carefully it has been edited and annotated.

Survivals in Christianity. Studies in the Theology of Divine Immanence. Special Lectures delivered before the Episcopal Theological School at Cambridge, Mass., in 1892. By CHARLES JAMES WOOD. (New York and London : Macmillan and Co., 1893.)

The author of these lectures has evidently spent much time and pains on the study of heathen religions and of the popular customs of many nations. The volume before us contains a great deal of interesting matter which has been thus collected. And it has the further interest of showing the use which an acute and thoughtful and earnest mind can, under the influence of particular philosophical and theological opinions, make of such materials.

At the same time, we regret that the lectures should have been delivered or published. We cannot imagine that in any who are not firmly established on a strong basis of dogmatic belief, they could have any other result than to produce that perplexed and bewildered state of mind which is only too often the harbinger of unbelief. Such a result, no doubt, would be very far from being the object of the lecturer. His aim has been rather to free the Christian religion from

as he thinks, false ideas which have been derived from other sources and associated with it, and by thus emancipating Christianity from the bondage in which it has been held by survivals from heathenism to give it new strength and vigour. Accordingly he traces out what he thinks to be due to heathen influences in commonly held ideas of 'God,' of 'the Church,' of 'the forgiveness of sins,' of 'the Resurrection,' and of 'eternal life.' If he has some fine thoughts on the doctrine of the Trinity as necessitated by a true idea of God, the general character of his theology will be shown if we say that he looks upon any view of the Atonement which regards Christ's death as a propitiation, or of the ministry which allows special powers to the Clergy, or of the Sacraments which sees in them the means of conveying objective grace, as alike heathen.

We have the greatest sympathy with the claim that a religion which is to be worthy of God, or can demand the attention of man, must be a moral power. A system which could pretend to save men from Hell without saving them from sin would stand self-condemned. If a theology is to be worth anything it must tell of the possibility of a real removal of sin, a real acquiring of holiness. And of this the theology of the Catholic Church, when rightly interpreted, does tell. The Atonement is, indeed, the perfect satisfaction for all human sins, but it avails only for those who, in their desire for righteousness, lay hold of it. The powers of the Priesthood and the grace of the Sacraments benefit those only whose wills are set in a right direction.¹ The purpose of the whole scheme of salvation is to impart the merits of Christ, not by a process merely mechanical, but by an objective system which provides known means whereby those who desire to become holy can participate, in actual life, in the righteousness of their Lord. There is nothing heathen, nothing unworthy of God, nothing which detracts from the true dignity of man in such theology as this.

And we fail to see that any objection from a moral standpoint can rightly be taken to a belief that the condition of men in the future world is the reward or the punishment for their life here, not for any arbitrary reason, but because it is the Divinely appointed result of a course of action which has formed a character for good or for evil. There is nothing immoral in allowing the help of hope or in using the restraining force of a solemn warning. It may be true that our Lord did not 'hold up' 'future rewards and punishments' as the 'reason for godly and righteous living in the present time' (p. 269); it is no less true that a Church which failed to impress that there is a reward for holiness and a punishment for sin would be working on methods other than those of Christ.

We think if Mr. Wood will acquire the knowledge of the real meaning of Catholic theology, he will find that while there have been in heathenism, by the providence of God, fragmentary anticipations of some parts of Christian truth, there is in the true teaching of what we understand by the Church of Christ no admixture of elements which are heathen in the sense of being unchristian.

¹ We are, of course, writing only of those who are of sufficient age to exercise will.

Thomas Chalmers, Preacher, Philosopher, and Statesman. By Mrs. OLIPHANT. (London: Methuen and Co., 1893.)

THIS is a well told history of an interesting life. It begins with Chalmers's boyhood, and we read of him as 'one of the idlest, strongest, merriest, and most generous-hearted boys in Anstruther school' (p. 3). There is a brief sketch of his life as a student at St. Andrews and the anticipation in some of his writings at that time of his future oratorical power. The account of his tutorship gives us a glimpse into one side of his character:

'The last straw was added to his burden when he discovered that his employers were in the habit of having supper-parties in which he was not included. The idea that he is thought "unworthy of supping in the same room with the family" fires his blood. . . . Flesh and blood could not stand this indignity, and the fiery youth took a characteristic way of vindicating himself. "Whenever he knew that there was to be a supper from which he was to be excluded, he ordered one in a neighbouring inn to which he invited one or more of his own friends"' (p. 13).

We are told a good deal about him as teacher, as parish minister, as pulpit orator, as one who studied and worked hard at methods of parochial relief. It is interesting to read of his visit to London, and the series of lectures on Church Establishment which he delivered there, of the impetuous eloquence which carried with him hearers who could hardly agree with all he said. The short story of the closing years of his life is pleasantly told.

But the chief interest of the book centres round the actions which led to the foundation of the 'Free Church.' In his lectures in London he had spoken with enthusiasm of the independence of the religious body to which he belonged, and when this principle seemed to him to be violated by the State, there was no course open but secession from the Establishment. The critical moment when he and those who followed him left the General Assembly is vividly described:

'One can feel the rustle yet hush of that crowd when, after a few minutes of breathless expectation, occupied within by necessary formalities, a rustle of movement was heard, and the well-known white head and pale, impressive heavy countenance of Chalmers became suddenly visible, with the Moderator in his robes at his side, issuing from the door: and behind him an endless line, figure after figure, appearing like an army. The crowd held its breath, then breaking into tumultuous cheers, opened a narrow line in which three men could walk abreast in the ever-lengthening line; and soon that dark and silent procession, a quarter of a mile long, wound on between these living walls, recognized, shouted over, cheered with the wild outcries of unrestrainable emotion, along the whole course of the way. More than four hundred ministers walked in that line, leaving their all in this world—their incomes, their positions, their homes—behind them for ever' (p. 232).

It is worth while to notice that though Chalmers thought it necessary to leave the Establishment as the only way, in his opinion, to resist the unjust claims of the State, yet he did not change his

former opinion that Established religious bodies are right; and at the time of the foundation of the 'Free Church' he said:

'Though we quit the Establishment, we go out on the Establishment principle; we quit a vitiated Establishment, but would rejoice in returning to a pure one' (p. 240).

There are many subjects upon which loyal Churchmen must necessarily disagree with Dr. Chalmers, and his character was not without unpleasing traits; but this history of his life is well worth the time it takes to read, both for its personal interest and the help it affords towards understanding the Presbyterian side of religious life in Scotland.

The Guided Life: or Life Lived under the Guidance of the Holy Spirit. By the Rev. GEORGE BODY, D.D., Canon Missioner of the Diocese of Durham, Chaplain to the Bishop of St. Andrews, and Warden of the Community of the Epiphany. (London: Skeffington and Son, 1893.)

THE five beautiful Meditations which are contained in this new book by Canon Body are not, in the exact form in which they have been published, wholly his work. They were delivered some years ago as Lenten Instructions at the Church of St. Mary Abbot, Kensington. A friend of the preacher embodied notes of the Instructions in this form, and they were privately circulated. They have now been revised by Canon Body, but he tells us that 'they are as they appear the composition of' his 'friend' (Preface, p. v).

It is unnecessary to dwell on the spiritual power and real helpfulness of the Meditations. The subject of them is the guidance of Christian life by the Holy Ghost as He leads through contrition to sanctity and in the way of ministry and patience. It is their object to deepen the spiritual communion between God and the soul, and so to teach the soul to look up to God as its guide and yield itself to His will. They may well be used by devout Christians as supplying thoughts which will be profitable in private meditation and prayer.

We are not quite sure that a little caution in the way of expression is not needed in the passage where it is said:

'The Holy Ghost is as truly God, and as such is the object of our praise, thanksgiving, and prayer, equally with the Father and the Son' (p. 12).

It is of course true that we ought to praise, thank, and pray to the Holy Spirit as a Divine Person. The great hymns to the Holy Ghost are among the most useful of Christian devotions. But is there not sometimes a danger lest the great principle of worship, which extends beyond the Eucharist, that it should be offered primarily to God the Father, be lost sight of? And while we have no doubt that by the word 'equally' in the sentence we have quoted it is rightly meant that the Spirit ought to receive worship no less profound than that offered to the Father and the Son, we should have welcomed an indication that the point we have mentioned was not forgotten.¹

¹ It will be remembered in this connexion that not one of the Collects in the Book of Common Prayer is addressed directly to the

It is in harmony with the general subject of the book that Canon Body should in the preface emphasize the need of recognizing the responsibility of the soul to God, and that it is not possible to get rid of this responsibility by submission to the commands of a director :

'Nothing can set each Christian free from personal responsibility for his conduct. All moral decisions must be the act of the individual; they cannot be rightly made for him by any other, be he priest or layman. A true spiritual direction is educative. It leads the directed to follow the guidance of the Living Lord by a free and personal conformity with His known Will; it guides to true liberty. But not unfrequently direction, as used to-day, guides to a servile and unintelligent obedience to a fallible director . . . in which the surrender of mind and will and conscience is demanded and yielded. From such a tyranny may all God's children be set free, to find in the ever-present ministry of the Living Lord, by His in-dwelling Spirit, that true Direction which is at once wise and free' (Preface, p. vi).

The Life of Love. A Course of Lent Lectures. By the Rev. GEORGE BODY, D.D., Canon Missioner of the Diocese of Durham, Vice-President of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel. (London and New York : Longmans, Green, and Co., 1893.)

CANON BODY has published in this volume the substance of a series of lectures which were delivered at St. Paul's Church, Knightsbridge, the matter of which he has used also in addresses given in retreat. The line of thought adopted is, as Canon Body mentions in the first lecture, derived from St. Bernardine of Siena. The Christian life is considered as 'the life of love, first of God, and then of man in and for God,' and the particular way of illustrating this fundamental truth is founded on 'the utterances of the Blessed Virgin recorded in the Gospels,' which are regarded as revealing 'to us our life as Christians as being ideally this life of love, and also varied characteristic features of that life in due spiritual order' (p. 1). The words of Blessed Mary and the salutation to St. Elizabeth, of which the words are not recorded, are taken, then, as indicating the separation, consecration, association, joy, sorrow, ministry of intercession, and ministry of service, which are marks of the life of love.

Holy Ghost. Dr. Bright in his *Ancient Collects* (p. 201) writes as follows :—'The general rule is that a Collect is addressed to God the Father. Pope Benedict XIV. quotes Cardinal Bona's statement that only a few Collects are addressed to God the Son and none to the Holy Spirit; partly because the Eucharistic worship has regard to the sacrifice offered to the Father by the Son.' In a note he adds: 'In the Mozarabic Rite some Collects are addressed to the Holy Spirit. See *Miss. Mozar.* 258, 263. On Whitsunday indeed in this Rite the "great oblation" itself is addressed to Him. This was probably in its origin a protest against Arianism, which was dominant in Spain.' See Pope Benedict XIV. *De Sacrosancto Missæ Sacrificio*, Lib. ii. cap. v. §. 6; Cardinal Bona, *Rer. Lit.* Lib. ii. cap. 5, No. 85; Durandus, *Rationale*, Lib. iii. cap. xv. 11. It is to be observed that this limitation is confined to the Collects. In the Sarum Missal several sequences are addressed to the Holy Spirit. It would seem from this that while it is lawful in some instances to ask of the Holy Ghost His *special* influence and gifts, it is not lawful to address to Him a liturgical prayer.

None who are acquainted with Canon Body's earlier writings will be surprised to find in this volume a very high example of the devotional and practical use of Holy Scripture ; and it is most necessary in the Church of England at the present time that such examples should be given. Large numbers of persons have of late years been learning to make a fuller use of the privileges of religion, and one of their needs is guidance in devotion. There is danger lest the Bible, which is the storehouse of spiritual truth, be neglected, and a quite different danger lest it be used in a fantastic and unreal fashion, which is destructive to strength of thought. When, as in Canon Body's books, theological accuracy and spiritual insight lie behind expositions of Scripture, those whom his earnest words attract and uplift are also instructed. And what many are desiring, almost more than anything else in the way of preaching, is to be taught what is the practical meaning of the Bible for themselves.

The book is not controversial ; but of necessity parts of it recall controversies, and the writer takes some pains to call attention to its theological teaching with regard to the Holy Mother of our Lord. He expresses his wish 'to be loyal to that primitive Catholicism which is the recognized theology of the English Church,' and goes on to say :—

'That theology gives a positive teaching as to the position of St. Mary in the Church, and as to our relation to her. It bids us give to her the honour and love that is her due as the Mother of our Lord, and as our Mother in Him. It recognizes her as being the second Eve. But it knows nothing of the honour that is claimed for her as the Queen of Heaven. It is this clear distinction that marks off the Holy Mother's position in the theology of the Primitive Church from that of mediæval and modern days. In it lies our safety from sinning against the truth, either by an undue appreciation or an untrue exaggeration of her position in the Christian economy. And by witnessing for it everyone who desires the reunion of Christians will best advance the cause of unity. That unity can only be by a common return to the tradition of the faith as confessed in the first ages of the Church' (preface, pp. viii-ix).

In the fifth lecture he puts aside as unrevealed the various opinions which he thus describes :—

'Some have imagined God's gift of salvation was given to her in the very moment of her conception ; others that, like Jeremiah, it was given to her before her birth ; others that it was given to her at the moment of her birth ; and others at the first moments of her life of moral responsibility' (pp. 128-9).

And in the seventh lecture he says :—

'I at least cherish the conviction that now in Paradise, at the head of the waiting Church, she fulfils in a like solicitude and sympathy her ministry of intercession for the Church Militant on earth. For the vision of St. Mary on which I love to gaze is not that of the reigning queen in heaven, the giver of grace, a conception which rests on a theory of her bodily assumption, which lacks historical support, and so is a baseless dream, but that of a mother with her children in Paradise, fulfilling a common ministry of intercession for us who still are in the perils and the trials of our pilgrimage on earth' (p. 191).

It is true that reunion ought to be the hope of all Catholics, and if reunion is ever to be attained it must be on the acceptance of the common ground which primitive teaching affords, and by considering what inferences are rightly drawn from that teaching. Yet, when Canon Body is so strongly of opinion, as what he says appears to imply, that the soul of the Blessed Virgin is still waiting in Paradise, and has not attained to the Beatific Vision, we are not sure that he attaches sufficient importance to the theology of the Church since the days of St. Augustine as the true outcome of earlier belief and the practice of the Liturgies. And it is worth while to notice that theologians as little prone to accept opinions which are local or temporary or exaggerated as Bishop Pearson¹ and Dr. Liddon² have spoken of St. Mary as now in heaven. But this and kindred questions which Canon Body's words suggest cannot be dealt with in the limits of a Short Notice, and we must be content to pass them by without further comment and to thank him for a beautiful book of power and devotion.

SOME BOOKS ABOUT THE SAINTS.

1. *Stories about the Wonderful Kingdom and some of its Soldiers and Servants.* By C. A. JONES. (Masters and Co., 1876.)
2. *Under the King's Banner: Stories of the Soldiers of Christ in all Ages.* By C. A. JONES. (Wells Gardner, Darton and Co., no date.)
3. *Saints of the Prayerbook: Outlines of the Lives of the Saints in the Calendar.* By C. A. JONES. (Swan Sonnenschein, Lowry and Co., 1886.)
4. *Stories from the Lives of Saints and Martyrs of the Church told in Simple Language.* By JETTA S. WOLFF. (Masters and Co., 1890.)
5. *Red Letter Saints: being a Series of Biographies of those Saints for which Proper Collects, Epistles, and Gospels are appointed in the Book of Common Prayer.* (S.P.C.K., no date.)
6. *Stories of the Saints for Children: the Black Letter Saints.* By MRS. MOLESWORTH. (Longmans and Co., 1892.)
7. *Saints of the Fourth Century.* (Mowbray and Co., no date.)
8. *The English Saints of the English Calendar.* Drawn by FRANK A. SMALLPEICE. (Mowbray and Co., 1893.)

DURING the latter half of the present century many books of hagiography for children have been published—forming, indeed, a new branch of literature. The leader in this movement was the

¹ Pearson, *An Exposition of the Creed*, article iii.: 'If Elizabeth cried out with so loud a voice, "Blessed art thou among women!" when Christ was but newly conceived in her womb, what expressions of honour and admiration can we think sufficient now that Christ is in heaven and that mother with Him?'

² Liddon, *The Magnificat*, p. 28: 'Mary owed and owes what she was on earth, what she is in heaven, no less entirely to the merits and the Precious Blood of her Divine Son than does the humblest Christian among us at this hour.'

learned and voluminous writer John Mason Neale, who contributed a dozen or more of little books containing stories of the Saints, besides his *History of the Church for Children*.

Those among us whose childhood belongs to the first twenty years of the period we have mentioned still maintain that Neale's little closely-printed volumes, innocent of pictures or gilding, have a charm and a fascination not to be found in the richly illustrated books of which the titles are given at the head of this notice.

But with this opinion no doubt the children of the present day will not agree; and it is, we suppose, hardly to be expected that a generation which professes to be bored with Walter Scott should not also find Neale's style stilted and his stories long-winded. We would ask whether it is merely the modern dread of being dull which has prevented any of Neale's successors in the work of hagiography for children from following his example in referring to original authorities? No doubt it is true that, as Dr. Conan Doyle says in his preface to a recent work, 'Were the writer of an old tale to acknowledge *all* his sources he would have to burden his book with a bibliography.' But Dr. Doyle's book is of the nature of a romance, whereas the stories of the Saints profess to be history, and therefore we think that some reference should be made to the sources from which these stories are drawn. Not to do so is a mistake even as regards the little readers for whom the stories are intended. The spirit which prompts most children to ask anxiously 'Is it true?' on hearing a new and thrilling tale leads the same children in after-years to find a real satisfaction in being able to prove the pedigree of their favourite stories. It also seems strange to us that none of these writers should ever allude to Neale's works, although in at least one case, which we shall notice presently, it is evident that much is owed to him.

1. It will be noticed that the first three books on our list are by the same author. Miss C. A. Jones is to be congratulated on the ingenuity which has enabled her to write three books on the same subject, two of which (Nos. 1 and 2) follow almost precisely the same lines. The first of these came out some ten years or more before any of the other books on our list, and it has always been extremely popular with children of all classes. It begins with the founding of the Wonderful Kingdom on the first Whitsunday, and ends with the story of Bishop Patteson as 'A Martyr Bishop of our own Land.' The titles of the chapters are most attractive, and each story has one or more illustrations.

2. This, as we have said, is written on the same plan as the first book, but it is longer and fuller, and contains more stories. It is very clever of Miss Jones to have been able to think of different titles for each of the stories she tells twice; and the names are certainly most suggestive—e.g. 'The Story of a Winter's Night,' 'Out on the Ice,' 'The Little Brass Coin,' 'The Story of a Little Shepherdess,' 'All about Soldiers,' &c., &c. But it would greatly help her reviewers, and also anyone who might wish to teach from these fascinating volumes, if she would provide a simple index of

the names of the Saints mentioned. In these hurrying days one would be glad to find St. Ignatius at once without having to discover him in a chapter called 'Safe in the Arms of Jesus'; and it would be an advantage to know directly that 'A Saintly Queen' is St. Margaret of Scotland, and 'About a King's Daughter' means St. Elizabeth of Hungary.

In a chapter entitled 'About some Baby Subjects of the Great King,' Miss Jones tells the story of the infant Martyr St. Cyriacus and his mother St. Julitta. Although these saints are commemorated by the Eastern Church on July 15, and by the Western on June 16, a suspicion of heresy appears to have been attached to their Acts, and the Decretal of Gelasius forbids the public reading of the Acts on that account.¹ The Saints were, however, widely venerated, and more than one church in England is dedicated in their honour. Many and various are the spellings of the child Martyr's name—viz. 'Cericus,' 'Curig,' 'Cyr,' 'Cyricus,' 'Cyriacus,' and 'Quiricus,' under which last he appears in the *Roman Martyrology*. But Miss Jones has apparently discovered a new form, as she spells it 'Cyracius,' of which we can find no other example. It is rather strange that she did not adopt Neale's spelling of the name, as she has evidently copied the story from his version of it in *Victories of the Saints*. This will be easily seen by comparing the following extracts :

'Cyriacus rode on the mule before his mother. "Do you think, mama," he said, "that we shall ever be martyrs?" "GOD only knows, my child, to what He will call us. But, my pet, if I should be taken away from you first, you are old enough to ask our LORD to make you able to suffer anything rather than worship gods of wood and stone." "I know He will if I ask of Him," said Cyriacus, "for you have told me that He loves little children." "And little children were his first martyrs, you know, and many children, even now, have suffered for Him. It was but last year that one glorified Him at Rome : her name was Agnes." "Was she older than I am?" said Cyriacus. "Yes, she was twelve years old ; and she gained a most glorious victory, and is now before the Throne of GOD, serving Him day and night in His Temple ; and He has wiped away all tears from

"Do you think, mother," said the little three years old child, "that we shall ever be martyrs?" "GOD only knows, my child, but you will ask Him to enable you to suffer anything rather than worship gods of wood and stone." "I know He will if I ask Him," answered Cyriacus, "for you have told me that He loves little children." "And little children were His first martyrs, you know, my child ; and many children even now have suffered for Him ;—I have told you about St. Agnes." "Was she older than I am, mother?" "Yes, she was twelve years old, and she died a glorious death, and is now before the Throne of GOD, and He has wiped away all tears from her eyes." "And some day He will wipe away all tears from our eyes, mother, will He not?" "Yes, my darling, He will if we are true to Him and serve Him faithfully."²

¹ See Tillemont, *Hist. Eccles.* ed. Venice, 1732, v. 349 ; also *Dict. Christian Biography*, s.v. 'Cyriacus.'

² *Under the King's Banner*, by C. A. Jones, p. 100.

her eyes." "And some day He will wipe away all tears from ours, mama, will He not?" "I trust indeed He will, Cyriacus."¹

This conversation between St. Cyriacus and his mother finds no place in the story as related by Tillemont and Alban Butler, and indeed the child was probably too young for such a discussion, although he irritated the Præfect and so brought about his martyrdom by constantly repeating the words 'I am a Christian.'

3. The third book by Miss Jones occupies narrower limits than the former two, as it deals only with the lives of the Saints who are commemorated in our Calendar. It has the advantage of a charming little preface by the late Dr. Littledale, and is excellent in every way.

4. If we may judge from the tone of Miss Wolff's preface, she is not acquainted with the fact that others have written on the Saints for children before her, but she is well aware of the great benefit she is conferring by doing so herself. We should, however, be sorry for those whose knowledge was solely gathered from Miss Wolff's little book, for her selection of saints appears to us to be rather arbitrary and incomplete, as may be seen from a glance at her Table of Contents. Under the head of 'Saints of the Calendar' Miss Wolff gives some twenty-five names, but we may remark that the list does not include either St. Clement, St. Lawrence, St. Hilary, or St. Jerome. We at first thought that St. Augustine of Hippo was also omitted, as his name does not appear; but further researches showed us that he is mentioned in the chapter entitled 'St. Ambrose of Milan.' We think St. Augustine might have been allowed a chapter to himself, and his introduction merely as an appendage to St. Ambrose reminds us of an advertisement we once read in the *Church Times* recommending an English governess, which, after enumerating her virtues and accomplishments, ended with the words 'Also a very pleasant German lady.'

5. The object of this little book is sufficiently explained by the title. No date is given, but the rather antiquated style of writing makes us wonder if it is merely a reprint of some earlier work on the subject. The illustrations are very highly coloured, not to say gaudy, and do not commend themselves to our taste, although no doubt they would attract children. We should like to know on what possible ground the Holy Innocents are omitted from a book on 'Red Letter Saints.' Surely such a book is quite incomplete without the story of these 'infant martyr flowers.'

The story of St. Andrew is very negligently given. No allusion is made either to his bringing the Greeks to our Lord or to his asking a question with Peter and James and John upon the Mount of Olives.

6. The appearance of this charming book is all that could be desired. A dainty binding, gilt edges, and illustrations copied from the old masters make it quite the gem of our collection.

¹ *Victories of the Saints*, by Rev. J. M. Neale, p. 67.

It seems almost invidious to find fault with so fascinating a volume, but we cannot help wondering why a picture of St. Christopher is chosen to adorn the outside of a book which does not contain his history. Mrs. Molesworth confines herself to writing about the Black Letter Saints of our Calendar, among whom the legendary St. Christopher has no place. She arranges the Saints in order of time, and not of the Calendar, and gives an excellent chronological table at the beginning. The most frivolous nineteenth century child could not find this book dull, for Mrs. Molesworth's style is peculiarly attractive, and she writes as if thoroughly in love with her subject. She has, however, fallen into a curious error in describing St. Satorius, the companion of St. Perpetua, as her brother. There is, indeed, a little uncertainty about the number of St. Perpetua's brothers, as it is not quite plain whether she had two besides the child Dinocrates, who died of cancer in his face. But Satorius is called by St. Perpetua her 'father in the faith,' probably because he baptized her; and it does not appear that he stood in any other relation to her. Mrs. Molesworth advises her little readers to learn Latin, that they may be able to read the Saint's 'very own original words.' She is evidently unaware of the recent discussion as to the priority of the Greek or Latin Acts of St. Perpetua. In telling the story of St. Alban Mrs. Molesworth gives the information that the priest's cloak in which he disguised himself was called in Latin 'caracalla.' It would have been more interesting if she had said it was also called 'amphibalus,' as that would have reminded us of the twelfth century legend which gives the name of Amphibalus to the priest whom St. Alban sheltered. This legend appears to have obtained much favour, and a beautiful shrine of St. Amphibalus has lately been discovered and restored in St. Alban's Cathedral.

7. In this book nine representative 'Saints of the fourth century' are chosen from among those in our Calendar, including St. Helena, who may be said to be commemorated on the Feast of the Invocation of the Cross. The compiler's name is not given, but the stories are well, though briefly, told; and the illustrations, which are very pretty and graceful, are evidently by Mr. Wyndham Hughes. The book well deserves a better binding than the limp paper wrapper in which it is enclosed. This is the sixth book among those we have noticed which gives the story of the popular St. Nicolas; but it is the only one which reminds us that his three purses are represented by the familiar three golden balls of the pawnbroker. On the other hand, the writer surely makes a curious mistake in speaking of pictures of St. Nicolas baptizing three children in a font. This well-known subject in art really represents St. Nicolas in the act of restoring to life the children who had been cut up and pickled in a tub of brine by a cruel landlord.

8. This last book on our list has also a paper cover, though a stiff one. Why are Messrs. Mowbray so fond of paper covers? Several of their books for children have lately been reissued in this form, and we think it a most unfortunate departure. To the little dwellers in our grimy cities a paper-covered book soon ceases to be

a thing of beauty ; and we doubt whether even in a cleaner atmosphere it can long resist the sticky fingers of childhood. It is true that paper-covered books are cheap, but we believe that most people would agree with us in being willing to pay more for a more durable possession.

The English Saints of the English Calendar has a Preface by Prebendary Oldham, but we do not know whether 'Frank A. Smallpeice' has drawn the pictures with pen as well as with pencil. The former are rather lacking in interest, and the latter in individuality. The word 'English' must be taken in a liberal sense, as it is made to include not only the Welsh David but also the Italian Augustine.